Supplementary for Do Economists Punish Less?

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Supplementary A

Table A1. Summary statistics.

	DG (pooled) [a]	DG (altruist.) [a]	DG (egoist.) [a]	SDG	SDGP (pooled) [b]	SDGP (other) [b]	SDGP (own) [b]	Male	Age [c]	Knows DG	Semester	Trust [d]	High trust [e]	Number of correct control questions
Economics (narrow)														
Econ														
N	148	71	77	148	148	77	71	146	148	148	146	148	148	148
min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	18.00	0.00	2.00	-1.00	0.00	1.00
max	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	6.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
mean	26.91	29.42	24.60	43.68	0.32	0.30	0.34	0.77	21.66	0.16	3.14	0.22	0.57	5.75
std.dev.	26.89	26.49	27.21	40.65	0.47	0.46	0.48	0.42	1.44	0.36	1.04	0.93	0.50	0.65
Non-econ														
N	1275	633	642	1275	1275	638	637	1229	1275	1274	1274	1275	1275	1275
Min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	18.00	0.00	1.00	–1.00	0.00	1.00
Max	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	8.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
Mean	39.44	40.07	38.82	62.05	0.36	0.34	0.38	0.46	21.79	0.22	3.01	0.47	0.71	5.64
std.dev.	21.49	22.08	20.89	37.21	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.50	1.52	0.42	1.24	0.85	0.46	0.72
Economics (broad) [f]														
Econ														
N	600	299	301	600	600	304	296	572	600	600	598	600	600	600
min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	18.00	0.00	1.00	–1.00	0.00	1.00
max	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	8.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
mean	33.89	34.64	33.15	55.01	0.35	0.33	0.36	0.67	21.72	0.18	2.92	0.25	0.58	5.67
std.dev.	24.42	24.24	24.62	39.39	0.48	0.47	0.48	0.47	1.46	0.39	1.11	0.92	0.49	0.66
Non-econ														
N	823	405	418	823	823	411	412	803	823	822	822	823	823	823
min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	18.00	0.00	1.00	–1.00	0.00	1.00
max	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	8.00	1.00	1.00	6.00

				0										
mean	41.23	42.21	40.28	63.87	0.36	0.35	0.38	0.37	21.81	0.24	3.11	0.59	0.78	5.64
std.dev.	20.32	21.08	19.54	36.50	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.48	1.54	0.43	1.30	0.79	0.42	0.75
Non-econ educations separately														
Business Administration														
N	363	185	178	363	363	186	177	338	363	363	363	363	363	363
Min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	19.00	0.00	1.00	–1.00	0.00	1.00
Max	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.0 0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	8.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
Mean	36.27	35.66	36.90	58.34	0.37	0.33	0.40	0.68	21.73	0.19	2.87	0.21	0.56	5.63
std.dev.	23.68	23.96	23.44	38.14	0.48	0.47	0.49	0.47	1.50	0.39	1.13	0.94	0.50	0.67
Public Policy														
N	14	10	4	14	14	9	5	13	14	14	14	14	14	14
Min	0.00	0.00	20.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	19.00	0.00	2.00	–1.00	0.00	5.00
Max	50.00	50.00	50.00	100.0 0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	24.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
Mean	38.14	39.90	33.75	52.50	0.14	0.11	0.20	0.69	20.93	0.36	2.00	0.86	0.93	5.86
std.dev.	15.54	16.54	13.77	24.55	0.36	0.33	0.45	0.48	1.38	0.50	0.00	0.53	0.27	0.36
Marketing & Management Communication														
N	75	33	42	75	75	32	43	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
Min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	19.00	0.00	2.00	–1.00	0.00	3.00
Max	100.00	100.00	79.00	100.0 0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	26.00	1.00	6.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
Mean	35.37	38.55	32.88	61.71	0.35	0.44	0.28	0.40	21.95	0.16	2.87	0.39	0.63	5.65
std.dev.	21.78	21.60	21.86	41.17	0.48	0.50	0.45	0.49	1.30	0.37	1.12	0.85	0.49	0.69
Psychology														
N	176	85	91	176	176	81	95	173	176	176	176	176	176	176
Min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	18.00	0.00	2.00	–1.00	0.00	1.00
Max	100.00	100.00	80.00	100.0 0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	7.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
Mean	45.48	45.12	45.82	70.14	0.31	0.28	0.34	0.16	22.19	0.56	3.11	0.73	0.84	5.73
std.dev.	15.64	18.21	12.89	33.23	0.46	0.45	0.48	0.37	1.61	0.50	1.14	0.65	0.37	0.63
Law														
N	252	121	131	252	252	129	123	240	252	252	252	252	252	252
Min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	19.00	0.00	1.00	–1.00	0.00	1.00
Max	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	6.00	1.00	1.00	6.00

