The Spatial Effect of Air Pollution Governance on Labor Productivity: Evidence from 262 Chinese Cities
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. Literature Review
1.1.1. Visual Analysis of the Literature
1.1.2. Overall Growth Trend Analysis
1.1.3. Analysis of Highly Cited Literature
1.1.4. Keyword/Co-Word Visual Analysis
1.1.5. Burst Detection
1.2. Air Pollution Governance and Labor Productivity
1.3. Summary
2. Theory
2.1. Air Pollution Governance Affects the Labor Productivity of Adjacent Cities through the Spatial Spillover Effect
2.2. Air Pollution Governance Strengthens Urban Innovation Capacity and Improves Labor Productivity
2.2.1. Air Pollution Governance Forces Enterprises to Strengthen Technological Innovation and Promote Labor Productivity
2.2.2. Air Pollution Governance Forces Enterprises to Improve Energy Efficiency and Promote Labor Productivity
2.3. Air Pollution Governance Ensures the Health of Urban Residents and Improves Labor Productivity
2.4. Models, Variables, and Data
2.4.1. Model Selection
2.4.2. Spatial Correlation Test
2.4.3. Variable Selection and Data Sources
Air Pollution Governance and Labor Productivity
Mediated Variable
Control Variables
3. Results
3.1. Dynamic Analysis of Enterprise Productivity
3.2. Spatial Correlation Analysis of Air Pollution Governance and Labor Productivity
3.3. Analysis of Model Results
3.3.1. Direct Effect
3.3.2. Indirect Effect
3.3.3. Total Effect
3.4. Heterogeneity Analysis
3.4.1. Regional Heterogeneity
3.4.2. Time Heterogeneity
3.4.3. Heterogeneity of Urban Development Levels
3.5. Endogeneity Test
3.6. Robustness Tests
3.6.1. Replacement of Core Explanatory Variables
3.6.2. Replacement of the Weight Matrix
3.6.3. Alternate Regression Method
3.7. Further Analysis
3.7.1. City Innovation Capacity
3.7.2. Residents’ Health
4. Discussion
4.1. Contribution
4.2. Limitations
5. Conclusions
5.1. Conclusions
5.2. Policy Recommendation
- (1)
- All provinces and cities should form a joint prevention and control mechanism for air pollution governance when implementing government measures due to the obvious spatial spillover effect. In essence, the core of regional joint prevention and governance is that local governments can balance the interests of all regions when forming joint prevention and governmental mechanisms. Therefore, it is necessary for each government to establish a regional emissions trading market and compensation mechanisms, as well as an air pollution emissions detection system to strengthen mutual supervision among regions and promote the formation of joint prevention and control management systems in all provinces and cities. It is also necessary to accelerate the improvement of air quality supervision systems, so that environmental quality can be actually included in the official performance appraisal. Environmental policies must be formulated according to the enterprises’ characteristics, and the implementation of policies must be effective and targeted. Then, environmental policies will ultimately promote an increase in cities’ labor productivity.
- (2)
- The government should implement improved regulations for the prevention and control of total fossil fuel energy consumption. On the one hand, air pollution emissions are controlled from the source. The government has further strengthened air pollution regulation measures to improve air pollution prevention and governance regulations. Further, the government will implement market-oriented policies, such as carbon taxes to enhance the level of intensity in air pollution governance. On the other hand, the government actively encourages enterprises to use clean energy and limits total fossil fuel energy consumption. Through fiscal and tax policies, enterprises are encouraged to actively introduce foreign advanced technologies, innovative talent, and the market competition mechanism is used to force efficient production technologies to gradually replace traditional and backward high-pollution technologies.
- (3)
- The government should implement workers’ security regulations to ensure workers’ welfare and a healthy working environment. On the other hand, a good working environment has gradually become an important non-monetary welfare considered by the labor force. In order to prevent the loss of labor force, enterprises should take the negative effect of air pollution into consideration when formulating management policies. For labor in poor working conditions, enterprises should appropriately increase laborers’ compensation as an alternative compensation, so as to motivate them to improve productivity. Moreover, air pollution will cause productivity losses by harming the health of workers. Therefore, enterprises can increase health insurance for labor to reduce the loss of human capital.
