1. Introduction
Global markets are characterised by extreme and growing concentration. Almost twenty years ago, Bernard et al. [
1] documented that the largest 1 percent of trading firms, formally defined in the literature as
superstar firms [
2], was responsible for over 80 percent of the value of total US trade. Since their seminal publication, a similar pattern has consistently come up in most developed and developing nations [
3,
4,
5]. Recently, an emerging empirical literature has suggested a rising trend in the market power of superstar firms [
5,
6,
7,
8,
9] and has highlighted globalisation as, arguably, the most powerful force behind their increasingly dominant presence [
10,
11]. The theoretical literature, on the other hand, by emphasising the intensification of competition as a robust effect of international trade [
12,
13,
14], has not gone far enough in reconciling this theoretical pro-competitive effect with the documented progressing global influence of big businesses.
In this paper, we build a simple theoretical mechanism to show how a select few firms grow into superstars while operating alongside a fringe of small competitors. We use this to uncover a novel composition effect that enables those lucky few to come out as the big winners of trade liberalisation at the price of lowering the profitability of small firms and suppressing aggregate welfare gains from trade.
To construct a model of how superstars emerge, our natural starting point is to examine how they differ from small and medium enterprises. Superstars are characterised by a superior productive efficiency [
15] that generates increased market shares and also, unlike small firms, by the ability to internalise the impact of their behaviour on the market, as manifested in their unique ability to charge higher markups [
4,
16,
17] selected strategically [
18] to vary with their market shares. Building on this empirical evidence, we develop a stylised two-period model, where a priori identical (non-strategic) monopolistic competitors draw from a common productivity distribution (period one), as in [
19], and show how exogenous initial differences in productivity draws are endogenously magnified, resulting in different abilities to invest in cost-reducing innovations. Thus, our study contributes to the existing literature by rationalising the appearance of polarised markets as a subgame perfect general equilibrium result: successful innovators, and only them, expand to the extent that they find it optimal to start behaving in a strategic (oligopolistic) fashion. We end up (period two) with an industry governed by mixed market competition [
20,
21] with an oligopolistic sub-sector of superstars co-existing with a monopolistically competitive fringe of small firms.
Moving on, in this setup of two sub-sectors, we introduce international trade. Our paper is, to our knowledge, the first to show that, when explicitly modelling the increased productivity and oligopolistic nature of superstars, trade triggers two different types of market share reallocation away from smaller and towards larger firms: one which resembles Melitz-type [
19] selection and is due to the efficiency advantage of superstar firms, and one that is solely attributed to the differential abilities of the two types of firms to charge variable markups. Hence, a newly documented composition effect is generated, materialised through a market share reallocation from smaller towards larger rivals, which dampens the standard pro-competitive effect of trade liberalisation and cements the dominant position of big businesses by boosting their profitability. We find that, although trade always increases welfare by reducing the average markup and markup heterogeneity, gains from trade are significantly suppressed in the shadow of a few powerful large firms. We conclude that, in polarised international markets, size-dependent policies, like, for example, subsidies for smaller exporters, may have a welfare-enhancing role to play.
The structure of our paper is as follows. In
Section 2, based on the assumption that firms grow because of luck and successful innovation, we construct a two-period general equilibrium model with free entry where the most efficient firms grow into superstars and choose to take action in order to exploit their market power. At the same time, the majority of their competitors end up supplying only a small portion of the market and refrain from internalising their impact on the aggregates. We end up with a polarised market where a handful of big businesses compete alongside a myriad of small enterprises, very much like what the empirical literature reports. In
Section 3, conditions are derived for this polarised market to emerge as the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. We find that productivity heterogeneity, which is commonly assumed in trade models, emerges as a necessary condition for the endogenous emergence of mixed markets with an oligopolistic and a monopolistically competitive sub-sector. We go on to conduct a comparative statics analysis of our closed economy equilibrium: we illustrate the potentially devastating effect of large firms on aggregate welfare and indicate that our model could serve as an alternative interpretation of the inverted-U relationship between innovation and competition [
22].
