Supplementary Information

Supplementary A: Additional Analysis

1. Descriptive Overview: Partners Matching

Table S1 reports the average cooperation levels and standard deviations for each treatment with Partners matching. Holding constant the feedback condition, average cooperation is higher with Take framing compared to Give framing. Also, holding constant the frame condition, average cooperation is higher with Individual feedback compared to Aggregate feedback. When average cooperation is separated by gender, average cooperation is higher for women than men with Take framing. The opposite is true with Give framing.

Table S1. Average Cooperation and Standard Deviation (Partners).

Treatment	Individual-Level	-MEN- [#Men]	-WOMEN- [#Women]
Partners-Take-Aggregate (PTA)	36.14 (22.91)	33.54 (20.03) [14]	38.41 (25.60) [16]
Partners-Take-Individual (PTI)	47.24 (24.95)	46.75 (26.40) [32]	48.44 (21.89) [13]
Partners-Give-Aggregate (PGA)	30.97 (18.95)	37.38 (19.49) [15]	24.57 (16.60) [15]
Partners-Give-Individual (PGI)	39.20 (23.38)	39.69 (23.69) [13]	38.82 (23.89) [17]

Treatment effects that may be present in the first period could, over time, dissipate due to group and session dynamics. An analysis of the first period decisions allows for tests for treatment effects before subjects receive feedback regarding others' decisions. Significant framing effects, holding constant feedback, are present in the first period (two-sample t-tests PGA $vs.$ PTA $p = 0.030$, $n = 60$; PGI $vs.$ PTI $p = 0.066$, $n = 75$) and (Wilcoxon Ranksum tests PGA $vs.$ PTA $p = 0.046$, $n = 60$; PGI $vs.$ PTI $p = 0.180$, $n = 75$). However, there are no feedback effects, holding constant framing, in the first period (two-sample t-tests PGA $vs.$ PGI $p = 0.978$, $n = 60$; PTA $vs.$ PTI $p = 0.867$, $n = 75$) and (Wilcoxon Ranksum tests PGA $vs.$ PGI $p = 0.750$, $n = 60$; PTA $vs.$ PTI $p = 0.848$, $n = 75$).

Table S2 reports the proportion of free riders (coop=0) for treatments with Partners matching. There are higher proportions of free riders with Take framing and Individual feedback. When the proportions of free riders are separated by gender, in each treatment, men have a higher proportion of free riders than women.

Table S2. Proportion of Free Riders (Partners).

Treatment	Proportion of Free Riders	Proportion of Men [#Men]	Proportion of Women [#Women]
Partners-Take-Aggregate (PTA)	18.89%	26.19% [14]	12.50% [16]
Partners-Take-Individual (PTI)	21.63%	27.71% [32]	6.67% [13]
Partners-Give-Aggregate (PGA)	2.67%	4.00% [15]	1.33% [15]
Partners-Give-Individual (PGI)	8.67%	10.26% [13]	7.45% [17]

Figure S1 displays the path of the proportion of complete free riders for men and women by treatment. For women, there appears to be a higher proportion of free-riding with Take framing compared to Give framing with Aggregate feedback. For men, Take framing leads to higher proportions of free-riding with both Individual and Aggregate feedback. Moreover, the framing effect appears stronger for men than women. Note, our study lacks the necessary power to make stronger conclusions on these details.

Figure S1. Proportion of Free Riders Over Time (Partners).

Table S3 reports the proportion of full cooperators (coop = 80) for treatments with Partners matching. There are higher proportions of full cooperators with Take framing and Individual feedback. When the proportions of full cooperators are separated by gender, in each treatment, men have a higher proportion of full cooperators than women.

Table S3. Proportion of Full Cooperators (Partners).

Treatment	Proportion of Full Cooperators	Proportion of Men [#Men]	Proportion of Women [#Women]
Partners-Take-Aggregate (PTA)	15.33%	21.43% [14]	10.00% [16]
Partners-Take-Individual (PTI)	39.11%	43.96% [32]	27.18% [13]
Partners-Give-Aggregate (PGA)	7.78%	15.56% [15]	0.00% [15]
Partners-Give-Individual (PGI)	17.56%	17.95% [13]	17.25% [17]

Figure S2 displays the path of the proportion of full cooperators for men and women by treatment. Two observations stand out. First, the relatively high proportion of full cooperation by both men and women in the PTI treatment. Second, none of the 15 women (half of the subjects) in the PGA treatment were ever full cooperators. Combining this result with the low number of women free riders in the PGA treatment displayed in Figure S1, it appears women exhibit a very low proportion of extreme behavior with Aggregate feedback and Give framing. Note, our study lacks the necessary power to make stronger conclusions on these details.


