Blockchain Consensus: An Overview of Alternative Protocols
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. Contribution and Scope
- An introduction to widely adopted, conventional consensus protocols, such as PoW and PoS, for the benefit of readers who are new to the area.
- A survey of alternative consensus protocols that have been proposed within the past three years (as of April 2021).
- Categorization of alternative consensus protocols based on their properties as depicted in Figure 2.
- An evaluation of the overall performance of these alternative protocols based on metrics depicted in throughput, security, energy consumption, finality, and scalability.
- A critical analysis of alternative protocols based on their properties, advantages, and disadvantages.
1.2. Outline
2. Past Reviews
3. Popular Consensus Protocols
3.1. Proof of Work
3.2. Delayed Proof of Work
3.3. Proof of Stake
3.4. Delegated Proof of Stake
3.5. Proof of Authority
3.6. Proof of Importance
3.7. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
3.8. Ripple Protocol
3.9. Delegated Byzantine Fault Tolerance
3.10. Federated Byzantine Agreement
- If all nodes in a slice are in agreement about the system state, v assumes that they are right.
- System information can be obtained by v in a timely fashion from one of the quorum slices at any given time.
3.11. Proof of Elapsed Time
3.12. Proof of Burn
3.13. Proof of Capacity
4. Alternative Protocols
- Consensus protocol based on Effort or Work (CPE).
- Consensus protocol based on Wealth or Resources (CPW).
- Consensus Protocol based on Past Behavior or Reputation (CPPB).
- Consensus Protocol based on Representation (CPR).
4.1. Consensus Protocols Based on Effort or Work
4.1.1. Proof of Benefit
4.1.2. Proof of Phone
- Block control unit (BCU): Verify integrity of blocks and transactions.
- Micro mining accelerator (MMA): Perform hashing operations.
- Data transceiver: Communicate with peers.
- Key authentication unit (KAU): Contains device-specific, system identifiers in a one-time programmable memory for authentication purposes (enforces one AMU per smartphone rule).
4.1.3. Proof of Learning
- Suppliers: Nodes who host machine learning competitions.
- Trainers: Nodes who train and submit models for machine learning tasks.
- Validators: Nodes who evaluate the machine learning models, form a consensus and propose new blocks.
4.1.4. Proof of Sincerity
4.1.5. Proof of Accuracy
4.1.6. Proof of Adjourn
4.1.7. Proof of Search
4.1.8. Proof of Evolution
4.1.9. Proof of Experience
4.2. Consensus Protocols Based on Wealth or Resources
Proof of Participation and Fees
4.3. Consensus Protocols Based on Past Behavior or Reputation
4.3.1. Proof of Familiarity
- Patient, P;
- Recovered patient ;
- Doctor, D;
- Insurance company, .
- The doctor’s judgment: To rate a doctor’s decision, factors such as job experience time (JET) and treatment success rate (TSR) are considered. The IFI of a doctor is represented as (job experience time and treatment success rate).
- The perspective of a recovered patient: To evaluate the perspective of a recovered patient, factors such as treatment experience time (TET), current condition (CC), and experience of disease (ED) of recovered patients are considered. The IFI of a recovered patient is represented as (treatment experience time, current condition and experience of disease).
- Insurance company’s perception: The perception of an insurance company is a significant aspect of collaborative medical decision making. IFI of an insurance company is calculated from the settlement time (ST) and cover amount (CA). is represented as (settlement time and amount covered by the insurance).
4.3.2. Proof of Reputation
- Broadcasting transactions: A service requestor records the rate of the service via feedback at the end of each interaction. This message is broadcast along with its signature to other nodes who then verify and store them in memory.
- Building blocks: Nodes receive transactions until a certain threshold. Upon hitting this threshold, the node stops receiving transactions and ranks each service provider based on this set of transactions. If the current node happens to be the highest-ranked service provider, it constructs and publishes a block, signed with its private key.
- Verifying blocks: The block is appended to the blockchain after verifying that the sender is truly the most reputable node. This is performed by all nodes receiving the block, who also verify transaction signatures using the signer’s public key. If verification is successful, the block is included in the blockchain.
4.3.3. Proof of Reputation X
4.4. Consensus Protocol Based on Representation
4.4.1. Proof of Vote
- Commissioners: Commissioners are chosen from the consortium members, represented by a working node. A Commissioner has the power to recommend, vote and evaluate the Butlers in addition to the obligation of verifying and forwarding both transactions. All Commissioners are considered to be of equal status. Every block generated in the blockchain network is sent to and verified by all Commissioners. A block is marked as valid and be added to the blockchain if it receives at least of the votes.
