Physical Layer Authentication and Identification of Wireless Devices Using the Synchrosqueezing Transform
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- A more extensive review of the related work in the literature for the problem of physical layer authentication (e.g., RAI, SEI or RF-DNA) and on the application of WSST.
- In the initial paper, only the identification problem was analyzed. In this paper, we also evaluate the verification/authentication problem.
- In the initial paper, only the K nearest neighbor with K = 1 was used to compare the performance of WSST with the other representations. In this paper, the authors have compared the results from different machine learning algorithms.
- A more extensive analysis and optimization of the hyperparameters of WSST and machine learning algorithms is performed in this paper.
2. Related Work
3. Definition of the Wavelet Synchrosqueezing Transform
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Materials
- Twelve wireless devices (i.e., GSM mobile phones) of 4 different brands (Sony Experia, HTC One, Samsung S5 and Apple iPhone): three phones were used for each of the four models.
- An OpenBTS software was used to activate the GSM communication from each of 12 wireless Devices Under Test (DUT) and to generate the signal in space.
- A Universal Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) type N200 receiver (RX) configured with a sampling rate of 1 MHz is used to collect the signal in space from each of the 12 transmitting wireless devices. The wireless devices were linked with a GSM base station implemented using OpenBTS running on a USRP N200. The base station and digitizer were fully disciplined and synchronized using a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver with a Global Positioning System Disciplined Oscillator (GPSDO). To support repeatability and stability, the same USRP digitizer, as well as the same base station were used for all tests. All tests were performed after a minimum half hour lock after the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver was properly synchronized on at least four satellites. In the Software-Defined Radio (SDR), the signal is received and down-converted using a WBX, flexible frequency front-end compatible with the USRP with a passing bandwidth of 40 MHz and tuning capabilities from 20 MHz to 2 GHZ. Then, the signal is digitally down-converted by the built-in Digital Down Converter (DDC) employing half band and Cascaded Integrator Comb (CIC) decimators from 100 MHz to 1 MHz.
4.2. Methodology
- Each of the 12 wireless devices (i.e., GSM mobile phones) were activated, and they started to transmit in a controlled environment where a specific transmission channel is used.
- The signal in space from the wireless devices was collected using the SDR USRP type N200 receiver with the configuration described in the previous section.
- The real-valued signal samples were sampled directly in In-phase and Quadrature components (IQ) format and then synchronized and normalized offline to extract the burst of traffic associated with each payload. For each wireless device, a set of 800 bursts was processed for a total of 800 × 12 = 9600 bursts.
- From each burst, the content (payload data associated with the voice communication) was removed. In this way, each burst has only the transients and the preamble, which is the same for all the bursts and all the devices. After the removal, each burst is around 130 samples in length. An image of the normalized magnitude of the GSM bursts after synchronization, normalization and content removal is presented in Figure 2, where the differences among wireless devices can be seen especially near the transients. We note that the granularity of the digitized signal (i.e., number of samples for each burst) used for identification is quite inferior to the granularity of the datasets used by other authors [6,12,18], where a very high identification accuracy is obtained. This is intentional because the objective of this paper is to show that the application of WSST provides a better performance than conventional techniques from the literature in difficult datasets like the one used in this paper.
- WSST was applied to each of the bursts recorded in the test bed. A representation of the burst is shown in Figure 3 for the Morlet mother wavelet, the scale factor and the entire GSM burst.
- Different machine learning algorithms are used for classification to implement identification and authentication: Support Vector Machine (SVM), K Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and decision trees. A 10-fold method was used for all the machine learning algorithms. Each collection of statistical fingerprints is divided into ten blocks. Nine blocks from each device are used for training, and one block is held out for classification. The training and classification process is repeated ten times until each of the ten blocks has been held out and classified. Thus, each block of statistical fingerprints is used once for classification and nine times for training. Final cross-validation performance statistics are calculated by averaging the results of all folds.
- Optimization of the hyperparameters: In the application of WSST, the scale factor a from Equation (1) is used as a hyperparameter. The window size both for WSST and STFT is set to 10 because this is roughly the size of the transient of the burst. Each of the machine learning algorithms can be optimized on the basis of specific parameters (e.g., K index for the KNN algorithm). The optimization of these parameters is described in detail in Section 5.
- Metrics definition: For identification, the overall identification accuracy is used as a metric to evaluate the performance of the identification. The accuracy is defined as the sum of the True Positives (TP)s and True Negatives (TN)s divided by the number of all samples. To show the relevance of False Positives (FP) and False Negatives (FN) in the final results, a confusion matrix is also provided. For verification and authentication, the adopted metrics are the Receiver Operative Characteristics (ROC) and the Equal Error Rate (EER), which is the point on the ROC where false positive and false negative rates are equal. The value of the X axis is used to determine the EER in this paper.
- Impact of noise. Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) is added to the original data sample to simulate the presence of noise in the environment. This is a common practice in the literature [26,27] to evaluate the performance of the classification algorithm in terms of identification accuracy for different values of Signal Noise Ratio (SNR).