Figure S2. Proportion of Full Cooperators Over Time (Partners).

2. Descriptive Overview: Strangers Matching

Table S4 reports the average cooperation levels and standard deviations for each treatment with Strangers matching. Holding constant the feedback condition, average cooperation is higher with Take framing compared to Give framing. Also, holding constant the frame condition, average cooperation is higher with Individual feedback compared to Aggregate feedback. When average cooperation is separated by gender, average cooperation is higher for men than women in all treatments, except with Take framing and Aggregate feedback.

Table S4. Average Cooperation and Standard Deviation (Strangers).

Treatment	Individual-Level	-MEN- [#Men]	-WOMEN- [#Women]
Strangers-Take-Aggregate (STA)	32.42 (21.41)	25.82 (28.01) [8]	34.82 (18.68) [22]
Strangers-Take-Individual (STI)	35.15 (22.25)	37.52 (23.95) [12]	33.57 (21.60) [18]
Strangers-Give-Aggregate (SGA)	27.24 (18.03)	37.76 (15.99) [9]	22.73 (17.26) [21]
Strangers-Give-Individual (SGI)	33.34 (21.86)	34.70 (21.33) [20]	29.48 (24.64) [7]

Treatment effects that may be present in the first period could, over time, dissipate due to group and session dynamics. An analysis of the first period decisions allows for tests for treatment effects before subjects receive feedback regarding others' decisions. Significant framing effects, holding constant feedback, are present in the first period (two-sample t-tests SGA $vs.$ STA $p = 0.011$, $n = 60$; SGI $vs.$ STI $p = 0.022$, $n = 57$) and (Wilcoxon Ranksum tests SGA $vs.$ STA $p = 0.027$, $n = 60$; SGI $vs.$ STI $p = 0.023$, $n = 57$). However, there are no feedback effects, holding constant framing, in the first period (two-sample t-tests SGA $vs.$ SGI $p = 0.769$, $n = 57$; STA $vs.$ STI $p = 0.649$, $n = 60$) and (Wilcoxon Ranksum tests SGA $vs.$ SGI $p = 0.885$, $n = 57$; STA $vs.$ STI $p = 0.604$, $n = 60$).

Table S5 reports the proportion of free riders (coop=0) for treatments with Strangers matching. There are higher proportions of free riders with Take framing and Individual feedback. When the proportions of free riders are separated by gender, men have a higher proportion of free riders than women, except with Give framing and Individual feedback.

Table S5. Proportion of Free Riders (Strangers).

Treatment	Proportion of Free Riders	Proportion of Men [#Men]	Proportion of Women [#Women]
Strangers-Take-Aggregate (STA)	16.00%	42.50% [8]	6.36% [22]
Strangers-Take-Individual (STI)	25.33%	30.56% [12]	21.85% [18]
Strangers-Give-Aggregate (SGA)	9.33%	10.37% [9]	8.89% [21]
Strangers-Give-Individual (SGI)	12.59%	10.67% [20]	18.10% [7]

Figure S3 displays the path of the proportions of complete free riders for women and men by treatment. For women, it appears the proportions of free riders are higher in treatments when subjects receive Individual feedback compared to Aggregate feedback. For men, it appears the proportions of free riders are higher in treatments with Take framing compared to Give framing. Note, our study lacks the necessary power to make stronger conclusions on these details.

Figure S3. Proportion of Free Riders Over Time (Strangers).

Table S6 reports the proportion of full cooperators (coop = 80) for treatments with Strangers matching. There are higher proportions of full cooperators with Individual feedback. When the proportions of full cooperators are separated by gender, in each treatment, men have a higher proportion of full cooperators than women.

Table S6. Proportion of Full Cooperators (Strangers).

Treatment	Proportion of Full Cooperators	Proportion of Men [#Men]	Proportion of Women [#Women]
Strangers-Take-Aggregate (STA)	4.44%	15.00% [8]	0.61% [22]
Strangers-Take-Individual (STI)	24.44%	33.33% [12]	18.52% [18]
Strangers-Give-Aggregate (SGA)	5.78%	17.78% [9]	0.63% [21]
Strangers-Give-Individual (SGI)	17.28%	17.33% [20]	17.14% [7]

Figure S4 displays the path of the proportions of full cooperators for women and men by treatment. For women, there are extremely low proportions of full cooperators in all periods of treatments with Aggregate feedback. For men, in many periods the proportion of full cooperators in the STI treatment is much higher than the other three treatments. Note, our study lacks the necessary power to make stronger conclusions on these details.