Moving on, in
Section 4, we introduce international trade between two symmetric countries and, in
Section 5, we discuss how bringing together the two established market structures of oligopoly and monopolistic competition in an open economy setup does not result in a simple combination of the variety gains predicted by the monopolistically competitive models [
23], with the pro-competitive gains expected to materialise under pure oligopoly [
24]. The co-existence of firms that differ in their strategic behaviour, as well as their efficiency level, gives rise to a composition effect of these two traditional sources of gains, resulting in a market share reallocation from smaller to larger players that dampens the pro-competitive effect and reduces welfare gains from trade. We show that trade liberalisation disproportionately benefits large firms, since small firms largely absorb globalisation-related competitive pressures, shielding large firms from increased import penetration. Our results replicate the widely documented and discussed global rise of big firm profitability and market concentration [
6,
25,
26]. Finally, in
Section 6, we show how subsidising the exports of small enterprises may induce a raise in welfare gains from trade.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
4. The Open Economy
We use the two-period framework presented in
Section 2 in order to analyse a global economy consisting of two symmetric countries with identical preference and production structure. We assume that the countries open up to trade only in the second period of the game, when both large CO and small MC firms are operating (allowing for trade in the first period would involve two monopolistically competitive industries, as in [
19], and we have nothing new to say here about the gains from this type of trade). In an open economy, at the beginning of period two, once the innovation decisions have been made, firms have the option to export to a foreign, perfectly symmetric economy. Trade costs are of the iceberg type,
, and units of goods must be shipped abroad in order for one unit to be consumed. We abstract from the presence of a fixed entry cost in the export market and, therefore, all firms choose to export.
Starting with large CO firms, they select the quantity sold in the domestic and the foreign market, denoted by
and
, respectively, to maximise profits:
subject to the inverse demand function of each country and taking as a given that both domestic and foreign MC firms maximise their profits subject to the inverse demand at home and abroad and that every other oligopolist (foreign and domestic) produces according to their reaction functions. We denote the price charged by a large CO firm in the domestic market by
, and in the foreign market by
.
Small MC firms choose the level of output supplied in the domestic market
and the export market
to maximise the following profit function:
subject to the inverse demand function of each country. We denote the price charged by a small MC firm in the domestic market by
, and in the foreign market by
. We find that each domestic small firm sets a domestic price equal to the one in a closed economy setup, but a higher price is set in the foreign market, reflecting the increased marginal cost of exporting.
We consider a non-cooperative game in which big and small firms choose their output simultaneously. We characterise a mixed market equilibrium using the profit maximisation conditions of the small and large firms, as well as the free entry condition. We find that, as in the closed economy case, oligopolists charge a markup that is higher than monopolistic competitors. More importantly, large firms are able to charge a markup that varies with
, unlike the fringe firms who charge a constant markup of price over marginal cost. These results replicate common empirical patterns [
18].
Finally, we use the indirect utility of the representative consumer to obtain the aggregate welfare function
V. For the evaluation of welfare gains from trade, we use the compensating variation
caused by going from the trade equilibrium
to the autarky equilibrium
:
Welfare and welfare gains from trade decrease with prices and the average markup and increase with average productivity. For the evaluation of a trade policy regime, in
Section 6, we use the exact same approach, where
is the equilibrium under the policy regime and
is the equilibrium without the policy.
5. The Composition Effect of Trade
In this section, we look into the effect of international trade liberalisation. We consider a setup where, in order to export, there is an iceberg-type cost
but no fixed cost of exporting. (In the presence of fixed costs, we would find one of two possible cases: (1) The fixed cost of exporting is too high for small firms; in which case, international trade only occurs among oligopolists. (2) The fixed cost is low enough for all firms to export; in which case, the no fixed cost analysis is exactly applicable, only scaled down. The case where only oligopolists trade is an even more extreme version of the results under no fixed costs, and small firms are even less flexible to react to trade liberalisation and, hence, even more severely harmed by it.) In
Figure 3, which should be read from right to left, we illustrate the effects of decreasing the iceberg cost
to the point where
and trade becomes free (as in
Section 3.2, our results are robust to changes in the parameters provided subgame perfection is guaranteed; we set our parameters as follows:
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
and
).