5. Discussion of the Results
5.1. Identification
5.1.1. Optimization of the Hyperparameters
5.1.2. Comparison of the WSST-Based Approach with Other Signal Representations in the Presence of AWGN
5.2. Authentication
5.3. Authentication of Unknown Devices
6. Conclusions
Supplementary Materials
Supplementary File 1Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
AWGN | Additive White Gaussian Noise |
CMOS | Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor |
CWT | Continuous Wavelet Transform |
DDC | Digital Down Converter |
ECG | Electro-CardioGram |
EER | Equal Error Rate |
EMD | Empirical Mode Decomposition |
FAR | False Accept Rate |
FN | False Negatives |
FP | False Positives |
FRR | False Reject Rate |
GNSS | Global Navigation Satellite System |
GSM | Global System for Mobile Communications |
GT | Gabor Transform |
GWT | Gabor–Wigner Transform |
HHT | Hilbert–Huang Transform |
ISM | Industrial, Scientific and Medical |
ISO | International Organization for Standardization |
JPEG | Joint Photographic Experts Group |
KNN | K Nearest Neighbor |
PNU | Pixel Non-Uniformity |
PRNU | Photo-Response Non-Uniformity noise |
PUF | Physical Unclonable Functions |
RAI | Radiometric Identification |
RF | Radio Frequency |
RF-DNA | Radio Frequency DNA |
ROC | Receiver Operative Characteristics |
SDR | Software-Defined Radio |
SNR | Signal to Noise Ratio |
SST | Synchrosqueezing Transform |
STFT | Short Time Fourier Transform |
SVM | Support Vector Machine |
TAR | True Accept Rate |
TD | Time Domain |
TFD | Time Frequency Domain |
TN | True Negatives |
TP | True Positives |
UMTS | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System |
USRP | Universal Software Radio Platform |
WSST | Wavelet Synchrosqueezed Transform |
WVD | Wigner–Ville distribution |
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Sampling frequency | 1 MS/s IQ |
Sample recording time | 60 s |
Downlink frequency | 935.2 MHz |
Uplink frequency | 890.2 MHz |
Synchronization | GPS only, using GPSDO (min 4 satellites, min 30 min lock) |
Distance between DUT and RX | 0.84 m |
USRP gain | 5 |
GSM arfcn | 1 |
OpenBTS version | 3.1.3 |
Machine Learning Algorithm | Optimal Values | Identification Accuracy | Computing Time Ratio |
---|---|---|---|
WSST | === | === | === |
SVM | , | 0.9236 | 10 |
KNN | K = 3 | 0.8388 | 8.57 |
Decision Tree | 0.8225 | 7.28 | |
STFT | === | === | === |
SVM | , | 0.8503 | 4.64 |
KNN | K = 17 | 0.706 | 4.285 |
Decision Tree | 0.753 | 4 | |
1D Frequency domain (magnitude component) | === | === | === |
SVM | , | 0.753 | 4.35 |
KNN | K = 3 | 0.7558 | 1.785 |
Decision Tree | 0.7352 | 1.428 | |
1D Time domain (magnitude component) | === | === | === |
SVM | , | 0.7558 | 3.64 |
KNN | K = 9 | 0.7910 | 1.1 |
Decision Tree | 0.7265 | 1 |
Technique | Predicted Percentage for the Three Models | Predicted Percentage for iPhone 1 | Predicted Percentage for iPhone 2 |
---|---|---|---|
SNR = 100 | === | === | === |
WSST | 0 | 0.51 | 0.49 |
STFT | 0 | 0.72 | 0.28 |
FFT | 0 | 0.57 | 0.43 |
TIME | 0 | 0.77 | 0.23 |
SNR = 10 | === | === | === |
WSST | 0.45 | 0.18 | 0.37 |
STFT | 0.3 | 0.21 | 0.49 |
FFT | 0.44 | 0.18 | 0.38 |
TIME | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.48 |
SNR = 0 | === | === | === |
WSST | 0.8 | 0.09 | 0.11 |
STFT | 0.71 | 0.1 | 0.19 |
FFT | 0.77 | 0.1 | 0.13 |
TIME | 0.69 | 0.15 | 0.16 |
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Baldini, G.; Giuliani, R.; Steri, G. Physical Layer Authentication and Identification of Wireless Devices Using the Synchrosqueezing Transform. Appl. Sci. 2018, 8, 2167. https://doi.org/10.3390/app8112167
Baldini G, Giuliani R, Steri G. Physical Layer Authentication and Identification of Wireless Devices Using the Synchrosqueezing Transform. Applied Sciences. 2018; 8(11):2167. https://doi.org/10.3390/app8112167
Chicago/Turabian StyleBaldini, Gianmarco, Raimondo Giuliani, and Gary Steri. 2018. "Physical Layer Authentication and Identification of Wireless Devices Using the Synchrosqueezing Transform" Applied Sciences 8, no. 11: 2167. https://doi.org/10.3390/app8112167
APA StyleBaldini, G., Giuliani, R., & Steri, G. (2018). Physical Layer Authentication and Identification of Wireless Devices Using the Synchrosqueezing Transform. Applied Sciences, 8(11), 2167. https://doi.org/10.3390/app8112167