Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from the Role of the Largest Institutional Blockholders in the Korean Market
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Institutional Monitoring and CSR in the Korean Market
3. Sample Data
4. Empirical Analysis
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Minimum | 25th Pct. | Median | 75th Pct. | Maximum |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
KNPS_BIO | 7.8924 | 2.3728 | 5.0000 | 5.9976 | 7.3100 | 9.2535 | 14.6600 |
K_CSR | 64.1731 | 3.1617 | 52.7315 | 62.2419 | 64.3550 | 66.1978 | 75.1924 |
SIZE | 21.1130 | 1.5586 | 17.9755 | 20.0718 | 20.8363 | 22.0333 | 26.0521 |
LEV | 0.4581 | 0.1941 | 0.0621 | 0.2839 | 0.4561 | 0.5977 | 0.9328 |
ROA | 0.0603 | 0.0746 | −0.2862 | 0.0257 | 0.0532 | 0.0851 | 1.5265 |
Q | 1.2898 | 0.7684 | 0.3970 | 0.8888 | 1.0664 | 1.4427 | 7.5200 |
RNDS | 0.0116 | 0.0233 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0021 | 0.0101 | 0.1347 |
BM | 1.0573 | 0.7839 | 0.0799 | 0.5580 | 0.8831 | 1.3241 | 9.3265 |
CASHF | 0.0926 | 0.0800 | −0.1140 | 0.0556 | 0.0843 | 0.1184 | 1.5744 |
SD | 0.3635 | 0.1594 | 0.0152 | 0.2863 | 0.3668 | 0.4573 | 0.8879 |
HHI | 0.0751 | 0.0699 | 0.0461 | 0.0489 | 0.0494 | 0.0748 | 0.9177 |
KNPS_BIO | K_CSR | SIZE | LEV | ROA | Q | RNDS | BM | CASHF | SD | HHI | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
KNPS_BIO | 1 | ||||||||||
K_CSR | −0.0005 [0.9901] | 1 | |||||||||
SIZE | −0.0191 [0.6399] | 0.1608 *** [<0.0001] | 1 | ||||||||
LEV | 0.0460 [0.2606] | −0.1341 *** [0.0010] | 0.3991 *** [<0.0001] | 1 | |||||||
ROA | −0.0200 [0.6238] | 0.0737 * [0.0709] | −0.0968 ** [0.0177] | −0.2681 *** [<0.0001] | 1 | ||||||
Q | 0.0176 [0.6664] | 0.1665 *** [<0.0001] | −0.0126 [0.7567] | −0.1015 ** [0.0129] | 0.2531 *** [<0.0001] | 1 | |||||
RNDS | 0.0446 [0.2750] | 0.2109 *** [<0.0001] | −0.0132 [0.7466] | −0.1599 *** [<0.0001] | 0.1090 *** [0.0075] | 0.3042 *** [<0.0001] | 1 | ||||
BM | −0.1576 *** [0.0001] | −0.1961 *** [<0.0001] | −0.0569 [0.1638] | 0.0572 [0.1615] | −0.2141 *** [<0.0001] | −0.5467 *** [<0.0001] | −0.1833 *** [<0.0001] | 1 | |||
CASHF | −0.0342 [0.4025] | 0.1119 *** [0.0061] | −0.0183 [0.6532] | −0.2793 *** [<0.0001] | 0.9369 *** [<0.0001] | 0.2379 *** [<0.0001] | 0.1638 *** [<0.0001] | −0.2395 *** [<0.0001] | 1 | ||
SD | −0.2727 *** [<0.0001] | −0.0207 [0.6127] | −0.0999 ** [0.0143] | 0.0896 ** [0.0281] | 0.0707 * [0.0832] | 0.0556 [0.1733] | −0.0079 [0.8453] | −0.0300 [0.4625] | 0.0817 ** [0.0453] | 1 | |
HHI | −0.0029 [0.9419] | 0.0013 [0.9744] | 0.0192 [0.6380] | 0.0111 [0.7857] | 0.0165 [0.6863] | 0.0816 ** [0.0457] | −0.0391 [0.3379] | −0.0176 [0.6662] | 0.0160 [0.6957] | −0.0023 [0.9534] | 1 |
Mean | Q1 | Q2 | Q3 | Q4 | Q4–Q1 (t-stat) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Quantiles Are Formed Based on Average Lagged KNPS_BIO | |||||
KNPS_BIO | 5.4087 | 6.5996 | 8.1673 | 10.4830 | 5.0743 *** (9.28) |
K_CSR | 64.4293 | 65.1524 | 64.3562 | 64.5096 | 0.0803 (0.24) |