Figure S4. Proportion of Full Cooperators Over Time (Strangers).

3. Extreme Behavior and Framing Interactions with Gender

Table S7 reports logit regressions for free-riding (coop $= 0$) in order to examine the interaction between gender and Take framing. The dependent variable in each model is an indicator variable equal to one if a subject's cooperation decision in a particular period is 0. Unlike previous regressions, we use indicators for Take framing, Individual feedback, and Partners matching instead of indicators for individual treatment conditions (such as STA, PGI, *etc.*). In Model 3 in Table S7 we fully interact these treatment variables with one another, which is equivalent to controlling for a full set of treatment condition indicators. This approach simplifies the interpretation of the main effect of Take framing and its interaction with gender, compared to interacting gender with treatment condition indicators.

Table S7. Logit Regressions for Free-Riding Interacting Gender with Take Framing.

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	0.04 ***	0.06 ***	0.07 ***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Lagged Cooperation of Others	—-	0.98 ***	0.98 ***
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Take	5.05 ***	5.54 ***	4.14 **
	(1.74)	(1.78)	(2.69)
Individual	1.35	1.50	1.44
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.94)
Partners	0.61 *	0.70	0.29 **
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.14)
Take × Individual	—-	—-	1.19
			(0.96)
Take × Partners	—-	—-	3.69 **
			(2.43)
Individual × Partners	—-	—-	2.62
			(2.12)
Take × Individual × Partners	—-	—-	0.23
			(0.23)
Female	0.94	0.89	0.88
	(0.40)	(0.35)	(0.38)
Female × Take	0.30 **	0.31 **	0.32 **
	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.18)
Period	1.10 ***	1.11 ***	1.11 ***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Odds ratios reported with standard errors are in parentheses. In all models, errors are clustered by subject for Strangers and group for Partners (162). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using 2-tailed tests; Model 1: $n = 3780$; Models 2 & 3: $n = 3092$.

The main effect of Take framing measures the framing effect for men. Take framing significantly increases free-riding for men (*p*-value < 0.001 in Models 1 and 2, *p*-value $= 0.029$ in Model 3). Women are less likely to free ride than men, but not significantly so. The interaction between Take framing and female gender indicates that the effect of Take framing is significantly weaker for women than

men (*p*-values = 0.028 in Model 1, 0.031 in Model 2, and 0.039 in Model 3). This result suggests the effect of Take framing on the likelihood of free-riding differs by gender. The effect of Take framing on free-riding for women (a linear combination of the coefficients for Take framing and the interaction term with gender) is insignificant in all models. This result is in contrast to the previous findings of Cox (2015), who found that Take framing had a stronger effect on cooperation for men than women, but increased free-riding for both. The results in Table S7 also show some evidence of greater free-riding under Partners matching than under Strangers matching (*p*-values = 0.074 in Model 1, 0.190 in Model 2, and 0.011 in Model 3).

Table S8 reports logit regressions for full cooperation (coop = 80) in order to examine the interaction between gender and Take framing. The dependent variable in each model is an indicator variable equal to one if a subject's cooperation decision in a particular period is 80.

Table S8. Logit Regressions for Full Cooperation Interacting Gender with Take Framing.

Independent Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	0.07 ***	0.04 ***	0.06 ***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Lagged Cooperation of Others	—-	1.03 ***	1.03 ***
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Take	2.10 **	1.81 *	0.50
	(0.73)	(0.58)	(0.46)
Individual	3.27 ***	2.67 ***	1.78
	(1.16)	(0.89)	(1.21)
Partners	1.59	1.27	0.89
	(0.50)	(0.37)	(0.56)
Take × Individual	—-	—-	4.08
			(4.10)
Take × Partners	—-	—-	3.80
			(3.98)
Individual × Partners	—-	—-	1.22
			(1.05)
Take × Individual × Partners	—-	—-	0.27
			(0.35)
Female	0.41 **	0.40 **	0.40 **
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Female × Take	0.93	1.00	1.03
	(0.47)	(0.51)	(0.53)
Period	1.00 ***	0.98	0.99
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Odds ratios reported with standard errors are in parentheses. In all models, errors are clustered by subject for Strangers and group for Partners (162). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels; Model 1: *n* = 3780; Models 2 & 3: *n* = 3092.

