

*Article*



# **Developing an Alternate Mineral Transportation System by Evaluating Risk of Truck Accidents in the Mining Industry—A Critical Fuzzy DEMATEL Approach**

**Binay Prakash Pandey and Devi Prasad Mishra [\\*](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0730-3894)**

Department of Mining Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (Indian School of Mines), Dhanbad 826 004, Jharkhand, India

**\*** Correspondence: dpmishra@iitism.ac.in

**Abstract:** The innovative transportation system is a pertinent need for the mining industry. Truck haulage is currently the most common mode of mineral transportation between the excavation sites and end use plants. However, besides being resource-intensive and inefficient, this mode of transportation accounts for a high number of accidents and injuries. In order to reduce the occurrence of accidents, it is important to first understand the primary contributors to truck-related occupational risks and then develop strategies to eliminate such risks. The available literature predominantly advocates for the use of statistical or probabilistic methodologies that suffer from considerable limitations. This paper utilizes the Fuzzy DEMATEL (Fuzzy Decision-Making Trial Evaluation Laboratory) approach to conduct an in-depth assessment of the critical factors that result in mining accidents involving trucks and the relationships between these factors, presented using a cause-andeffect diagram. The study also includes a sensitivity analysis for validating the robustness of the fuzzy model. The results show that high speed and aggressive driving is the most important causal factor behind accidents. The negative impact on socio-economic conditions of local community members is also discussed. Among other preventive measures, the paper emphasizes the pipe conveyor system as an alternate and safer mineral transportation system.

**Keywords:** mining truck accidents; risk evaluation; Fuzzy DEMATEL; mineral transportation planning; decision making; mine safety

#### **1. Introduction**

Safety remains a contentious issue in the mining industry. It is reported that the industry accounts for 8% of all workplace fatalities while employing just 1% of the global workforce [\[1\]](#page-19-0). In countries such as the United States (US), as per the most recent data available, the rate of fatal mining accidents is more than four times higher than the average for all industries [\[2\]](#page-19-1). The number of mining accidents is expected to be even higher in India when compared to the US  $[3,4]$  $[3,4]$ . Despite year-on-year improvements in safety performance, the incident frequency rates for fatal as well as serious accidents is concerning. As per data presented by the Minister of State for Labor and Employment in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of India's parliament), 268 mine workers lost their lives and 748 suffered serious injuries between 2016 to 2019, i.e., on average, one mine worker's life was lost every six days [\[5\]](#page-20-1). These numbers indicate that government regulations and managerial oversight have proven insufficient in reducing the exposure of workers to the inherent risks involved in mine-related activities. Restructuring some of the fundamental components of the industry, therefore, gains urgency.

It is in this context that innovating the mineral transportation system becomes a pertinent need. According to a report published by the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), transportation-related accidents accounted for 24% of all fatal accidents in the mining industry between 2015 and 2019 [\[6\]](#page-20-2). In Indian mines, the Director General



**Citation:** Pandey, B.P.; Mishra, D.P. Developing an Alternate Mineral Transportation System by Evaluating Risk of Truck Accidents in the Mining Industry—A Critical Fuzzy DEMATEL Approach. *Sustainability* **2023**, *15*, 6409. [https://doi.org/](https://doi.org/10.3390/su15086409) [10.3390/su15086409](https://doi.org/10.3390/su15086409)

Academic Editors: Jurgita Antuchevičienė and Elżbieta Macioszek

Received: 8 March 2023 Revised: 6 April 2023 Accepted: 7 April 2023 Published: 9 April 2023



**Copyright:** © 2023 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license [\(https://](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) [creativecommons.org/licenses/by/](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)  $4.0/$ ).

of Mine Safety (DGMS) reported that 37.64% of all lethal accidents and 34.57% of all of Mine Safety (DGMS) reported that 37.64% of all lethal accidents and 34.57% of all mortalities during the period from 2000 to 2013 were transportation-related [\[7\]](#page-20-3). In 2019, transportation-related accidents accounted for 62% of all accidents in Indian mines [\[8\]](#page-20-4).

Among different modes of power-driven transportation, haul trucks are the most widely used mobile gear to move ore and waste from mines to manufacturing units and account for approximately 50% of all mining fatal accidents that occur every year globally [\[9](#page-20-5)[,10\]](#page-20-6). In India, they are the third most common group of vehicles to be involved in all road accidents (12.3%) and road-accident fatalities (15.8%), with 10% of all victims being drivers or passengers in trucks [\[11\]](#page-20-7). Data on accidents involving mining trucks and/or dumpers in coal mines and non-coal mines over the years as reported by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Government of India, are presented in Figure 1 [\[12\]](#page-20-8). In t[he](#page-1-0) Karnataka state, particularly in the Ballari district, a hotspot for mining activities in India, media outlets have reported that in the year 2021, of a total of 180 road fatalities occurred, 110 involved mining trucks. Those who lost their lives were either two-wheeler riders or pedestrians and the accidents resulted from reckless driving of mining trucks [\[13\]](#page-20-9).

<span id="page-1-0"></span>

**Figure 1.** Fatal and serious accidents in mines involving trucks. **Figure 1.** Fatal and serious accidents in mines involving trucks.

Various causal factors have been identified for transport accidents in the mining industry, ranging from failure in operating compliance, where the violated policies related to seat belts, pre-shift inspections, and traffic control, to site requirements failures, which refers to faulty roadway and equipment design and conditions, as well as human performance failures including driver fatigue and distraction from either long working hours or irregular sleep [pa](#page-20-10)tterns [14[–16\]](#page-20-11). A joint study in 2018 by the market research and consultancy firm Kantar IMRB and automotive lubricant maker Castrol India, which covered 1000 truckers, [id](#page-2-0)entified a range of self-reported causes behind truck accidents (Figure 2). While 53% of truck drivers reported psychological issues such as fatigue, obesity, backache, joint and neck pain, or breathlessness, 23% reported struggling with sl[eep](#page-20-12) deprivation [17].

