

Article

On the *Ālayavijñāna* in the *Awakening of Faith*: Comparing and Contrasting Wōnhyo and Fazang's Views on *Tathāgatagarbha* and *Ālayavijñāna*

Sumi Lee

Academy of Buddhist Studies, Dongguk University, Seoul 04626, Korea; np140209@dongguk.edu or sumiring@gmail.com

Received: 25 August 2019; Accepted: 17 September 2019; Published: 19 September 2019



Abstract: The *Awakening of Faith*, one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna*. Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in which *ālayavijñāna* is described as a defiled consciousness, the *Awakening of Faith* explains it as a “synthetic” consciousness, in which *tathāgatagarbha* and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes noted the innovative explanation of the *Awakening of Faith* and compiled the commentaries, among which Huayan master Fazang's (643–712) commentary had a profound effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative *tathāgatagarbha* texts in East Asia. However, as scholarly perceptions that the commentators' interpretations do not always represent the *Awakening of Faith*'s tenets themselves have grown, the propriety of relying on Fazang's commentary for understanding the treatise has also been questioned. What attracts our attention in this regard is that the Silla scholar-monk Wōnhyo's (617–686) commentaries, which are known to have significantly influenced Fazang's, present very different views. This article demonstrates that two distinct interpretations existed in Wōnhyo's days for *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna* of the *Awakening of Faith*, by comparing Wōnhyo and Fazang's commentaries, and further considers the possibility that the *Awakening of Faith*'s doctrine of *ālayavijñāna* is not doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra on the basis of Wōnhyo's view on *ālayavijñāna*.

Keywords: the *Awakening of Faith*; *tathāgatagarbha*; *ālayavijñāna*; Wōnhyo (617–686); Fazang (643–712)

1. Introduction

The *Treatise on the Awakening of Faith According to the Mahāyāna* (C. *Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論, hereafter, the *Awakening of Faith*), one of the most seminal treatises in East Asian Buddhism, is well-known for its synthesis of the two Mahāyāna concepts of *tathāgatagarbha* (“womb of Tathāgatas”, viz., the potential to achieve buddhahood) and *ālayavijñāna* (“storehouse consciousness”, viz., the fundamental mind of a sentient being). Unlike early Yogācāra texts, such as the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in which *ālayavijñāna* is described as a defiled consciousness, the *Awakening of Faith* explains it as a “synthetic” consciousness, in which *tathāgatagarbha* and the defiled mind are unified in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. East Asian Buddhist exegetes, who noted the innovative way of explanation of the *Awakening of Faith*, compiled commentaries, and among them, Huayan 華嚴 master Fazang's 法藏 (643–712) *Dasheng qixinlun yiji* 大乘起信論義記 (hereafter, *Yiji*), had a profound

effect on the process of the establishment of the treatise as one of the most representative *tathāgatagarbha* texts in East Asia.¹

However, as scholarly recognition that the original tenets of the *Awakening of Faith* should not directly be identified with the commentators' interpretations has grown, the prevailing reliance on Fazang's commentary in understanding the *Awakening of Faith* has also been questioned. For instance, Kashiwagi Hirō states, in the preface of his extensive research on the *Awakening of Faith*, that the theories of the *Awakening of Faith* that were discussed by later Chinese Buddhist scholars are the so-called "ideas of the *Awakening of Faith* (起信論思想)", rather than the original teaching of it (Kashiwagi 1981, p. 4).² Indeed, the dharma characteristics school (C. *faxiang zong* 法相宗), the Yogācāra school of Dharmapāla's (ca. 6th century CE; C. Hufa 護法) line, which Fazang attempts to reconcile in the *Yiji* with the Madhyamaka teaching of Bhāvaviveka's (ca. 500–570; C. Qingbian 清辯/清辨) line,³ had not even spread to China when the *Awakening of Faith* was compiled.⁴

The fact that Fazang's commentary is no more taken as the 'standard text' for understanding the *Awakening of Faith* leads us to reconsider the doctrinal significance of other commentaries. In this regard, particular attention is given in this paper to the Silla master Wōnhyo's 元曉 (617–686) commentaries, the *Kisillon so* 起信論疏 and the *Taesūng kisillon pyōlgi* 大乘起信論別記 (hereafter, *Pyōlgi*), which are known to have substantially influenced Fazang's *Yiji*, but hold a distinctly different position than it. By comparing Wōnhyo and Fazang's commentaries of the *Awakening of Faith*, this article seeks to demonstrate that the *Awakening of Faith*'s notions of *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna* may be understood in a different

¹ The predominant recognition of the *Awakening of Faith* as a so-called "*tathāgatagarbha* text" owes evident debts to Fazang's identification of the treatise as "the teaching of the dependent origination of *tathāgatagarbha*" (C. *Rulaizang yuanqi zong* 如來藏緣起宗) in his fourfold doctrinal taxonomy (C. *jiaopan* 教判) of Buddhist teachings. Based on Fazang's interpretation, the thought of *tathāgatagarbha* has been regarded as a separate doctrinal system from the two major Mahāyāna traditions, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, especially by Japanese scholars. For instance, Katsumata Shunkyō argues that Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism cannot be explained merely in terms of the antagonistic evolution of the two doctrinal systems of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, by saying that Fazang's recognition of the teaching of the dependent origination of *tathāgatagarbha* (C. *Rulaizang yuanqi zong* 如來藏緣起宗) separately from Madhyamaka and Yogācāra shows his impartial perspective on Indian Buddhism (Katsumata 1961, pp. 593–94). Takasaki Jikido also admits that the present distinction of the *tathāgatagarbha* thought as a separate doctrinal system from Yogācāra is based on the traditional way of thinking that has been formed through Huayan doctrines (Takasaki 1960, p. 280).

² Kashiwagi also goes on to indicate that in the history of the development of "the ideas of the *Awakening of Faith*" in China and Japan, Huayan's, especially Fazang's, understanding of the *Awakening of Faith*, offered a decisive direction (Kashiwagi 1981, pp. 4–5). Thereafter, Yoshizu Yoshihide also addresses this issue of "the ideas of the *Awakening of Faith*" in his article on Jingying Huiyuan's 淨影慧遠 (523–592) deviating interpretation of the *Awakening of Faith*. Although Kashiwagi emphasized the need to distinguish the original tenets of the *Awakening of Faith* from the later commentators' interpretations of the *Awakening of Faith*, in this article, Yoshizu carefully suggests the possibility that the late commentators' interpretations may also discuss some of the original teachings of the *Awakening of Faith* (Yoshizu 2005, p. 1).

³ In the *Dasheng qixinlun yiji* (Hereafter, *Yiji*), Fazang seeks to resolve the contemporary doctrinal tension revolving around the distinct doctrinal positions of Madhyamaka master Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500–570; C. Qingbian 清辯/清辨) and Yogācāra master Dharmapāla (ca. 6th century CE; C. Hufa 護法), by using the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith*. At the beginning of the *Yiji*, Fazang introduces the contrasting positions of Madhyamaka exegete Jñānaprabha (d.u.; C. Zhiguang 智光) and Yogācāra exegete Śīlabhadra (529–645; C. Jiexian 戒賢), Bhāvaviveka and Dharmapāla's successors, respectively, regarding the Buddha's three-period teachings (C. *sanshi jiao* 三時教). In his four-level taxonomy of Buddhist teachings, Fazang locates their teachings on the second and third level, designating them as the teaching of true emptiness and no-characteristics (C. *Zhenkong wuxiang zong* 真空無相宗) and the teaching of consciousness-only and dharma characteristics (C. *Weishi faxiang zong* 唯識法相宗), respectively. The *Awakening of Faith* is located in the fourth and highest teaching, with the name of the teaching of the dependent origination of *tathāgatagarbha* (C. *Rulaizang yuanqi zong* 如來藏緣起宗). In this highest teaching of the *Awakening of Faith*, the principle (C. *li* 理) and phenomena (C. *shi* 事), which are valued in the second and third teachings, respectively, are unimpededly interpenetrated. See the *Yiji*, *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新修大藏經 (Hereafter, T)1846:44.242a29–242c05; 243b22–c01.