The main effect of Take framing measures the framing effect for men. There is some evidence that Take framing significantly increase full cooperation for men in Models 1 and 2 (p-values = 0.033 in Model 1 and 0.066 in Model 2), but it appears to insignificantly decrease full cooperation in Model 3 (p-value = 0.453). Women are singnificantly less likely to fully cooperate than men (p-values = 0.027 in Model 1, 0.016 in Model 2, and 0.016 in Model 3). The interaction between Take framing and female gender is insignificant in all models.

4. Strangers *vs.* Partners Matching Data

Descriptive Overview

Table S9 reports average cooperation levels and standard deviations in each treatment. Holding constant the frame and feedback conditions, average cooperation is higher with Partners matching than Strangers matching. When average cooperation is separated by gender, average cooperation with Partners matching is higher in all cases women and in all cases for men, except with Give framing and Aggregate feedback.

Table S9. Average Cooperation and Standard Deviation (Strangers and Partners).

Treatment	Individual-Level	-MEN- [#Men]	-WOMEN- [#Women]
Partners-Take-Aggregate (PTA)	36.14 (22.91)	33.54 (20.03) [14]	38.41 (25.60) [16]
Strangers-Take-Aggregate (STA)	32.42 (21.41)	25.82 (28.01) [8]	34.82 (18.68) [22]
Partners-Take-Individual (PTI)	47.24 (24.95)	46.75 (26.40) [32]	48.44 (21.89) [13]
Strangers-Take-Individual (STI)	35.15 (22.25)	37.52 (23.95) [12]	33.57 (21.60) [18]
Partners-Give-Aggregate (PGA)	30.97 (18.95)	37.38 (19.49) [15]	24.57 (16.60) [15]
Strangers-Give-Aggregate (SGA)	27.24 (18.03)	37.76 (15.99) [9]	22.73 (17.26) [21]
Partners-Give-Individual (PGI)	39.20 (23.38)	39.69 (23.69) [13]	38.82 (23.89) [17]
Strangers-Give-Individual (SGI)	33.34 (21.86)	34.70 (21.33) [20]	29.48 (24.64) [7]

Figure S5 displays the paths of average cooperation over time in four panels comparing matching while holding frame and feedback conditions. Figure S6 displays the paths in each panel separated by gender. The primary observation is the similarities of the time trends in each panel, the exception being the higher average cooperation after the first period with Take framing, Individual feedback, and Partners matching.

Table S10 reports the proportion of free riders (coop=0) in each treatment. Holding constant the frame and feedback conditions, there are higher proportions of free riders with Strangers matching compared to Partners matching in all cases, except with Take framing and Aggregate feedback. When the proportions of free riders are separated by gender, holding constant frame and feedback conditions, men have a higher proportion of free riders with Strangers matching in all cases. Women have a higher proportion of free riders in all cases, except with Take framing and Aggregate feedback.

**Figure S5.** Average Cooperation Over Time (Strangers and Partners).

Figure S6. Average Cooperation Over Time by Gender (Strangers and Partners).

Table S10. Proportion of Free Riders (Strangers and Partners).

Treatment	Proportion of Free Riders	Proportion of Men [#Men]	Proportion of Women [#Women]
Partners-Take-Aggregate (PTA)	18.89%	26.19% [14]	12.50% [16]
Strangers-Take-Aggregate (STA)	16.00%	42.50% [8]	6.36% [22]
Partners-Take-Individual (PTI)	21.63%	27.71% [32]	6.67% [13]
Strangers-Take-Individual (STI)	25.33%	30.56% [12]	21.85% [18]
Partners-Give-Aggregate (PGA)	2.67%	4.00% [15]	1.33% [15]
Strangers-Give-Aggregate (SGA)	9.33%	10.37% [9]	8.89% [21]
Partners-Give-Individual (PGI)	8.67%	10.26% [13]	7.45% [17]
Strangers-Give-Individual (SGI)	12.59%	10.67% [20]	18.10% [7]

Figure S7 displays the paths of proportion of free riders over time in four panels comparing matching while holding frame and feedback conditions. Figure S8 displays the paths in each panel separated by gender. The primary observation is the similarities of the time trends in each panel. Note, our study lacks the necessary power to make stronger conclusions on these gender details.


