1. Introduction
There has seemingly never been a better time in terms of environmentalism, framed as environmentally friendly attitudes by citizens who increasingly join environmental causes and embrace sustainability (some papers on sustainability in this journal include Zimon et al. [
1], Fonseca et al. [
2], Fonseca et al. [
3]). Yet, explaining what determines this environmental culture is not fully unveiled and remains controversial. In this research, we explore the link between environmental culture and economic complexity. In particular, we study how and when the capabilities required to produce sophisticated goods have lasting implications on the attitudes of individuals towards the environment. While the existing literature has explored various economic determinants of culture, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that estimates the implications of economic complexity on shaping cultural traits. These traits are essential as they have an impact on reinforcing social and environmental sustainability. Not only; unveiling the sources of heterogeneity in environmental culture is critical for reaching global environmental agreements across different nation states.
The hypothesis we test is whether the amount of knowledge that is embedded in the productive structure of an economy has a long lasting impact on the formation of cultural traits related to the environment. This approach would fall into the broader literature that explores the economic determinants of culture, and would add a novel element, i.e., that of economic complexity. Why shall economic complexity affect environmentalism? It is our content that several mechanisms are in place. First and foremost, elevated awareness about the negative effects of consumption on the environment. Individuals who possess a high level of human capital to produce sophisticated products populate countries with high levels of economic complexity, hence they are aware of the impact that consumption and production have on the environment. Consumers that are more aware are also more green persuaded consumers who display environmentalism. Secondly, perceived responsibility for the harm caused: individuals living in complex countries know that sophisticated goods are not necessarily goods with a clean environmental footprint neither in production, neither in consumption, nor in transportation. Quite on the contrary, as shown in the literature discussed in
Section 2 below, countries with high ECI tend to be more air-polluted than countries with low ECI. For this reason, people living in complex countries, may react to the pollution they feel responsible for, by acting for the environment. Third, exposure to environmental campaigns and the green pride. Complex countries are the countries where knowledge is not only accumulated but also diffused. In particular, in these countries there exist extensive environmental campaigns sensitizing consumers about the production and transport, as main sources of pollution. “Buy local campaigns” are very strong and have changed the social norms about the environment [
4]. In these countries, green consumers become socially worthy citizens when external motivation is the main driver of a green action. They show a kind of “green pride” when preferring an environmentally friendly product over an ordinary variant [
5], thereby obtaining a reputational payoff [
6]. In other words, being environmentalist is a cherished social value, while being brown may yield a social penalty. While in each of these three potential mechanisms there are different underlying forces, awareness is their common element. In trying to empirically establish our mechanism, we will use measure that implicitly capture the environmental awareness of individuals.
The empirical analysis is designed to test our main and other related hypotheses in three layers of analysis (
Figure A1 in the
Appendix A illustrates our main hypothesis, data and identification strategies). In the first specification, we associate each native individual with the level of ECI at his country of residence (which in this sample coincides with the origin country). Thus, the ECI is our main explanatory variable and we hypothesize that it has a long-lasting effect on individual environmentalist attitudes. The analysis is conducted using a multi-level model that brings together individual level data with country aggregate data. We further control for country and survey round fixed effects, time varying country level controls that may also affect cultural attitudes such as income per capita or the volume of trade, as well as for a wide range of individual level controls. To mitigate reverse causality issues, though this is more difficult in a multi-level model (and would operate via an anticipation effect), we associate each individual with past ECI values.
In the second specification, we replicate the analysis of the first specification using as the main explanatory variable the average level of ECI of contiguous countries. As such we can further mitigate endogeneity concerns associated with potential co-founders in a country that determine both individual attitudes and the ECI simultaneously. We use three measures for the ECI of neighbouring countries. First, we simply take the average of all neighbouring countries, while in the other cases we introduce two types of weights to built the matrix of contiguous countries for each country in the sample. In particular, we use the volume of trade as well as the population size of neighbouring countries to weight their entry in the ECI. In all three specifications, our results remain unchanged. In the third specification, we further work to establish a causal effect by using the epidemiological approach. Therefore we exploit a sample of immigrants (second generation) and we associate each immigrant with the level of ECI at the origin country of his father, while controlling for the above set of controls as well as host country fixed effects. As such, we exploit the within immigrant variation in a host country, i.e., how experiences from a society that has the capabilities of producing and exporting sophisticated products at the origin country have impacted the cultural attitudes of second generation immigrants whose parents had moved to a different host country. Beyond identification, this approach is crucial in nailing down the element of culture as conveyed by home country ECI to host country attitudes of the immigrant. Last, by exploiting the group of second-generation immigrants we can explore the persistence of this effect and the transmission mechanisms.
