4.1. Case Overview
The events that began in Libya with the Day of Anger, on 17 February 2011, when massive anti-government protests were organised across the country, have resulted in an unstable country that is politically and militarily divided, beleaguered by social and cultural tensions, struggling with terrorism and affected by a mass exodus of refugees. Of these events, certain milestones should be mentioned. The Operation Odyssey Dawn (19 March 2011), carried out by US forces and the allied armed forces of the Netherlands, Norway, Qatar, Denmark, United Arab Emirates, Spain, and Italy, was the international crisis response operation. It was an air, sea and land attack campaign carried out to protect civilians, in particular in eastern Libya, against actions taken by the army of Muammar al-Gaddafi. Simultaneously (19–31 March 2011), the French Operation Harmattan began, a military operation following the international crisis response under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at ensuring compliance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973. The second military operation, strictly naval and air, was Operation Unified Protector (OUP), conducted from 27 March to 31 October 2011, under the auspices of NATO. The OUP was aimed at enforcing the provisions of UNSCR 1970 and 1973, including the establishment of a no-fly zone. The events that followed these military operations were critical for the later situation in Libya, including the current bid for power by forces rallied behind General Khalifa Haftar [
34].
The collapse of the dictatorship and the death of Muammar Gaddafi enabled many tribal and social tensions to come to the fore. The weakened state could not prevent or counter the growing extremism and increased activity of terrorist organisations, of which the so-called Islamic State was the most notorious but by no means the only one operating in this region. The power struggles between the local coalition partners often lapsed into a grey zone of international law and contributed to the deteriorating situation in Libya, which has never returned to its former condition. The state has also had to face economic collapse, resource scarcity and rifts between migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities, as well as between Arabic and non-Arabic speakers.
After 42 years of dictatorship, the political vacuum led to substantial social unrest. Over time, there has been a progressive radicalisation of social, political and, in many cases, religious beliefs. This polarisation of extreme social moods has manifested itself in many ways, from family vendettas to political feuds and to the skyrocketing aversion to strangers in a formerly hospitable society [
34]. There was also a significant change in the demographic structure: more women, fewer men and vast numbers of children. Drugs and alcohol use skyrocketed. Additionally, many Libyans have experienced internal exile. Critical infrastructure, including hospitals, airports, networks and telecommunications, was destroyed. Similarly, numerous historical monuments were annihilated. There was a massive demand for necessities, medicines and building materials. However, the climate change worsened the humanitarian situation in the country, especially in the capital city of Tripoli. This worsened poverty and caused rising food prices. At the same time, the changes also affected the Libyan economy, warping the whole structure of the state. The change in the currency caused a physical lack of banknotes and a drop in inflation, which encouraged the growing “grey economy” and already rampant corruption. It also needs to be remembered that the Guardia di Finanza seized the assets of the al-Gaddafi regime, which amounted to 1.1 billion Euros in two financial funds: the LIA (Libyan Investment Authority) and LAFICO (Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company), as well as governmental shares in Unicredit Bank, ENI energy group, Finmeccanica, Fiat Industrial and Juventus FC. Additionally, 43 tonnes of gold disappeared. The above nearly renders the problems of gas extraction and the illicit antiquities trade inconsequential.
At present, Libya, next to Syria, is still the most destabilised Arab country, with a myriad of conflicting parties, warlords, militias, terrorist organisations as well as smugglers and traffickers that constantly compete in a complex network of multidimensional power struggles. Human trafficking is crucial, especially in the context of the 2015 migration crisis, which permanently changed the regional and international security architecture [
35]. Since 2017, Libya has been the main migration route from Africa to Europe. From the South come migrants fleeing war-torn areas. Refugees from the East try to escape the ongoing local conflicts there. Those who come from the West seek asylum from poverty and illegitimate warlords. Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on Refugees, a multilateral treaty that sets out the responsibilities of states towards asylum seekers. However, Libya is a party to the regional Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), which encompasses the very nature of the 1951 Convention. However, Libya has not incorporated the convention into domestic legislation. This has prevented the development of a migrant governance system or a dedicated institution to deal with migrant concerns, which has left authorities without a compass to guide them in upholding international norms and standards when deliberating on policy and interacting with migrants and asylum seekers. According to the Libyan legal system, “illegal migrants will be placed in detention and condemned to forced labour in jail or a fine of 1000 Libyan dinars and be expelled from the Libyan territory after serving a sentence” (Article 6 of Law No. 19 of 2010 on Combating Irregular Migration), whereas “all foreigners residing in Libya had to legalize their stay in Libya within two months after entry into force of the law” (Article 11 of Law No. 19 of 2010 on Combating Irregular Migration); otherwise, they are to be considered illegal migrants and subject to penalties under Article 6.