**Figure S7.** Proportion of Free Riders Over Time (Strangers and Partners).

Figure S8. Proportion of Free Riders Over Time by Gender (Strangers and Partners).

Table S11 reports the proportion of full cooperators (coop = 0) in each treatment. Holding constant the frame and feedback conditions, there are higher proportions of full cooperators with Partners matching compared to Strangers matching in all cases. When the proportions of full cooperators are separated by gender, holding constant frame and feedback conditions, men and women have higher proportions of full cooperators with Partners matching in all cases, except with Give framing and Aggregate feedback.

Table S11. Proportion of Full Cooperators (Strangers and Partners).

Treatment	Proportion of Full Cooperators	Proportion of Men [#Men]	Proportion of Women [#Women]
Partners-Take-Aggregate (PTA)	15.33%	21.43% [14]	10.00% [16]
Strangers-Take-Aggregate (STA)	4.44%	15.00% [8]	0.61% [22]
Partners-Take-Individual (PTI)	39.11%	43.96% [32]	27.18% [13]
Strangers-Take-Individual (STI)	24.44%	33.33% [12]	18.52% [18]
Partners-Give-Aggregate (PGA)	7.78%	15.56% [15]	0.00% [15]
Strangers-Give-Aggregate (SGA)	5.78%	17.78% [9]	0.63% [21]
Partners-Give-Individual (PGI)	17.56%	17.95% [13]	17.25% [17]
Strangers-Give-Individual (SGI)	17.28%	17.33% [20]	17.14% [7]

Figure S9 displays the paths of proportion of full cooperators over time in four panels comparing matching while holding frame and feedback conditions. Figure S10 displays the paths in each panel separated by gender. The primary observation is with Give framing, the time trends in each panel are similar. However, with Take framing, the time trends are higher with Partners matching in each panel. Note, our study lacks the necessary power to make stronger conclusions on these gender details.

**Figure S9.** Proportion of Full Cooperators Over Time (Strangers and Partners).

Figure S10. Proportion of Full Cooperators Over Time by Gender (Strangers and Partners).

Supplementary B: Experimental Instructions

Experiment Overview

This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision-making. In this experiment you will make a series of choices, each of which may earn you money. The amount of money you earn will depend on the decisions you make and on the decisions of others. If you listen carefully and make good decisions, you could earn a considerable amount of money that will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.

Ground Rules

Please make all decisions independently; do not communicate with others (in the room or outside the room) in any way during the experiment. This means no talking, no cell phone usage, no texting, no internet chatting, *etc*. Please do not attempt to use any software other than the experiment software provided. Failure to comply with these rules will lead to dismissal from the experiment.

Instructions (Give Treatments)

During the experiment, participants earn tokens. All participants will be paid based on the number of tokens they earn. Each token is worth 1 cent, or $1 for every 100 tokens.

[STRANGERS] The experiment consists of 15 periods. At the start of the first period, you will be randomly and anonymously matched into groups of 3. At the start of each later period, you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched into new groups of 3, so that your group changes every period.

[PARTNERS] The experiment consists of 15 periods. At the start of the first period, you will be randomly and anonymously matched into groups of 3. You will remain with the same group of 3 for all 15 periods of the experiment.

In each period, you will choose how to allocate tokens between your private account and a group account. Each other member of your group will be faced with the same choice. At the start of each period, you will have 80 tokens in your private account. The group account starts with a balance of 0 tokens. You may reallocate any number of tokens between 0 and 80 from your private account to the group account.

For each token you reallocate to the group account, 1 token will come out of your private account, but 2.25 tokens will go into the group account. At the end of each period, you get the tokens remaining in your private account plus 1/3 of the tokens in the group account. Similarly, each other member of your group will get the tokens remaining in their own private account plus 1/3 of the tokens in the group account. Thus, the tokens in the group account at the end of the period are divided equally among the 3 members of your group (including yourself).

In other words, for each token reallocated from a private account to the group account (by you or any other member of your group), the amount you and every other member of your group get from the group account at the end of the period is increased by 3/4 of a token each. To clarify, consider the following examples.

Suppose you and each of the other 2 members of your group reallocate 12 tokens each to the group account, for a total of 36 tokens. This number would be multiplied by 2.25, for a balance of 81 tokens in the group account at the end of the period. You would get the 68 tokens remaining in your private account plus a 1/3 share of the tokens in the group account (27 tokens). Thus, your total earnings for the period would be 95 tokens. Similarly, the other 2 members of your group would get 95 tokens each.