However, despite the wide range of data on the matter, there is a scope to clear the ambiguity around the context within which transport-related mine accidents take place as well as to further explore the interrelationships between the critical causal factors. It is evident to the authors that identifying the risks that might result in mining truck accidents using a single technique proves insufficient, and an integrated approach is certainly required. The shortcomings of the conventional methods used in analyzing the cause–effect relationships underlying mineral transport accidents have been discussed in some detail in Section [2](#page-2-1) of this paper.

<span id="page-2-0"></span>

**Figure 2.** Causes of accidents as reported by truck drivers. **Figure 2.** Causes of accidents as reported by truck drivers.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section [3,](#page-3-0) we introduce our research methodology, which is an improved Fuzzy DEMATEL modeling approach, and illustrate our findings. Section 4 captures t[he](#page-11-0) results and its interpretation. Finally, Section  $5$ presents recommendations to promote transportation safety in the mining industry and Section 6 presents the conclusions drawn.

### <span id="page-2-1"></span>2. Review of Literature: Risk Analysis in the Mining Industry

Traditional methodologies commonly used to identify the risk factors in various industries include the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) methodology, the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), the Job Hazard Analysis (JHA), the Bowtie Analysis, and the and Effects Analysis (FMEA), the Job Hazard Analysis (JHA), the Bowtie Analysis, and the<br>Structured What-if Technique (SWIFT), among others. The limitations and shortcomings of such risk assessment methodologies have been previously researched by numerous academics  $[18-21]$ . One such limitation is their reliance on quantitative data and statistical cases, the available data may be incomplete or uncertain, which can lead to inaccurate  $T_{\rm max}$  methods commonly used to identify the risk factors in various in-various in-vari analysis to estimate the likelihood and consequences of different risks. However, in many risk assessments.

It is in this context that fuzzy concept-based risk assessment methods can prove to be better suited. They allow for a more flexible and nuanced approach to risk assessment by incorporating the concept of uncertainty and imprecision into the decision-making process, whilst guaranteeing accuracy and reliability of results. This is particularly useful in complex systems where there are many interacting factors that contribute to risk. More importantly, fuzzy concept-based risk assessment methods can help to identify the most critical risk factors and prioritize risk mitigation efforts accordingly.<br>
critical risk factors and prioritize risk mitigation efforts accordingly.

Owing to such advantages, fuzzy methods have become common place in managing workplace safety and mitigating risks. For example, in the construction industry, there is<br>literature as the second the Essere Assettis Uisensky Process (AUP) to develop a Gadat merature on the use of the Fuzzy Finary to Fierurerly Frocess (FITH) to develop a safety<br>Management System (SMS) as well as on the application of the Fuzzy Decision-Making Trial Indiagement by stem (sms) as wen as on the apprecision of the Tazzy Beelson-making Than<br>and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) method for analyzing occupational risks using cause–effect diagrams as well as a sensitivity analysis in the construction industry [\[22,](#page-20-15)[23\]](#page-20-16). exactor effect angle are when the are many interpretation factors that contribute to risk. Mithin the mining industry, the relationship between the specific context of various mining Finant the manning and star), the reducentify extrement the epositive centeries of various manning activities and human error rate has previously been modeled using a fuzzy mapping critical risk factors and prioritize risk modeled and approach [\[24\]](#page-20-17). Risk-based maintenance systems have also been developed using fuzzy<br>logie [25] where  $\frac{1}{2}$  such and mitigating risks. For example, in the construction industry, literature on the use of the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to develop a Safety logic [\[25\]](#page-20-18).

Upon noting some of the limitations of common fuzzy concept-based risk assessment methods (as captured in Table 1), the authors opted for the use of the Fuzzy DEMATEL methodology to assess the causal influences of haul truck accidents in Indian mines. The authors reviewed previous research that utilizes the Fuzzy DEMATEL approach to analyze variables for cause-and-effect relationships in the mining industry in India, Iran, drift china, and other geographies [\[26](#page-20-19)[–29\]](#page-21-0). The gap in literature that utilizes this methodol- $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$  ogy to particularly assess the transportation-related risks in Indian mines inspired the present research.

<span id="page-3-1"></span>**Table 1.** Different fuzzy models or risk assessments and their limitations. **Table 1.** Different fuzzy models or risk assessments and their limitations.



## <span id="page-3-0"></span>**3. Methodology 3. Methodology**

fuzzy logic [25].

This study utilizes the fuzzy DEMATEL described to assess potential risk factors in This study utilizes the fuzzy DEMATEL described to assess potential risk factors in the mining transportation system. The research methodology detailed in the following sections is depicted systematically in the flow chart (Figure 3). sections is depicted systematically in the flow chart (Fig[ur](#page-3-2)e 3).

## <span id="page-3-2"></span>Step 1: Identification of risk factors

Step 2: Selection of the decision-making panel

Step 3: Defining the linguistic scale

## Step 4: Developing the direct-relation matrix with pair wise comparison

Step 5: Normalizing the direct-relation matrix

Step 6: Developing the total-relation matrix

Step 7: Determine importance and net effect of each factor

## Step 8: Construction of cause–effect relationship diagram

Step 9: Conduct sensitivity analysis

**Figure 3.** Schematic representation of steps involved in relating cause and effect through fuzzy reasoning.

#### *3.1. Identification of Risk Factors*

In a fuzzy DEMATEL model, the identification of the set of risk factors is the crucial first step. The risk factors represent the various aspects or dimensions of the problem under consideration, mining truck accidents, and their selection which should be based on their relevance, significance, and measurability.

<span id="page-4-0"></span>For our model, the potential risk factors causing mining truck accidents were identified after conducting an in-depth review of relevant literature. Evidence was also collected by consulting with experts and witnesses in the field from the Ballari-Hospet-Sandur (BHS) region, where the 1st author's (BPP) work is based, who referred to specific accident incidents to identify the causal factors (Figures 4 and 5). The 20 select[ed](#page-4-1) risk factors are listed in Table 2. The causal factors (Figures 4 and 5). The 20 selected risk factors are  $\sim$ 



Figure 4. A mining truck accident occurred in the BHS region due to hazardous weather conditions and speeding/aggressive driving. and speeding/aggressive driving. and speeding/aggressive driving.



<span id="page-4-1"></span>

Figure 5. A mining truck accident occurred in the BHS region due to drunken driving and improper **Table 2. Table 2. Causal risk factors** in the minimizing transport according to minimizing the minimizing of  $\mathbb{R}^n$ . vehicle maintenance. vehicle maintenance.



