A Study on the Impact of Institutional Pressure on Carbon Information Disclosure: The Mediating Effect of Enterprise Peer Influence
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis
2.1. Institutional Pressure and Corporate Carbon Information Disclosure
2.2. Institutional Pressure and Enterprise Peer Influence
2.3. Institutional Pressure, Enterprise Peer influence, and Corporate Carbon Information Disclosure
3. Model Construction and Data
3.1. Data Sources
3.2. Variable Descriptions
3.2.1. Response Variable
3.2.2. Explanatory Variables: Institutional Pressure
3.2.3. Mediating Variable
3.2.4. Control Variable
3.3. Model Setting
4. Analysis of Empirical Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis
4.2. Correlation Analysis
4.3. Multiple Regression Analysis
4.4. Robustness Test
5. Conclusions
6. Implications
6.1. Develop and Improve Carbon Disclosure Institution
6.2. Strengthen External Supervision through the Joint Participation of All Sectors of Society
6.3. Encourage Enterprises to Actively Undertake Environmental Protection Responsibilities
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Dimensions of Carbon Information Disclosure | Carbon Information Disclosure Indicators | Explanation |
---|---|---|
Low carbon development strategy and management | Whether to integrate carbon emission reduction into enterprise development strategy | 1 point for incorporating carbon emission reduction into enterprise development strategy; otherwise 0. |
Whether to set carbon emission reduction targets | 1 point for setting clear carbon emission reduction targets; otherwise 0. | |
Risks of carbon reduction | 1 point for disclosing the business risks and economic benefit losses caused by the government’s carbon emission regulation; otherwise 0. | |
Establish low carbon management organization or system | 1 point for setting up a special low carbon management organization or establishing a low carbon management system; otherwise 0. | |
Enhance employees’ low carbon awareness | 1 point for carrying out low carbon environmental protection publicity for enterprise employees; otherwise 0. | |
Integrate carbon emission reduction into reward, punishment, and assessment mechanism | In the rules and regulations of the enterprise, if the reward and punishment management mechanism for carbon emission reduction is clearly formulated, it can be assigned as 1 point; otherwise 0. | |
Carbon emission accounting | Annual carbon emissions of enterprises | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. |
Carbon emission classification and accounting standards | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. | |
Energy consumption of the enterprise in the current year | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. | |
Whether the enterprise has passed ISO14001 environmental management system certification | 1 point for passing, otherwise 0. | |
Carbon emission governance | Carbon emission reduction of enterprises | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. |
Whether enterprises invest in technology, capital, and labor for carbon reduction | The enterprise has carried out technology research and development and project investment for energy conservation and emission reduction, such as the new purchase, reconstruction, and expansion of environmental protection equipment or projects, and low carbon technology innovation activities. 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. | |
Cost of daily carbon emission reduction | 1 point for the disclosure of sewage charges, greening fees, and other expenses incurred in the process of carbon emission reduction management; otherwise 0. | |