In all three specifications, our main result points to a positive relationship between economic complexity and environmentalism: higher ECI is linked to higher environmentalism of individuals expressed in several dimensions explored (i.e., participation in environmental associations or movements, willingness to buy greener goods, willingness to pay for more expensive greener goods). Hence, we argue that the pronounced differences in attitudes towards the environment between countries (e.g., Sweden and Greece) can be partly traced to differences in their productive capabilities. As such, exploring the interplay between these elements and using causal inference techniques we show that the ‘product space’ conditions the development of specific attributes of culture.
Having established the effect of economic complexity on environmentalism we then move to empirically exploring the mechanism beyond this reduced form effect. Having framed our hypothesized mechanism as awareness driven by a series of factors (human capital, pollution) we test this mechanism directly by interacting the ECI with three individual measures of awareness. These measures reflect how serious individuals find the issues of: (i) global warming or the greenhouse effect; (ii) loss of plants or animal species; and (iii) pollution of rivers, lakes and oceans. Overall, we find that the positive effect of economic complexity on environmentalism, is mitigated the less environmentally-aware individuals are.
Robustness is shown with respect to the method of estimation leaving the results invariant when we use probit estimation and when we introduce double clustering of standard errors along the country and survey round dimensions.
Last, we present a discussion of interesting dimensions of heterogeneity as well as to the role of government. While economic complexity impacts very similarly and positively the environmentalism of men and women, young individuals of age inferior to 25 years are much more “greener” than those of age exceeding 65 years. As to government intervention, individuals seem to believe that while coordinated action is needed to battle environmental issues, they are at the same time less in favor of actual government intervention and they are always in favor of higher growth if they have to choose between the two. The suggested environmentalism thus seems to be driven by an intrinsic motive expressed primarily in voluntary participation and exploiting the forces of the market having embedded environmentalism, such as e.g., paying more for environment-friendly goods, etc.
Our findings have two main implications. First, we identify a novel channel that impacts environmental culture. Unveiling what determines positive attitudes towards the environment is crucial for the protection of the environment and the development of a new set of tools different than the standard measures for environmental protection. We also get a very clear picture as to what type of state intervention is needed, i.e., a policy that encourages participation without hurting the market at the same time. Second, our research points to the relevance of economic drivers on culture. In view of only partly successive international environmental agreements, understanding the driving forces behind environmentalism informs the discussion of which environmental agreements are feasible. It is our contend that the paper has real implications, because it quantifies precisely the size of the effect of economic complexity on concrete environmental attitudes such as participation in environmental organization or voluntary work for the environment. The mechanism behind these results is consumers’ environmental awareness. Accordingly, the results of our paper are useful to estimate the effects of policies aiming to increase environmental awareness.
The paper is set out as follows. In the next section, we present the related strands of literature.
Section 2 presents the data sets and the empirical strategy.
Section 3 is dedicated to the results of the paper. We provide some discussions in
Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Our research complements a growing body of economic literature on the economic drivers of culture by pushing forward the hypothesis that economic complexity shapes attitudes. Accordingly, we contribute to two strands of literature, the first on the economic determinants of culture, and the second is literature investigating the effects of economic complexity.
Economists define culture using economic primitives such as preferences. Preferences include for instance time preference, risk preference, altruism, positive and negative reciprocity, trust, religiosity. Preferences combine into cultural norms defining female labour force participation, living arrangements or fertility [
7,
8,
9]. Do preferences vary across countries and time? Cultural norms vary considerably across countries, as shown in the GPS survey with 76 countries that represent approximately 90 % of the world population [
10]. As concerns time variations, for decades economists hypothesized that preferences were endogenously given and unchanged in time. Such a view is consistent with a very slow moving evolution of culture arguing that norms are deeply rooted in the country and show high inertia. Nonetheless, several studies, as shown below, document that preferences and thus cultural norms change quickly in response to changes in economic opportunities.