⁴ As is well-known, Dharmapāla's Yogācāra teaching spread to China when the famous pilgrim and translator Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664) brought a new corpus of canonical texts from India in 645, after he had studied under Śīlabhadra, the teacher of Dharmapāla. Beside this, the fact that early commentaries, such as Tanyan's 曇延 (516–588) *Qixinlun yishu* 起信論義疏 and the Dunhuang manuscript of the *Dasheng qixinlun shu* 大乘起信論疏 (tentative title; 羽333V) recently discovered in the archives of the Kyou Shōoku 杏雨書屋, are written from significantly different perspectives than Wōnhyo or Fazang's, also suggests that the *Awakening of Faith* was interpreted in different ways, according to the commentators' positions. For instance, while Wōnhyo and Fazang explain the *Awakening of Faith* by drawing on the *Laikāvātāra Sūtra*, Tanyan's commentary and the anonymous Dunhuang text are written with considerable reference to the *She dashenglun shi* 攝大乘論釋, Paramārtha's (499–569; C. Zhendi 真諦) translation of *Mahāyānasamgraha*, never mentioning the *Laikāvātāra Sūtra*. For more information on the Dunhuang manuscript of the *Dasheng qixinlun shu*, see Ikeda (2012).

way than what has broadly been accepted so far by relying on Fazang's commentary. I shall discuss that while Fazang takes the position that despite its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, *tathāgatagarbha* interacts directly with the arising-and-ceasing mind, Wōnhyo considers that *tathāgatagarbha*, which has a twofold nature, interacts with the arising-and-ceasing mind on the one hand, but on the other, preserves the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature. Based on Wōnhyo's understanding, I shall also suggest a possible doctrinal compatibility between the *Awakening of Faith* and the early Yogācāra, which has been dismissed among scholars.

2. *Tathāgatagarbha*

In the *Awakening of Faith*, *ālayavijñāna* is defined as a unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing (mind of suchness) (viz. *tathāgatagarbha*) and the arising-and-ceasing (mind) in a neither-identical-nor-different condition.⁵ Such exegetes as Wōnhyo and Fazang both find the doctrinal origin of this unique nature of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*.⁶ In the same manner as the *Awakening of Faith*, the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* explains the consciousness of a sentient being as having not only a phenomenal (or defiled), but also a 'true' or 'real', nature. In Guṇabhadra's four-fascicle recension of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, the consciousness is described as consisting of three kinds of mental attributes; that is, [self] true character (C. [zi]zhenxiang [自]真相), karmic character (C. yexiang 業相), and evolving character (C. zhuanxiang 轉相).⁷ Likewise, Bodhiruci's ten-fascicle version presents these three characters of the consciousness with slightly different names: the consciousness of wisdom character (C. zhixiangshi 智相識), the consciousness of karmic character (C. yexiangshi 業相識), and the consciousness of evolving character (C. zhuanxiangshi 轉相識).⁸ While the first character of the three, the (self) true character (or self-character) or the consciousness of wisdom character, corresponds to the true nature of the consciousness, the other two correspond to the phenomenal nature. Wōnhyo also indicates that the (self) true character among the three characters of the four-fascicle recension is also referred to as the self-character (C. zixiang 自相) in the 10-fascicle edition.⁹ Consulting the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* in commenting *ālayavijñāna* of the *Awakening of Faith*, Wōnhyo and Fazang both explain the first character of the three kinds of mental attributes described in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* as the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind, viz., *tathāgatagarbha*, of *ālayavijñāna*.¹⁰

Although Wōnhyo and Fazang both consider the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature of *ālayavijñāna* as *tathāgatagarbha* by relying on the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, the next passage of Wōnhyo's *Kisillon so* suggests

⁵ See the *Awakening of Faith* T1666:32.576b07-09: 心生滅者，依如來藏故有生滅心，所謂不生不滅與生滅和合，非一非異，名為阿梨耶識。

⁶ Four recensions of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* are known: Bodhiruci's (fl. 508–35) *Ru lengqie jing* 楞伽經 in 10 fascicles (513), Guṇabhadra's (394–468) *Lengqie abatuoluo baojing* 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 in 4 fascicles (443), Dharmakṣema's (d.u.) *Lengqiejing* 楞伽經 in 4 fascicles (412–433), and Śikṣānanda's (fl. ca. 695) *Dasheng rulengqie jing* 大乘入楞伽經 in 7 fascicles (700). Among these, Dharmakṣema's *Lengqiejing* is not extant.

⁷ See the *Lengqie abatuoluo baojing* T670:16.483a14-17: 諸識有三種相，轉相、業相、真相。大慧！略說有三種識，廣說有八相。何等為三？謂真識、現識，及分別事識。

⁸ See the *Ru lengqie jing* T671:16.521c29-522a03: 大慧！識有三種。何等三種？一者、轉相識；二者、業相識；三者、智相識。大慧！有八種識，略說有二種。何等為二？一者、了別識；二者、分別事識。

⁹ See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.208c08: 自真相者。十卷經云中真名自相。

¹⁰ To explain the unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition, Wōnhyo and Fazang both quote the passage of the four-fascicle recension, in which the true character (C. zhenxiang 真相) and the evolving character (C. zhuanxiang 轉相) are described as neither different nor identical by using the parable of a lump of soil and dust. For Wōnhyo's quotation, see the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.208b19-c12: 此是不生滅心與生滅和合。非謂生滅與不生滅和合也。非一非異者。不生滅心舉體而動。故心與生滅非異。而恒不失不生滅性。故生滅與心非一。又若是一者。生滅識相滅盡之時。心神之體亦應隨滅。墮於斷邊。若是異者。依無明風熏動之時。靜心之體不應隨緣。即墮常邊。離此二邊。故非一非異。如四卷經云。譬如泥團微塵。非異非不異。金莊嚴具亦如是。若泥團微塵異者。非彼所成。而實彼成。是故非異。若不異者。泥團微塵應無差別。如是轉識藏識真相若異者。藏識非因。若不異者。轉識滅藏識亦應滅。而自真相實不滅。是故非自真相識滅。但業相滅。 For Fazang's quotation, see the *Yiji* T1846:44.255b16-26: 又若一者。生滅識相滅盡之時。真心應滅。則墮斷過。若是異者。依無明風熏動之時。靜心之體不應隨緣。則墮常過。離此二邊故非一異。又若一則無和合。若異亦無和合。非一異故得和合也。如經云。譬如泥團微塵非異非不異。金莊嚴具亦復如是。若泥團異者。非彼所成。而實彼成。是故非異。若不異者。泥團微塵應無差別。如是轉識藏識真相若異者。藏識非因。若不異者。轉識滅。藏識亦應滅。而自真相實不滅。是故非自真相識滅。但業相滅。

that the two commentators did not agree in their views on *tathāgatagarbha*. In response to the question of whether or not the self-character (K. *chasang* 自相), i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*, of the consciousness arises due to defiled conditions, Wŏnhyo answers by introducing three types of views on the mind-essence (of the self-character) (K. *chasang* [*simch'e*] 自相[心體])¹¹, as follows:

Question: Should it be said that the self-character of this consciousness arises just due to defiled conditions, or that it does not conform to the conditions? If it arises just due to defiled conditions, then when defiled conditions are exhausted, the self-character should disappear; if the self-character does not conform to defiled conditions and thus does not disappear, then it would naturally exist by itself (K. *chayŏnyu* 自然有). Again, if the self-character also disappears [as in the former case], then it amounts to nihilism; likewise [if] the self-character does not disappear [as in the latter case], in turn it amounts to eternalism.

Answer: Some say: The mind-essence of *ālayavijñāna* is ripened (K. *isuk* 異熟, *vipāka*) dharma, which is produced by karmic afflictions. Therefore, when karmic afflictions are exhausted, the base consciousness (K. *ponsik* 本識; viz. *ālayavijñāna*) disappears altogether. At the resultant [stage of] Buddhahood, however, there exists the pure consciousness that corresponds to the great perfect mirror cognition (K. *taewŏn kyŏngji* 大圓鏡智, *ādarśa-jñāna*), which has been attained from the two types of practice, practice of merits and wisdom. Thus, the minds in the both cases have identical meaning. Based on this meaning, the mind is said to be consistent until the resultant [stage of] Buddhahood.

Some say: The mind-essence of self-character moves its essence, and [this] is raised due to nescience (K. *mumyŏng* 無明, *avidyā*). This means that the serene [mind-essence] is moved and raised, not that nothing turns to something. [In other words, this mind-essence should be what originally exists, not what arises from nothing.] Therefore, the moving of this mind is what is caused by nescience, and is called the karmic character. This moving mind is basically the mind in itself, which is also called self-character. The nature of self-character is not involved with nescience. However, this mind, which is moved by nescience, also has the implication that [karmic seeds inherent in the mind continuously] produce the same types [of seeds]. Thus, although not falling into the fallacy of “naturally [existing by itself],” it still has the nature of non-ceasing. When nescience is exhausted, the moving character [of the mind] accordingly ceases, and [yet] the mind returns to the original basis by going after the initial enlightenment (K. *sigak* 始覺). [Therefore, the mind-essence of this mind does not cease.]