<span id="page-5-0"></span>**Table 2.** Causal risk factors linked to mining transport accidents.

#### *3.2. Selection of the Decision-Making Panel*

In a fuzzy DEMATEL model, the decision-making panel consists of a group of experts or stakeholders who provide their subjective judgments on the cause-and-effect relationships among the risk factors identified. The decision-making panel also plays a key role in interpreting the results of the fuzzy DEMATEL model and using them to support decisionmaking. It is, therefore, important to consult with specialists who were well-versed in the subject matter and had sufficient hands-on experience with producing logical evaluations.

Our panel of evaluators was selected based on their total, relevant work experience, age, and nature or duties performed within the mining sector. It was important to consult with specialists who were well-versed in the subject matter and had sufficient hands-on experience with producing logical evaluations. Ten external evaluators were selected from the age group 35–65 years with their total professional experience ranging from 15 to 30 years (Table [3\)](#page-7-0). The chosen evaluators work at mining sites and have personally been tasked with the responsibility to evaluate the reasons for accidents at some point in their career. Therefore, despite the variation in level of expertise of panel experts, their understanding of the factors causing haul-truck accidents in the mining industry was satisfactory for the purposes of the present research.

**Table 3.** Characteristics of selected evaluators.





<span id="page-7-0"></span>**Table 3.** *Cont*.

#### *3.3. Defining the Linguistic Scale*

In the fuzzy DEMATEL model, a linguistic scale is a tool used to represent the degree of importance or influence of a risk factor being analyzed. This scale is used to capture the subjective judgments of experts in numerical terms that can be analyzed for effective decision making. The scale typically consists of a set of labels or terms that are used to describe the degree of importance or influence of a risk factor. Our panel experts described their judgement on the likelihood of each causal factor resulting in an accident using a five-point linguistic scale: no influence (NO), very low influence (VLI), low influence (LI), high influence (HI), and very high influence (VHI).

Next, triangular fuzzy numbers are assigned to each linguistic label. The triangular membership function is a commonly used mathematical function in fuzzy logic that assigns a degree of membership to a fuzzy set based on how close an input value is to a specific point or range of values. The function takes the form of a triangle, hence its name. The triangular fuzzy numbers are defined using three parameters: the minimum value, the most likely value, and the maximum value. These parameter values are obtained from the experts' knowledge [\[30\]](#page-21-1). The corresponding triangular fuzzy numbers used in our model are given in Table [4](#page-7-1) [\[23\]](#page-20-16). Overall, this fuzzy linguistic scale is deemed appropriate in handling the full range of uncertainties and vagueness associated with subjective judgments.

<span id="page-7-1"></span>**Table 4.** The fuzzy linguistic scale considered for the evaluation.



#### *3.4. Developing the Direct-Relation Matrix with Pair-Wise Comparison*

The initial direct-relation matrix, represented by  $Z<sup>k</sup>$ , where *k* is the number of evaluators, is a set obtained using the Fuzzy scale. It is developed to capture the judgement of panel experts on the relationship between any two risk factors, represented in an  $n \times n$ matrix. Any given element in the matrix  $[z_i]$  represents the direct impact of factor *i* on *j* [\[23\]](#page-20-16). All diagonal elements are listed as NI since *i* = *j*. The pair-wise comparison matrix is constructed using the linguistic terms given by the evaluators. The pair-wise direct-relation matrix developed is provided in Table [A1.](#page-15-0)

#### *3.5. Normalizing the Direct-Relation Matrix*

In this step, the direct relation matrix,  $Z^k$ , is scaled so that the sum of each row is equal to one, reflecting the fact that the relationships between the variables in the row are complete and consistent. Normalizing the direct-relation matrix involves dividing each element in a row by the sum of that row. The mathematical equation to obtain the normalized direct-relation matrix, denoted by *N* is as follows [\[23\]](#page-20-16):

$$
N = \frac{Z^k}{\max_{1 \le i \le n} \sum_{j=1}^n Z_{ij}}
$$
(1)

where  $i, j = 1, 2, ..., n$ .

Normalization is done to ensure that the matrix accurately reflects the degree of relationship between the factors, without being skewed by variations in the scale used to describe the relationships between any two factors. The normalized direct relation matrix is given in Table [A2.](#page-17-0)

#### *3.6. Developing the Total-Relation Matrix*

The total-relation matrix (*T*) is developed by multiplying the *N* by itself. This matrix squaring process captures the cumulative effect of all the intermediate factors on the relationship between each pair of factors, resulting in a matrix that reflects the total degree of relationship between all the factors in the risk assessment. The total-relation matrix *T* is obtained using the following equation [\[22\]](#page-20-15):

$$
T = N(I - N)^{-1}
$$
 (2)

where  $T = N + N^2 + \dots + \dots = \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} N^I$ ,  $I = n \times n$  matrix, and ^(-1) denotes the matrix inverse operation. The diagonal elements represent the total relations of each factor with itself, which is always equal to 1. The obtained matrix is presented in Table [A3.](#page-18-0)

#### <span id="page-8-0"></span>3.6.1. Calculating Row and Column Sums from the Total-Relation Matrix

The row  $(r_i)$  and column  $(c_j)$  sums for each row *i* and column *j* in the total-relation matrix (*T*) are calculated to provide a measure of the overall degree of relationship between each risk factor and all the other factors in the risk assessment [\[23\]](#page-20-16). The row sum for each row *i* reflects the total degree of relationship between factor *i* and all the other factors in the assessment, while the column sum for each column *j* reflects the total degree of relationship between all the factors in the assessment and factor *j*. This is an important step in identifying the most important factors, as those with higher row and column sums will have a greater influence on the overall risk landscape. The following equations were used to calculate  $r_i$  and  $c_j$ , and the calculated (fuzzy) values are presented in Table [A4.](#page-18-1) This information can be used to prioritize risk management efforts and allocate resources more effectively.

$$
T = [t_{ij}]_{n \times n} \tag{3}
$$

$$
r_i = \sum_{1 \le j \le n}^{n} t_{ij} \tag{4}
$$

$$
c_j = \sum_{1 \le i \le n}^{n} t_{ij} \tag{5}
$$

where *i, j* = 1, 2, 3,......, *n*.