There are three main entry points for refugees and migrants into Libya: (1) via Niger or Chad, along Libya’s southern borders; (2) via Algeria, on the northwestern or southwestern border; and (3) via the eastern route, with refugees and migrants reaching the south-eastern region of Alkufra transiting through both Chad and Sudan. Secondary routes include entering Libya via Egypt, through the coastal town of Emsaed. Corresponding to the main entry points into the country, there are two main routes which refugees and migrants in Libya use to reach the coast, via the east and west of the country, respectively. In 2017, refugees and migrants who entered Libya from Algeria or Niger used the western route to reach the coast, while individuals entering from Chad and Sudan used the eastern route to Alkufra, and from there joined the western route. That year, it was found that the northeast of Libya was no longer an important area for migration due to recurrent fighting in the area [
36].
It also needs to be specified that while some in the groups mentioned above are voluntary migrants, others are forced to migrate either by dire circumstances or simply by becoming a commodity on the market ruled by smugglers, who often operate under false pretences. These human trafficking cartels prey on those who come from inland Africa. Armed militias control the border between Niger and Libya, where a network of smugglers selling drugs, oil, artwork, telephones, counterfeit money, humans and documents operate a market worth hundreds of thousands of Libyan dinars. As elucidated in our earlier research, many migrants who enter Libya on their way to Europe call it a “purgatory”. Furthermore, some of those who arrive in Libya decide to take their chances and travel onward through the most dangerous stretch of the Mediterranean. Unlike many others, who, mainly due to lack of funds to travel further, or who get swept up in the ongoing struggle of General Khalifa Haftar, remain stuck in the country [
34].
4.2. Fieldwork
As of February 21, 2020, in Libya, there were 356,572 Libyans classified as IDPs, 447,707 as returned IDP and 47,647 refugees and asylum seekers. Furthermore, the International Organisation for Migration [
37] estimated that there were 700,000 to 1 million migrants in Libya. Given that 44% of the indigenous Libyan population is under 24, nearly the same percentage of refugees and IDPs fall into the “vulnerable migrant” category accounting for minors and other particularly unprotected groups [
38].
Children in Tripoli, Derna and other urban areas in the western and southern parts of the country are particularly vulnerable. After the attack of the Libyan National Army on the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli in April 2019, violence increased. In one city, Tripoli, more than 150,000 people, of whom 90,000 were children, were forced to flee their homes. This included 60,000 refugee and migrant children living in the urban and peri-urban areas of Tripoli and its surroundings [
39]. The largest clusters of minors were in the vicinity of the most unstable towns, where there is still the highest activity of paramilitary militias and organised criminal and smuggling groups: Musrata, Sirte and Tripoli, where migrants are left to the mercy of the militias, not to mention the recent phenomenon of open slave markets.
The majority of IDPs and migrants seek help in various detention centres, resettlement centres and refugee camps. Migrant detention centres are controlled by the Department for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), in the Ministry of Interior. Yet, in reality, the Ministry has little authority over the centres. An official of the Ministry admitted to the UN that: “In Tripoli, there are 13 illegal detention centres, managed by the armed militia. We cannot even get close to their areas because we risk our lives”. Estimating the factual number of centres and camps in Libya is not an easy task. According to an Amnesty International report [
40], there were 31 to 34 detention centres, 24 of which were run by the DCIM, but many more centres run by local militias. The Libyan government revealed that there were 23 detention centres, holding between 9000 (February 2019) and 7500 (December 2019) asylum seekers. According to the Ministry of Interior, there were between 5000 and 6000 refugees and migrants, of whom 2000 were minors (December 2019). The data provided by the Libyan government did not match those presented by the IOM [
41] or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) [
42], indicating 145,000 children, of whom 9% were exposed to serious violations of children’s rights. Data obtained from the Tobruk-based GNA were entirely different and indicated that of 23 centres, 19 operated illegally and should be closed as soon as possible, while the remainder should be managed by the military, which was the only guarantor of security. Despite a large number of scientific articles and reports, the data are so diverse that it is difficult to determine which figures are accurate, especially when the situation is changing so quickly. No available statistics include the number of births in Libyan camps. Our estimates suggest that between 2013 and 2015, 1700 children were born in the centres, and by 2019 the number of births increased to 4700.