Some say: Both of the two masters' views have a reasonable basis, because both rely on the teachings of the sacred scriptures. The former master's view coincides with the tenets of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and the latter's with that of the *Awakening of Faith*. However, one should not take the meanings in a literal sense. Why? If the meaning of the former teaching is taken in a literal sense, then this would be attachment to dharmas (K. *pŏp ajip* 法我執, *dharma-grāha*); if the meaning of the latter teaching is taken in literal sense, this would be called attachment to self (K. *in agyŏn* 人我見, *ātma-grāha*). Again, if one attaches to the former meaning, one would fall into nihilism; if one attaches to the latter meaning, one would fall into eternalism. [Therefore,] one should know that the two meanings may not be taught.

¹¹ Wŏnhyo uses self-character (K. *chasang* 自相), mind-essence (K. *simch'e* 心體), and mind-essence of the self-character (K. *chasang simch'e* 自相心體) in the same sense, as seen in the quotation below. In another place, Wŏnhyo also states that the mind-essence refers to the mind of self-character (K. *chasangsim* 自相心). See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.213c07-08: 而無別體。唯依心體。故言依心。即是梨耶自相心也。The compound word, the mind-essence of the self-character, is seen in two other places in the *Kisillon so*. See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.216c17-19: 又復上說因滅故 不相應心滅者。但說心中業相等滅。非謂自相心體滅也; T1844:44.216c 24-25 而其自相心體不滅。故言非是水滅也。

[However,] although they may not be taught, they may also be taught, because although they are not like [what it means], they are not unlike [what it means] either.¹²

According to the first view, the mind-essence of the *ālayavijñāna* is described as what is subject to arising-and-ceasing in accordance with karmic afflictions. It is regarded as being produced by karmic afflictions and disappears when they are exhausted. By contrast, in the second view, the mind-essence is neither-arising-nor-ceasing. The mind-essence, or self-character, should originally exist (viz., does not arise from nowhere), and moves its essence when being prompted by nescience; however, with nescience exhausted, the mind returns to the original basis (viz., does not cease).

In the third view, the first and second views are both accepted in that they have a reasonable basis, which relies on the sacred scriptures. This position might seem idiosyncratic at first, since the two former views take contrasting positions. In fact, the first and second views are respectively attributed to the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Awakening of Faith*, which are generally considered to take distinct or even incompatible doctrinal positions on a concept such as *ālayavijñāna*. According to this third view, however, the real messages of the two teachings should not be assumed merely by their literal expressions. In other words, if properly understood beyond their literal meanings, the first and second views may both be accepted without any doctrinal conflict. It may then be said that in this view, the mind-essence—i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*—has a twofold nature, though in a somewhat paradoxical way; that is, the nature of arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing.

Wōnhyo advocates the third view that the mind-essence—i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*—of *ālayavijñāna*, has a twofold nature.¹³ When taken in their literal senses, the nature of arising-and-ceasing of the first view and the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing of the second should be seen as two distinct natures, which are incompatible for one single mind of *ālayavijñāna*. In the same vein, the teachings of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Awakening of Faith* would be two incompatible doctrinal positions, because their explanations of a concept such as *ālayavijñāna*, as mentioned above, conflict with each other. However, when considered beyond the literal meanings, these two seemingly opposite natures may be taken as compatible as a twofold nature of one single mind of *ālayavijñāna*. The teachings may have literal meanings, and may also mean what is beyond the literal meanings. In this regard, the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Awakening of Faith*'s positions on *ālayavijñāna* need not be seen as doctrinally conflicting with each other. It is a well-known fact that Wōnhyo seeks to reconcile the early Yogācāra texts with the *Awakening of Faith* in the *Kisillon so* and the *Pyōlgi*.¹⁴

What should be noted, particularly in terms of our current issue, is that this passage reveals that there were two different views, that is, the second and the third, on the mind-essence (i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*). According to the typical understanding, based on Fazang's interpretation of the *Awakening of Faith*, *tathāgatagarbha* is considered neither-arising-nor-ceasing. This way of understanding seems

¹² See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.216c28-217a21: 問。此識自相。為當一向染緣所起。為當亦有不從緣義。若是一向染緣所起。染法盡時自相應滅。如其自相不從染緣故不滅者。則自然有。又若使自相亦滅同斷見者。是則自相不滅還同常見。答。或有說者。梨耶心體是異熟法。但為業惑之所辨生。是故業盡時。本識都盡。然於佛果。亦有福慧二行所惑大圓鏡智相應淨識。而於二處心義是同。以是義說心至佛果耳。或有說者。自相心體。舉體為彼無明所起。而是動靜令起。非謂辨無令有。是故此心之動。因無明起。名為業相。此動之心。本自為心。亦為自相。自相義門不由無明。然即此無明所動之心。亦有自類相生之義。故無自然之過。而有不滅之義。無明盡時動相隨滅。心隨始覺還歸本源。或有說者。二師所說皆有道理。皆依聖典之所說故。初師所說得瑜伽意。後師義者得起信意。而亦不可如言取義。所以然者。若如初說而取義者。即是法我執。若如後說而取義者。是謂人我見。又若執初義。墮於斷見。執後義者。即墮常見。當知二義皆不可說。雖不可說而亦可說。以雖非然而非不然故。

¹³ Although it is not directly stated that Wōnhyo himself advocates the third view in the *Kisillon so*, it is clear that Wōnhyo defends the third view in the context. Moreover, at the beginning of the third view in the equivalent passage of the *Pyōlgi*, "[if I] make a comment [on the two former views, it is as follows:]" (K. *p'yōngwal* 評曰) appears instead of "Some say." See the *Taesūng kisillon pyōlgi* (hereafter, *Pyōlgi*) T1845:44. 239a03.

¹⁴ See the *Pyōlgi* T1845:44.229a12-229b22; T1845:44.236b02-23; T1845:44.237b24-c17 and the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.215b25-215c13. It has also been known that although Fazang substantially relies on Wōnhyo's commentaries, he never cites or quotes the passages from Wōnhyo's commentaries, in which the early Yogācāra doctrine or text is introduced to be reconciled with the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith*. Besides, in the *Ijang ūi* 二障義 [System of the Two Hindrances], Wōnhyo comprehensively deals with this matter of reconciliation between the early Yogācāra and the teaching of the *Awakening of Faith* by focusing on the concept of the two hindrances (K. *ijang* 二障). Detailed discussions may be found in Muller (2004, 2006).

very similar to the second view. However, there was another view on *tathāgatagarbha*, the third view that *tathāgatagarbha* has the twofold nature of not only neither-arising-nor-ceasing but also arising-and-ceasing, and this view was advocated by Wōnhyo.

Wōnhyo's twofold view on *tathāgatagarbha* is also evident in his interpretation of the concept of [original] enlightenment (C. [ben]jue, K. [pon]gak [本]覺), one of the two aspects of *ālayavijñāna* presented in the *Awakening of Faith*, along with non-enlightenment (C. bujue, K. pulgak 不覺).¹⁵ It is stated in the *Awakening of Faith* that (original) enlightenment indicates the mind-essence that is freed from deluded thoughts, implying that original enlightenment has the same connotation as *tathāgatagarbha*.¹⁶ Wōnhyo also says that it has a twofold meaning, just in a way that recalls the aforementioned twofold nature of the mind-essence; in his answer to the question of whether the reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is because it lacks non-enlightenment or because it has the function of illumination of awakening, Wōnhyo answers by saying that original enlightenment has a twofold meaning, original enlightenment and initial enlightenment (C. shijue, K. sigak 始覺), as follows:

Question: Is the reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is because it lacks non-enlightenment or because it has the function of illumination of enlightening (K. kakcho 覺照)? If it is called original enlightenment only because it lacks non-enlightenment, then it would not have the [function of] illumination of enlightening. If then, it should be non-enlightenment. If it is called original enlightenment only because it has the function of illumination of enlightening, then I am not sure if all defilements are eradicated from this [original] enlightenment. If defilements have not been eradicated, then [in turn] it would not have the function of enlightening; if the defilements have been eradicated, then sentient beings should never exist.