#### *3.7. Determining Importance and Net Effect of Each Factor*

The  $(r_i + c_j)$  and  $(r_i - c_j)$  values based on results from Section [3.6.1](#page-8-0) are calculated. If the  $(r_i - c_j)$  value is positive, the factor is in the cause group, and if the  $(r_i - c_j)$  value is negative, the factor is in the effect group. The  $(r_i + c_j)$  value represents the degree of

importance of a factor and  $(r_i - c_j)$  refers to the strength of influence. Using the Centre of Area (COA) defuzzification technique,  $(r_i + c_j)$  and  $(r_i - c_j)$  are defuzzified and Best Nonfuzzy Performance (BNP) or crisp values are obtained [\[23\]](#page-20-16). The COA is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$
x \text{ centroid} = \frac{\sum_{i} \mu(x_i) x_i}{\sum_{i} \mu(x_i)} \tag{6}
$$

where  $\mu(x_i)$  is the membership value for the point and  $x_i$  is the universe of discourse. The values are presented in Tables A4 and A5.

## .<br>3.8. Construction of Cause–Effect Relationship Diagram

The diagrammatic representation of the cause-and-effect relationship takes on the  $(r_i + c_j)$  values on the horizontal axis, with the vertical axis taking on the  $(r_i - c_j)$  values (Figure [6\)](#page-9-0). values on the horizontal axis, with the vertical axis taking on the (*ri* − *cj*) values (Figure 6).

<span id="page-9-0"></span>

**Figure 6.** Cause-and-effect diagram. **Figure 6.** Cause-and-effect diagram.

### *3.9. Conduct Sensitivity Analysis 3.9. Conduct Sensitivity Analysis*

To test the reliability of the fuzzy logic model, we add and deduct a fixed percentage To test the reliability of the fuzzy logic model, we add and deduct a fixed percentage (10%) from each fuzzy set value. This also helps us investigate the impact of uncertainties (10%) from each fuzzy set value. This also helps us investigate the impact of uncertainties in the input data on the model's output by rerunning the fuzzy logic model to observe the changes. The crisp value obtained in these scenarios is then compared with the actual values. The results show that the ranking of the factors as categorized under cause and effect remains unchanged (Table  $A6$ ). The graphical representation of the results is shown Figure 7. in Figure [7.](#page-11-1)







<span id="page-11-1"></span>

**Figure 7.** Results of the sensitivity analysis. **Figure 7.** Results of the sensitivity analysis.

#### <span id="page-11-0"></span>**4. Results and Discussion 4. Results and Discussion**

Based on the cause-and-effect diagram (Figure [6\)](#page-9-0) and sensitivity analysis (Figure [7\)](#page-11-1), Based on the cause-and-effect diagram (Figure 6) and sensitivity analysis (Figure 7), the causal factors responsible for mining truck accidents are identified as follows: alcohol the causal factors responsible for mining truck accidents are identified as follows: alcohol consumption (E16), speeding and aggressive driving (E19), working capabilities of the consumption (E16), speeding and aggressive driving (E19), working capabilities of the drivers (E10), physical limitation of the drivers (E7), overloading (E5), adverse physiological state (E6), mental limitation (E8), driver's behavior (E9), and poor lighting (E20). The following effects are identified: inadequate supervision (E1), planned inappropriate operations (E2), failure to correct the known problems (E3), supervisory problem (E4), site condition (E11), working schedule (E12), inadequate safety training (E13), lack of safety management (E14), lack of awareness (E15), unsafe climatic condition (E17), and improper hicle maintenance (E18). Causal factors have a direct or indirect influence on other factors vehicle maintenance (E18). Causal factors have a direct or indirect influence on other factors and need to be prioritized for improvement. The effect factors can be used to determine and need to be prioritized for improvement. The effect factors can be used to determine the the effectiveness of any solutions developed to prevent the occurrence of the accidents. effectiveness of any solutions developed to prevent the occurrence of the accidents.

The most significant causal factors behind mining truck accidents are identified as speed and aggressive driving (E19) with the uppermost  $(r_i - c_j)$  value of 1.152, followed by alcohol consumption (E16)  $(r_i - c_j = 0.9806)$ . E16 also has the highest  $r_i$  value. Further, failure to correct known problems with the vehicle (E3) and inadequate supervision (E1) are identified as important factors with the two highest  $(r_i + c_j)$  values. Moreover, their  $(r_i - c_j)$  values are above average, meaning they have an impact on the other causal factors.

These results align with the analysis found in existing literature, and are not limited to the study of Indian mines. Speeding by operators is identified as the leading causal factor<br>the study of Indian mines. Speeding by operators is identified as the leading causal factor factor resulting in the loss of control and/or unexpected movement of haul trucks [15]. This has been tied to driver distraction and fatigue that impacts decision-making abilities around<br>when to decrease aread at the ability to make aspiralled management at high anod [21]. In are under the control when the ability to make controlled maneuvers at high speed of  $250$  (equipped possible) our results as well, driver distraction [E9] scores a high  $r_i$  value of 2.3596 as well as a high  $(r + \epsilon)$  value of 4.504 resulting in the loss of control and/or unexpected movement of haul trucks [\[15\]](#page-20-20). This has when to decrease speed or the ability to make controlled maneuvers at high speed [\[31\]](#page-21-2). In  $(r_i + c_j)$  value of 4.504.

a high (*ri* + *cj*) value of 4.504. It is evident that investigating the role of human error in accidents is increasingly com-It is evident that investigating the role of human error in accidents is increasingly monplace. Identified contributing factors has pre-dominantly focused on the unsafe acts of individuals, in this case, the truck drivers. Through our results, we aim to balance this approach with an organizational approach that identifies shortfalls of the over-arching sys-tems [\[32\]](#page-21-3). The findings reported in the previous section can guide decision making around  $\frac{1}{2}$  is assessment and management strategies in the mining sector to address these shortfalls  $\overline{a}$ risk assessment and management strategies in the mining sector to address these shortfalls. Supervisors and managers can plan and prioritize the adaptation and implementation of relevant preventive measures (outlined in Table [5\)](#page-12-0).