Gruber and Hungerman [
11] find that changes in shopping hours had a large impact on church attendance and conclude that this validates economic models of religiosity that highlight the importance of economic influences, such as the opportunity cost of church-going for religious participation.
Individualism, the role of merit, and trust evolve quickly in an experiment setting [
12]. More specifically, receiving property rights changes the beliefs that people hold because property rights may affect the incentives people have for self-manipulation of beliefs. Repeatedly, Earle et al. [
13] find that receiving and retaining property in voucher privatizations is associated with support for market reforms.
Luttmer and Singhal [
14] bring evidence that preferences for redistribution of immigrants in Europe tend to reflect those of their countries of origin. The intuition behind this hypothesis is that these preferences are intergenerationally transmitted from parents to children à la Bisin and Verdier. Preferences for distribution do change over time as shown in Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln [
15], who focus on German reunification and find that preferences concerning redistribution differ between East and West and that East Germans’ preferences converge towards those of West Germans after unification.
Giuliano and Spilimbergo [
16] point the economic driver of time changes of these preferences. They explore the effects of an economic recession on various social norms finding that macroeconomic condition long-lastly affect preferences for redistribution. Indeed, individuals who went through a recession when young, hold beliefs that put luck as central in success in life. Not only, these individuals support redistribution and vote for left-wing parties. The effect of recessions on beliefs is long-lasting.
Another cultural trait, critically related to economic outcomes is trust, which has become one of the key concepts in social sciences. Scholars have argued that trust plays a crucial role in various outcomes such as economic growth [
17,
18], financial growth [
19], voting attitudes [
20] or labour market institutions [
21]. In addition, prior literature provides individual-level and macro level evidence that the level of income is a driver of trust since trust is associated with higher income (see, among others, Alesina and Ferrara [
22] and Algan and Cahuc [
18]).
We contribute a novel factor in this literatture, i.e., we advance economic complexity as a driver of cultural attitudes associated with the environment.
Turning to the literature on economic complexity, the methodology of ECI has been initiated in Hidalgo et al. [
23] and hidalgo and Hausmann [
24] where the authors introduce the analytical tool for economic complexity i.e., the network representation of the products traded internationally (the so-called ‘product space’). It is showed that product relatedness explains the way countries change their specialization patterns over time: countries that specialize in the production of one product can also produce other related products. High income products are located in the highly connected core of the international trade network while exported products associated with lower income countries are lying in the periphery of the network. Poorer countries are constrained by the structure of the ‘product space’ in moving to a better position (i.e., towards the core of the network) and developing more competitive exports. On the other hand, moving their production into nearby products is an effective strategy for richer countries because these products require production capabilities that are already embedded in their economies. In other words, the ‘product space’ depicts the product affinity and reflects the similarities in the capabilities required to develop a particular product. In turn, the probability that a country will be able to export this product with relative comparative advantage is conditioned by its (network) distance from the products that the country has been exporting already. As the products produced and exported by a country become more complex i.e., as the network becomes more dense, the country upgrades in the development process towards to more industrialized sectors.
Based on the above, Simoes and Hidalgo [
25] introduced the Economic Complexity Observatory (ECO), which is a tool that can be used to visualize high volumes of highly dissagregated trade data with the objective to help decision making in an industrial policy setting through the better understanding of big data on trade and improved information readily available to policy makers.
The ECO tool mobilized a new strand of literature on the relationship of economic complexity with various socio-economic variables such as economic growth [
24,
26,
27,
28], income inequality [
29,
30], human development [
31], foreign direct investment [
32], labor market [
33], labor share [
34], the internet [
35], intelligence [
36], social tolerance towards homosexuality [
37], spatial concentration of economic activities [
38]. The ECI is a better predictor of income per capita compared to commonly adopted predictors such as institutions, human capital, competitiveness and governance and this has attracted the attention of both researchers and policy makers [
39]. Alternative measures for capturing the countries’ production capabilities have been proposed such as the ‘fitness index’ [
40] and different strategies for measuring relatedness have been adopted looking e.g., at patent citations [
41,
42,
43], the strength of input-output linkages and the flow of workers between industries/firms [
44,
45,
46,
47]. Mealy and Teytelboym [
39] develop a new measure of green production capabilities across countries by constructing a new dataset of traded products with environmental benefits. This measure predicts future green exports and has important policy implications for green growth.