Answer: [The reason why the mind-essence is called original enlightenment is] not only because it lacks non-enlightenment, but also because it has the function of illumination. Because it has the [function of] illumination, defilements can be also eradicated. What does this mean? When enlightenment that comes after delusions is considered to be called enlightenment, initial enlightenment has [the meaning of] enlightenment, while original enlightenment does not. When the original lack of delusion is said to be called enlightenment, original enlightenment is enlightenment, but initial enlightenment is not. The [matter of] eradicating defilements [may be discussed] likewise. When eradication of previously existing defilements is called eradication, initial enlightenment has the [function of] eradication, but original enlightenment does not. When the original lack of defilements is called eradication, original enlightenment refers to eradication, but initial enlightenment does not. Viewed from this [latter] way, [defilements] are originally eradicated, and thus originally there is no ordinary being, just as stated in the passage below, "all sentient beings are originally

¹⁵ See the *Awakening of Faith* T1666:32.576b10-14: 此識有二種義，能攝一切法、生一切法。云何為二？一者、覺義，二者、不覺義。所言覺義者，謂心體離念。離念相者，等虛空界無所不遍，法界一相即是如來平等法身，依此法身說名本覺。Here, the "enlightenment" (C. jie 覺), which is contrasted with non-enlightenment (C. bujue 不覺), is also expressed as "original enlightenment" (C. benjue 本覺). Strictly speaking, it may be said that there are two levels of meaning of original enlightenment: one that is contrasted with non-enlightenment and the other that is contrasted with initial enlightenment (C. shijue 始覺). The former may be seen as original enlightenment in a broad sense, in contrast to non-enlightenment, and the latter as in a narrow sense, in contrast to initial enlightenment within the category of the enlightenment. Yet, the *Awakening of Faith* states that initial enlightenment is ultimately not different from original enlightenment, and thus the broad and narrow senses of original enlightenment may be accordingly said to be not-different from each other in an ultimate sense. See the *Awakening of Faith* T1666:32.576b14-16: 本覺義者，對始覺義說，以始覺者即同本覺。始覺義者，依本覺故而有不覺，依不覺故說有始覺。

¹⁶ See the *Awakening of Faith* T1666:32.576b11-12: 所言覺義者，謂心體離念。 Wōnhyo also clearly says that the one mind essence is (or has) original enlightenment, and associates it with the nature of Tathāgata, namely, *tathāgatagarbha*. See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.206c18-20: 此一心體是[有]本覺。而隨無明動作生滅。故於此門如來之性隱而不顯。名如來藏。"The essence of this one mind is[has] the original enlightenment, and yet moves in accordance with nescience to produce the arising-and-ceasing. Therefore, the nature of Tathāgata of this abode [of arising-and-ceasing], which is hidden and does not manifest itself, is called *tathāgatagarbha*."

consistently abiding (C. *changzhu*, K. *sangju* 常住) within the dharmas of *nirvāṇa* and *bodhi*.” However, although it is said that original enlightenment exists and thus originally there is no ordinary being (凡夫), there is not yet initial enlightenment and thus originally there are ordinary beings. Therefore, there is no fallacy [between the two cases]. If you [take only one aspect and] claim that because there is original enlightenment, originally there are no ordinary beings, then there would not be initial enlightenment at last. If then, on what basis could ordinary beings exist? If those [ordinary beings] do not have initial enlightenment at last, then there would be no original enlightenment, [which is contrasted to initial enlightenment,] then on basis of what original enlightenment can it be said that there is no ordinary beings?¹⁷

Wōnhyo argues that the mind-essence is called original enlightenment because it has the meaning of not only original enlightenment, as represented in the literal expression of original enlightenment, but also initial enlightenment. On the one hand, original enlightenment has the meaning of the original lack of non-enlightenment and, in this sense, all sentient beings are considered as constantly abiding. On the other hand, original enlightenment is called as such because it has the function of illumination of enlightening, explaining the presence of ordinary beings. Two seemingly contrasting characters are both accepted as the twofold aspect of original enlightenment, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*. Here again, Wōnhyo takes original enlightenment not just in the literal sense, but in the sense beyond literal expression.

One might indicate that the division of (original) enlightenment into original and initial enlightenment is already stated in the *Awakening of Faith* and Fazang also provides a proper explanation of them in his commentary. However, a comparison of Wōnhyo and Fazang’s explanation on the two types of original enlightenment, original enlightenment that is pure in nature (C. *xingjing benjue*, K. *sōngjōng pon’gak* 性淨本覺) and original enlightenment that conforms to impurity (C. *suiran benjue*, K. *suyōm pon’gak* 隨染本覺), discloses that their views on original enlightenment are not identical, but rather implies a significant difference. In the *Kisillon so*, Wōnhyo addresses these two types of original enlightenment as the basis of the twofold aspect of (original) enlightenment, which have just been discussed above, original enlightenment and initial enlightenment, respectively.¹⁸ In other words, Wōnhyo explains each side of the twofold aspect of original enlightenment in a separate way, by relating them to each type of original enlightenment among the two; that is, the original enlightenment that is pure in nature and the original enlightenment that conforms to impurity. This respective interpretation of the twofold meaning of original enlightenment may also be applied back to the twofold nature of the mind-essence, the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing and arising-and-ceasing. Then, it seems that in Wōnhyo’s interpretation of the *Awakening of Faith*, the terms that have the connotation of *tathāgatagarbha*, such as the mind-essence or original enlightenment, have a twofold nature/meaning, each side of which has a distinct meaning/nature. In Wōnhyo’s commentary on the *Nirvana Sutra*, the *Yōlban chongyo* 涅槃宗要, original enlightenment that conforms to impurity appears with a slightly modified name, as the nature of realization that conforms to impurity (K. *suyōm haesōng* 隨染解性).¹⁹ Given this, we may presume that in Wōnhyo’s works, the two terms—nature of realization (K. *haesōng* 解性) and original enlightenment—are distinguished from each other, with different implications.

¹⁷ See the *Pyōlgi* T1845:44.230b02-18: 問。為當。心體只無不覺故名本覺。為當。心體有覺照用名為本覺。若言只無不覺名本覺者。可亦無覺照故是不覺。若言有覺照故名本覺者。未知此覺為斷惑不。若不斷惑則無照用。如其有斷則無凡夫。答。非但無斷。亦有明照。以有照故。亦有斷惑。此義云何。若就先眠後覺名為覺者。始覺有覺。本覺中無。若論本來不眠名為覺者。本覺是覺。始覺則非覺。斷義亦爾。先有後無名為斷者。始覺有斷。本覺無斷。本來離惑名為斷者。本覺是斷。始覺非斷。若依是義。本來斷故。本來無凡。如下文云。一切眾生。從本已來。入於涅槃菩提之法。然雖曰有本覺故本來無凡。而未有始覺故。本來有凡。是故無過。若汝。言由有本覺本來無凡。則終無始覺。望何有凡者他。亦終無始覺則無本覺。依何本覺以說無凡。

¹⁸ See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.211c26-212a01: 總說雖然。於中分別者。若論始覺所起之門。隨緣相屬 而得利益。由其根本隨染本覺。從來相關有親疎故。論其本覺所顯之門。普益機熟不簡相屬。由其本來性淨本覺。等通一切無親疎故。

¹⁹ See the *Yōlban chongyo* T1769:38.250a03-250a17.

Although Fazang likewise mentions the two types of original enlightenment in the *Yiji*, it does not seem that he recognizes any distinction between them, because he often interchangeably uses the terms “original enlightenment” and “nature of realization”, which are distinguished by Wōnhyo as the two types of original enlightenment: the original enlightenment that is pure in nature and the nature of realization that conforms to impurity.²⁰ For instance, in explaining original enlightenment as the cause of uncontaminated (C. *wulou* 無漏, *anāsrava*) dharmas along with the conditions of permeation from learning (C. *wen xunxi* 聞熏習, *śruta-vāsanā*), Fazang draws on a passage from Paramārtha’s commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha*, in which the nature of realization, not original enlightenment, is presented as the cause of sainthood, together with the permeation from learning.²¹ This shows that Fazang identifies original enlightenment with the nature of realization. Fazang also uses these two terms side by side in a compound word, as if the words have the same meaning.²² Most of all, he clearly identifies these two concepts in the *Huayan wujiao zhang* 華嚴五教章 by saying that the nature of realization mentioned in Paramārtha’s commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* refers to the original enlightenment of the *Awakening of Faith*.²³ Given all of this, it does not seem that Fazang distinguishes the two types of original enlightenment in the same way as Wōnhyo does. Although Fazang addresses the two types of original enlightenment, it is apparent that he does not see any valid distinction between them. Rather, it seems that these two terms just refer to two names given to *tathāgatagarbha*, which has only one (not a twofold) nature, merely by depending on whether or not it is combined with the arising-and-ceasing mind.

In fact, just as Fazang identifies the two types of original enlightenment, Fazang describes *tathāgatagarbha* as having one, not a twofold, nature. Unlike Wōnhyo, as discussed above, who considers the mind-essence, i.e., *tathāgatagarbha*, to have a twofold nature of arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing, Fazang says that the *tathāgatagarbha* has only the one nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing.²⁴ This implies, along with his identification of the two types of original enlightenment, that, for Fazang, *tathāgatagarbha* and other concepts that have an equivalent connotation, such as original enlightenment, do not have a twofold meaning/nature, but only one. I have mentioned that among the three views introduced by Wōnhyo on the mind-essence, the second view is very similar to Fazang’s interpretation of *tathāgatagarbha* as neither-arising-nor-ceasing. It seems very likely then that Wōnhyo introduced the second view by keeping in his mind an exegete such as Fazang.