<span id="page-12-0"></span>**Table 5.** Preventive measures against the critical causal factors responsible for mining truck accidents.



#### *Linkages to Socio-Economic Conditions of Local Community*

The authors' interactions with local community members revealed that truck accidents are usually seen as an unavoidable occupational hazard by mining workers and their family members. Many of the risk factors identified negatively impact the drivers and their families as they relate to the drivers' health outcomes, employment status, earning levels and overall quality of life. For drivers involved in truck accidents, there are also reputational damages that in turn impact levels of self-confidence and self-esteem. The individual's role within the society as well as within their household might change, causing deep instability. Despite such enormous costs, there is surprisingly minimal effort taken by the industry to explore new mitigative measures or innovate the transportation system.

#### <span id="page-13-0"></span>**5. Recommendation**

While strategies to address the various causal factors influencing mining haul truck accidents are discussed in this paper, driver training, strict monitoring, and enforcement of safety policies may be more feasible and cost-effective in the short-run. To achieve safer outcomes in the long-run, an alternative transportation system might be better suited. The authors recommend replacing the road-based movement of trucks in mining sites with a conveyor belt system. This energy-efficient method of using conveyor belts for transporting ore reduces the burden on both road and rail transport infrastructure and, importantly, prevents accidents. Alongside minimal particulate emissions at loading and unloading points, the conveyor belt system ensures no spillage of valuable mineral resources, does not contribute to dust or noise pollution, and is a faster means of transportation. On the other hand, it is also important to note certain limitations of the pipe conveyor systems, including the need for regular maintenance to prevent equipment failure such as belt deviation or belt damage, power outages that can halt operations, cost intensive repairs, and other general issues caused by wear and tear. However, there is ongoing research on utilizing innovative technologies to make the system more efficient and reliable [\[33](#page-21-4)[,34\]](#page-21-5).

Despite the above limitations, switching to mechanical methods, such as pipe conveyors, has been directed by the Honorable Supreme Court of India, specifically for mines transporting ore in excess of 0.7 MTPA (million tons per annum). In response, technoeconomic feasibility reports for the transportation and loading of iron ore using a downhill conveyor system have already been developed by the KSMCL (Karnataka State Minerals Corporation Limited) and other private mining lease owners. Moreover, one of the largest steel plants operating in the state of Karnataka, M/s JSW Steel, has implemented the use of pipe conveyors to transport raw material from the mines located in Sandur to its integrated steel plant in Vijayanagar, as part of the company's commitment to promote environmental outcomes (Figure [8\)](#page-14-1). Further research should be conducted on strategies to make the implementation of the pipe conveyor belt system economically viable for mining companies dealing in smaller quantities of ore, while replacing the conventional truck transport system in a phased manner. This will ensure that this mode of transportation becomes the new standard in the mining industry.

<span id="page-14-1"></span>

**Figure 8.** Closed pipe conveyor belt system used for transportation of iron ore. **Figure 8.** Closed pipe conveyor belt system used for transportation of iron ore.

## <span id="page-14-0"></span>**6. Conclusions 6. Conclusions**

The truck haulage system is a continuing challenge for the mineral industry. The results of the fuzzy DEMATEL model identified the most critical human and systematic errors resulting in mining transport accidents, thereby enabling multi-criteria decision making. While targeted steps can be taken to address the safety concerns due to conventional transportation systems, the authors recommend a shift to an automated/mechanical transportation system in the mineral industry for a long-term sustainable improvement in resource efficiency.

As evident from our research, the conventional truck haulage is the cause of increasing road accidents, resulting in loss of manpower and increased costs. The carbon emissions released from the trucks also add to the pollution load on the environment. The paper concludes that the conveyor system is a better replacement for the truck haulage system concludes that the conveyor system is a better replacement for the truck haulage system<br>depending upon the scale of mining operation. It would reduce the number of accidents caused due to human error, while reducing the risk of dust exposure and various environmental hazards. As next steps, the project managers in both large and small mining mining companies must conduct feasibility studies to assess the impacts of shifting to the companies must conduct feasibility studies to assess the impacts of shifting to the conveyor system, considering the business, environmental, and social and governance (ESG) impacts, including any disruptive impacts on local communities. Nevertheless, the success of mining projects is closely tied to public perception and therefore, investments in building a safety culture in the mining industry is the need of the hour.

**Author Contributions:** B.P.P.: Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Data curation, Formal analysis, Writing—original draft; D.P.M.: Supervision, Methodology, Writing—review & editing. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to privacy.

**Acknowledgments:** This research forms a part of the Ph.D. work carried out by the first author. The authors are thankful to Prajwal Prabhu, Research Scholar, IISc, Bangalore, Karnataka, India for providing valuable inputs in completing the study successfully.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

#### **Appendix A**

<span id="page-15-0"></span>**Table A1.** Direct-Relation Matrix.



**Table A2.** Normalized Direct-Relation Matrix.







	E16	E17	E18	E19	E20
E7	(0.054, 0.0535, 0.0579)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E <sub>8</sub>	(0.054, 0.0535, 0.0579)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
F <sub>9</sub>	(0.081, 0.0714, 0.0579)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E <sub>10</sub>	(0.054, 0.0535, 0.0579)	(0.054, 0.0535, 0.0579)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E11	(0.0.0178, 0.0289)	(0.054, 0.0535, 0.0579)	(0.027, 0.0357, 0.0434)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E <sub>12</sub>	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E <sub>13</sub>	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E14	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E <sub>15</sub>	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E <sub>16</sub>	(0,0.0.0144)	(0.054, 0.0535, 0.0579)	(0.027, 0.0357, 0.0434)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E <sub>17</sub>	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0.0144)	(0.054, 0.0535, 0.0579)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)
E18	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0.054, 0.0535, 0.0579)	(0,0.0.0144)	(0.027, 0.0357, 0.0434)	(0.027, 0.0357, 0.0434)
E <sub>19</sub>	(0.081, 0.0714, 0.0579)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0.027, 0.0357, 0.0434)	(0,0,0.0144)	(0.027, 0.0357, 0.0434)
E20	(0.0.0178, 0.0289)	(0.054, 0.0535, 0.0579)	(0,0.0178,0.0289)	(0.027, 0.0357, 0.0434)	(0,0.0.0144)

<span id="page-17-0"></span>**Table A2.** *Cont*.