				0										
mean	38.55	39.68	37.50	61.25	0.37	0.39	0.34	0.35	21.23	0.06	2.66	0.23	0.60	5.52
std.dev.	22.41	23.99	20.88	37.38	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.48	1.41	0.24	0.97	0.96	0.49	0.93
Political Science														
N	220	112	108	220	220	106	114	219	220	220	220	220	220	220
Min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	19.00	0.00	1.00	–1.00	0.00	1.00
Max	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.0 0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	8.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
mean	39.07	41.01	37.06	57.71	0.44	0.35	0.52	0.53	21.55	0.27	2.95	0.80	0.90	5.61
std.dev.	21.82	21.70	21.87	38.80	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.50	1.38	0.44	1.16	0.58	0.31	0.74
Medicine														
N	120	62	58	120	120	65	55	120	120	119	119	120	120	120
Min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	20.00	0.00	2.00	–1.00	0.00	3.00
Max	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.0 0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	8.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
Mean	44.38	44.92	43.81	72.14	0.28	0.26	0.31	0.37	22.46	0.08	3.33	0.77	0.87	5.78
std.dev.	19.10	18.70	19.66	33.63	0.45	0.44	0.47	0.48	1.38	0.27	1.26	0.62	0.34	0.51
Other subject														
N	55	25	30	55	55	30	25	51	55	55	55	55	55	55
Min	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	19.00	0.00	1.00	–1.00	0.00	3.00
Max	60.00	60.00	50.00	100.0 0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	27.00	1.00	8.00	1.00	1.00	6.00
Mean	41.62	43.20	40.30	62.45	0.40	0.50	0.28	0.43	22.85	0.27	5.25	0.47	0.71	5.69
std.dev.	17.08	17.01	17.31	33.83	0.49	0.51	0.46	0.50	1.46	0.45	1.51	0.86	0.46	0.60

Notes. Total number of observations (N) 1423

[a] Results in the paper are based on the pooled data for the two DG treatments with an *altruistic* or an *egoistic* dictator example (see footnote 3 in the paper).

[b] Results in the paper are based on the pooled data for the two SDGP treatments where the free rider is from the *own group* or from *another group* (see Section 3.4 in the paper).

[c] Age is an approximation where all 27+ have been coded as being 27 years old.

[d] Trust question coded 1=Most people can be trusted, 0 = Don't know/Don't want to answer, –1 = You cannot be too careful.

[e] 1 = Most people can be trusted, 0 = other answer to the trust question.

[f] Broad definition includes Economics (narrow), Business Administration, Public Policy, and Marketing and Management Communication.

Table A2. Logistic regressions for determinants of generalized trust.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Economics (narrow)	–0.14 ***	–0.12 ***			Reference	Reference
	(0.04)	(0.04)			category	category
Economics (broad) [a]			–0.20 ***	–0.20 ***		
			(0.02)	(0.03)		
Business Administration					–0.01	–0.02
					(0.05)	(0.05)
Public Policy					0.36 ***	0.34 ***
					(0.08)	(0.08)
Marketing & Management Communication					0.06	0.02
					(0.07)	(0.07)
Other discipline		Reference category				
Psychology					0.27 ***	0.24 ***
					(0.05)	(0.05)
Law					0.03	0.03
					(0.05)	(0.05)
Political Science					0.32 ***	0.32 ***
					(0.05)	(0.05)
Medicine					0.30 ***	0.26 ***
					(0.05)	(0.05)
Other subject					0.14 *	0.15 **
					(0.07)	(0.08)
Male		–0.06 **		–0.02		–0.04
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.03)
Knows DG		0.06 **		0.05 *		0.01
		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.04)
SDGP control questions correct		0.04		0.04		0.04
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)
Semester		–0.02 *		–0.02 **		–0.03 *
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.02)
Age dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of observations	1423	1369	1423	1369	1423	1369

Notes. Dependent variable: trust (1 = Most people can be trusted, 0 = Don't know/Don't want to answer, –1 = You cannot be too careful) marginal effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.