- (4)
- The government makes overall plans based on the levels of air pollution and economic development, and it implements different prevention and control measures. Since the promoting effect of air pollution governance on labor productivity is characterized by significant regional heterogeneity, the focus can be divided into the eastern, central, and western regions. The eastern region is a key economic region in China, and the effect of air pollution governance on labor productivity is obvious, so it can be regarded as a key region for pollution control. Moreover, the strong economic foundation in the eastern region can encourage enterprises to introduce advanced green production and emission technology which can reduce the enterprises’ pollution emission intensity. Since the central region is suffering from the transfer of polluting enterprises from the eastern region, the government can focus on such transfers and improve the relocation standards for enterprises located in the central region. In addition, the central region can establish regional core cities as the transfer stations for the introduction of green technology, and the government can also increase the subsidies for the introduction of green technology to strengthen the spillover effect. To solve the backward economic development and the low degree of urban industrial structure in the western region, the government can provide certain tax subsidies to promote the introduction of green production technology and implement east–west assistance policies to strengthen the spillover effect of green technology and advanced management experience.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variable Name | Mean | Std. Dev. | Median | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
LP | 0.263 | 0.148 | 0.241 | 0.015 | 2.096 |
lnAQG | 5.631 | 1.129 | 5.762 | 0.182 | 8.175 |
TS | 0.854 | 0.398 | 0.777 | 0.149 | 3.458 |
FTD | 0.187 | 0.327 | 0.078 | 0.001 | 2.882 |
TF | 1.323 | 1.289 | 0.927 | 0.043 | 11.830 |
BB | 0.152 | 0.153 | 0.109 | 0.006 | 1.071 |
VC | 7.519 | 0.526 | 7.564 | 4.285 | 9.102 |
ER | 27.220 | 14.830 | 25.000 | 1.000 | 108.000 |
PH | 0.059 | 0.047 | 0.049 | 0.001 | 0.436 |
lnIQ | 6.517 | 1.706 | 6.430 | 2.398 | 10.920 |
Year | Labor Productivity | Air Pollution Govern | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
I | z | p-Value * | I | z | p-Value * | |
2005 | 0.146 | 5.133 | 0.000 | 0.259 | 8.34 | 0.000 |
2006 | 0.157 | 5.577 | 0.000 | 0.269 | 8.655 | 0.000 |
2007 | 0.157 | 5.562 | 0.000 | 0.299 | 9.596 | 0.000 |
2008 | 0.154 | 5.480 | 0.000 | 0.301 | 9.653 | 0.000 |
2009 | 0.140 | 4.864 | 0.000 | 0.303 | 9.714 | 0.000 |
2010 | 0.127 | 4.413 | 0.000 | 0.243 | 7.837 | 0.000 |
2011 | 0.115 | 3.970 | 0.000 | 0.181 | 5.882 | 0.000 |
2012 | 0.117 | 3.995 | 0.000 | 0.182 | 5.893 | 0.000 |
2013 | 0.070 | 2.370 | 0.009 | 0.157 | 5.111 | 0.000 |
2014 | 0.045 | 1.574 | 0.058 | 0.142 | 4.632 | 0.000 |
2015 | 0.051 | 1.757 | 0.039 | 0.103 | 3.397 | 0.000 |
2016 | 0.058 | 1.984 | 0.024 | −0.048 | −1.385 | 0.083 |
2017 | −0.065 | −1.974 | 0.024 | 0.047 | 1.614 | 0.053 |
2018 | 0.059 | 1.981 | 0.024 | 0.036 | 1.268 | 0.102 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) |
---|---|---|---|
SDM | OLS | ||
Main | Wx | ||
lnAQG | 0.120 *** | 0.037 *** | 0.126 *** |
(0.004) | (0.010) | (0.004) | |
TS | −0.009 | 0.059 ** | −0.001 |
(0.010) | (0.025) | (0.010) | |
FTD | 0.071 *** | 0.048 | 0.066 *** |
(0.014) | (0.032) | (0.014) | |
TF | −0.011 *** | 0.021 *** | −0.011 *** |
(0.002) | (0.005) | (0.002) | |
BB | −0.099 *** | 0.182 *** | −0.082 *** |
(0.022) | (0.058) | (0.023) | |
rho | −0.128 *** | ||
(0.031) | |||
Time | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Region | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 |
Number of city | 262 | 262 | 262 |
Variable | Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect |
---|---|---|---|
lnAQG | 0.120 *** | 0.020 ** | 0.140 *** |
(0.004) | (0.008) | (0.008) | |
TS | −0.010 | 0.054 ** | 0.044 * |
(0.009) | (0.024) | (0.025) | |
FTD | 0.072 *** | 0.035 | 0.106 *** |
(0.013) | (0.028) | (0.030) | |
TF | −0.012 *** | 0.020 *** | 0.009 * |