**Table A3.** Total-Relation Matrix.



	E11	E12	E13	E14	E15	E16	E17	E18	E19	E20
E13	0.182996	0.219286	0.18728	0.212304	0.231121	0.184242	0.170109	0.185448	0.161011	0.128454
E14	0.175547	0.209056	0.219325	0.174414	0.221733	0.174541	0.162049	0.17672	0.153587	0.122858
E15	0.175597	0.209547	0.219423	0.202887	0.180146	0.175214	0.162682	0.176983	0.153806	0.123041
E16	0.230278	0.260448	0.26894	0.265038	0.272337	0.207708	0.231884	0.235593	0.19172	0.15325
E17	0.14901	0.177866	0.187802	0.185215	0.176222	0.160952	0.135486	0.188532	0.140818	0.114888
E18	0.20378	0.2266	0.222444	0.219573	0.210722	0.190444	0.206269	0.179603	0.181473	0.147428
E19	0.206634	0.261002	0.241953	0.238819	0.244616	0.237484	0.194936	0.223863	0.16786	0.159415
E20	0.168399	0.16699	0.163807	0.16155	0.1656	0.151497	0.170122	0.152759	0.146894	0.094735

<span id="page-18-0"></span>**Table A3.** *Cont*.

<span id="page-18-1"></span>**Table A4.** Fuzzy Values  $r_i$ ,  $c_j$ ,  $r_i + c_j$ ,  $r_i - c_j$ .

E1	(1.3151, 2.1681, 4.2932)	(1.4891, 2.3763, 4.5702)	(2.8042, 4.5444, 8.8635)	$(-0.1739,-0.2081,-0.2769)$
E2	(1.203, 2.0643, 4.1494)	(1.3759, 2.2703, 4.506)	(2.5789, 4.3346, 8.6555)	$(-0.1728,-0.206,-0.3565)$
E <sub>3</sub>	(1.2058, 2.0657, 4.223)	(1.7, 2.5777, 4.7006)	(2.9058, 4.6435, 8.9237)	$(-0.4941,-0.512,-0.4776)$
E4	(1.1547, 2.0163, 4.0078)	(1.6391, 2.5209, 4.8602)	(2.7938, 4.5372, 8.8681)	$(-0.4843,-0.5045,-0.8523)$
E <sub>5</sub>	(0.9864, 1.8583, 3.9335)	(0.7424, 1.6436, 3.6838)	(1.7289, 3.502, 7.6173)	(0.2439, 0.2147, 0.2496)
E6	(0.5994, 1.5204, 3.5172)	(0.4812, 1.473, 3.4959)	(1.0806, 2.9934, 7.0131)	(0.1182, 0.0473, 0.0212)
E7	(0.7152, 1.6445, 3.7025)	(0.4053, 1.3892, 3.3709)	(1.1205, 3.0338, 7.0734)	(0.3098, 0.2553, 0.3315)
E8	(0.5994, 1.5386, 3.5574)	(0.4053, 1.3892, 3.3709)	(1.0048, 2.9279, 6.9283)	(0.1941, 0.1494, 0.1864)
E9	(1.0606, 1.9626, 4.0556)	(0.8308, 1.7938, 3.8101)	(1.8915, 3.7564, 7.8658)	(0.2298, 0.1688, 0.2454)
E10	(1.1096, 2.0297, 4.1847)	(0.8379, 1.7785, 3.7698)	(1.9476, 3.8082, 7.9546)	(0.2717, 0.2511, 0.4149)
E11	(0.4677, 1.4219, 3.4068)	(0.5822, 1.5321, 3.5174)	(1.05, 2.954, 6.9242)	$(-0.1145,-0.1102,-0.1106)$
E12	(0.6599, 1.5902, 3.6322)	(1.2743, 2.1728, 4.3704)	(1.9343, 3.7631, 8.0026)	$(-0.6143,-0.5826,-0.7381)$
E13	(0.8699, 1.7894, 3.9149)	(1.1739, 2.0553, 4.2615)	(2.0439, 3.8447, 8.1764)	$(-0.304,-0.2659,-0.3465)$
E14	(0.6944, 1.6284, 3.6941)	(1.1669, 2.0528, 4.189)	(1.8613, 3.6812, 7.8832)	$(-0.4724,-0.4243,-0.4949)$
E <sub>15</sub>	(0.705, 1.6354, 3.7009)	(1.2445, 2.1372, 4.3198)	(1.9496, 3.7727, 8.0207)	$(-0.5394,-0.5017,-0.6188)$
E16	(1.8934, 2.7943, 4.8501)	(0.869, 1.8376, 3.873)	(2.7624, 4.632, 8.7231)	(1.0244, 0.9566, 0.977)
E17	(0.3955, 1.3603, 3.3293)	(0.5542, 1.5201, 3.5534)	(0.9497, 2.8805, 6.8828)	$(-0.1586,-0.1598,-0.224)$
E18	(0.9823, 1.9134, 4.0984)	(1.1358, 2.0141, 3.8813)	(2.1181, 3.9276, 7.9798)	$(-0.1534,-0.1006,0.2171)$
E19	(1.533, 2.4159, 4.5498)	(0.4098, 1.346, 3.2852)	(1.9428, 3.762, 7.8351)	(1.1232, 1.0699, 1.2646)
E20	(0.2626, 1.2438, 3.1037)	(0.0957, 0.7811, 2.5152)	(0.3583, 2.0249, 5.619)	(0.1669, 0.4627, 0.5885)

**Table A5.** Crisp Values  $r_i$ ,  $c_j$ ,  $r_i + c_j$ ,  $r_i - c_j$ .





<span id="page-19-3"></span>**Table A5.** *Cont*.

<span id="page-19-4"></span>**Table A6.** Results of Sensitivity Analysis, Comparing Original Crisp Values with Results from Two Different Scenarios: 10% Increment and Decrement to Original Fuzzy Values.