Benefits from carbon emission reduction. | 1 point for qualitative description and 2 points for quantitative description; otherwise 0. | |
Government support for carbon reduction | 1 point for obtaining government financial subsidy support; otherwise 0. | |
Administrative penalties for environmental protection | 1 point for not being punished by environmental protection administration; otherwise 0. |
Variable Type | Variable Name | Variable Symbol | Definition and Description |
---|---|---|---|
Response Variable | Carbon information disclosure index | CIDI | Natural logarithm of carbon information disclosure score |
Explanatory variable | Explicit institutional pressure | EIP | Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI) |
Implicit institutional pressure | IIP | Confucian culture, that is, the logarithm of the number of Jinshi in the Ming and Qing dynasties within 100 km of the registered area of listed companies | |
Mediating variable | Peer influence level of enterprises | PIL | The average value of CIDI after the sample enterprises are eliminated |
Control variable | Enterprise size | Size | Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the period |
Financial leverage | LEV | Total liabilities at the end of the year/total assets at the end of the year | |
Total asset turnover | ATO | Operating income/average total assets | |
Growth rate of operating revenue | Growth | Current year’s operating income/previous year’s operating income-1 | |
Number of directors | Board | Natural logarithm of board members | |
Proportion of independent directors | INDEP | Number of Independent Directors/the number of directors | |
Equity balance degree | Balance | The sum of the shareholding ratio of the second to fifth largest shareholders/the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder | |
Tobin Q value | Tobin Q | (Current stock market value + number of non-tradable shares) × Net assets per share + book value of liabilities)/total assets | |
Cumulative years of listing years | List | Natural logarithm of cumulative listing years | |
Shareholding ratio of institutional investors | INST | Total shares held by institutional investors/circulating share capital | |
Nature of ownership | OWN | The value of state-owned holding enterprise is 1; otherwise 0 |
Variable | Sample Size | Minimum | Maximum | Mean | Standard Deviation |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
CIDI | 4600 | 0 | 2.944 | 1.327 | 0.964 |
EIP | 4600 | 27.800 | 80.800 | 61.073 | 12.328 |
IIP | 4600 | 0.693 | 7.403 | 5.484 | 1.597 |
PIL | 4600 | 1.333 | 11.769 | 5.133 | 2.110 |
Size | 4600 | 20.233 | 26.063 | 22.465 | 1.274 |
LEV | 4600 | 0.068 | 0.859 | 0.423 | 0.192 |
ATO | 4600 | 0.109 | 2.129 | 0.638 | 0.358 |
Growth | 4600 | −0.399 | 1.337 | 0.144 | 0.276 |
Board | 4600 | 1.609 | 2.708 | 2.135 | 0.205 |
INDEP | 4600 | 0.333 | 0.571 | 0.376 | 0.053 |
Balance | 4600 | 0.037 | 2.800 | 0.681 | 0.585 |
Tobin Q | 4600 | 0 | 7.788 | 2.076 | 1.296 |
List | 4600 | 1.099 | 3.258 | 2.361 | 0.551 |
INST | 4600 | 0.005 | 0.870 | 0.422 | 0.233 |
OWN | 4600 | 0 | 1 | 0.393 | 0.488 |
Variables | CIDI | EIP | IIP | PIL | Size | LEV | ATO | Growth | Board | INDEP | Balance | Tobin Q | List | INST | OWN |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CIDI | 1 | ||||||||||||||
EIP | 0.029 ** | 1 | |||||||||||||
IIP | 0.047 *** | 0.358 *** | 1 | ||||||||||||
PIL | 0.372 *** | −0.004 | 0.002 | 1 | |||||||||||
Size | 0.466 *** | 0.083 *** | 0.020 | 0.271 *** | 1 | ||||||||||
LEV | 0.187 *** | −0.040 *** | −0.057 *** | 0.100 *** | 0.537 *** | 1 | |||||||||