[a] Broad definition includes Economics (narrow), Business Administration, Public Policy, and Marketing and Management Communication.

Table A3. Logistic regressions for punishment behavior in the other group treatment of the social dilemma game with punishment.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Economics (narrow)	–0.04	–0.03			Reference	Reference
	(0.06)	(0.06)			Category	category
Economics (broad) [a]			–0.02	–0.03		
			(0.04)	(0.04)		
Business Administration					0.03	0.02
					(0.06)	(0.06)
Public Policy					–0.19	–0.18
					(0.12)	(0.11)
Marketing & Management Communication					0.14	0.16
					(0.10)	(0.10)
Other discipline		Reference category				
Psychology					–0.01	0.05
					(0.07)	(0.08)
Law					0.09	0.09
					(0.07)	(0.07)
Political Science					0.05	0.05
					(0.07)	(0.07)
Medicine					–0.04	–0.02
					(0.07)	(0.08)
Other subject					0.20 *	0.28 **
					(0.11)	(0.11)
Male		0.08 **		0.09 **		0.09 **
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Knows DG		–0.02		–0.02		–0.01
		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.04)
SDGP control questions correct		–0.20 ***		–0.20 ***		–0.17 ***
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Trust [b]		–0.02		–0.02		
		(0.02)		(0.02)		
Semester		0.00		0.00		–0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
DG amount given		0.00		0.00		
		(0.00)		(0.00)		
SDG contribution		0.00 **		0.00 **		
		(0.00)		(0.00)		
Age dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of observations	715.00	690.00	715.00	690.00	715.00	690.00

Notes. Dichotomous dependent variable: Punishment. Marginal effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%.

[a] Broad definition includes Economics (narrow), Business Administration, Public Policy, and Marketing and Management Communication.

[b] Trust question coded 1 = Most people can be trusted, 0 =Don't know/Don't want to answer, –1 = You cannot be too careful.

Table A4. Logistic regressions for punishment behavior in the own group treatment of the social dilemma game with punishment.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Economics (narrow)	–0.04	–0.03			Reference	Reference
	(0.06)	(0.06)			category	category
Economics (broad) [a]			–0.02	–0.02		
			(0.04)	(0.04)		
Business Administration					0.06	0.05
					(0.07)	(0.07)
Public Policy					–0.14	–0.12
					(0.19)	(0.21)
Marketing & Management Communication					–0.06	–0.04
					(0.09)	(0.09)
Other discipline		Reference category				
Psychology					–0.00	0.02
					(0.07)	(0.08)
Law					0.00	–0.05
					(0.07)	(0.08)
Political Science					0.18 **	0.18 **
					(0.07)	(0.08)
Medicine					–0.03	–0.03
					(0.08)	(0.09)
Other subject					–0.06	–0.04
					(0.11)	(0.12)
Male		0.01		0.01		–0.02
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Knows DG		–0.06		–0.06		–0.09 **
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)
SDGP control questions correct		–0.08		–0.09		–0.09
		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)
Trust [b]		–0.02		–0.02		
		(0.02)		(0.02)		
Semester		0.02		0.02		0.03
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
DG amount given		0.00		0.00		
		(0.00)		(0.00)		
SDG contribution		0.00		0.00		
		(0.00)		(0.00)		
Age dummies	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of observations	708.00	679.00	708.00	679.00	708.00	679.00

Notes. Dichotomous dependent variable: Punishment. Marginal effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: ** = 5%.

[a] Broad definition includes Economics (narrow), Business Administration, Public Policy, and Marketing and Management Communication.

[b] Trust question coded 1 = Most people can be trusted, 0 = Don't know/Don't want to answer, –1 = You cannot be too careful.