Some other works implementing or inspired by the economic complexity methodology and/or studying the role of economic complexity to environmental outcomes and the green economy are the following.
Fankhauser et al. [
48] combine patent data with international trade and output data in analyzing the ‘green competitiveness’ of countries. For the period 2005–2007 and with eight countries included in the dataset (China, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, South Korea, UK and the US) they show that Japan and Germany are better placed to benefit from the green economy, while e.g., Italy could fall behind.
Hamwey et al. [
49] build on the economic complexity methodology and propose a ‘green product space’ of nations that maps the export strengths of countries for a specified set of green products. Results for Brazil are shown as an illustrative example and the authors argue that the ‘green product space’ methodology could be useful input to industrial policy formulation in supporting emerging green sectors.
The economic complexity methodology is also implemented in Fraccascia et al. [
50]. The authors develop the ‘max proximity’ measure which is an alternative measure of relatedness and show—for 141 countries and 41 green products—that the green products with the highest potential for growth among all green products exported by a country are those that tend to be more related to the products the country exports with high relative comparative advantage.
Despite its potential importance, the relevant strand of the literature on the relationship between economic complexity and the environment remains relatively limited and only a few papers identify the ECI as a predictor of environmental outcomes and performance. Can and Gozgor [
51] consider the effects of the energy consumption and the ECI on
emissions in France and show that higher economic complexity suppresses the level of
emissions in the long run.
The long-term relationship between economic complexity, energy consumption structure, and greenhouse gas emission is also examined in Neagu and Teodoru [
52] for a panel of EU countries and for the period 1995–2016. The paper shows that economic complexity is positively associated with greenhouse gas emissions and suggests a higher risk of pollution as the economic complexity grows and as the energy balance inclines in favor of non-renewable energy consumption.
Doğan et al. [
53] investigate the effect of economic complexity on
emissions for 55 countries over the period 1971–2014 and find that economic complexity increases the environmental degradation in lower and higher middle-income countries. Similarly, a panel analysis of 25 European Union countries from 1995 to 2017 in Neagu [
54] shows an inverted U-shaped relationship between the ECI and
emissions. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis for ECI and
emissions is also validated in Chu [
55] with data for 118 countries and for the period 2002-2014.
In addition, Lapatinas et al. [
56] show that the ECI has a positive relationship with the environmental performance of countries as measured by the Environmental Performance Index in 88 countries for the period 2002–2012. However, the paper finds evidence of a negative effect of economic complexity on air quality i.e., exposure to PM2.5 and
emissions increases. The authors also build two product-level indicators that associate the products to the average level of environmental performance and
emissions in the countries that export them. These indicators could be informative tools for reallocation policies towards activities/sectors that are associated with better environmental performance and lower air pollution.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to combine the two strands of literature cited above. In particular, we explore the impact of economic complexity on culture, exemplified here by the environmental attitudes.
Last, undoubtedly, we shed light to the environmental literature that studies environmental attitudes. Prior literature on this topic reaches contrasting results. Inglehart [
57] argues that citizens of developed economies hold more friendly attitudes towards the environment because in these societies there has been a shift from materialistic to post-materialistic values. By contrast, Dunlap and Mertig [
58] show that environmental concern is even higher in poorer nations. To the best of our knowledge, the only prior research on the intergenerational transmission of environmental culture is Litina et al. [
59]. We complement this literature by bringing a new component into the discussion. Economic complexity does closely predicts growth but still it captures unexplored aspects related to the knowledge embodied in a certain economy. This feature turns out to matter for environmental attitudes.
4. Results
In this section, we turn to the description of the main results of the paper. We also describe and estimate the mechanism behind the results. Furthermore, we present the results of various alternative specifications that verify the robustness of our findings.
Benchmark Specification
Estimating Equation (
1) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), we find a positive relationship between a country’s level of economic complexity and various aspects of environmental attitudes of its people. Overall, we present the results from the full specification, i.e., the one where we introduce the full set of individual and macro-level controls. Analytically, beyond the ECI, which is our main explanatory variable, we introduce time-varying controls such as income per capita (
GDPpc) and the volume of trade (
Openness), as well as individual controls such as age, gender (
Female), income and education level. We also account for several time invariant factors via controlling for country fixed effect (FE) as well as for factors homogeneously affecting countries, via controlling for year (survey-wave) fixed effects.