Before our arrival in Libya in 2013, according to the data we obtained directly from all 23 camps, there were 25,000 minors housed there, and in the seven we selected for fieldwork, about 8000. Nevertheless, in many cases, these were merely rough estimates, as systematic, quantitative data are not available, which demonstrates the research difficulty.
Table 1 juxtaposes the officially estimated figures with the numbers we actually encountered during our field visits.
Among the characteristic features of all the centres we visited—Triq al Sika/Tripoli, Tajoura (which is officially closed but still functioning), Sirte, Misrata, Benghazi Ganfouda, Derna and Bab Zaytouna/Tobruk—we found incomplete data; no legal, stable regulations; unknown management and the simultaneous rule of katibas (militias); lack of confidence in the existing security measures; torture and punishment; inhumane conditions; and recruitment of migrants to militias and terrorist organisations. These facilities can be classified as open, semi-open and closed. As of February 2020, some of the facilities no longer existed because of the bombings and ongoing internal conflicts, especially in the western part of Libya [
42]. It is estimated that (as of 30 November 2019) there were about 355,672 thousand people in those hot spots, of which 37% were minors [
43]. It is estimated that 25,000 unaccompanied minors were kept in detention centres, often against their will and without any security guarantees, and that some detention facilities were hit by airstrikes (Protection Sector Libya 2019). The UNHCR alone has carried out 118 monitoring visits to detention facilities [
44].
Our empirical research was carried intermittently between June 2013 and March 2019 in Tripoli, Tajoura, Sirte, Misrata, Benghazi, Derna and Tobruk. The interviews were conducted several times: in 2013, 2015 and 2019, in the seven centres mentioned above. The research began in 2013 at the centre in Tripoli, and then, when travel was possible, in Tajoura, Misrata, Sirte, Benghazi, Derna and finally in Tobruk, which is the closest to the Egyptian border. During fieldwork, a total of 740 minors at seven centres were interviewed: 330 in 2013, 250 in 2015 and 160 in 2019. After verification, 140 interviews were rejected on the grounds of incompleteness, unverifiable data or unreliability of field notes. As a result of tests and verifications, 600 interviews were accepted for further analysis. Of the 600 individual cases of minors that were investigated, 135 were in Tripoli (80% boys and 20% girls), 140 in Tajoura (74% boys and 26% girls), 92 in Sirte (85% boys, 15% girls), 40 in Misrata (60% boys and 40% girls), 90 in Benghazi (82% boys and 18% girls), 63 in Derna (57% boys and 44% girls) and 40 in Tobruk (86% boys and 14% girls). In order to ensure diversity and empirical richness, only one child per family was admitted. With all ethical considerations in place, the children were interviewed either individually or during focus group interviews within four age categories. Minors between 10 and 14 years of age and from 14 to 18 years of age were interviewed individually. The youngest participants (0 to 5 years) and those between 5 and 10 years of age took part in focus groups. Focus interviews in the two youngest age groups took place in the presence of the temporary guardian, the centre’s employee. It is worth mentioning that the employee turnover is so high that during subsequent visits to the sites, none of the individuals present during the initial fieldwork was still working there.
Furthermore, the physical conditions in the centres deteriorated over time as the research progressed. The best situation was in 2013, when the state was relatively stable—if we can use this phrase to describe a country that had collapsed, together with the Gaddafi regime, in 2011. In 2015, the centres were under the protection of various groups or paramilitary organisations controlling a given area. Access to the sites as well as the opportunity to talk to minors often depended on arbitrary decisions and the permission to enter. This period was the most difficult, due to the lack of stability, the incessant threat of terrorist attacks and the expansion of Daesh and organised criminal groups. Paradoxically, in 2019, the deteriorating humanitarian conditions and lack of water enabled full access to the centres, as they were no longer as well guarded as in previous years. There was no need to obtain a pass or even permission from the management.