(0.002) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
BB | −0.101 *** | 0.176 *** | 0.075 |
(0.022) | (0.053) | (0.053) |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Eastern Cities | Central Cities | Western Cities | ||||
Main | Wx | Main | Wx | Main | Wx | |
lnAQG | 0.116 *** | 0.066 *** | 0.124 *** | 0.002 | 0.108 *** | −0.022 |
(0.007) | (0.016) | (0.006) | (0.017) | (0.007) | (0.018) | |
TS | −0.044 ** | −0.062 | 0.065 *** | 0.027 | −0.035 ** | 0.116 ** |
(0.019) | (0.047) | (0.016) | (0.033) | (0.017) | (0.046) | |
FTD | 0.126 *** | 0.069 | −0.106 *** | −0.010 | −0.010 | −0.073 |
(0.020) | (0.054) | (0.026) | (0.040) | (0.039) | (0.068) | |
TF | −0.004 | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.005 | −0.015 *** | −0.007 |
(0.004) | (0.009) | (0.003) | (0.008) | (0.005) | (0.008) | |
BB | −0.074 ** | 0.123 | −0.032 | −0.199 * | −0.078 ** | 0.600 *** |
(0.033) | (0.077) | (0.051) | (0.121) | (0.039) | (0.134) | |
rho | −0.141 ** | −0.269 *** | 0.265 *** | |||
(0.057) | (0.044) | (0.058) | ||||
Time | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Region | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 1316 | 1316 | 1386 | 1386 | 966 | 966 |
Number of city | 94 | 94 | 99 | 99 | 69 | 69 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Eastern Cities | Central Cities | Western Cities | |||||||
Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect | Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect | Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect | |
lnAQG | 0.115 *** | 0.045 *** | 0.160 *** | 0.126 *** | −0.026 ** | 0.100 *** | 0.108 *** | 0.009 | 0.117 *** |
(0.007) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.006) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.007) | (0.021) | (0.023) | |
TS | −0.044 ** | −0.050 | −0.094 * | 0.064 *** | 0.008 | 0.072 ** | −0.032 * | 0.142 ** | 0.110 |
(0.019) | (0.044) | (0.048) | (0.016) | (0.029) | (0.032) | (0.016) | (0.065) | (0.071) | |
FTD | 0.127 *** | 0.044 | 0.171 *** | −0.104 *** | 0.014 | −0.090 ** | −0.009 | −0.101 | −0.110 |
(0.019) | (0.045) | (0.047) | (0.025) | (0.032) | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.090) | (0.107) | |
TF | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.007 | −0.003 | −0.003 | −0.006 | −0.016 *** | −0.014 | −0.030 ** |
(0.005) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.003) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.005) | (0.011) | (0.013) | |
BB | −0.075 ** | 0.119 * | 0.044 | −0.023 | −0.157 | −0.180 * | −0.055 | 0.774 *** | 0.718 *** |
(0.032) | (0.071) | (0.074) | (0.050) | (0.103) | (0.104) | (0.039) | (0.183) | (0.193) |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
2005–2010 | 2011–2018 | |||
Main | Wx | Main | Wx | |
lnAQG | 0.042 *** | −0.017 | 0.150 *** | 0.038 *** |
(0.004) | (0.012) | (0.005) | (0.014) | |
TS | 0.011 | 0.039 ** | 0.015 | 0.022 |
(0.007) | (0.020) | (0.018) | (0.046) | |
FTD | −0.025 *** | −0.011 | 0.077 ** | 0.091 |
(0.008) | (0.019) | (0.032) | (0.065) | |
TF | −0.007 *** | 0.033 *** | −0.008 ** | 0.005 |
(0.002) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.009) | |
BB | −0.006 | 0.255 *** | 0.003 | 0.161 * |
(0.016) | (0.039) | (0.032) | (0.090) | |
rho | −0.119 *** | −0.159 *** | ||
(0.041) | (0.041) | |||
Time | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Region | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 1572 | 1572 | 2096 | 2096 |
Number of city | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2005–2010 | 2011–2018 | |||||
Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect | Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect | |
lnAQG | 0.043 *** | −0.020 * | 0.023 ** | 0.149 *** | 0.013 | 0.163 *** |
(0.004) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.005) | (0.011) | (0.011) | |
TS | 0.010 * | 0.036 * | 0.046 ** | 0.013 | 0.018 | 0.031 |
(0.006) | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.015) | (0.040) | (0.044) | |
FTD | −0.024 *** | −0.010 | −0.034 ** | 0.078 ** | 0.060 | 0.138 ** |
(0.008) | (0.016) | (0.017) | (0.034) | (0.051) | (0.057) | |
TF | −0.007 *** | 0.031 *** | 0.024 *** | −0.008 ** | 0.006 | −0.003 |