ATO | 0.104 *** | 0.060 *** | 0.041 *** | 0.100 *** | 0.074 *** | 0.118 *** | 1 | ||||||||
Growth | −0.049 *** | 0.076 *** | −0.014 | −0.002 | 0.024 * | −0.001 | 0.133 *** | 1 | |||||||
Board | 0.223 *** | −0.072 *** | 0.041 *** | 0.128 *** | 0.291 *** | 0.187 *** | −0.003 | −0.018 | 1 | ||||||
INDEP | −0.067 *** | 0.004 | −0.066 *** | −0.024 | 0.017 | 0.012 | −0.038 *** | −0.033 ** | −0.533 *** | 1 | |||||
Balance | −0.056 *** | 0.051 *** | −0.006 | −0.063 *** | −0.102 *** | −0.112 *** | −0.117 *** | 0.071 *** | 0.018 | 0.008 | 1 | ||||
Tobin Q | −0.215 *** | −0.013 | −0.012 | −0.179 *** | −0.464 *** | −0.370 *** | −0.005 | 0.003 | −0.149 *** | 0.010 | 0.007 | 1 | |||
List | 0.288 *** | −0.062 *** | −0.066 *** | 0.249 *** | 0.345 *** | 0.333 *** | 0.119 *** | −0.113 *** | 0.199 *** | −0.053 *** | −0.158 *** | −0.160 *** | 1 | ||
INST | 0.293 *** | −0.008 | 0.023 | 0.170 *** | 0.447 *** | 0.201 *** | 0.146 *** | −0.049 *** | 0.230 *** | −0.070 *** | −0.219 *** | −0.013 | 0.287 *** | 1 | |
OWN | 0.273 *** | −0.152 *** | 0.005 | 0.173 *** | 0.374 *** | 0.321 *** | 0.055 *** | −0.123 *** | 0.294 *** | −0.050 *** | −0.253 *** | −0.171 *** | 0.530 *** | 0.418 *** | 1 |
Variables | Size | OWN | Board | LEV | List | INST | INDEP | Tobin Q | EIP | IIP | PIL | Balance | ATO | Growth | Mean |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
VIF | 2.25 | 1.77 | 1.72 | 1.56 | 1.54 | 1.54 | 1.50 | 1.41 | 1.23 | 1.18 | 1.14 | 1.12 | 1.09 | 1.06 | 1.44 |
1/VIF | 0.444 | 0.566 | 0.580 | 0.641 | 0.648 | 0.649 | 0.668 | 0.710 | 0.813 | 0.850 | 0.878 | 0.892 | 0.919 | 0.943 |
Variable | Explicit Institutional Pressure | Implicit Institutional Pressure | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CIDI | PIL | CIDI | CIDI | PIL | CIDI | |
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | |
EIP | 0.003 *** | 0.016 *** | 0.001 | |||
(2.93) | (16.01) | (0.75) | ||||
IIP | 0.023 *** | 0.020 *** | 0.018 ** | |||
(3.16) | (3.13) | (2.49) | ||||
PIL | 0.107 *** | 0.102 *** | ||||
(18.27) | (16.77) | |||||
Size | 0.295 *** | −0.059 *** | 0.283 *** | 0.301 *** | 0.028 ** | 0.287 *** |
(21.59) | (−3.81) | (20.62) | (22.19) | (2.18) | (21.03) | |
LEV | −0.389 *** | −0.277 *** | −0.507 *** | −0.322 *** | 0.279 *** | −0.481 *** |
(−4.74) | (−3.36) | (−6.49) | (−3.94) | (3.94) | (−6.13) | |
ATO | 0.041 | −0.158 *** | 0.147 *** | 0.049 | −0.065 * | 0.144 *** |
(1.01) | (−3.70) | (4.12) | (1.19) | (−1.81) | (4.00) | |
Growth | −0.164 *** | 0.273 *** | −0.178 *** | −0.188 *** | 0.099 ** | −0.182 *** |
(−3.80) | (6.19) | (−4.08) | (−4.31) | (2.50) | (−4.10) | |
Board | 0.191 *** | −0.147 * | 0.197 *** | 0.200 *** | −0.280 *** | 0.202 *** |
(2.75) | (−1.84) | (2.84) | (2.85) | (−4.05) | (2.88) | |
INDEP | −0.516 ** | 0.437 | −0.623 ** | −0.559 ** | −0.043 | −0.613 ** |
(−2.01) | (1.56) | (−2.39) | (−2.18) | (−0.19) | (−2.35) | |
Balance | 0.045 ** | 0.033 | 0.049 ** | 0.038 * | −0.022 | 0.047 ** |
(2.20) | (1.61) | (2.35) | (1.87) | (−1.33) | (2.25) | |
Tobin Q | −0.028 *** | −0.145 *** | −0.007 | 0.000 | −0.003 | 0.005 |
(−2.60) | (−13.24) | (−0.64) | (0.01) | (−0.37) | (0.46) | |
List | 0.172 *** | 0.526 *** | 0.133 *** | 0.107 *** | −0.081 *** | 0.121 *** |
(6.51) | (19.57) | (5.19) | (3.81) | (−3.18) | (4.48) | |
INST | 0.258 *** | 0.018 | 0.198 *** | 0.241 *** | −0.064 | 0.193 *** |
(3.94) | (0.28) | (3.06) | (3.71) | (−1.23) | (2.99) | |
OWN | 0.128 *** | −0.229 *** | 0.097 *** | 0.151 *** | 0.068 ** | 0.102 *** |
(3.91) | (−6.36) | (3.03) | (4.65) | (2.30) | (3.22) | |
Constant | −6.571 *** | 1.218 *** | −6.123 *** | −6.644 *** | 3.150 *** | −6.267 *** |
(−17.58) | (3.10) | (−18.78) | (−17.74) | (9.28) | (−19.23) | |