Model (1), K_CSR | Model (2), K_CSR with Chaebol Dummy | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Intercept | 55.366 *** | 25.886 *** | 59.519 *** | 30.481 *** |
(16.09) | (5.70) | (16.25) | (6.01) | |
KNPS_BIOt–1 | −0.034 | 0.020 | −0.078 | −0.015 |
(−0.41) | (0.27) | (−0.95) | (−0.21) | |
Chaebol_Dummy | −0.283 ** | −0.231 ** | ||
(−2.23) | (−2.15) | |||
KNPS_BIOt–1Χ Chaebol_Dummy | 0.560 | 1.031 | ||
(0.21) | (0.41) | |||
SIZEt–1 | 0.457 *** | 0.155 | 0.344 ** | 0.121 |
(2.77) | (1.05) | (2.00) | (0.77) | |
LEVt–1 | −3.877 *** | −2.125 ** | −3.673 *** | −2.328 ** |
(−3.21) | (−1.98) | (−2.95) | (−2.08) | |
ROAt–1 | 5.216 | 4.100 | 8.725 | 6.337 |
(0.78) | (0.70) | (1.27) | (1.03) | |
Qt–1 | −0.373 | −0.147 | −0.579* | −0.345 |
(−1.33) | (−0.60) | (−1.94) | (−1.29) | |
RNDSt–1 | 17.925 ** | 9.731 | 16.112 * | 7.492 |
(2.05) | (1.27) | (1.84) | (0.95) | |
BMt–1 | −0.313 | 0.036 | −0.860 ** | −0.417 |
(−1.24) | (0.16) | (−2.25) | (−1.21) | |
CASHFt–1 | −3.017 | −0.710 | −6.744 | −3.296 |
(−0.47) | (−0.13) | (−1.01) | (−0.55) | |
SDt–1 | 4.111 ** | 5.474 *** | 2.789 | 5.112 *** |
(2.40) | (3.64) | (1.40) | (2.83) | |
HHIt–1 | 2.106 | 1.826 | 0.621 | 1.231 |
(0.75) | (0.74) | (0.22) | (0.49) | |
MARKET_D | 0.824 | 0.853 * | 0.874 * | 0.955 ** |
(1.58) | (1.88) | (1.67) | (2.05) | |
K_CSRt–1 | 0.515 *** | 0.476 *** | ||
(8.64) | (7.48) | |||
Firm-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Adj. R-Squared | 0.1360 | 0.3430 | 0.1297 | 0.3101 |
Obs. | 554 | 554 | 554 | 554 |
C1 | C2 | C3 | C4 | C5 | C6 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Intercept | 6.548 *** | 13.157 *** | 2.130 | 8.968 *** | −0.031 | 6.695 *** |
(3.17) | (4.44) | (1.24) | (4.05) | (−0.04) | (3.80) | |
KNPS_BIOt–1 | −0.038 | 0.083 | 0.059 | 0.040 | −0.012 | 0.066 |
(−0.83) | (1.18) | (1.42) | (0.72) | (−0.56) | (1.55) | |
SIZEt–1 | 0.076 | −0.232 * | 0.124 | −0.140 | 0.072* | −0.106 |
(0.84) | (−1.72) | (1.52) | (−1.35) | (1.67) | (−1.29) | |
LEVt–1 | 0.438 | 1.160 | −0.255 | 1.323 * | −0.402 | 0.628 |
(0.66) | (1.18) | (−0.43) | (1.73) | (−1.33) | (1.05) | |
ROAt–1 | 5.833 | 11.317 ** | 9.196 *** | 9.004 ** | −3.389 ** | 0.711 |
(1.58) | (2.08) | (2.79) | (2.14) | (−2.05) | (0.21) | |
Qt–1 | 0.038 | 0.178 | 0.110 | −0.071 | −0.014 | 0.064 |
(0.25) | (0.78) | (0.80) | (−0.40) | (−0.20) | (0.46) | |
RNDSt–1 | 2.584 | 3.546 | 2.168 | 0.427 | −2.482 | 3.086 |
(0.53) | (0.50) | (0.50) | (0.08) | (−1.15) | (0.71) | |
BMt–1 | −0.137 | −0.282 | −0.129 | −0.312 * | −0.059 | −0.198 |
(−0.98) | (−1.37) | (−1.03) | (−1.96) | (−0.95) | (−1.57) | |
CASHFt–1 | −2.957 | −8.913 * | −7.230 ** | −7.680 * | 2.671 * | −0.903 |
(−0.83) | (−1.70) | (−2.27) | (−1.88) | (1.67) | (−0.28) | |
SDt–1 | −1.782 * | −5.899 *** | −2.217 ** | −5.930 *** | 1.179 *** | −3.598 *** |
(−1.83) | (−4.11) | (−2.57) | (−5.29) | (2.76) | (−4.09) | |
HHIt–1 | −0.237 | 0.846 | 1.134 | −0.886 | −0.190 | 1.022 |
(−0.15) | (0.37) | (0.82) | (−0.50) | (−0.27) | (0.73) | |
MARKET_D | 0.095 | 0.161 | −0.203 | 0.136 | 0.138 | 0.156 |
(0.33) | (0.38) | (−0.79) | (0.41) | (1.07) | (0.60) | |