#### **References**

- <span id="page-19-0"></span>1. ILO Sectoral Policies and Governance. *Safety and Health in Mining*; International Labour Organization: Genève, Switzerland, 2018. Available online: [https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/safety-and-health-at-work/events-training/WCMS\\_633314/lang--en/](https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/safety-and-health-at-work/events-training/WCMS_633314/lang--en/index.htm) [index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/safety-and-health-at-work/events-training/WCMS_633314/lang--en/index.htm) (accessed on 7 January 2023).
- <span id="page-19-1"></span>2. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Mining: The Leading Cause of Fatalities; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 16 October 2020. Available online: [https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/features/mining](https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/features/mining-fatalities.html)[fatalities.html](https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/features/mining-fatalities.html) (accessed on 7 January 2023).
- <span id="page-19-2"></span>3. Mine Safety and Health Administration. *2019 Year End Summary of Mining Fatalities*; US Department of Labor: Washington, DC, USA, 2020. Available online: <https://www.msha.gov/data-reports/fatality-reports/2019> (accessed on 10 January 2023).
- <span id="page-20-0"></span>4. Directorate General of Mines Safety. *Annual Report 2019*; Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India: New Delhi, India, 2020. Available online: [https://www.dgms.gov.in/writereaddata/uploadedfile/statistics/Annual\\_Report\\_2019\\_Eng.pdf](https://www.dgms.gov.in/writereaddata/uploadedfile/statistics/Annual_Report_2019_Eng.pdf) (accessed on 14 January 2023).
- <span id="page-20-1"></span>5. The Mining Sector's Human Cost: Over 260 Miners Died in Accidents in 3 Years. *The Hindu Business Line*, 31 January 2020. Available online: [https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/mining-sector-sees-over-260-fatalities-in-3-years/article3](https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/mining-sector-sees-over-260-fatalities-in-3-years/article30684708.ece) [0684708.ece](https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/mining-sector-sees-over-260-fatalities-in-3-years/article30684708.ece) (accessed on 9 January 2023).
- <span id="page-20-2"></span>6. *Safety Performance Data: 2015-2019*; International Council on Mining and Metals: London, UK, 2020. Available online: [https:](https://www.icmm.com/-/media/documents/publications/safety-performance-data-2015-2019.pdf) [//www.icmm.com/-/media/documents/publications/safety-performance-data-2015-2019.pdf](https://www.icmm.com/-/media/documents/publications/safety-performance-data-2015-2019.pdf) (accessed on 12 January 2023).
- <span id="page-20-3"></span>7. Dash, A.K.; Bhattcharjee, R.M.; Paul, P.S.; Tikader, M. Study and Analysis of Accidents Due to Wheeled Trackless Transportation Machinery in Indian Coal Mines—Identification of Gap in Current Investigation System. *Procedia Earth Planet. Sci.* **2015**, *11*, 539–547. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1016/j.proeps.2015.06.056)
- <span id="page-20-4"></span>8. *Safety in Coal Mines*; Directorate General of Mines Safety: Dhanbad, India, 2019. Available online: [https://www.dgms.gov.in/](https://www.dgms.gov.in/writereaddata/uploadedfile/Coal%20Safety%20Report%202018-19.pdf) [writereaddata/uploadedfile/Coal%20Safety%20Report%202018-19.pdf](https://www.dgms.gov.in/writereaddata/uploadedfile/Coal%20Safety%20Report%202018-19.pdf) (accessed on 27 December 2022).
- <span id="page-20-5"></span>9. *Safety Performance in the Mining Industry*; International Council on Mining and Metals: London, UK, 2019. Available online: <www.icmm.com/en-gb/publications/safety-performance-in-the-mining-industry> (accessed on 27 December 2022).
- <span id="page-20-6"></span>10. National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). Haul Truck Research Roadmap Report 2020; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Available online: [https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/researchprogram/strategicplan/](https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/researchprogram/strategicplan/HaulTruckRoadmap2020.html) [HaulTruckRoadmap2020.html](https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/mining/researchprogram/strategicplan/HaulTruckRoadmap2020.html) (accessed on 10 January 2023).
- <span id="page-20-7"></span>11. *Road Accidents in India—2018*; Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India: New Delhi, India, 2019. Available online: [https://morth.nic.in/sites/default/files/Road\\_Accidents\\_in\\_India\\_2018.pdf](https://morth.nic.in/sites/default/files/Road_Accidents_in_India_2018.pdf) (accessed on 17 January 2023).
- <span id="page-20-8"></span>12. *Annual Report 2020-2021; Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India: New Delhi, India,, 2021. Available online:* [https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/annual\\_report-21-22.pdf](https://labour.gov.in/sites/default/files/annual_report-21-22.pdf) (accessed on 21 January 2023).
- <span id="page-20-9"></span>13. 180 Died in Accidents in Ballari in 2021, Mining Lorries, Bad Roads to Blame. *The New Indian Express*, 21 December 2021. Available online: [https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/karnataka/2021/dec/21/180-died-in-accidents-in-ballari-in-](https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/karnataka/2021/dec/21/180-died-in-accidents-in-ballari-in-2021-mining-lorries-bad-roads-to-blame-2398215.html)[2021-mining-lorries-bad-roads-to-blame-2398215.html](https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/karnataka/2021/dec/21/180-died-in-accidents-in-ballari-in-2021-mining-lorries-bad-roads-to-blame-2398215.html) (accessed on 24 December 2022).
- <span id="page-20-10"></span>14. Bellanca, J.L.; Ryan, M.E.; Orr, T.J.; Burgess-Limerick, R.J. Why Do Haul Truck Fatal Accidents Keep Occurring? *Min. Metall. Explor.* **2021**, *38*, 1019–1029. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1007/s42461-021-00410-1) [\[PubMed\]](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/34423255)