- Butlers: Blocks are produced by Butler nodes, which are limited in number. Butlers are analogous to miners in PoW but rather than competing to be a block producer based on computational capability, they take turns to be appointed randomly. Butlers are in charge of gathering transaction data, packing them into blocks and signing them. They are then rewarded for their efforts, taken from an alliance fund that is supplemented by commissioners. Butlers are elected by commissioners from the list of Butler candidates. After the tenure cycle is over, Butlers can accept re-election. It is possible for a node to be both a Commissioner and a Butler at the same time.
- Butler candidates: A Butler is elected from Butler candidates based on votes by Commissioners who vote to elect the candidates. In the advent of a loss in the election, they can stay online and wait for the next election. Butler candidates are scored based on their performance during their tenure as a Butler. This score is taken into consideration when voting for new Butlers. Three mandatory steps are required to apply to be a Butler candidate:
- Register a user account and submit an application.
- Submit a recommendation cryptographically signed by at least one Commissioner.
- Submit deposit, which is used to enforce good behavior.
- Ordinary users: Ordinary users can join or exit the network anytime without being authorized, and their behavior can be arbitrary. Ordinary users can only be part of block distribution and message forwarding that are not part of block generation unless they apply to become Butlers. The entire consensus protocol is visible to ordinary users.
4.4.2. CHB and CHBD
- Nodes broadcast their digital certificate and verify the validity of all digital certificates broadcast by their peers. These certificates are then hashed and included in a digital certificate Merkle tree.
- Nodes can then issue and broadcast transactions to their peers. All nodes collect transactions, verify them, and forward them. These transactions are also hashed and included in a transaction Merkle tree.
- At the end of the transaction period, one of the nodes are selected at random based on the consistent hash algorithm and digital certificate serial numbers from one of the previous blocks in the blockchain. The chosen node receives tokens and is granted the privilege of creating the new block.
- Other nodes validate the new block and include it into their copy of the blockchain. The validation process also includes a check to ensure that the same node cannot be selected consecutively as the block leader.
5. Evaluation of Alternative Protocols
5.1. Evaluation Metrics
5.2. Protocol Comparison
6. Discussion
6.1. Critical Analysis
6.2. Open Problems and Future Research Work
- Adopting design philosophies that channel puzzle-solving toward useful purposes.
- Incorporating non-transferable incentives (such as reputation or familiarity) that can dynamically control mining difficulty.
- Redesigning permissioned blockchain protocols with desirable properties to be applicable for public blockchains.
- Redesigning or improving alternative protocols to be applicable for real-world use.
- Conducting an experimental evaluation of alternative protocols on the same machine using the same simulation framework, such as BlockSim.
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Author | Consensus Protocols | Evaluation Metrics |
---|---|---|
This Paper | 15 Alternative Protocols (Section 4) | Energy Consumption, Scalability, Finality, Security, Throughput |
Xiao et al. [19] | PoW, Hybrid PoW-BFT, Chain-based PoS, Committee-based PoS, BFT-based, PoS, DPoS, PoA, PoET, PoTS, Proof of Reputation (PoR, Ripple protocol | Block proposal, block validation, information propagation, block finalization, incentive mechanism, fault tolerance, transaction capacity |
Vukolic [15] | PoW, BFT | Node identity management, consensus finality, scalability (No. of nodes), scalability (No. of clients), performance (throughput, latency), power consumption, fault tolerance |
Banor et al. [17] | PoW, PoS, PoR | Security (transaction censorship resistance, DoS resistance, adversary), performance (throughput, scalability, latency and experimental setup) |
Wang et al. [18] | PoW, Proof of Exercise, Proof of Retrievability, PoC, Proof of Human Work | Origin of hardness, design goal, implementation description, zero-knowledge proof properties, simulation of a random function, features of puzzle design |
Shikah et al. [20] | PoW, PoS, DPoS, PoA, PoI, Proof of Luck, PBFT, Raft | Node identity management, data model, electing miners, energy-saving ability, fault tolerance (Byzantine, crash, attack), transaction fee, block reward, performance (verification speed, throughput, block creation speed), scalability, double spending |