K_CSRt–1 | 0.580 *** | 0.516 *** | 0.350 *** | 0.569 *** | 0.697 *** | 0.558 *** |
(11.83) | (10.82) | (6.60) | (14.33) | (16.28) | (13.03) | |
Firm-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Adj. R-Squared | 0.4323 | 0.5018 | 0.2885 | 0.6213 | 0.6667 | 0.5687 |
Obs. | 554 | 554 | 554 | 554 | 554 | 554 |
Low Liquidity | High Liquidity | Low RNDS | High RNDS | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Intercept | 34.569 *** | 21.961 *** | 21.272 *** | 34.546 *** |
(3.14) | (3.39) | (3.12) | (5.10) | |
KNPS_BIOt–1 | 0.111 | −0.043 | 0.067 | 0.007 |
(1.09) | (−0.40) | (0.58) | (0.07) | |
SIZEt–1 | 0.222 | 0.154 | 0.130 | 0.260 |
(0.51) | (0.68) | (0.60) | (1.14) | |
LEVt–1 | −1.816 | −1.568 | −1.216 | −4.158 ** |
(−1.22) | (−0.84) | (−0.72) | (−2.36) | |
ROAt–1 | 5.086 | 8.646 | 7.162 | 2.266 |
(0.46) | (0.85) | (0.58) | (0.32) | |
Qt–1 | −1.299 *** | 0.068 | −0.490 | −0.116 |
(−2.81) | (0.19) | (−1.38) | (−0.25) | |
RNDSt–1 | 29.403 *** | −0.125 | 653.186 ** | 6.458 |
(2.78) | (−0.01) | (2.21) | (0.63) | |
BMt–1 | −0.791 * | 0.426 | −0.158 | 0.020 |
(−1.81) | (1.39) | (−0.37) | (0.07) | |
CASHFt–1 | −2.843 | 5.103 | −1.366 | 0.424 |
(−0.26) | (0.69) | (−0.13) | (0.06) | |
SDt–1 | 2.099 | 5.978 *** | 5.048 ** | 5.675 ** |
(0.88) | (2.80) | (2.35) | (2.40) | |
HHIt–1 | 0.958 | 5.887 | 2.228 | 7.440 |
(0.36) | (0.75) | (0.81) | (0.99) | |
MARKET_D | 0.691 | 2.179 ** | 1.131* | 0.284 |
(1.04) | (2.43) | (1.85) | (0.37) | |
K_CSRt–1 | 0.405 *** | 0.530 *** | 0.585 *** | 0.365 *** |
(4.39) | (6.32) | (7.43) | (3.59) | |
Firm-fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Year dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Adj. R-Squared | 0.2822 | 0.4270 | 0.4137 | 0.2209 |
Obs. | 275 | 279 | 280 | 274 |
F-stat: Low (KNPS_BIOt–1) = High (KNPS_BIOt–1) | ||||
0.23 | 0.52 | |||
[0.78] | [0.56] |
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Choi, D.; Choi, P.M.S.; Choi, J.H.; Chung, C.Y. Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from the Role of the Largest Institutional Blockholders in the Korean Market. Sustainability 2020, 12, 1680. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12041680
Choi D, Choi PMS, Choi JH, Chung CY. Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from the Role of the Largest Institutional Blockholders in the Korean Market. Sustainability. 2020; 12(4):1680. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12041680
Chicago/Turabian StyleChoi, Daeheon, Paul Moon Sub Choi, Joung Hwa Choi, and Chune Young Chung. 2020. "Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from the Role of the Largest Institutional Blockholders in the Korean Market" Sustainability 12, no. 4: 1680. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12041680
APA StyleChoi, D., Choi, P. M. S., Choi, J. H., & Chung, C. Y. (2020). Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from the Role of the Largest Institutional Blockholders in the Korean Market. Sustainability, 12(4), 1680. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12041680