As decreases, tending to 1, two things happen. First, export penetration from both small and large foreign firms increases, suppressing the market shares of domestic firms and raising the market shares of foreign firms in the home market. Second, with CES preferences, small firms cannot adjust their markups, as opposed to large firms who can.
Consequently, large firms engage in reciprocal dumping by charging a lower markup abroad than at home. More importantly, as trade liberalisation proceeds, large firms lower their markups in the domestic market to cope with increased competition at home and raise them in the foreign market as a result of decreased export costs. Differential abilities to adjust markups create a market share reallocation from small towards large firms that boosts large firms’ profits as trade becomes cheaper. This result is shown in
Figure 3, where, as the trade cost decreases, the total profit (from the whole two-period game) of a small MC firm decreases (total MC profit in the top left plot of
Figure 3) and the total profit of a large CO firm increases (total CO profit in the top middle plot of
Figure 3).
To link our findings to the trade literature, when big businesses co-exist with small non-atomic firms, trade liberalisation gives rise to a composition effect of the two traditional sources of gains, namely the variety gains predicted by monopolistically competitive models and the pro-competitive gains expected to materialise under oligopoly. Hence, our predicted effect of trade liberalisation differs from both monopolistically competitive Krugman-type [
23] and olipolistic Brander-and-Krugman-type [
24] models. We find that, in the presence of market power heterogeneity, there is a new channel through which trade liberalisation affects welfare. This channel, that we refer to as the composition effect, works through the differential abilities of firms to price-to-market and materialises via a market share reallocation from small towards big businesses. (In our baseline calibration, MC firms have positive total operational profits, but, when the entry cost is subtracted, their total profits are negative. The reason they do not exit is that they have to repay the sunk fixed entry cost. On the contrary, even after the deduction of the entry cost, oligopolists make positive profits. Our model is insensitive to changes in the entry cost value.)
To shed more light on the interaction between the big and the small, in the remainder of
Figure 3, we focus on the markup adjustment taking place with the increase in trade openness. We obtain that large firms’ variable markups imply that the change in trade costs is only partly being passed on to the prices. Thus, the aggregate price decreases but less than the trade cost (aggregate price in the top right plot of
Figure 3). Regarding markups, we find that the average markup decreases but only marginally (average markup price in the top right plot of
Figure 3); the increase in large firms’ foreign markups is slightly lower than the decrease in their domestic markups (home markup gap and export markup gap in the middle right plot and bottom left plot of
Figure 3, respectively). Given that the average markup (average markup in the bottom middle plot of
Figure 3) and also markup dispersion (markup dispersion in the bottom right plot of
Figure 3) both decrease as
decreases, we find that some pro-competitive gains from trade survive (welfare gains, middle plot of
Figure 3). These gains, however, are crucially diminished due to market power asymmetries.
The intuition behind this result is that, in the presence of a competitive fringe, the fringe largely absorbs competitive pressures. Thus, as
decreases, large-firm profitability rises, and this happens at the expense of small firms, whose profits decline as trade becomes cheaper, causing a dampening in the pro-competitive gains from trade. Note that the increase in oligopolistic profits dominates the decrease in monopolistically competitive profits, causing expected profits, prior to entry, to increase and inducing more entry (number of firms in the middle left plot of
Figure 3). This result is driven by the presence of small firms, because in strictly oligopolistic models, like [
38], trade liberalisation creates less entry. However, even though the number of operating firms increases, intensifying competition among large firms, this effect is not sufficient to overturn the increase in oligopolistic profits due to trade liberalisation, much like the evidence documented in [
6]. (In terms of the mixed market literature, our model shares an intuition similar to [
21]. However, this model operates under the assumptions of a homogeneous productivity and no entry, and, therefore, lowering trade costs drives consumer surplus down. Being a more general framework, our paper performs better in replicating the vast majority of empirical works in the field of international trade, according to which trade is, on aggregate, welfare-enhancing).