²⁰ In Wōnhyo’s works, such as the *Yōlban chongyo*, the nature of realization that conforms to impurity refers to the original enlightenment that conforms to impurity. See footnote 19 above.

²¹ See the *Ru lengqixin xuanyi* 入楞伽心玄義 T1790:39.431c11-14: 由習氣海中有帶妄之真。名本覺。為無漏因。多聞熏習為增上緣。或亦聞熏與習海合為一無漏因。梁論云。多聞熏習與本識中解性和合。一切聖人以此為因。 “In the ocean of habituated tendencies (*vāsanā*), there is the truth that assumes delusion, and it is called original enlightenment. [This] constitutes the cause of uncontaminated [dharmas] (*anāsrava*), while permeation from great learning works as auxiliary conditions. Otherwise, permeation of hearing combined with the ocean of habituated tendencies serves as the one cause of uncontaminated [dharmas]. [Therefore] Paramārtha’s commentary on the *Mahāyānasamgraha* states that permeation from great learning is combined with the nature of realization in the base-consciousness, and this is taken as the cause of all sainthood.”

²² See the *Huayan yisheng jiao fenqi zhan* 華嚴一乘教義分齊章 T1866:45.485c14-20: 其有種性者。瑜伽論云。種性略有二種。一本性住。二習所成。本性住者。謂諸菩薩六處殊勝有如是相。從無始世。展轉傳來法爾所得。習所成者。謂先串習善根所得。此中本性。即內六處中意處為殊勝。即攝賴耶識中本覺解性為性種性。

²³ See the *Huayan yisheng jiao fenqi zhan* T1866:45.487c04-c05: 梁攝論說為黎耶中解性。起信論中。說黎耶二義 中本覺是也。

²⁴ By comparison, Fazang describes *tathāgatagarbha* as neither-arising-nor-ceasing, the seven consciousnesses as arising-and-ceasing, and *ālayavijñāna* as arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing. See the *Yiji* T1846:44.255a29-b03: 一以如來藏唯不生滅。如水濕性。二七識唯生滅。如水波浪。三梨耶識亦生滅亦不生滅。如海含動靜。四無明倒執非生滅非不生滅。如起浪猛風非水非浪。 “First, *tathāgatagarbha* neither-arises-nor-ceases, just like the nature of the wetness of water; second, the seven consciousnesses only arise-and-cease, just like waves [of water]; third, *ālayavijñāna* not only arises-and-ceases but also neither-arises-nor-ceases, just like the ocean that contains [the natures of] moving and stillness; the fourth, *nescience* and deluded attachments neither arise-and-cease nor neither-arise-nor-cease, just like arising waves and strong wind are neither water nor waves.” Fazang also states that *tathāgatagarbha* maintains the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing even when it is involved in the abode of arising-and-ceasing (C. *shengnie men* 生滅門). See the *Yiji* T1846:44.255b13-15: 非直梨耶具動靜在此生滅中。亦乃如來藏 唯不動亦在此門中。 “It is not just that *ālayavijñāna*, which has [both natures of] moving and stillness, belongs to [the abode of] arising-and-ceasing; rather *tathāgatagarbha*, which never move, also belongs to this abode.”

3. *Ālayavijñāna*

Wōnhyo and Fazang's distinct views on *tathāgatagarbha* are also reflected in their understanding of *ālayavijñāna*. As mentioned above, *ālayavijñāna* is defined in the *Awakening of Faith* as a unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing (mind of suchness, viz. *tathāgatagarbha*) and the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. Wōnhyo accounts for the unification of these two minds in *ālayavijñāna* as twofold, namely, in a non-identical (K. *piil* 非一) condition on the one hand, and in a non-different (K. *pii* 非異) condition on the other hand, in a similar way to how he considers *tathāgatagarbha* to have a twofold nature.²⁵ It may be said that there are two (viz., non-identical) minds in *ālayavijñāna*, that is, the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind; however, the mind-essence of these two minds are not separated (viz., non-different) and thus constitute one single mind. This mind, which has the two minds and yet is not separated, is called *ālayavijñāna*.²⁶

The twofold condition of *ālayavijñāna* is explained by Wōnhyo as a logical consequence that follows when two mistaken views are removed; the view that the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind (viz., *tathāgatagarbha*) is either identical with or different from the arising-and-ceasing mind (viz., phenomenal mind). Wōnhyo also gives a warning, in this regard, of nihilism and eternalism in a similar way to how he does in discussing the twofold nature of *tathāgatagarbha*, mentioned above. The view that they are identical would end up with nihilism because the mind-essence, or *tathāgatagarbha*, should also disappear when the arising-and-ceasing mind is eradicated; the view that they are different would amount to eternalism because the mind-essence, which would be regarded as just neither-arising-nor-ceasing, could not move along in accordance with various conditions.²⁷ The logical basis of this twofold condition of *ālayavijñāna*, in this sense, may be traced back to the twofold nature of *tathāgatagarbha*. Viewed from the perspective of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, *tathāgatagarbha* is distinct from the arising-and-ceasing mind and thus their unification in *ālayavijñāna* will also be in a non-identical condition. In this case, *ālayavijñāna* may not be seen as identical to (or not-different from) *tathāgatagarbha*. By contrast, from the perspective of the arising-and-ceasing nature of *tathāgatagarbha*, it may be said to accord with the arising-and-ceasing mind and accordingly, their unification will be in a non-different condition. In this case, *ālayavijñāna* is viewed as identical to (or not-different from) *tathāgatagarbha*.

On the basis of this twofold unification in *ālayavijñāna*, Wōnhyo also explains the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*'s inconsistent statements on the relationship between *ālayavijñāna* and *tathāgatagarbha*. The *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* is well-known for taking an ambiguous position on the relationship between *ālayavijñāna* and *tathāgatagarbha*. *Ālayavijñāna* is sometimes equated with *tathāgatagarbha*, thereby implying that it

²⁵ Wōnhyo explains the neither-identical-nor-different [condition], in which the two types of mind are unified, as twofold, by saying, "As for 'the neither-identical-nor-different [condition], [on the one hand,] the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind moves its essence, and thus this mind is not different from the arising-and-ceasing [mind]. Yet, [on the other hand, the mind] does not lose the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature and thus the arising-and-ceasing [mind] is not identical to the [neither-arising-nor-ceasing] mind.'" See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.208b20-22: 非一非異者。不生滅心舉體而動。故心與生滅非異。而恒不失不生滅性。故生滅與心非一。 In other words, the two types of minds are said to be unified in a not-different or in a not-identical condition, depending on whether *tathāgatagarbha* (or, the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind) moves its essence in accordance with the arising-and-ceasing mind or keeps its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature. In this passage, the implication is that the nature of *tathāgatagarbha* consists of two distinct aspects, and the twofold condition of the unification in *ālayavijñāna* is explained based on these aspects. In fact, Fazang cites this same passage by Wōnhyo in the equivalent place of the *Yiji*. However, the implication is different: The nature of *tathāgatagarbha* has only the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, and thus, for Fazang, the twofold unification in *ālayavijñāna* is determined depending on whether this neither-arising-nor-ceasing *tathāgatagarbha* is non-identical to or non-different from the arising-and-ceasing mind. A more detailed discussion shall follow below in the main text.

²⁶ See the *Pyōlgi* T1845:44.228c25-26: 雖有二義。心體無二。此合二義不二之心。名為梨耶識也。

²⁷ See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.208b22-26: 又若是一者。生滅識相滅盡之時。心神之體亦應隨滅。墮於斷邊。若是異者。依無明風熏動之時。靜心之體不應隨緣。即墮常邊。離此二邊。故非一非異。 Fazang also states a similar passage in the *Yiji* (T1846:44.255b16-19: 又若一者。生滅識相滅盡之時。真心應滅。則墮斷過。若是異者。依無明風熏動之時。靜心之體應不隨緣。則墮常過。離此二邊故非一異)。 However, as discussed above, Fazang's understanding of *tathāgatagarbha* is different from Wōnhyo's, and his interpretation of the unification in *ālayavijñāna*, which is based on his understanding of *tathāgatagarbha*, also has a different implication than Wōnhyo's. More discussion will follow soon.

is pure; at other times, it is regarded as separate from it, with the connotation that it is impure.²⁸ Wōnhyo seeks to resolve this problem by drawing upon the twofold condition of the *ālayavijñāna*. When the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind (viz., *tathāgatagarbha*) and the arising-and-ceasing mind are unified in a non-identical condition, the *ālayavijñāna* is described as separated from the *tathāgatagarbha*. On the contrary, when they are unified in a non-different condition, *ālayavijñāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* are identified with each other.²⁹ In Wōnhyo's view, if the *tathāgatagarbha* did not have a twofold nature, but had only one nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing, the unification, if ever, between *tathāgatagarbha* and the arising-and-ceasing mind would only occur in a non-identical condition, and *tathāgatagarbha* could not move along in accordance with the arising-and-ceasing mind.