(0.002) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.009) | |
BB | −0.013 | 0.232 *** | 0.220 *** | −0.007 | 0.142 * | 0.135 |
(0.019) | (0.034) | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.083) | (0.085) |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Developed Cities | Underdeveloped Cities | |||
Main | Wx | Main | Wx | |
lnAQG | 0.120 *** | 0.035 ** | 0.114 *** | 0.001 |
(0.006) | (0.014) | (0.005) | (0.014) | |
TS | −0.038 ** | 0.058 | 0.011 | 0.017 |
(0.017) | (0.046) | (0.011) | (0.028) | |
FTD | 0.086 *** | 0.070 ** | −0.044 | −0.057 |
(0.017) | (0.035) | (0.029) | (0.054) | |
TF | −0.008 ** | 0.023 *** | −0.012 *** | 0.004 |
(0.003) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.009) | |
BB | −0.131 *** | 0.238 *** | 0.030 | −0.084 |
(0.031) | (0.069) | (0.034) | (0.115) | |
rho | −0.141 *** | −0.150 *** | ||
(0.043) | (0.039) | |||
Time | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Region | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 1820 | 1820 | 1848 | 1848 |
Number of city | 130 | 130 | 132 | 132 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Developed Cities | Underdeveloped Cities | |||||
Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect | Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect | |
lnAQG | 0.119 *** | 0.017 | 0.137 *** | 0.115 *** | −0.014 | 0.101 *** |
(0.006) | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.005) | (0.011) | (0.012) | |
TS | −0.041 *** | 0.059 | 0.018 | 0.010 | 0.014 | 0.023 |
(0.015) | (0.041) | (0.042) | (0.010) | (0.026) | (0.027) | |
FTD | 0.086 *** | 0.047 * | 0.133 *** | −0.041 | −0.052 | −0.093 * |
(0.019) | (0.029) | (0.032) | (0.032) | (0.043) | (0.049) | |
TF | −0.008 ** | 0.021 *** | 0.013 * | −0.012 *** | 0.005 | −0.007 |
(0.003) | (0.007) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.009) | |
BB | −0.141 *** | 0.228 *** | 0.087 | 0.025 | −0.082 | −0.057 |
(0.036) | (0.056) | (0.062) | (0.040) | (0.106) | (0.110) |
(1) | (2) | |
---|---|---|
First Stage Regression Results | Second Stage Regression Results | |
Variable | lnAQG | LP |
l.lnVL | 0.110 * | |
(0.062) | ||
L.ER | 0.009 *** | |
(0.002) | ||
F value of the first stage regression | 22.950 | |
lnAQG | 0.830 *** | |
(2.886) | ||
Control variables | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 3406 | 3406 |
Cities | 262 | 262 |
Under-identification test | p = 0.000 | |
Weak identification test | F = 22.952 | |
Over-identification test | p = 0.996 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Main | Wx | Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect | |
lnAQG2 | 0.011 ** | 0.037 *** | 0.011 ** | 0.036 *** | 0.046 *** |
(0.005) | (0.012) | (0.005) | (0.011) | (0.012) | |
TS | −0.029 ** | 0.126 *** | −0.030 *** | 0.123 *** | 0.093 *** |
(0.012) | (0.031) | (0.010) | (0.031) | (0.032) | |
FTD | 0.074 *** | −0.011 | 0.076 *** | −0.020 | 0.056 * |
(0.016) | (0.036) | (0.017) | (0.031) | (0.034) | |
TF | −0.009 *** | 0.013 ** | −0.009 *** | 0.013 ** | 0.004 |
(0.003) | (0.006) | (0.003) | (0.006) | (0.006) | |
BB | −0.117 *** | 0.111 * | −0.123 *** | 0.111 * | −0.012 |
(0.025) | (0.066) | (0.030) | (0.060) | (0.063) | |
rho | −0.048 | ||||
(0.030) | |||||
Time | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Region | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 |
Number of cities | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 |
Vairable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Main | Wx | Direct Effect | Indirect Effect | Total Effect | |
lnAQG | 0.120 *** | 0.320 *** | 0.119 *** | 0.236 *** | 0.355 *** |
(0.004) | (0.072) | (0.004) | (0.048) | (0.049) | |
TS | 0.000 | 0.305 ** | −0.000 | 0.250 * | 0.250 * |
(0.010) | (0.154) | (0.009) | (0.141) | (0.142) | |
FTD | 0.063 *** | −0.300 | 0.065 *** | −0.261 | −0.197 |
(0.014) | (0.260) | (0.013) | (0.207) | (0.208) | |
TF | −0.010 *** | 0.002 | −0.010 *** | 0.006 | −0.004 |
(0.002) | (0.030) | (0.002) | (0.025) | (0.025) | |
BB | −0.090 *** | −0.046 | −0.089 *** | −0.019 | −0.108 |
(0.022) | (0.439) | (0.022) | (0.368) | (0.367) | |
rho | −0.250 | ||||
(0.184) | |||||