Given the above specification,
Table 2 reports OLS estimates on the impact of ECI on individuals’ perceptions about voluntary participation to a conservation related to the environment (column 1), voluntary work related to the environment (column 2), voluntary participation to an environmental organization (column 3). In all three specifications, economic complexity has a positive and statistically significant impact on individuals’ involvement to voluntary activities related to the environment. In particular, the higher the ECI, the higher the voluntary participation to a conservation related to the environment, the higher the likelihood to voluntary work for the environment, and the higher the voluntary participation to an environmental organization. To evaluate the size of the effect of the ECI on the three dimensions of environmentalism, we use the marginal effects at means, provided in Table 9 where we use an ordered probit estimation method. A marginal increase of the ECI, increases by 0.191 the probability to be a member of a conservation related to the environment (Marginal effects rows, column 1) and an increase by 0.259 in the probability to engage in voluntary work for the environment (Marginal effects rows, column 2). In addition, using the marginal effects in column 3, we show that a standard deviation increase of the ECI, more than doubles the probability of being a member of a environmental organisation (from 0.021 to 0.048).
Table 3 shows the results for variables related to people’s willingness to pay for the environment, namely their willingness to give part of their income for the environment (column 1), to buy things at a price that is 20% higher if this helped protect also the environment (column 2), to choose environmental friendly products (column 3).
The findings reveal that people in countries with high level of economic complexity are more willing to pay for the environment, along the three dimensions. As above, to understand the size of the effect, we use the marginal effects at means shown in Table 9 in columns 4–6. We find that a standard deviation increase of the ECI doubles the probability of strongly agreeing to give part of own income for the environment from 0.166 to 0.325. In addition, a standard deviation of the ECI, increases from 0.673 to 0.832 the total probability to be either strongly agreeing or agreeing to give part of own income for the environment. Similarly, we find a 5% increase in the likelihood that people will pay a higher price if the additional money is spent for the environment (the total probability to strongly agree and agree increases from 0.590 to 0.621). Finally, the probability of buying green goods increases by 0.692 for a marginal increase of ECI, keeping all other controls at means.
As to the rest of the controls, interestingly, we find that the higher the volume of trade, the lower is environmentalism. The relationship between trade openness and environment at the macro-level has lead to an extensive theoretical and empirical literature (see Jayadevappa and Chhatre [
63] for a survey). Scholars reach contradicting results. At the micro level, we find that the more open to trade is a country, the less environmentally friendly are its citizens. Why trade volumes shall impact individual attitudes? The quantity of traded goods has dramatically increased over the last decades, naturally increasing emissions from transportation. According to International Transport Forum (ITF) estimates, international trade-related freight transport accounts for around 30% of all transport-related
emissions from fuel combustion, and more than 7% of global emissions [
64]. Interestingly, despite this environmental detrimental effect, our results show that the more intense trade, the less consumers become environmentalist. We believe this result is due to different beliefs about the carbon footprint of imported vs. exported goods. While consumers can observe imported goods in their domestic market and react to the related transportation environmental costs, consumers ultimately do not actually consume exported goods. It follows that higher volume of exports leads to lower environmental awareness and in turn to lower environmentalism.
A last remark is in order. We find a non-systematic pattern for the effect of income per capita on environmental attitudes. In some cases, income appears to have a positive effect, in other cases a negative one, and in some instances a statistically non-significant effect. While we introduce this control in order to capture the richness of channels associated with economic growth and environmental attitudes, we shall underline that this control needs further exploration as it may be associated to some sort of attitudes-related Environmental Kuznets Curve, a hypothesis we are testing in an accompanying research paper.
In a follow-up section we further explore the scope for heterogeneity as this is reflected in the results associated with the micro-level controls.
Neighbouring Countries
Despite the fact that our benchmark results are systematic and we account for several unobservables, yet our estimates may be subjected to endogeneity, and, accordingly, driven by confounders of the ECI and of environmental attitudes. To mitigate this concern, we use as our main explanatory variable the ECI of the neighbouring countries. Our results remain intact.