Fazang's view on *ālayavijñāna* is quite different from Wōnhyo's. I have mentioned that Fazang only accepts the unitary nature of *tathāgatagarbha*: the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing. Then, the twofold unification in *ālayavijñāna* should occur between the neither-arising-nor-ceasing *tathāgatagarbha* and the arising-and-ceasing mind; Fazang does not need the twofold nature of *tathāgatagarbha* to explain the twofold unification in *ālayavijñāna*. When considered from Wōnhyo's perspective, the unification of the neither-arising-nor-ceasing *tathāgatagarbha* and the arising-and-ceasing mind constitutes only one side of the twofold unification, that is, the unification in a non-identical condition. In Fazang's view, however, the *tathāgatagarbha*, which only has the nature of neither-arising-nor-ceasing, still moves itself and produces the arising-and-ceasing [phenomena],³⁰ and is unified with the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition. The former activity of the *tathāgatagarbha*, the activity of moving itself and producing the arising-and-ceasing, is well-known as the dependent origination of *tathāgatagarbha* (C. *rulaizang yuanqi* 如來藏緣起) or the dependent origination of Thusness (C. *zhenru yuanqi* 真如緣起); the latter activity of its unification with the arising-and-ceasing mind in a neither-identical-nor-different condition as the unification of truth and delusion (C. *zhenwang hehe* 真妄和合).³¹

The doctrine of dependent origination of *tathāgatagarbha* (or Thusness) means that all of the phenomenal world is evolved from *tathāgatagarbha* (or Thusness). This doctrine is often regarded as deviating from, or even contradictory to, the position of the early Yogācāra tradition,

²⁸ The seemingly inconsistent statements of the *Laikāvatāra Sūtra* on the relationship between *ālayavijñāna* and *tathāgatagarbha* appear only in the *Ru lengqie jing*, Bodhiruci's 10-fascicle recension. The passage, in which *ālayavijñāna* is identified as *tathāgatagarbha*, reads, "Mahāmāti! *Ālayavijñāna* is named *tathāgatagarbha* and coexists with the seven consciousnesses in delusion." See the *Ru lengqie jing* T671:16.556b29-c01: 大慧! 阿梨耶識者, 名如來藏, 而與無明七識共俱。Soon after this passage, it states, "Mahāmāti! *Tathāgatagarbha* consciousness does not reside in *ālayavijñāna*; therefore, the seven kinds of consciousness arise and cease and *tathāgatagarbha* neither arise nor cease." See the *Ru lengqie jing* T671:16.556c11-13: 大慧! 如來藏識不在阿梨耶識中, 是故七種識有生有滅, 如來藏識不生不滅。In Guṇabhadra's translation in the four-fascicle, *the Lengqie abatuoluo baojing*, *ālayavijñāna* is consistently identified with *tathāgatagarbha*. See the *Lengqie abatuoluo baojing* T670:16.511b07-19; 512b06-08. For a detailed explanation of the difference in the two recensions, see Fuji (1964, pp. 154–55).

²⁹ In commenting on the *Laikāvatāra Sūtra*'s passage in which *tathāgatagarbha* consciousness does not reside in *ālayavijñāna* (the *Ru lengqie jing* T671:16.556b29-c01; see footnote 28 above), Wōnhyo makes a distinction between the seven consciousnesses and *tathāgatagarbha* by describing them as arising-and-ceasing and neither-arising-nor-ceasing, respectively (See the Pyōlgi T1845:44.229c28-230a04: 十卷意者。欲明七識。是浪不非海相。在梨耶識海中故有生滅。如來藏者。是海非浪。不在阿梨耶識海中故無生滅。故言如來藏不在阿梨耶識中。是故七識。有生有滅等。以如來藏即是阿梨耶識故。言不在)。On the contrary, regarding the passage in which *ālayavijñāna* is named *tathāgatagarbha* (the *Ru lengqie jing* T671:16.556b29-c01; see footnote 28 above), Wōnhyo says that this sentence clarifies the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature of the original enlightenment inherent in *ālayavijñāna* (See the Pyōlgi T1845:44.230a07-10: 又四卷經云。阿梨耶識名如來藏。而與無明七識共俱。離無常過。自性清淨。餘七識者。念念不住。是生滅法。如是等文。同明梨耶本覺不生滅義)。Although Wōnhyo says that this passage is stated in the four-fascicle *Sūtra*, which is a mistake, it appears in the 10-fascicle recension. See the *Ru lengqie jing* T671:16.556b29-c04: 大慧! 阿梨耶識者, 名如來藏, 而與無明七識共俱, 如大海波常不斷絕身俱生故, 離無常過離於我過自性清淨, 餘七識者, 心、意、意識等念念不住是生滅法。Moreover, Wōnhyo also explains, in another place, the passages of the *Laikāvatāra Sūtra* from both approaches of a non-identical nature (K. *purirūmun* 不一義門) and non-different nature (K. *purirūmun* 不異義門). The distinction between the self-true character (K. *chajinsang* 自真相) and the evolving character (K. *chōnsang* 轉相) of *ālayavijñāna* is explained from the approach of a non-identical nature, while the identity of the nature of numinous realization (K. *sinhae* 神解) in the arising-and-ceasing and the self-true character is interpreted from the approach of a non-different nature. See the *Kisillon so* T1844:44.208c06-12: 如十卷經言。如來藏即阿梨耶識。共七識生。名轉轉相。故知轉相在梨耶識。自真相者。十卷經云中真名自相。本覺之心。不藉妄緣。性自神解名自真相。是約不一義門說也。又隨無明風作生滅時。神解之性與本不異。故亦得名為自真相。是依不異義門說也。

³⁰ See the *Yiji* T1846:44. 254c04: 此說。此顯真心隨動。故作生滅。

³¹ More explanations shall follow below.

according to which the evolution of the phenomenal world typically occurs from *ālayavijñāna*, an arising-and-ceasing (viz., conditioned, C. *youwei* 有為, *saṃskāra*) dharma, not from *tathāgatagarbha* or Thusness, neither-arising-nor-ceasing (viz., unconditioned, C. *wuwei* 無為, *asaṃskāra*) dharma. In East Asia, however, as Fazang's interpretation of the *Awakening of Faith* was established as the most influential commentary of the treatise, the theory of the dependent origination of *tathāgatagarbha* was also predominantly accepted as a doctrinal frame for understanding it. In the four-fold taxonomy (C. *jiaopan* 教判) of Buddhist teaching, which Fazang explicates at the beginning of the *Yiji*, texts such as the *Awakening of Faith* and the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* are attributed to the fourth and highest level as the teaching of the dependent origination of *tathāgatagarbha* (C. *Rulaizang yuanqi zong* 如來藏緣起宗).³² According to this doctrine, *tathāgatagarbha*, despite its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, directly participates in such an activity as the dependent origination. Fazang declares that the teaching of the dependent origination of *tathāgatagarbha* indicates the doctrine of interfusion and non-obstruction between the principle and phenomena (C. *lishi rongtong wuai shuo* 理事融通無說), implying that a direct interaction occurs between the principle (C. *li* 理; viz., *tathāgatagarbha*) and phenomena (C. *shi* 事; viz., the arising-and-ceasing).³³ Indeed, Fazang states that the *tathāgatagarbha* of this teaching, which conforms to (phenomenal) conditions to constitute the *ālayavijñāna*, refers to the principle and it penetrates into phenomena (C. *liche yushi* 理徹於事).³⁴ In Fazang's view, the *tathāgatagarbha*'s interaction with the arising-and-ceasing mind, which is described in the *Awakening of Faith*, is none other than a direct interaction between principle and phenomena.