In centres located in the west of the country—Tripoli, Tajoura and Sirte—an interpreter was present during the interviews because 85% of the respondents did not come from Arabic-speaking countries due to migration flows. The western Libyan trail (Tripoli, Tajoura, Syrta, Musrata) is mainly used by migrants arriving from Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ghana, Benin and Togo, where people do not speak classic Arabic, but its regional dialects (such as hassanija, ouolof, yallof, walaf, volof and waro waro Arabic, as well as French patois and many other languages). The eastern route (Benghazi, Derna, Tobruk) is mainly used by people coming from Libya (internal migration) as well as Somalia, Chad, Sudan, Eritrea and Egypt.
Research with minors requires special methods (cf. “Interviewing Children and Young People”, Esomar World Research Codes and Guidelines 2009). Nonetheless, the security situation in Libya and the constant uncertainty resulted in the inability to record and take pictures that would capture the physical environment. Even detailed notes had to be taken discreetly and usually after the interview had been concluded. Even in normal circumstances, minors are a unique and challenging research group. Additionally, most of the respondents in our study went through a traumatic journey through the desert or areas torn by conflict, lost their family, were detained or abused. All of these factors had to be taken into account on an ongoing basis, and each interview was adjusted to the individual needs and the particular situation of the respondent.
In every case, the interviewee gave explicit consent and was asked a set of standardised questions based on a semi-structured script which offered the respondents flexibility that allowed for digressions, yet kept them within the parameters of the study’s interests. A qualitative methodology was adopted to enable individuals to recount experiences in their own words, highlighting what was important to them. We focused initially on descriptions provided by participants, but, as the study progressed, we took a more interpretive approach to evidence, employing the hermeneutics of trust [
45] (p. 61). Such a respondent-driven approach had already been employed and proved successful in our previous research [
46]. The narratives were subsequently aggregated into a “thick description” [
47] and typified along the main theoretical axes that shed light on the reasons for the children’s arrival in detention centres and refugee camps, the living conditions there and the potential threats to human security affecting their development, including various criminal phenomena. As the research progressed, we identified specific variables to ensure diversity in the sample. Data collection continued until the sample was diverse in terms of children’s age, gender, route experiences and displacement period, and it was estimated that data saturation had been reached.
4.3. Findings
With respect to age breakdown, as
Figure 1 shows, the respondents can be divided into the following four age groups:
While male adolescents constituted the majority of camp residents, most of them were also not accompanied by close family members. As shown in
Table 2, most often, they migrated with distant relatives, though some were all alone.
The geographic analysis enhanced by the duration of displacement showed (
Table 3), minor differences among the camps notwithstanding, a general trend of shortening of the period spent in the camp, which was particularly visible in 2019, in a stark contrast with our initial field visit, in 2013.
Regarding the travel time to Libya and the stay in Libya as a transit country, it is worth pointing out that, on average, the children were on the road for a minimum of 5 months and stayed from 3 to 6 months, on average, in individual centres. Only five cases remained in Libya all the time, moving from camp to camp. Within the 2019 group, of the respondents from the centres in Benghazi, Derna and Tobruk, 82% had stayed in centres since 2015, on average, and 18% since 2011. This pattern was not present in the centres located in the west of the country. However, migration between the camps is a separate phenomenon, as we met the same people in different camps between 2015 and 2019. These places had also evolved, some having simply become neighbourhoods (in Tobruk and Derna) and others divided, such as the Benghazi camp, which by 2019 had converted into three smaller centres, each under a different organisation.
With regard to the reasons for migration or displacement, our respondents can be divided along the following axes: 40% of the respondents escaped from war and conflicts; 30% moved due to economic factors, like a loss of livelihood or expulsion; 25% were forced to migrate for personal reasons, like the need to repay debts or family vendettas. The promise of a better life (either in Europe or in Libya) was often a decisive factor in such cases. Needless to say, such promises had nothing to do with reality.
When asked about their future plans, the children offered different answers, depending mainly on the year of the study. In 2013, out of 330 minors, 70% of respondents wanted to stay in Libya with their relatives or family, although some wanted to continue to Europe as soon as possible, 30% wanted to go to Turkey and 10% anywhere else. Naturally, the personal dreams of the children were subject to family decisions and financial possibilities. What is most important is that nobody considered returning to their place of origin. In contrast, in 2015, out of the 250 interviewed, 76% wanted to get to Europe, 10% to Egypt and 14% specifically to Turkey. Finally, in 2019, out of 160 respondents, 72% wanted to travel to Turkey or the Balkans, 14% to Europe and 14% anywhere they could afford. In 2019, 11% of all respondents considered returning to their country of residence, provided that they received financial support and free transport. Financial considerations proved to be the critical variable. The cheapest option was both the most popular and most easily attainable: “the cheapest: it is to get to Turkey, then to Italy and Greece”. In this respect, the change of Libya from a destination to a transit country is apparent.