Suppose you reallocated 60 tokens to the group account, and the other 2 members of your group reallocated 8 tokens each to the group account, for a total of 76 tokens. This number would be multiplied by 2.25, for a balance of 171 tokens in the group account at the end of the period. You would get the 20 tokens remaining in your private account plus a 1/3 share of the balance of tokens in the group account (57 tokens). Thus, your total earnings for the period would be 77 tokens. Each of the other 2 members of your group would get the 72 tokens remaining in each of their private accounts plus 57 tokens each from the group account. Thus, the other 2 members of your group would get 129 tokens each.

[AGGREGATE FEEDBACK] Note that you must make your choice without knowing the choices of the other members of your group. Similarly, the other members of your group must make their choices without knowing anyone else's choice. At the end of each period, you will see the total number of tokens that were reallocated to the group account by your group. You will also see your own earnings in tokens for the period.

[INDIVIDUAL FEEDBACK] Note that you must make your choice without knowing the choices of the other members of your group. Similarly, the other members of your group must make their choices without knowing anyone else's choice. At the end of each period, you will see the number of tokens that were reallocated to the group account by each individual member of your group. You will also see your own earnings in tokens for the period.

[STRANGERS] Remember that you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched into new groups of 3 at the start of each period. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for the total number of tokens you earned in all 15 periods.

[PARTNERS] Remember that you will remain with the same group of 3 for the entire experiment. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for the total number of tokens you earned in all 15 periods.

Are there any questions before we begin the experiment?

Instructions (Take Treatments)

During the experiment, participants earn tokens. All participants will be paid based on the number of tokens they earn. Each token is worth 1 cent, or $1 for every 100 tokens.

[STRANGERS] The experiment consists of 15 periods. At the start of the first period, you will be randomly and anonymously matched into groups of 3. At the start of each later period, you will be randomly and anonymously re-matched into new groups of 3, so that your group changes every period.

[PARTNERS] The experiment consists of 15 periods. At the start of the first period, you will be randomly and anonymously matched into groups of 3. You will remain with the same group of 3 for all 15 periods of the experiment.

In each period, you will choose how to allocate tokens between your private account and a group account. Each other member of your group will be faced with the same choice. At the start of each

period, you will have 0 tokens in your private account. The group account starts with a balance of 540 tokens. You may reallocate any number of tokens between 0 and 80 from the group account to your private account.

For each token you reallocate from the group account, 1 token will go into your private account, but 2.25 tokens will come out of the group account. At the end of each period, you get the tokens in your private account plus 1/3 of the tokens remaining in the group account. Similarly, each other member of your group will get the tokens in their own private account plus 1/3 of the tokens in the group account. Thus, the tokens in the group account at the end of the period are divided equally among the 3 members of your group (including yourself).

In other words, for each token reallocated from the group account to a private account (by you or any other member of your group), the amount you and every other member of your group get from the group account at the end of the period is reduced by 3/4 of a token each. To clarify, consider the following examples.

Suppose you and each of the other 2 members of your group reallocate 68 each from the group account to your own private accounts, for a total of 204 tokens. This number would be multiplied by 2.25, changing the balance in the group account by 459 tokens from 540 to 81 at the end of the period. You would get the 68 tokens you reallocated to your private account plus a 1/3 share of the balance of tokens in the group account (27 tokens). Thus, your total earnings for the period would be 95 tokens. Similarly, the other 2 members of your group would get 95 tokens each.

Suppose you reallocated 20 tokens from the group account, and the other 2 members of your group reallocated 72 tokens each from the group account, for a total of 164 tokens. This number would be multiplied by 2.25, changing the balance in the group account by 369 tokens from 540 to 171 at the end of the period. You would get the 20 tokens you reallocated to your private account plus a 1/3 share of the balance of tokens in the group account (57 tokens). Thus, your total earnings for the period would be 77 tokens. Each of the other 2 members of your group would get the 72 tokens they each reallocated to their private accounts plus 57 tokens each from the group account. Thus, the other 2 members of your group would get 129 tokens each.

[AGGREGATE FEEDBACK] Note that you must make your choice without knowing the choices of the other members of your group. Similarly, the other members of your group must make their choices without knowing anyone else's choice. At the end of each period, you will see the total number of tokens that were reallocated from the group account by your group. You will also see your own earnings in tokens for the period.