In particular, as shown in
Table 4,
Table 5 and
Table 6, the higher the average ECI in the neighbouring countries, the higher the participation in green movements, voluntary work and the willingness to buy more greener goods and purchase more expensive goods that are eco-friendly. In some cases it seems that neighbours’ economic complexity does not have predicting power, e.g., on active membership in environmental organizations or on the willingness to pay part of own income for environmental causes. This might be due to the fact that a neighbour-countries’ measure is an imperfect, yet more exogenous, proxy of a country’s actual level of economic complexity or because of the fact that we take simple average for all neighbouring countries. To this end, in
Table 5, we take a weighted average of neighbours’ ECI using as weights the volumes of trade flows to capture the degree of openness of the neighbouring economies. Similarly, in
Table 6, we present the results for the weighted ECI using the populations of the neighbouring countries as weights and taking into account in this way the size of their economies. In both cases, it seems that when we use better proxies, we recover the result of the positive effect of ECI on willingness to pay for the environment while we sustain the rest of the results.
Overall, in line with the benchmark specification, we argue that pronounced differences in attitudes towards the environment between countries can be partly traced to differences in their productive capabilities. As such, exploring the interplay between these elements and using causal inference techniques we show that the ‘product space’ conditions the development of specific environmental attributes of culture.
Immigrant Analysis
In
Table 7, we focus on second generation immigrants’ attitudes in our sample (i.e., citizens who are born in the country where they live, but their parents are migrants). The idea behind this approach is not only to further mitigate omitted variable bias, but also to establish the presence of a cultural effect. Associating immigrants with the economic complexity of their fathers’ origin country, allows us to isolate the effect of economic complexity in an origin country from other confounders in the country. Moreover, we obtain our result from variation across immigrants in a host country, i.e., if we are able to detect an effect then this is not driven by host country factors.
Our analysis is restricted compared to the benchmark analysis, as we have a more restricted sample for immigrants and thus only a subset of our benchmark questions. Our findings suggest that a more complex productive structure in the origin country results in higher likelihood to be a member of an environmental organization and higher voluntary participation of immigrants in environmental organizations. However, more willingness of immigrants to pay for the environment is not driven by the economic complexity of the father’s origin country. While we obtain a partial confirmation of our benchmark findings, we view the results about the willingness to pay as non-surprising. The reason is that cultural attitudes towards the environment are better captured by voluntary actions that are not subjected to pecuniary constraints. On the contrary the potential willingness to pay is more subjected to these constraints, especially for the sample (composed of migrants) under consideration.
These results are not only reassuring in terms of identification, given that we have netted out the effect of economic complexity in the country of destination (which crucially is the same for all immigrants). They also point to a persistent channel running from economic complexity to attitudes. The persistence is so high that it is transmitted inter-generationally and can be traced back to second generation migrants that never lived in the country of origin of their parents.
The Mechanism
After having elucidated the effect of economic complexity on attitudes about the environment, we hypothesize on the mechanism that explains why these two phenomena are positively intertwined. We push forward the idea that the mechanism in play operates via awareness. Citizens in complex countries are aware of the environmental footprint of production and exportation activities. This awareness can be due to a series of factors that include for instance human capital. Individuals who possess a high level of human capital (‘person-bytes’) required to produce sophisticated goods populate complex countries. Accordingly, they are more likely to be aware of the impact that consumption and production have on the environment. Consumers that are more aware are also more green persuaded consumers who display environmentalism. These individuals are also more highly exposed to environmental campaigns. In fact, in complex countries there exist extensive environmental campaigns sensitizing consumers about the production and transport, as main sources of pollution.
To investigate the hypothesized channel, we use two of our environmentalism variables, for which we have data on awareness as well, i.e, the willingness to pay for the environment and the membership in environmental organizations. We then replicate our analysis, considering the full set of benchmark controls while controlling for the interaction of the ECI with each of the three individual measures of awareness. These measures reflect how serious individuals find the issues of: (i) global warming; (ii) loss of plants or animal species; and (iii) pollution of rivers, lakes and oceans. We call these variables
Global Warm.,
Loss Animals/Plants,
Pollution respectively and in
Table 8 we show the results of the mechanism. Our findings suggest that the positive effect of economic complexity on environmentalism, is mitigated the less environmentally-aware individuals are. As a matter of fact, the magnitude of the coefficients of the interaction terms suggest that this mitigating effect becomes stronger for lower levels of awareness.