As far as the mental condition of the children is concerned, it can be pointed out that 80% of them survived some trauma during migration, were often detained against their will or forced to work or break the law, most often by theft and extortion. Some children either did not want to talk about such issues or did not have such experience, although it is difficult to determine reliably. Girls were particularly vulnerable to forced marriages or sexual exploitation. The minors who travelled alone emphasised that they had to hide to avoid becoming victims of human trafficking and organised criminal groups. Those children often joined other family groups, pretending, by mutual agreement, to be a member. However, we could not verify how many respondents from the two oldest age groups told the truth when claiming they were travelling with relatives or family. Most did not have any documents and frequently were not able to accurately determine the beginning of their journey. In the two oldest age groups, illiteracy and the inability to indicate the place of origin on a map were very common. This information was deduced on the basis of language and other cultural and ethnic determinants.
The division along ethnic and national lines was an essential aspect because it was associated with the availability of medical care, food and sanitary facilities. The cultural belonging of the child determined the quality of housing, food and basic amenities, and thus had a very practical and physical dimension. The refugee children from African countries had the fewest chances and least access to these amenities; the Arab population was in a much better position, with meals, water, separate places for women and men and space for prayer. The separation into “better” and “worse” categories was palpable in each centre. Statistically, Arabs constituted 15% of the sample.
Our fieldwork shows that the worst situation was in 2015 and the best was in 2019, which is encouraging. Nevertheless, all the centres we visited were severely overpopulated and had deplorable living conditions, rife with sexual and gender-based violence and deprived of refugee and human rights standards. This makes the camps dangerous places for everyone, let alone minors, who are even more exposed to human security threats. A normal physical and mental development in such an environment is impossible, since, for these children, even everyday activities pose a danger to health and life. Furthermore, moving around the camps at night is extremely dangerous, due to harassment, rape, aggression, theft and widespread fights. In these conditions, sleeping also proves to be a challenge, and full rest is a rarity due to sharing rooms with strangers of different sexes and ages who have different intents and needs. Inadequate medical help is a separate issue, as there is one doctor or nurse, on average, per 300 people. Migrants held in the Tripoli, Tajoura, Sirte, Misrata, Benghazi, Derna and Tobruk centres are systematically subjected to starvation and severe beatings, burned with hot metal objects, electrocuted and subjected to other forms of ill-treatment to extort money from their families through a complex system of money transfers. They are frequently sold from one criminal group to another and required to pay multiple ransoms. In addition to the abuses and violence, many of them suffer from malnutrition, skin infections, acute diarrhoea, respiratory tract infections and other ailments, as well as inadequate medical treatment. Minors are held with adults in the same squalid conditions, boys and girls together, despite being from various countries of origin and different religions and cultures. All the visited centres can be classified as open, as people staying in them could move about freely and to other centres. Simultaneously, there were significant differences among centres with regard to the following criteria: control, protection and security, housing conditions, food, medical care and health requirements, access to education and level of violence.
The centre in Triq al Sika/Tripoli was under the militia protectorate and broader protection of the Libyan Task Force from the Government of National Accord. In 2015 it was closed three times, and in 2019 it could not operate according to official guidelines, which were ignored despite the ongoing fighting in the area and the frequent bombings. The number of people staying at the centre, including minors, was significantly higher than the official reports and documentation suggested. There were no safety standards in Triq al Sika. When it comes to housing conditions, children were assigned either to a brick building, a tent or a container, depending on their origin (Arab or African), position and financial capabilities, and had to stay where they were allocated. The accommodation was overcrowded, dirty and without access to essential utilities such as electricity, water or air conditioning. Food also depended on the place of origin and money. The oldest children indicated that they could work for access to food, thus increasing their chances of survival. Medical care in the camp was provided only in 2019, by a doctor or a nurse who visited on a weekly basis. In previous years, contrary to official claims, it was not available. Additionally, there were several impediments to care, such as no uniform health and safety requirements and procedures. This included an insufficient number of unhygienic and poorly-ventilated toilets, as two or three toilets were shared among 400–500 migrants and, in some cases, migrants had to use a bucket. Bathrooms were located outside and guarded. People were allowed in only during fixed times, once or twice per day; access to showers was also scarce or had to be bought, a deprivation which was further exacerbated by the lack of sanitary products, including soap or menstrual hygiene products. Minors, both boys and girls, were also not subject to education and basic protection, and were exposed instead to beatings, arrests, physical punishments, harassment, rape, theft, racism and extortion of money.