Time | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Region | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Observations | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 |
Number of cities | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Main | Wx | Short-Term Direct Effect | Short-Term Indirect Effect | Short-Term Total Effect | Long-Term Direct Effect | Long-Term Indirect Effect | Long-Term Total Effect | |
L.LP | 0.247 *** | |||||||
(0.015) | ||||||||
L.WLP | 0.028 | |||||||
(0.036) | ||||||||
lnAQG | 0.125 *** | 0.026 ** | 0.125 *** | 0.008 | 0.133 *** | 0.166 *** | 0.009 | 0.175 *** |
(0.004) | (0.010) | (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.005) | (0.011) | (0.011) | |
TS | −0.001 | 0.022 | −0.001 | 0.021 | 0.020 | −0.002 | 0.028 | 0.026 |
(0.011) | (0.027) | (0.010) | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.014) | (0.031) | (0.033) | |
FTD | 0.056 *** | 0.067 ** | 0.055 *** | 0.055 * | 0.110 *** | 0.073 *** | 0.073 * | 0.145 *** |
(0.015) | (0.034) | (0.014) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.019) | (0.040) | (0.042) | |
TF | −0.007 *** | 0.013 ** | −0.007 *** | 0.012 ** | 0.005 | −0.009 *** | 0.016 ** | 0.007 |
(0.003) | (0.006) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.003) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |
BB | −0.061 *** | 0.164 *** | −0.064 *** | 0.158 *** | 0.094 | −0.086 *** | 0.210 *** | 0.124 |
(0.023) | (0.059) | (0.024) | (0.056) | (0.058) | (0.032) | (0.074) | (0.076) | |
rho | 0.135 *** | |||||||
(0.032) | ||||||||
Time | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Region | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 |
Number of city | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
LP | lnIQ | LP | PH | LP | |
lnAQG | 0.140 *** | 0.177 *** | 0.132 *** | −0.044 *** | 0.130 *** |
(0.008) | (0.035) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.008) | |
lnIQ | 0.032 *** | ||||
(0.010) | |||||
PH | −0.191 * | ||||
(0.104) | |||||
TS | 0.044 * | −0.296 *** | 0.062 *** | −0.009 | 0.041 * |
(0.025) | (0.106) | (0.023) | (0.010) | (0.023) | |
FTD | 0.106 *** | 0.012 | 0.098 *** | −0.039 *** | 0.093 *** |
(0.030) | (0.126) | (0.034) | (0.012) | (0.034) | |
TF | 0.009 * | 0.061 *** | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.008 |
(0.005) | (0.021) | (0.006) | (0.002) | (0.006) | |
BB | 0.075 | −1.109 *** | 0.092 | −0.000 | 0.076 |
(0.053) | (0.222) | (0.059) | (0.020) | (0.058) | |
W·lnAQG | 0.037 *** | 0.132 *** | 0.031 *** | −0.008 ** | 0.043 *** |
(0.010) | (0.034) | (0.010) | (0.003) | (0.011) | |
W·lnIQ | 0.030 *** | ||||
(0.011) | |||||
W·PH | 0.326 *** | ||||
(0.121) | |||||
rho | −0.128 *** | −0.003 | −0.126 *** | 0.070 ** | −0.110 *** |
(0.031) | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.031) | (0.031) | |
Time | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Region | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Obs | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 | 3668 |
Number of cities | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 | 262 |
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Ren, F.; Zhu, Y.; Le, D. The Spatial Effect of Air Pollution Governance on Labor Productivity: Evidence from 262 Chinese Cities. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 13694. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192013694
Ren F, Zhu Y, Le D. The Spatial Effect of Air Pollution Governance on Labor Productivity: Evidence from 262 Chinese Cities. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2022; 19(20):13694. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192013694
Chicago/Turabian StyleRen, Fei, Yuke Zhu, and Dong Le. 2022. "The Spatial Effect of Air Pollution Governance on Labor Productivity: Evidence from 262 Chinese Cities" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 20: 13694. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192013694
APA StyleRen, F., Zhu, Y., & Le, D. (2022). The Spatial Effect of Air Pollution Governance on Labor Productivity: Evidence from 262 Chinese Cities. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 19(20), 13694. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192013694