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Peer-Review Record

Competing Historical Narratives: Memory Politics, Identity, and Democracy in Germany and Poland

Soc. Sci. 2023, 12(7), 391; https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12070391
by Oliver Schmidtke
Reviewer 1: Anonymous
Reviewer 2: Anonymous
Soc. Sci. 2023, 12(7), 391; https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci12070391
Submission received: 14 May 2023 / Revised: 26 June 2023 / Accepted: 27 June 2023 / Published: 4 July 2023

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

This is a highly readable and clearly argued piece of research. It adds to a wider body of research on memory in Eastern and Central Europe (although I missed reference to a good deal of that research in the bibliography, perhaps for reasons of space: e.g. Maria Malksoo, James Mark)

In general, although the empirical analysis of elite discourse provided helpful evidence for some of the claims, the insights into memory discourses in Germany and Poland will not be surprising to researchers who have been following developments in these two states over the past 20 years or so.

At times, although there is an acknowledgement of the recent successes of the AfD in Germany, I felt that the East/West distinction was too sharply drawn. Populism and populist memory are hardly unique to Hungary and Poland, although they have been arguably more successful there in electoral terms. Certainly from the British perspective, a turn to right wing populism within the political mainstream, underpinned by a populist memory politics, has had a significant impact, although it has nothing to do with memory of communism. I suppose my point here is that we see the rise of populist across Western and Eastern Europe (and further afield) in different forms that are conditioned by national political cultures and historical experiences, so that (implicitly) placing Poland and Hungary in the role of a threat to a Western-dominated consensus or as somehow incompatible with an alleged consensus looks increasingly tenuous. I kept wondering whether it would be more productive to situate different forms of populist memory in different European nations as local responses to a wider crisis of liberal democracy, which is something closer to what Dan Stone does in his 2014 book Goodbye to All That?, for instance.  

There are a few minor typos.

Author Response

Thank you very much for your very helpful review and suggestions. 

I included references to the work of Malksoo and Mark in the revised version of the text. 

On your main point: I cannot agree more with you on your assessment that threats to democracy are by no means only an Eastern European phenomenon (I have also written on the rise of right-wing populism/ nationalism in Italy and the UK). I included a brief (hopefully clarifying) reflection on this point in the concluding section of the revised text. My argument in this article was to shed light on how the dominant frames in Poland's memory politics and its use by the country's current political elite demonstrates an 'affinity' towards illiberal democracy. 

I am afraid that I will have to leave your well-taken suggestion 'to situate different forms of populist memory in different European nations as local responses to a wider crisis of liberal democracy' for a future writing project'. I will keep your suggestion in mind when working on the final version of the book associated with this journal article. 

Reviewer 2 Report

"Competing Historical Narratives: Memory Politics, Identity, and Democracy in Germany and Poland"

Social Sciences

 

The author has addressed the conjunctions between collective memory and national narratives to elucidate if they work in favor of a liberal democratic culture or against it.  In some countries—mainly the former Eastern European block—collective memories work to support similar nation-building narrations but at the cost of suppressing dissent or alternative discourses.  These nation-state narrations focus on constructing an ethnically homogenous group of people under the law of a state.  On the other hand, in most of the former Western European countries, like Germany, narrations that explain how the state and the nation came about usually emphasize democratic and citizen rights.  By paying close attention to two cases studies—Germany and Poland, one country from the West and the other a former Communist dictatorship—the author studies the two major political tendencies in relation to democracy in Europe as of today. 

 

From my point of view, the essay should be published as is.  As a matter of fact, I am already looking forward to reading the author's book, the essay I am evaluating here being one the chapters.  Hopefully, and once this review is sent to the editor, the journal will provide me with the author's name so that I can read their work.

 

Even though the essay is ready for publication, I would like to make a few suggestions:

 

1.  It wouldn’t hurt to include a brief definition of collective memory or national identities.  Somehow this is done throughout the essay, but an explanation of the concepts could place the author and the reader on the same intellectual page.  In relation to the topic of collective-individual memory, authors such as Maurice Hallbwachs or Pierre Nora come to my mind.  Even though these authors do not strictly belong to the field of empirical social sciences, their work is a must for anyone doing research in this discipline.  Perhaps the author clarifies these concepts in their book-length project. 

 

2.  It is impossible to discuss even briefly all the countries in the European West or East.  And it is true that both Germany and Poland are very good examples of how the former European block still behaves within the European Union: in broad terms, the West tending to the deepening of liberal democracy while the East being more interested in nation-building formation.  This is why some countries from the East show worrisome illiberal tendencies.  Poland and Hungry are the two most striking examples.  However, we cannot forget that the extreme political right is in power in Italy, the birth place of Fascism; that the official national French narratives do not deal very well with the Vichy regime because the Resistance myth portrays many inconsistencies; that it has taken Spain about 50 years after the death of the dictator to come up with a decent so- called memory law; or that in Austria, Sweden, Netherlands, Finland, among other countries, white supremacist groups—the extreme political right—hold sways of power.  My point being that in the West, liberal democracy is also under strain. 

 

One more time, a real pleasure to read this intelligent, insightful, and well-written paper. 

Author Response

Thank you very much for your very helpful review and suggestions. 

In the revised version of the text, I tried to clarify the definition of national identity. In the slightly expanded theoretical section of the article I also briefly referenced/ cited Halbwachs’ concept of collective memory. 

On your main point: I cannot agree more with you on your assessment that threats to democracy are by no means only an Eastern European phenomenon (I have also written on the rise of right-wing populism/ nationalism in Italy and the UK). I included a brief (hopefully clarifying) reflection on this point in the concluding section of the revised text. My argument in this article was to shed light on how the dominant frames in Poland's memory politics and its use by the country's current political elite demonstrates an 'affinity' towards illiberal democracy. 

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