A final interesting point is that, comparing the number of available varieties (
N versus
), variety gains from trade survive, although the adjustment in
as
changes is linked to the existence of market power, unlike in [
23].
We conclude that leaving out strategic asymmetries leads to a systematic error in the estimation of trade-induced competition. Hence, our model contributes to the literature on incomplete pass-through (for a survey, see [
39]) by being the first, to our knowledge, to study the co-existence of fixed and variable markup firms in a heterogeneous productivity framework.
The importance of modelling market power becomes obvious when we compare welfare gains for different levels of
(
Figure 4). We compare the scenario where large firms are more frequent and correspond to the top 10 percent of the firm distribution (
) to the one where the firm distribution is extremely skewed and large firms only correspond to the top 0.1 percent (
). Our baseline calibration is one where superstars are the top 1 percent (
), as implied by the data. We use a logarithmic representation of our y-axis for illustration purposes. We conclude that, as concentration increases (
decreases) and large firms become more sheltered from competition, welfare gains from trade decrease, although trade liberalisation is always welfare-enhancing. These results are in line with [
38,
40,
41], who find that markups decrease due to pro-competitive gains from trade. However, contrary to the findings in [
41], in our model, pro-competitive gains are lower in the presence of extensive misallocation, which is due to large inefficiencies associated with markups. The characteristic of our model driving these results is that we abstract from pure oligopoly and incorporate the documented inability of most firms to change their pricing behaviour in response to changes in trade costs. (However, as in [
42], gains from trade are not monotonically linked to the level of
. Although, given the existence of large firms (
), more inefficiency (lower
) implies lower gains from trade, in the binary comparison of zero versus positive percentage of large firms, trade creates more gains in an economy with oligopolists than in a purely monopolistically competitive framework.)
Having established that, at least in polarised markets, the presence of large firms limits welfare gains from trade, it may be implied that competition policy measures, in the shape of antitrust actions and regulatory reforms, which increase the percentage of large firms and boost competition among them, could be nothing but beneficial. However, bear in mind that large firms are the innovators in our market. Thus, even in our simple setup, it is clear that any attempt at a competition policy should aim to decrease markup dispersion among firms, but without altering the incentives to innovate. Any policy maker should progress with caution, carefully evaluating the trade off between efficiency gains from big firm innovation and market-power-related welfare losses, as the two tend to co-exist [
38].
6. Policy Implications
We can now use our model to show how differential market power could serve to justify the use of size-dependent policies. In
Section 5, large firms are more efficient and, therefore, they expand as trade becomes less costly. This selection-type reallocation is welfare-enhancing and any policy intervention raising obstacles to this mechanism is arguably harmful. However, selection is not the whole story. In the counterfactual exercise where all firms in the market are equally productive (
), market share reallocation still occurs. This is an inefficiency triggered by trade liberalisation: even without a cost advantage, strategic firms will always set a higher markup and will benefit from pricing-to-market. Consequently, our model emphasises the need to know why firms excel before drawing welfare conclusions regarding any resource reallocation among competitors.
In this final part of our analysis, we use our market structure to show that there exist crucial complementarities between trade and competition policies. We go on to investigate whether size-dependent trade policies could magnify the welfare gains from trade. In reality, such policies, that either restrict big establishments and/or promote small ones, are widespread across countries. They take different forms, including trade restrictions and subsidies, and an extensive literature has taken aim at evaluating their costs and benefits, as well as their impact on the size distribution of firms [
43,
44]. There is a consensus that such size-dependent policies tend to suppress both aggregate output and average productivity. We show that, in the presence of strategic market power heterogeneity, size-dependent policies might actually increase social welfare.