Table A5. Regressions for the impact of the number of economics courses taken on contributions in the DG and SDG and on punishment behavior.

Variable	(1) DG	(2) DG	(3) SDG	(4) SDG	(5) Punishment	(6) Punishment
Number of economics courses [a]	–2.04 ***		–3.72 ***		–0.00	
	(0.47)		(0.71)		(0.04)	
Zero courses [b]			Reference category			
1 course [b]		–3.73 **		–6.65 ***		0.25 *
		(1.45)		(2.51)		(0.14)
2 courses [b]		–9.84 ***		–20.81 ***		–0.47
		(3.22)		(5.06)		(0.30)
3 courses [b]		–21.20 ***		–4.65		0.69
		(2.53)		(28.29)		(1.49)
3.5 courses [b]		–3.08		–10.53 ***		0.07
		(2.40)		(3.71)		(0.21)
6 courses [b]		–14.14 ***		–21.69 ***		0.07
		(3.33)		(4.94)		(0.27)
Male	–4.46 ***	–4.00 ***	–1.60	–0.69	0.14	0.12
	(1.29)	(1.33)	(2.19)	(2.21)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Knows DG	0.46	0.02	–0.56	–1.00	–0.19	–0.19
	(1.44)	(1.44)	(2.49)	(2.49)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Semester	1.14 *	0.40	3.46 ***	2.33 **	0.06	0.06
	(0.60)	(0.63)	(1.03)	(1.13)	(0.06)	(0.07)
DG control questions correct	–9.28	–9.25				
	(6.76)	(6.85)				
SDG control questions correct			–6.93 ***	–6.66 **		
			(2.61)	(2.61)		
SDGP control questions correct					–0.59 ***	–0.57 ***
					(0.18)	(0.18)
Constant	8.42	14.36	–7.59	3.61	–0.04	0.20
	(8.94)	(9.44)	(12.84)	(15.53)	(1.23)	(1.16)
Age dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	1368	1320	1368	1320	1320	1320

Notes. Dependent variable: 1–2: DG contribution to others (OLS), 3–4: SDG contribution to others (OLS), 5–6: Punishment in the SDG with punishment (logit). Regression coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. Excludes students in 'other education' category.

[a] Courses in micro, macro, or financial economics (10 ECTS = one full course).

[b] Dummies for the number of economics courses a student accumulated

Supplementary B

Participation Rate

The overall participation rate is 36.6%. The unweighted average of participation rates across study areas (excluding *Public Policy* and *Other subject*) is 35.8%. The number of people signed up for each course is administratively given and overestimates the actual number of people still participating in the course as recent drop-outs are still included. Moreover, many of the enrolled students are absent at any given lecture. This means that the true participation rate is substantially above the ones we provide in Table B1.

The lower participation rate from Medicine is probably explained by the fact that it was not possible to make a link to the survey available to the students on the course web page, and that a particularly small share of the class attended the lecture because it was an introductory lecture.

Table B1. Participation rates.

Education	People signed up for the course	Participated in the survey (N)	Participation rates
Economics	321	148	46.1 %
Business Administration	1176	363	30.9 %
Public Policy	Part of other education	14	-
Marketing & Management Communication	286	75	26.2 %
Psychology	419	176	42.0 %
Law	754	252	33.4 %
Political Science	485	220	45.4 %
Medicine	446	120	26.9 %
Other subject	Part of other education	55	-
Total	3887	1423	36.6 %

Notes: It is not possible to find the participation rate for the 14 public policy students as these students follow courses from both economics and political science. Likewise, it was not possible to identify the relevant courses of the 55 participants who specified 'other subject'. Note that these students are included in the number of people signed up for the courses, and they might even be enrolled in more than one course.

Supplementary C

Figure C1. Power calculation.



Supplementary D

Experimental Instructions (translated from Danish)

First Screen: Introduction

INTRODUCTION

Thank you for participating in this economic study, which consists of three experiments.

As a part of the study, you will be asked to allocate money between you and other participants. **Your earnings** from the study consists of what you have kept for yourself and what you receive from others. When the study is finished, 20 participants will be drawn from **the first two experiments** to receive the money they have earned during the respective experiment.