The unification of truth and delusion refers to the unification of the *tathāgatagarbha* (viz., truth) and the arising-and-ceasing mind (viz., delusion) in a neither-identical nor-different condition. Fazang used this term to account for the unification of the two minds in the *ālayavijñāna*,³⁵ and afterwards, it came to be adopted widely throughout East Asia, along with its connotation. As a result, the *ālayavijñāna* of the *Awakening of Faith* is generally called the consciousness in which truth and delusion are unified (C. *zhenwang hehe shi* 真妄和合識). Fazang's view on the twofold unification in the *ālayavijñāna* might not appear different from Wōnhyo's in its appearance; just as Wōnhyo does, Fazang also explains the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*'s equivocal statements regarding the relationship between *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna*³⁶ in terms of the twofold unification in *ālayavijñāna*.³⁷ However, the implications of the twofold unification in Fazang's view are different from those in Wōnhyo's. Unlike Wōnhyo, who explains each side of the twofold unification respectively based on the twofold nature of the *tathāgatagarbha*, Fazang interprets this twofold unification in the *ālayavijñāna* as a single

³² The four levels of the teachings are as follows: the teaching of attachment to dharmas following their characteristics (C. *Suixiang fazhi zong* 隨相法執宗), the teaching of no-characteristics in true emptiness (C. *Zhenkong wuxiang zong* 真空無相宗), the teaching of dharma characteristics in consciousness-only (C. *Weishi faxiang zong* 唯識法相宗), and the teaching of the dependent origination of *tathāgatagarbha* (C. *Rulaizang yuanqi zong* 如來藏緣起宗); see the *Yiji* T1846:44.243b22-28: 第二隨教辨宗者。現今東流一切經論。通大小乘。宗途有四。一隨相法執宗。即小乘諸部是也。二真空無相宗。即般若等經。中觀等論所說是也。三唯識法相宗。即解深密等經。瑜伽等論所說是也。四如來藏緣起宗。即楞伽密嚴等經。起信實性等論所說是也。

³³ See the *Yiji* T1846:44.243b28-c03: 此四之中。初則隨事執相說。二則會事顯理說。三則依理起事差別說。四則理事融通無礙說。以此宗中許如來藏隨緣成阿賴耶識。此則理徹於事也。亦許依他緣起無性同如。此則事徹於理也。

³⁴ See footnote 33 above.

³⁵ See the *Yiji* T1846:44.254c24255b07. In this passage, Fazang explains the unification in *ālayavijñāna* by introducing not only the truth and delusion, but also the origin and derivative (C. *benmo* 本末), as another pair with the same connotation. In fact, Yoshizu Yoshihide, in his insightful article (1983) on the Huayan notion of interfusion between the nature and the characteristics (C. *xingxiang ronghui* 性相融通), demonstrates that a series of paired notions, such as the mutual penetration of the truth and delusion (C. *zhenwang jiaoche* 真妄交徹), the non-obstruction between the principle and phenomena (C. *lishi wuai* 理事無礙), the interfusion between the nature and characteristics, and the equality of the origin and derivatives (C. *benmo pingdeng* 本末平等), all have the same connotations in Fazang's works. For detailed information, see Yoshizu (1983).

³⁶ See footnote 28 above.

³⁷ As Wōnhyo also does, Fazang relates the sutra's statement that *tathāgatagarbha* and *ālayavijñāna* are separate from each other to the non-identical (C. *buyi* 不一) condition between the truth and delusion (see the *Yiji* T1846:44.255a14-18: 第二不一義者。即以前攝末之本唯不生滅故。與彼攝本之末唯生滅法而不一也。依是義故。經云。如來藏者。不在阿梨耶中。是故七識有生有滅。如來藏者不生不滅); he associates the statement that they are identical to the non-different (C. *buyi* 不異) condition between them (see the *Yiji* T1846:44.255a09-12: 三本末平等明不異者。經云。甚深如來藏。而與七識俱。又經云。何梨耶識名如來藏。而與無明七識共俱。如大海波常不斷絕)。

state, in which the truth and delusion are interfused to each other. In other words, for Fazang, the neither-identical-nor-different condition of the unification is a new state in the unitary condition, which is distinguished from both the non-identical condition and the non-different condition. Although the neither-identical-nor-different condition of *ālayavijñāna* may be called 'twofold' merely based on its formal division into 'not-identical' and 'not-different', it does not mean that it has two distinct aspects, because the *tathāgatagarbha* has a unitary, not twofold, nature. This interfused state of the unification of the *tathāgatagarbha* and the arising-and-ceasing mind in *ālayavijñāna* is known by Fazang as "the unification of truth and delusion", and is explicated in his comments on *ālayavijñāna*, as follows:

As for the above statement, "This consciousness has two natures [of the enlightenment and the non-enlightenment]," the "natures" are somewhat difficult [to understand] and now I summarize the [entire] passage above and below to briefly describe the meaning. For the rest of the passages, one will then understand it when [later] reading it. As for what [it is like, it is] as follows: Thusness (C. *zhenru* 真如) has two aspects. One is the aspect of unchangeability (C. *bubian yi* 不變義), and the other is the aspect of conforming to [changing] conditions (C. *suiyuan yi* 隨緣義). Nescience (C. *wuming* 無明, *avidyā*) also has two meanings. One is the aspect of emptiness that lacks the essence (C. *wuti jikong yi* 無體即空義), and the other is the aspect of functioning that forms phenomena (C. *youyong chengshi yi* 有用成事義). Truth (C. *zhen* 真), [i.e., Thusness] and delusion (C. *wang* 妄), [i.e., nescience] constitute the abode of Thusness (C. *zhenrumen* 真如門) on the basis of the former aspects, and constitute the abode of arising-and-ceasing (C. *shenmiemen* 生滅門) on the basis of the latter aspects.

[The two latter aspects, that is,] Thusness that conforms to conditions (C. *suiyuan zhenru* 隨緣真如) and nescience that forms phenomena (C. *chengshi wuming* 成事無明) each also have two aspects. One is the aspect of opposing itself and according with the other (C. *weizi shunta yi* 違自順他義), and the other is the aspect of opposing the other and according with itself (C. *weita shunzi yi* 違他順自義). In the case of nescience [that forms phenomena], the first [aspect of] opposing itself and according with the other has two further aspects. One is [the aspect of] being capable of refusing [language] expositions to reveal the virtuous merits of the nature [of Thusness] (C. *nengfanduiquan shixinggongde* 能反對詮示性功德), and the other is [the aspect of] being capable of knowing the meaning of names to accomplish pure functions (C. *nengzhimingyi chengjingyong* 能知名義成淨用). The [second aspect of] opposing the other and according with itself also has two aspects. One is [the aspect of] covering truth (C. *fu zhenli* 覆真理), and the other is [the aspect of] forming delusory mind (C. *cheng wangxin* 成妄心). In the case of Thusness [that conforms to conditions], the [aspect of] opposing the other and according with itself has also two aspects. One is [the aspect of] reversing delusion and defilements to reveal its own merits (C. *fanduiwangran xianzide* 翻對妄染顯自德), and the other is [the aspect of] internally perfuming nescience to arouse pure functions (C. *neixunwuming qijingyong* 內熏無明起淨用). [The aspect of] opposing itself and according with the other has also two aspects. One is the aspect of hiding its true essence (C. *yinzizhenti yi* 隱自真體義), and the other is the aspect of manifesting delusive dharmas (C. *xianxianwangfa yi* 顯現妄法義).

Among the four aspects for each of the truth and delusion, on the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of refusing [language] expositions to reveal [the virtuous merits] in case of nescience and the aspect of reversing delusion to reveal merits in case of Thusness, one can come to have original enlightenment. On the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of being capable of knowing the meaning of names in case of nescience and the aspect of internally perfuming in case of Thusness, one can come to have initial enlightenment. In addition, on the basis of [the two aspects, that is,] the aspect of covering the truth in case of nescience and the aspect of hiding the essence in case of Thusness, one can come to have the original non-enlightenment (C. *genben bujue* 根本不覺). And, on the basis of [the two aspects,

that is,] the aspect of forming delusion in case of nescience and the aspect of manifesting delusion in case of Thusness, one can come to have the derivative no-enlightenment (C. *zhimo bujue* 枝末不覺).

In this abode of arising-and-ceasing, [the nature of] the truth and delusion is briefly divided into four aspects, but in detailed level, there are eight aspects. When [paired aspects from Thusness and nescience] are unified to constitute the dependent origination, there are four divisions, namely, two for enlightenment and two for non-enlightenment. When the origin and its derivatives are not separated from each other, there are only two divisions, namely, enlightenment and non-enlightenment. When [they are all] interfused to encompass each other, there are only one, namely, the abode of arising-and-ceasing of the one mind (C. *yixin shengmie men* 一心生滅門).³⁸

The unification of the truth and delusion, described in the above passage, may be represented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The unification of truth and delusion in Fazang’s commentary of the *Awakening of Faith*³⁹.