Our policy is simple and abstract, taking the form of an export subsidy. The level of the subsidy is revealed once each firm has drawn an initial productivity. Government budget balances through a lump-sum tax
T to the consumers, whose lifetime income drops by
T. We compare the results from a subsidy to low-productivity firms to the situation where all firms face the same trade cost, for example,
. In
Figure 5, we present the effect of an export subsidy on the monopolistically competitive firms, where the subsidy takes the form of a decreased trade cost faced by these firms. In other words, oligopolistic firms face the real trade cost
, whereas the MC firms face a trade cost
. The difference between the two costs
is equal to the subsidy per unit of exported output.
We find that, contrary to the homogeneous market power case assumed in existing literature, a size-dependent policy leads to an increase in output, which drives aggregate prices down. Reading
Figure 5 from right to left reveals that substituting small firms lowers the average markup and markup dispersion by suppressing both the home and the foreign markup gap between small and big businesses. As a result, a market share reallocation in the opposite direction to the one that takes place during trade liberalisation increases the monopolistically competitive profit at the expense of the oligopolistic sub-sector. As a result, aggregate welfare increases and the welfare gains from the policy increase with the magnitude of the subsidy. Finally, subsidising small firms leads to a decrease in the expected profits prior to entry, driven by the decrease in oligopolistic profits. Hence, although they are found to be socially beneficial, size-dependent policies, in our setup, discourage entry. These findings are aligned with [
45], who argue that global market integration should be accompanied by competition policies. (When discussing policy implications, there is also the crucial matter of economic stability. Small firms are less resilient to crises than larger ones, partly due to their lower productivity and credit constraints, a matter that has been thoroughly investigated, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic [
46,
47,
48,
49,
50]. At the same time, large firms are discrete and granular, and their idiosyncratic shocks reshape the evolution of the aggregate economy, often in an unpredictable way [
51,
52]. Consequently, the matter of economic stability is impossible to discuss in a setup without random shocks affecting each type of firm, and through them, the aggregate income.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a model in order to examine how productivity differences could endogenously lead to differences in strategic behaviour, resulting in polarised markets. In our paper, some firms grow large due to a lucky draw from a common productivity distribution and successful cost-reducing innovations, whereas most of their competitors remain small, constrained by their low productivity draw and their limited access to credit. As a result, a small number of extremely productive firms grow into superstars while they compete with a fringe of small and relatively inefficient counterparts, and polarised markets emerge endogenously as the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
We go on to introduce international trade to this model economy and calculate the welfare gains from trade liberalisation. We find that superstars emerge as the big winners of globalisation, first, because of their increased productivity, as demonstrated by their lower prices generating increased market shares, and, second, due to their oligopolistic behaviour providing them with the unique ability to vary their markups with their market shares. We show that incorporating productivity heterogeneity jointly with differences in strategic behaviour generates a composition effect that dampens the pro-competitive effect of trade liberalisation. As trade becomes less costly, superstar firms benefit more from exporting to the foreign market than they are harmed by the increase in domestic competition, since competitive pressures are largely buffered by the fringe of smaller enterprises. Therefore, when trade occurs between countries with similar concentration, big businesses are not threatened enough by the competitive tensions induced by trade liberalisation. We find that using purely monopolistically competitive or oligopolistic models to predict welfare gains from trade leads to a significant systematic error in the estimation of trade-induced competition. As [
53] observes, the net effect of trade on welfare crucially depends on which firms see the largest increase in perceived competition due to increased import penetration.
Finally, we show that, in our simple setup, it is beneficial to promote size-dependent policies supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs). However, in a richer setup, one should be very careful in the evaluation of such practices. On the one hand, a lower concentration decreases welfare, but, on the other, in a dynamic setup, size-dependent and competition policies could affect innovation incentives. There is an important, although nuanced, trade-off between efficiency gains from large firm innovation and welfare losses due to decreased competition and markup-related misallocation. This concern emphasises the need for future research to design and pursue trade reforms jointly with competition policy and innovation incentives.