Robustness Analysis
Our empirical findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications. In
Table 9, we show results for our main proxies of environmentalism with an alternative method of estimation and with different clustering of standard errors. When using ordered probit rather than OLS, the estimated coefficients appear with the same sign as in
Table 2 and
Table 3. Higher economic complexity is associated with higher probability of voluntary participation to a conservation association related to the environment (column 1), voluntary work related to the environment (column 2), and voluntary participation to an environmental organization (column 3). As in
Table 3, there is a positive link between economic complexity and people’s willingness to give part of their income for the environment (column 4), to buy more expensive green goods (column 5), and to choose greener products (column 6). Similarly, when we double-cluster the standard errors at the country and survey-wave, our results remain unaffected (lower panel of
Table 9).
An additional robustness check of our findings is presented in
Table 10, where we replicate the benchmark regressions including
emissions (in million kt) in the set of control variables. The baseline findings remain qualitatively and quantitatively intact. Regarding the effect of pollution on people’s attitudes towards the environment it seems that the
coefficient changes sign across the six baseline dependent variables. In particular, we find a positive relationship between air-pollution and people’s voluntary work related to the environment (column 2) and their willingness to buy things at a price that is 20% higher if this helped protect the environment (column 5). However, air-pollution does not seem to be associated with higher participation to environmental and conservation organizations (columns 1 and 3) nor does it imply more willingness to give part of income for environmental purposes or to choose eco-friendly products (columns 4 and 6 respectively). These mixed results are not new. In fact, prior empirical literature (see Tvinnereim [
65] and papers there cited) already documents ambiguous results of the effect of pollution on public attitudes about the environment. This ambiguity is due to misconceptions about the quality of the environment as well as the difficulty to rightly understand the complex relationship between own behaviour and impact on the environment.
6. Conclusions
International environmental agreements call for radical changes in production but also in consumption, both in industrialized as well as in developing countries. Such a revolution of economies requires fundamental changes in the behaviour of producers and consumers. It is, therefore, crucial to the implementation of environmental agreements and any other policy that citizens-consumers share these environmental values and are committed to incur the costs that are associated with them. For this reason, understanding the drivers of ecological attitudes is more than timely.
In this paper, we explore a novel determinant of environmental attitudes and behaviours, i.e., economic complexity. In particular, we study how the degree of a country’s economic complexity can have lasting implications on the attitudes of its people with respect to the environment. We measure the economic complexity at the country level with the ECI; and the environmental attitudes and behaviors at the individual level, using a rich set of questions reducible to the integrated version of the EVS and WVS. These datasets cover a representative sample of citizens for 60 countries in the world, namely: USA, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Andorra, Albania, Romania, Turkey, Russia, Germany, Thailand, Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Pakistan, Egypt, large majority of European countries, and over dozen of other world countries. We find that economic complexity in each of these countries is a powerful predictor of environmental friendly behaviours such as voluntary participation in associations for the protection of the environment but also of environmental friendly attitudes such as being willing to invest part of own wealth for green causes. Importantly, this effect is vehiculated by the awareness hold by citizens about the effect of human activities on the environment. In addition, our results persist (at least) till the second generation of migrants.
To conclude, in this paper, not only we push forward a novel factor that affects culture, but we also point to a new source of heterogeneity of environmental culture across at least 60 nations present in our study, which is persisting through generations. Our research suggests that agreements or policies that aim to reduce pollution must rightly anticipate cultural differences of populations, beyond finding the right incentives for the firms and entrepreneurs.
Despite bringing a novel key driver of environmental culture, our research has some limitations that can be tackled in future research. Firstly, to further mitigate the endogenous issues arising in the multilevel regression analysis, one can collect new data by running experiments that are properly designed to capture our main researcher question. This is quite challenging because to have external validity, we would need to have experiments running in different countries with different economic complexity levels. Secondly, it would be very interesting to have better measures of local pollution and consequently shed light on their effects on environmentalism. Third, the use of longitudinal data, if these type of data were available for such a large number of countries, would allow to better capture possible omitted variables at the individual level. Finally, upon data availability, we shall better explore the intergenerational transmission of environmental culture to check its persistence in time.