The Tajoura facility, which according to UNHCR reports was closed in 2013, was under the protection of militias and non-state organisations. In 2015, the centre was managed by uniformed armed militia, some of whom swore allegiance to the so-called Islamic State (Daesh), and in 2019 the centre came under the control of grassroots organisations that were not evidenced in the Libyan legal system. Although the Tajoura centre does not officially exist, our fieldwork confirms that it still works, to the detriment of its inhabitants. There are no legal or safety regulations in place. Overcrowding, which was proven to have a negative effect on children’s development [
48], was just as bad at Tajoura as in the Tripoli camp, and there was no medical care or education. Living and sanitary conditions were also similar. However, because it is a relatively small centre, it was also much safer according to our respondents, many of whom came to Tajoura from Tripoli. Nonetheless, the children were exposed to racism, beatings, arrests, physical punishment, harassment, rape, theft and extortion of money, which was confirmed by 119 of 140 respondents.
The governor of the centre in Sirte changed during the study period. In 2013, it was under the control of state actors and local NGOs or militias. In 2015, together with the whole city, it was taken over by the local jihadi fighters from Ansar Al-Sharia and Daesh, while in 2019 it was already under the protectorate of the Libyan National Army (LNA), commanded by General Khalifa Haftar. In Sirte, out of 92 interviewed minors, the overwhelming majority pointed to the problems described above, but their condition was still visibly worsening by the lack of future prospects. The children talked about their desire to escape, and in many instances post-traumatic stress disorder was perceptible, although the possible causes were only alluded to in the conversations, including the experience of violence or sexual abuse by guards.
The Misrata detention centre was under the control of the Libyan Task Force from the Government of National Accord in 2013. In 2015 it was controlled by organisations affiliated with Daesh, and in 2019 operated under the control of non-governmental organisations and local militias, thanks to support from the UNHCR. Out of 40 respondents, 25 worked for food, and all pointed to problems with safety, access to water, hygiene, sanitary utilities and lack of security. The ethnic and religious divisions were also significant.
In 2013, the facility in Benghazi Ganfouda was managed by non-governmental organisations, but by 2015, when the struggles between LNA and the Benghazi Shura Revolutionaries were beginning, the centre could be considered a no man’s land, where the dominant position was held by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’s Libyan provinces. In 2019, the centre was under the protection of the LNA and local NGOs, including scout organisations active in the city. Housing conditions ranged from stone buildings to containers, depending on the payment made. The authorities segregated people according to their country of origin and status. For this reason, in 2019, part of the centre resembled a new district of Benghazi (which was not there in 2013). Its inhabitants (mainly of Arab origin) used privately purchased power generators, and some of them had access to water and even set up small workshops or services, usually hairdressers, bakeries or small shops. Simultaneously, the second part of the centre still consisted of container buildings with no access to sanitary facilities and no basic hygiene. Minors staying there were not provided with health care or education. In 2019, during our last visit, small grassroots organisations appeared, and during the Muslim festivals they provided food and organised activities for children, including both leisure and learning (elementary reading and writing).
The Derna camp was under the control of local militias and the numerous terrorist organisations already emerging in 2013. Two years later, it was managed by the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna, and in 2019 was under the protection of the Libyan National Army. In 2013, this facility consisted of tents and containers, which were put up by the migrants, and there was no light or water in them. In the following years, buildings appeared, and the camp melded with the city’s suburbs. Nevertheless, the camp was inhabited mainly by people who came from Africa, and the interviewees repeatedly indicated that it was a dangerous a place to live in. In 2015 it was a recruitment hub, where minors were bundled by various militant organisations. Between 2013 and 2015, all the threats described above were present at the centre, including illegal arrests and kidnappings, racially aggravated assaults, harassment of a cultural and religious nature, rape of both boys and girls, and many others. In 2019, minimal services, a school for children and an informal local militia appeared in the camp.