- <span id="page-20-20"></span>15. Drury, C.G.; Porter, W.L.; Dempsey, P.G. Patterns in Mining Haul Truck Accidents. *Proc. Hum. Factors Ergon. Soc. Annu. Meet.* **2012**, *56*, 2011–2015. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1177/1071181312561420)
- <span id="page-20-11"></span>16. Zhang, M.; Kecojevic, V.; Komljenovic, D. Investigation of haul truck-related fatal accidents in surface mining using fault tree analysis. *Saf. Sci.* **2014**, *65*, 106–117. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2014.01.005)
- <span id="page-20-12"></span>17. Kantar IMRB and Castrol India. Truckers Battle Sleep Deprivation, Other Health Issues: Study. 2018. Available online: <https://www.asianage.com/life/health/200618/truckers-battle-sleep-deprivation-other-health-issues-study.html> (accessed on 23 January 2023).
- <span id="page-20-13"></span>18. Qin, J.; Xi, Y.; Pedrycz, W. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for risk assessment based on interval type-2 fuzzy evidential reasoning method. *Appl. Soft Comput.* **2020**, *89*, 106134. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1016/j.asoc.2020.106134)
- 19. Dunjó, J.; Fthenakis, V.; Vílchez, J.A.; Arnaldos, J. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis. A Literature Review. *J. Hazard. Mater.* **2009**, *173*, 19–32. Available online: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304389409013727> (accessed on 7 February 2023). [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhazmat.2009.08.076) [\[PubMed\]](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19733970)
- 20. Sii, H.S.; Wang, J.; Ruxton, T. Novel risk assessment techniques for maritime safety management systems. *Int. J. Qual. Reliab. Manag.* **2001**, *18*, 982–999. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1108/02656710110407145)
- <span id="page-20-14"></span>21. Tixier, J.; Dusserre, G.; Salvi, O.; Gaston, D. Review of 62 risk analysis methodologies of industrial plants. *J. Loss Prev. Process Ind.* **2002**, *15*, 291–303. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1016/S0950-4230(02)00008-6)
- <span id="page-20-15"></span>22. Basahel, A.; Taylan, O. Using fuzzy AHP and fuzzy TOPSIS approaches for assessing safety conditions at worksites in construction industry. *Int. J. Saf. Secur. Eng.* **2016**, *6*, 728–745. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.2495/SAFE-V6-N4-728-745)
- <span id="page-20-16"></span>23. Seker, S.; Zavadskas, E.K. Application of Fuzzy DEMATEL Method for Analysing Occupational Risks on Construction Sites. *Sustainability* **2017**, *9*, 2083. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.3390/su9112083)
- <span id="page-20-17"></span>24. Gupta, S.; Kumar, P.; Karmakar, N.C.; Palei, S.K. Quantification of human error rate in underground coal mines—A fuzzy mapping and rough set-based approach. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, Bangkok, Thailand, 10–13 December 2013; pp. 140–144. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1109/IEEM.2013.6962391)
- <span id="page-20-18"></span>25. Tubis, A.; Werbińska-Wojciechowska, S.; Sliwinski, P.; Zimroz, R. Fuzzy Risk-Based Maintenance Strategy with Safety Considerations for the Mining Industry. *Sensors* **2022**, *22*, 441. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.3390/s22020441) [\[PubMed\]](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/35062400)
- <span id="page-20-19"></span>26. Mohammadfam, I.; Khajevandi, A.A.; Dehghani, H.; Babamiri, M.; Farhadian, M. Analysis of Factors Affecting Human Reliability in the Mining Process Design Using Fuzzy Delphi and DEMATEL Methods. *Sustainability* **2022**, *14*, 8168. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.3390/su14138168)
- 27. Shahabi, R.S.; Basiri, M.H.; Qarahasanlou, A.N.; Mottahedi, A.; Dehghani, F. Fuzzy MADM-Based Model for Prioritization of Investment Risk in Iran's Mining Projects. *Int. J. Fuzzy Syst.* **2022**, *24*, 3189–3207. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1007/s40815-022-01331-x)
- 28. Qi, R.; Li, S.; Qu, L.; Sun, L.; Gong, C. Critical factors to green mining construction in China: A two-step fuzzy DEMATEL analysis of state-owned coal mining enterprises. *J. Clean. Prod.* **2020**, *273*, 122852. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.122852)
- <span id="page-21-0"></span>29. Khaba, S.; Bhar, C. Quantifying SWOT analysis for the Indian coal mining industry using Fuzzy DEMATEL. *Benchmark. Int. J.* **2017**, *24*, 882–902. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1108/BIJ-06-2016-0089)
- <span id="page-21-1"></span>30. Azam, M.H.; Hasan, M.H.; Hassan, S.; Abdulkadir, S.J. Fuzzy Type-1 Triangular Membership Function Approximation Using Fuzzy C-Means. In Proceedings of the 2020 International Conference on Computational Intelligence (ICCI), Bandar Seri Iskandar, Malaysia, 8–9 October 2020; pp. 115–120. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1109/ICCI51257.2020.9247773)
- <span id="page-21-2"></span>31. Schutte, P.C.; Maldonado, C.C. Factors affecting driver alertness during the operation of haul trucks in the South African mining industry. In *Safety in Mines Research Advisory Committee Final Report*; CSIR Mining Technology, SIM 020502; Safety in Mines Research Advisory Committee, South Africa: June 2003; p. 78. Available online: <https://hdl.handle.net/10204/1296> (accessed on 8 February 2023).
- <span id="page-21-3"></span>32. Dekker, S.W. Reconstructing human contributions to accidents: The new view on error and performance. *J. Saf. Res.* **2002**, *33*, 371–385. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-4375(02)00032-4) [\[PubMed\]](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12404999)
- <span id="page-21-4"></span>33. Zhang, M.; Jiang, K.; Cao, Y.; Li, M.; Hao, N.; Zhang, Y. A deep learning-based method for deviation status detection in intelligent conveyor belt system. *J. Clean. Prod.* **2022**, *363*, 132575. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.132575)
- <span id="page-21-5"></span>34. Carvalho, R.; Nascimento, R.; D'Angelo, T.; Delabrida, S.; GCBianchi, A.; Oliveira, R.A.; Azpúrua, H.; Uzeda Garcia, L.G. A UAV-Based Framework for Semi-Automated Thermographic Inspection of Belt Conveyors in the Mining Industry. *Sensors* **2020**, *20*, 2243. [\[CrossRef\]](http://doi.org/10.3390/s20082243) [\[PubMed\]](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32326651)

**Disclaimer/Publisher's Note:** The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.