As seen in Figure 1, the mutual interfusion between Thusness and nescience represents a state, in which truth and delusion, are intricately interconnected to constitute *ālayavijñāna*. For Fazang, the neither-identical-nor-different state of the unification in *ālayavijñāna* is not dividable into two aspects of the non-identical condition and the non-different condition; rather, it is a unitary state called ‘synthetic’ consciousness. It was due to this interpretation that the concept of *ālayavijñāna* of the *Awakening of Faith* has been regarded as doctrinally incompatible with that of early Yogācāra Buddhism. The ‘synthetic’ structure of the *ālayavijñāna*, in which the neither-arising-nor-ceasing *tathāgatagarbha* is directly interacting with the arising-and-ceasing mind, is simply incongruous with the early Yogācāra’s

³⁸ See the *Yiji* T1846:44.255c18-256a13: 前中言此識有二義等者。此義稍難。今總括上下文略敘其意。餘可至文當知。何者。謂真如有二義。一不變義。二隨緣義。無明亦二義。一無體即空義。二有用成事義。此真妄中。各由初義故成上真如門也。各由後義故成此生滅門也。此隨緣真如及成事無明亦各有二義。一違自順他義。二違他順自義。無明中初違自順他亦有二義。一能反對證示性功德。二能知名義成淨用。違他順自亦有二義。一覆真理。二成妄心。真如中違他順自亦有二義。一翻對妄染顯自德。二內熏無明起淨用。違自順他亦有二義。一隱自真體義。二顯現妄法義。此上真妄各四義中由無明中反對證示義。及真如中翻對妄顯德義。從此二義得有本覺。又由無明中能知名義。及真如中內熏義。從此二義得有始覺。又由無明中覆真義。真如中隱體義。從此二義得有根本不覺。又由無明中成妄義。及真如中現妄義。從此二義得有枝末不覺。此生滅門中。真妄略開四義。廣即有八門。若約兩兩相對和合成緣起。即有四門。謂二覺二不覺。若約本末不相離。唯有二門。謂覺與不覺。若鎔融總攝。唯有一門。謂一心生滅門也。

³⁹ This figure was originally composed by Whalen Lai (1980, p. 252) in his article titled “the *I-ching* and the Formation of the Hua-yen Philosophy.” Here, I have added the part of the abode of Thusness and made some modifications in English translations. I introduce this figure to facilitate the understanding of the reciprocal interfusion between truth and delusion, or Thusness and nescience, described in this passage.

understanding of *tathāgatagarbha* or Thusness as the unconditioned dharmas, which never take part in any phenomenal activity. Moreover, the *ālayavijñāna* in this ‘synthetic’ state has a metaphysical implication, which is generally not accepted in Buddhist tradition.⁴⁰ It might be said that Fazang succeeded in compromising the contemporary doctrinal tension by interpreting *ālayavijñāna* of the *Awakening of Faith* as the ‘synthetic’ consciousness, in which the neither-arising-nor-ceasing mind and the arising-and-ceasing mind are interpenetrated to each other. However, as far as Fazang’s claim that *tathāgatagarbha* and the phenomenal world, or Thusness and nescience, are unified in one state has a metaphysical connotation, his interpretation of *ālayavijñāna* also remains odd from the general standpoint of Buddhist tradition.

4. Concluding Reflections

The *Awakening of Faith* has been considered to doctrinally deviate from the early Yogācāra because of its innovative description of *ālayavijñāna* as the ‘synthetic’ consciousness, in which the *tathāgatagarbha* and the phenomenal mind are unified. This way of understanding has mostly been based on Huayan exegete Fazang’s commentary, according to which Thusness and nescience, truth and delusion, or principle and phenomena, are interpenetrated in the *ālayavijñāna*. The question of how the neither-arising-nor-ceasing *tathāgatagarbha* can participate in the arising-and-ceasing activities of the phenomenal world still remains a problem innate to Fazang’s interpretation. In comparison, Wōnhyo’s commentaries of the *Awakening of Faith* suggest an alternative view on the *ālayavijñāna*. By considering the twofold nature of *tathāgatagarbha*, which includes not only the neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature, but also the arising-and-ceasing nature, Wōnhyo explains how *tathāgatagarbha* keeps its neither-arising-nor-ceasing nature on the one hand, and also engages itself in the phenomenal world on the other hand. On the basis of this understanding the *tathāgatagarbha*, the unification of the *tathāgatagarbha* and the arising-and-ceasing mind in *ālayavijñāna* is also explained in a twofold way—the unification in a not-identical condition on the one hand, and in a not-different condition on the other hand. In this way, Wōnhyo explains doctrinal compatibility between the *ālayavijñāna* of the *Awakening of Faith* and that of the early Yogācāra, and based on his perspective on the *tathāgatagarbha* and the *ālayavijñāna*, we may see a possible doctrinal connection between the *Awakening of Faith* and the early Yogācāra.

Funding: This work was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies (KSPS) Grant funded by the Korean Government (MOE) (AKS-2012-AAZ-2102).

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflicts of interest.

References

Primary Sources

- Awakening of Faith* 大乘起信論. T1666.
Dasheng qixinlun yiji 大乘起信論義記. T1846.
Huayan yisheng jiao fenqi zhan 華嚴一乘教義分齊章. T1866.
Kisillon so 起信論疏. T1844.
Lengqie abatuoluo baojing 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 T670.
Ru lengqie jing 入楞伽經 T671.
Ru lengqixin xuanyi 入楞伽心玄義 T1790.
Taesūng kisillon pyōlgi 大乘起信論別記 T1845.

⁴⁰ Whalen Lai (1980, pp. 252–55) also argues that Fazang’s doctrines were influenced by ontological metaphysics of classical Chinese philosophy, such as that of the *Yijing* 易經, by indicating a similarity between Fazang’s scheme of the mutual permeation of Thusness and delusion and *Yijing*’s “One-Two-Four-Eight” diagram, which stands for evolutionary process of phenomena from the one supreme principle.

Yōlban chongyo 涅槃宗要 T1769.

Secondary Sources

- Fuji, Ryūsei 藤隆生. 1964. *Ryōga kyō ni okeru ichini no mondai: Nyoraizō Yuishiki setsu no kōshō* 『楞伽經』における一・二の問題: 如来蔵唯識説の考証. [One or two problems in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*: Historical investigation of theories on *tathāgatagarbha* and *Yogācāra*]. *Ryūkoku Daigaku Bukkyō Bunka enkyūjo kiyō* 龍谷大学佛教文化研究所紀要 3: 153–56.
- Ikeda, Masanori 池田將則. 2012. *Kyō'u shōoku shōzou tonkō bunken the Dashengqixinlun shu* (gidai, 羽333V) ni tsuite 杏雨書屋所藏敦煌文獻『大乘起信論疏』(擬題, 羽333V) について. [On the Dunhuang Manuscript *Dasheng qixin lun shu* 大乘起信論疏 (provisional title; hane 羽 333 verso) belonging to the Kyō'u 杏雨 Library]. *Pulgyōhak Review 불교학리뷰* 12: 45–167.
- Kashiwagi, Hiroo 柏木弘雄. 1981. *Daijō kishin ron no kenkyū: Daijō kishin ron no seiritsu ni kansuru shiryōron teki kenkyū* 大乘起信論の研究: 大乘起信論の成立に関する資料論的研究 [A study of the Awakening of Faith: A study on the materials in the formation of the Awakening of Faith]. Tōkyō: Shunjūsha.
- Katsumata, Shunkyō 勝又俊教. 1961. *Bukkyō ni okeru shinshūketsu no kenkyū* 仏教における心識説の研究 [A study on the theory of consciousness and mind in Buddhism]. Tōkyō: Sankibō Busshorin.
- Lai, Whalen. 1980. The *I-ching* and the Formation of the Hua-yen Philosophy. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 7: 245–58. [CrossRef]
- Muller, Charles. 2004. The *Yogācāra* Two Hindrances and their Reinterpretations in East Asia. *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 27: 207–35.
- Muller, Charles. 2006. Wonhyo's Reliance on Huiyuan in his Exposition of the Two Hindrances. *Bulletin of Tōyō Gakuen University* 14: 1–16.
- Takasaki, Jikido 高崎直道. 1960. *Kegon shisō to nyoraizō shisō* 華嚴教学と如来蔵思想 [Huayan theories and *tathāgatagarbha* thoughts]. In *Kegon shisō* 華嚴思想 [Huayan thoughts]. Edited by Kawada Kumatarō 川田熊太郎 and Nakamura Hajime 中村元. Kyōto: Hōzōkan, pp. 277–334.
- Yoshizu, Yoshihide 吉津宜英. 1983. *Shōsō yūe ni tsuite* 性相融会について [On the interfusion of nature and characteristics]. *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu kenkyū kiyō* 駒澤大学佛教學部研究紀要 41: 300–21.
- Yoshizu, Yoshihide 吉津宜英. 2005. *Kishinron to Kishinron shisō: Jōyōji Eon no jirei o chūshin ni shite* 起信論と起信論思想: 淨影寺慧遠の事例を中心にして [The Awakening of Faith and the ideas of the Awakening of Faith: Centering on a Case Study of Jingying Huiyuan]. *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu kenkyū kiyō* 駒沢大学仏教学部研究紀要 63: 1–15.



© 2019 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).