Ismail and Materwala [21] | PoW, DPoW, PoS, DPoS, Proof of Stake Velocity (PoSV), PoB, PoC, PoH, PoI, Proof of Believability, PoA, PoET, Proof of Activity, PBFT, DBFT, FBA, DPoS+BFT, Raft | Scalability, complexity, cost effectiveness, energy efficiency |
Lepore et al. [22] | PoW, PoS, Pure PoS | Throughput, scalability |
Consensus Protocol | Cryptocurrencies |
---|---|
PoW | Bitcoin (2009), Litecoin (2011), Namecoin (2011), Peercoin (2012), Dogecoin (2013), Primecoin (2013), Auroracoin (2014), Mazacoin (2014), Monero(2014), Dash (2014), Titcoin (2014), Verge (2014), Vertcoin (2014), Ethereum (2015), Tether (2015), Zcash (2016), Ethereum Classic (2015), Bitcoin Cash (2017) |
dPoW | Komodo (2014) |
PoS | Nxt (2013), Gridcoin (2013), Potcoin (2014), Steem (2014), Tezos (2014), Ouroboros (2016), Algorand (2017) |
DPoS | EOS (2017) |
PoA | Ethereum Kovan (2019) |
RP | Ripple (2013) |
PoS | Dash (2014) |
POI | NEM (2014) |
PBFT | Tendermint (2014), Hyperledger Fabric (2015), Diem (2020) |
DBFT | NEO (2014) |
FBA | Stellar (2014) |
PoET | Hyperledger Sawtooth (2015) |
PoBr | Slim Coin (2014) |
PoC | SpaceMint (2014) |
Protocols | Energy Consumption | Scalability | Finality | Tolerated Adversary | Throughput (Tps) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
PoF | Low | High | Absolute | ≤75% | Very High |
PoR | Low | High | Probabilistic | Instant Detection | High |
PoRX | Low | PoX-dependent | Probabilistic | >50% | PoX-dependent |
PoX-R | PoX-dependent | PoX-dependent | PoX-dependent | ≤50% | PoX-dependent |
PoB | High | Moderate | Probabilistic | ≤50% | High |
PoP | High | Moderate | Probabilistic | ≤50% | Low |
PoL | Moderate | Low | Probabilistic | ≤50% | Low |
PoSn | High | Moderate | Probabilistic | ≤50% | Moderate |
PoA | Low | Moderate | Probabilistic | - | High |
PoPF | Moderate | High | Probabilistic | ≤50% | Moderate |
PoV | Low | High | Probabilistic | ≤50% | Moderate |
CHB * | Low | Low/Moderate | Probabilistic | >50%/≤50% | Low/High |
CHBD * | Low | Low/Moderate | Probabilistic | >50%/≤50% | Low/Moderate |
PoAj | High | Moderate | Probabilistic | ≤50% | High |
PoE | High | Moderate | Probabilistic | ≤50% | Moderate |
PoEx | High | Moderate | Probabilistic | ≤50% | Moderate |
PoSe | High | Moderate | Probabilistic | ≤50% | Moderate |
Protocol Category | Protocol | Description | Advantages | Disadvantages |
---|---|---|---|---|
Consensus Protocol based on Effort or Work (CPE) | PoB *, PoP, PoL *, PoSn, PoA, PoPF, PoAj, PoSe *, PoE *, PoEx * | Computational effort required to publish blocks | Large computational effort required to attack protocol, computational power spent for useful purposes * | High energy consumption, benefits nodes that amass computing power |
Consensus Protocol based on Wealth or Resources (CPW) | PoPF | Staked wealth or payment required to publish blocks | Enormous wealth required to attack protocol, no energy wastage | Benefits wealthy participants |
Consensus Protocol based on Past Behavior or Reputation (CPPB) | PoF **, PoR **, PoRx ***, PoX-R ***, PoPF | Non-transferable incentive based on node behaviour affects the selection of block publisher | Attacker must gather trust/reputation incentive which will be lost due to malicious actions, incentive is non-transferable, inherit advantages from underlying protocols *** | Only for permissioned blockchains **, inherits disadvantages from underlying protocols *** |
Consensus Protocol based on Representation (CPR) | PoV **, CHB, CHBD | Block publishers are selected based on voting/election mechanism | An attacker must first be elected and have control of other elected representatives to be successful, faster validation due to small number of validators | Tends toward centralization, only for permissioned blockchains ** |
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Oyinloye, D.P.; Teh, J.S.; Jamil, N.; Alawida, M. Blockchain Consensus: An Overview of Alternative Protocols. Symmetry 2021, 13, 1363. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym13081363
Oyinloye DP, Teh JS, Jamil N, Alawida M. Blockchain Consensus: An Overview of Alternative Protocols. Symmetry. 2021; 13(8):1363. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym13081363
Chicago/Turabian StyleOyinloye, Damilare Peter, Je Sen Teh, Norziana Jamil, and Moatsum Alawida. 2021. "Blockchain Consensus: An Overview of Alternative Protocols" Symmetry 13, no. 8: 1363. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym13081363
APA StyleOyinloye, D. P., Teh, J. S., Jamil, N., & Alawida, M. (2021). Blockchain Consensus: An Overview of Alternative Protocols. Symmetry, 13(8), 1363. https://doi.org/10.3390/sym13081363