The participants come from different study areas at Aarhus University. Your reply is anonymous and no participants will be informed about your decisions. We kindly ask you not to discuss your answers with anyone during the study.

Remember to read all instructions thoroughly before you answer the questions.

Second Screen: Experiment 1, Altruistic Treatment

FIRST EXPERIMENT

You are matched with another participant, who is a **randomly selected student**. One of you becomes *the divider*, the other becomes *the receiver*. *The divider* gets a starting amount of 100 DKK, and he/she must divide it between him-/herself and *the receiver*. That is, *the divider* gives an amount (X) to *the receiver* and keeps the rest (100-X) for him-/herself.

In the following, you must imagine that **you are *the divider.***

Before you continue to the real decision, we would like to test your understanding of the experiment. Note that it is crucial for your participation that you answer the following question correctly.

As *divider*, you give 90 DKK to *the receiver*. What are **your** earnings? (NB: write only numbers)

Now for **the real decision**, which your earnings depend on: (NB: it is completely up to you how you wish to allocate the money. There is not a correct answer.)

State an amount between 0 and 100 DKK that you wish to give **to *the receiver***: (NB: write only numbers)

Second Screen: Experiment 1, Egoistic Treatment

FIRST EXPERIMENT

You are matched with another participant, who is a **randomly selected student**. One of you becomes *the divider*, the other becomes *the receiver*. *The divider* gets a starting amount of 100 DKK, and he/she must divide it between him/herself and *the receiver*. That is, *the divider* gives an amount (X) to *the receiver* and keeps the rest (100-X) for him/herself.

In the following, you must imagine that **you are *the divider.***

Before you continue to the real decision, we would like to test your understanding of the experiment. Note that it is crucial for your participation that you answer the following question correctly.

As *divider*, you give 10 DKK to *the receiver*. What are **your** earnings? (NB: write only numbers)

Now for **the real decision**, which your earnings depend on: (NB: it is completely up to you how you wish to allocate the money. There is not a correct answer.)

State an amount between 0 and 100 DKK that you wish to give **to *the receiver***: (NB: write only numbers)

Third Screen: Experiment 2

SECOND EXPERIMENT

In this experiment, you are in a **group with three other** participants, who are **randomly selected students**.

Everybody in your group now gets both the role of *the divider* and of *the receiver*. When one is a *divider*, one gets a starting amount of 100 DKK and must choose to divide them between oneself and *the receivers* (the others in your group). We triple any amount that one chooses to give to *the receivers*, so all three *receivers* get the amount.

All members of your group make their decision without knowing what the others have chosen.

Below, you can see an example:



This means that your total earnings consist of two parts:

1. The money you choose to keep (as *divider*)
2. The money you receive from your three group members (as *receiver*)

Your earnings are largest if you keep all 100 DKK for yourself - **no matter what the others do**. On the contrary, the total earnings of your group will be largest if you all give 100 DKK to *the receivers* as money given to *receivers* are multiplied by 3.

To ease your understanding of the experiment, three examples are listed below:

Example 1

All four group members **keep 100 DKK** for themselves; give 0 DKK to the others. The earnings for each group member becomes 100 DKK.

Example 2

All four group members **keep 0 DKK** for themselves; give 100 DKK to the others. The earnings for each group member becomes 300 DKK.

Example 3

You **keep 95 DKK** for yourself; give 5 DKK to the others. Your three group members **keep 10 DKK** for themselves; give 90 DKK to the others. The earnings of the group members are as follows (the colours indicate who the money comes from):



Before you continue to the real decision, we would like to test your understanding of the experiment. Note that it is crucial for your participation that you answer the following question correctly.

If you want to make **the total earnings of your group** as large as possible, which strategy should you choose?

- To give 0 DKK to *the receivers*
- To give 50 DKK to *the receivers*
- To give 100 DKK to *the receivers*

If you wish to make **your own earnings** as large as possible, which strategy should you choose?

- To give 0 DKK to *the receivers*
- To give 50 DKK to *the receivers*
- To give 100 DKK to *the receivers*

Now for **the real decision**, which your earnings depend on: (NB: it is completely up to you how you wish to allocate the money. There is not a correct answer.)