Adjusted R-squared | 0.345 | 0.854 | 0.310 | 0.355 | 0.895 | 0.312 |
F-statistic | 78.74 *** | 819.70 *** | 217.68 *** | 74.55 *** | 1631.56 *** | 170.98 *** |
Variable | Explicit Institutional Pressure | Implicit Institutional Pressure | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CIDI | PIL | CIDI | CIDI | PIL | CIDI | |
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | |
EIP | 0.063 *** | 0.192 *** | 0.011 | |||
(4.78) | (2.67) | (1.05) | ||||
IIP | 0.071 *** | 0.135 ** | 0.027 *** | |||
(5.84) | (2.24) | (3.43) | ||||
PIL | 0.175 *** | 0.179 *** | ||||
(70.68) | (64.76) | |||||
Size | 0.295 *** | 1.178 *** | 0.103 *** | 0.303 *** | 1.332 *** | 0.111 *** |
(21.88) | (15.54) | (9.74) | (18.45) | (14.29) | (8.73) | |
LEV | −0.385 *** | −2.024 *** | −0.340 *** | −0.321 *** | −1.305 *** | −0.239 *** |
(−4.68) | (−5.19) | (−5.94) | (−3.44) | (−2.79) | (−3.64) | |
ATO | 0.036 | 0.767 *** | 0.077 ** | 0.032 | 0.265 | 0.088 *** |
(0.88) | (3.79) | (2.55) | (0.67) | (1.01) | (2.61) | |
Growth | −0.174 *** | −0.904 *** | −0.048 | −0.130 *** | −1.059 *** | −0.055 |
(−4.04) | (−4.05) | (−1.41) | (−2.67) | (−4.24) | (−1.44) | |
Board | 0.186 *** | 0.828 ** | 0.125 ** | 0.199 ** | 1.315 *** | 0.150 ** |
(2.68) | (2.11) | (2.20) | (2.37) | (2.75) | (2.26) | |
INDEP | −0.494 * | −1.501 | −0.303 | −0.331 | −0.890 | −0.038 |
(−1.93) | (−1.09) | (−1.59) | (−1.08) | (−0.54) | (−0.17) | |
Balance | 0.046 ** | 0.322 *** | −0.015 | 0.050 ** | 0.270 ** | −0.001 |
(2.24) | (3.00) | (−0.99) | (2.09) | (2.21) | (−0.03) | |
Tobin Q | −0.025 ** | 0.047 | −0.038 *** | −0.022 * | 0.058 | −0.010 |
(−2.34) | (1.02) | (−4.94) | (−1.71) | (0.94) | (−1.07) | |
List | 0.178 *** | 0.294 ** | 0.163 *** | 0.168 *** | 0.437 ** | 0.081 *** |
(6.73) | (1.98) | (7.90) | (5.43) | (2.39) | (3.31) | |
INST | 0.258 *** | 0.665 ** | 0.133 *** | 0.167 ** | 0.972 *** | 0.084 * |
(3.94) | (2.09) | (2.92) | (2.25) | (2.68) | (1.65) | |
OWN | 0.142 *** | 0.519 *** | 0.016 | 0.104 *** | 0.585 *** | 0.072 *** |
(4.33) | (2.97) | (0.66) | (2.81) | (2.88) | (2.73) | |
Constant | −6.934 *** | −29.934 *** | −1.565 *** | −6.891 *** | −34.332 *** | −1.659 *** |
(−18.17) | (−15.08) | (−5.70) | (−14.87) | (−15.08) | (−5.53) | |
Adjusted R-squared | 0.347 | 0.167 | 0.706 | 0.328 | 0.185 | 0.717 |
F-statistic | 79.73 *** | 57.29 *** | 705.5 *** | 66.15 *** | 14.74 *** | 469.5 *** |
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Tang, Y.; Zhu, J.; Ma, W.; Zhao, M. A Study on the Impact of Institutional Pressure on Carbon Information Disclosure: The Mediating Effect of Enterprise Peer Influence. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 4174. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19074174
Tang Y, Zhu J, Ma W, Zhao M. A Study on the Impact of Institutional Pressure on Carbon Information Disclosure: The Mediating Effect of Enterprise Peer Influence. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2022; 19(7):4174. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19074174
Chicago/Turabian StyleTang, Yongjun, Jun Zhu, Wenchao Ma, and Mengxue Zhao. 2022. "A Study on the Impact of Institutional Pressure on Carbon Information Disclosure: The Mediating Effect of Enterprise Peer Influence" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 7: 4174. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19074174
APA StyleTang, Y., Zhu, J., Ma, W., & Zhao, M. (2022). A Study on the Impact of Institutional Pressure on Carbon Information Disclosure: The Mediating Effect of Enterprise Peer Influence. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 19(7), 4174. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19074174