

Table S2. A tabular view of the empirical references using duration models

References	Data	Methodology	Explanatory Variables	Main Conclusions
Attia et al. 2020	EUSANCT dataset (1989-2016) Sanctions imposed by US and EU	Competing risks model. Multinomial logit: dependent variable- Target compliance (termination = 1), sender capitulation (termination = 2), ongoing sanctions (termination=0)	-Target related variable (sanctions cost, Civil democracy, GDP per capita, Political leadership changes, Number of domestic protests) - Sender related variables (Sanctions cost, Commitment, Leadership change) - Trade between sender and target - Political ties - Issue salience - Prior sanctions - US dummy - distance between capitals	- Determinants of target compliance and sender capitulation differ - Poor economic health and high political volatility in the target country increase probability to comply, political alignment between the sender and target and leadership changes in the sender country lead to a higher probability of sender capitulation.
Krustev and Morgan 2011	TIES dataset (1971-2000)	Three separate Cox regression models (Pooled hazards, sender capitulation, target capitulation) Dependent variable - duration of an economic coercion case.	-Sender WCC (winning coalition changes) and Target WCC (winning coalition changes) - Target and sender W/S (winning coalition to electorate ratio) - Sender commitment - Sender to target GDP ratio; - Pre-coercion trade linkage between the sender and target	-Both bargaining factors and domestic realignments matter -the way in which the sender delivers its initial threat has an impact on the duration and outcome of a coercion episode -mixed evidence concerning the effects of domestic political changes
Early 2011	Hufbauer et al. (2007) dataset US-imposed sanctions from 1950 to 2006	Competing risks model Multinomial logit: dependent variable-success, failure, ongoing sanctions	- 3-year averages of the general sanctions-busting variable (All Busters) and the Black Knight subsets (Black Knight Allies and Black Knight Great Powers) -Control variables: US cooperation, International Organization support, US defensive alliance, target defensive alliance, modest goal, prior relations, Democracy, Post-cold War	While black knights alone do not make sanctions more likely to fail, in conjunction with commercially-motivated sanctions busters they do exercise a potent, negative effect on sanctions' success
Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000	Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) dataset Data until 1992	Duration model-weibull distribution Dependent variable – number of months of sanction's duration	-Target Attributes (state's attributes and militarized interstate dispute., change in the regime, Economic health and strength) -Sender Attributes (Power status, coalition of senders, and 5 dummies for main objective of sanction) -Sanctions attributes (Three dummy variables: show of force, use of force and war)	Target state's features, especially its institutional structure and the political vulnerability of its regime, significantly impact the duration of sanction episodes