State an amount between 0 and 100 DKK that you wish to give **to *the three receivers***: (NB: write only numbers)

Fourth screen: experiment 3, other-treatment

THIRD EXPERIMENT

You cannot be paid on the basis of this last experiment.

Imagine that you are in a new group with three other participants. Again, everybody makes a decision about the allocation of 100 DKK.

Now, you hear how the members of **another group** has allocated the 100 DKK. From the allocations, you now—**as the only one**—get the opportunity to punish the group member (Y) who has given the least to the others in **the other group** (i.e. kept most for him/herself). The punishment reduces Y's earnings with **100 DKK**. It costs you **10 DKK** to punish Y.

Note: as *divider*, you only give to the members of **your own group**.

Before you continue to the real decision, we would like to test your understanding of the experiment. Note that it is crucial for your participation that you answer the following question correctly.

What does it cost you to punish a member in the other group?

- 5 DKK
- 10 DKK
- 50 DKK

Is the person you can punish a member of your group?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

How much does a person lose if you punish him/her?

- 10 DKK
- 50 DKK
- 100 DKK

Now to the decision:

Imagine that you gave 100 DKK to *the receivers* in your group. You now hear about **another group** in which three persons gave 100 DKK and one gave 0 DKK.

Below, you can see what you and each of the members of **the other group** have earned and kept and how a punishment will affect the earnings:



Do you wish to punish Group Member A from **the other group**?

- Yes, I wish to punish Group Member A from the other group
- No, I do not wish to punish Group Member A from the other group

Fourth screen: experiment 3, own-treatment

THIRD EXPERIMENT

You cannot be paid on the basis of this last experiment.

Imagine that you are in a new group with three other participants. Again, everybody makes a decision about the allocation of 100 DKK.

Now, you hear how the others have allocated the 100 DKK. From the allocations, you - **as the only one** - get the opportunity to punish the group member (Y) who has given the least to the others in your group (i.e. kept most for him/herself). The punishment reduces Y's earnings with **100 DKK**. It costs you **10 DKK** to punish Y.

Before you continue to the real decision, we would like to test your understanding of the experiment. Note that it is crucial for your participation that you answer the following question correctly.

What does it cost you to punish a member in your group?

- 5 DKK
- 10 DKK
- 50 DKK

Is the person you can punish a member of your group?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

How much does a person lose if you punish him/her?

- 10 DKK
- 50 DKK
- 100 DKK

Now to the decision:

Imagine that **you and two others** in your group gave 100 DKK to *the receivers* and **one** gave 0 DKK. Below, you can see what you and each of the members of your group have earned and kept and how a punishment will affect the earnings:



Do you wish to punish Group Member B?

- Yes, I wish to punish Group Member B
- No, I do not wish to punish Group Member B

Fifth Screen: Other Information

OTHER INFORMATION

Finally, we would like to ask you to fill in the following information:

Gender

- Male
- Female

Age

Education

Semester

Have you previously heard about a "Dictator game"?

- Yes
- No

Generally speaking, do you think most people can be trusted, or do you think that you cannot be too careful in dealing with other people?

- Most people can be trusted
- You cannot be too careful
- Don't know/Don't want to answer

Optionally: if you have any comments for the study, we ask you to write them below:

Sixth Screen: Thank You for Participating and Procedure for Payment

You have now completed the experiment!

Please write your email if you want the chance to be selected for payment. (NB: we will only use your email in case you are selected for payment. If you are selected, you must also state your CPR-number, and your payment will be reported as taxable income (B-tax).)

Thank you for your participation!

Procedure for payment:
If your reply is selected, your earnings will be as follows from the different experiments:

1. In the first experiment, you are matched with one other participant. Here, it is randomly decided who is to be the divider and who is to be the receiver, and the dividers' allocation decides the payment for you and the other participant.

2. In the second experiment, you are matched with three other participants. Here, all your allocations to each other are completed, and we triple any amount given to the receivers.
3. In the third and final experiment, your choice does not affect your earnings as it is stated in the instructions for this part.

Note that it is possible to be selected for more than one experiment, and your total earnings from the study can thus be up to 500 DKK.