In 2013, the site in Bab Zaytouna/Tobruk was under the control of non-state actors and local militia. In 2015 it was governed by local military factions, and in 2019 it finally fell under the protection of the Libyan National Army. Despite the lack of water, flooding and lack of hygiene, medical care and education, it was the safest of the sites we visited, especially for minors, as local militias were patrolling and guarding the residents. Furthermore, the local authorities responded to riots, fights and tensions between migrants. This centre had the lowest number of minors and the highest proportion of inhabitants of Arab origin (87%). Many indicated that the centre was a stopgap en route to Turkey or claimed that they ended up in Tobruk after a failed attempt to cross the Mediterranean. The latter group associated migration failures with personality disorders, stress and health problems, which were further enhanced by the lack of funds for the next trip and the lack of long-term prospects for development.
The children were also very candid about the fact that there was unlimited access, in the camps, to alcohol of unknown origin and all kinds of drugs or intoxicants, while the illegal trade in absolutely everything, including humanitarian aid (blankets, bandages, medicines, etc.), was booming. Similarly, one could buy sleeping places in the camps, and access to lights, toilets and minors for sexual exploitation or for use in warfare. Even if educational programmes were theoretically offered in the camps we visited during our fieldwork, in most observed cases they were entirely fictitious, and nobody attended them in practice. Furthermore, there is an omnipresent fear and anxiety, fuelled by the quite high birth rate in the camps, often resulting from sexual abuse and lack of medical supplies. Many inhabitants of the camps attempt suicide or inflict self-harm in acts of desperation. Under such conditions, sustainable development understood as human security is not attainable for the children. In the contrary, the numerous potential threats include, among others: human trafficking; organ trade; forced prostitution; using children for smuggling; and fundamentalist radicalisation, which for many children appears to be an escape from the problems encountered in the camps and a chance for a better life, but merely leads to the military recruitment of minors, used in the ongoing fighting as cannon fodder.
These issues, undoubtedly pertinent on the individual level of analysis, are worsened by the underlying structural factors inhibiting the provision of a safe and secure environment. All the interviewed children were either directly familiar with, or had indirect knowledge of, at least one of the following problems: activities of criminal groups, militias and terrorist organisations; unstable and porous state borders (especially in the south of Libya); ubiquitous access to, and use of, weapons; corruption; document forgery, including passports and citizenship; the control of the Libyan ports by various armed militias and paramilitary organisations; similar control over random inland checkpoints, which are more than a hindrance for travellers, as they are often coterminous with an obligation to “pay for the journey”; contract killings; kidnappings for ransom; home robbery; rape; Islamic radicalisation; migration black markets including organ trafficking; and trafficking of women and children.
In the context of our analytical framework, it can be concluded that children are the first and most severely affected victims of the ongoing civil war, unstable political situation, local conflicts and tribal tensions. In other words, they are victims of the changes occurring in the country, and they bear the consequences of the decisions taken by their guardians. Migrant children need special protection because they are at high risk of becoming victims of violence, child trafficking or abuse or of disappearing or being separated from their families. But on the micro-level, the immediate physical environment is equally important, if not determinant in some respects. A refugee camp is a unique place, where the customary norms and elements of a normal physical environment are either not present or warped to absurdity. Furthermore, whereas the majority of scholarly research has focused on merely one aspect or impact of a given factor, it would be next to impossible to indicate one characteristic feature that affects a refugee child more than others—especially since many are inter-related. The most intimate and necessary physical element, that is, home, is often non-existent, as most of the children live in communal, dirty and overcrowded accommodation. Very often these are not even made of brick or other durable material, but are reinforced tents exposed to the elements. There is lack of both natural light and electricity and no running water or basic amenities such as toilets or showers—which are considered luxuries. These factors are coupled with a lack of even minimal privacy (or even a sleeping place), which is not only a prerequisite for mental health but often creates threats of sexual harassment for both boys and girls. The lack of basic physical safety permeates everything, and violence is everywhere. The domestic, personal and structural violence (e.g., by camp guards or vigilantes) has been rationalised or even normalised. Yet very often after traumatic experiences, children commit self-harm, mutilations or suicide attempts. These negative influences cannot be alleviated at a medical centre (defunct in most of the visited camps) or school—which, if it exists at all, is normally understaffed and lacks equipment that would allow for education (e.g., tables and chairs, but also books, notepads and writing utensils, not to mention educational materials or technical enhancements like computers or audiovisual instruments).