Information Security Risk Assessment Using Situational Awareness Frameworks and Application Tools
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Presenting a new framework for risk assessment based on cyber situational awareness in organizations
- Developing an application that supports cybersecurity risk assessments.
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Cyber Situational Awareness
- Level 1: Perceiving the cyber environment; this perception involves identifying or detecting cyber environmental conditions.
- Level 2: Understanding the meaning of the current situation. Perception reveals important information that helps users achieve their goals.
- Level 3: Projecting the near future to support decisions. Information is extrapolated from an understanding of the cyber environment to determine the impact of the current status on future conditions.
2.2. Risk Assessment
2.3. Information Security Management System ISO 27001:2013
2.4. Information Security Risk Control Testing
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Risk Treatment Plan Testing Model with Cyber Situational Awareness Framework
- k = Sum of control from Annex
- Aacceptable = The total number of acceptable Annex A controls is the low (yellow) and medium (green)
- Atotal = The total number of controls from the Annex applied
3.2. System Architecture Testing Risk Treatment Plan
3.3. Application Features Testing Risk Treatment Plan for Cyber Situational Awareness
3.4. Network Security Case Study
4. Results
4.1. Risk Assessment Results
4.1.1. Results of the Audit Method
4.1.2. Results of the Tabletop Exercise Method
4.1.3. Results of the Penetration Testing Method
4.1.4. Results of Testing Improvements with Audit, Exercise and Penetration Testing
4.2. Model Development Results
5. Conclusions and Future Research
5.1. Conclusions
5.2. Future Research
- The scope of this study is the risk management process, a high-level strategy. In the future, it will be important to combine the common vulnerability score system method with low-level approaches like risk metrics.
- Develop a risk assessment for the country’s physical security using both a high-level and low-level risk assessment strategy.
- Added additional test techniques, such as vulnerability analysis
- Comparing audit, penetration testing, vulnerability assessment, and exercise outcomes to incident risk and risk test results.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Asset Number | Asset Name | Threat | Vulnerability | Risk Potential | Risk Treatment | Annex ISO 27001 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
I1 | Network Documentation | Data Lost | No Update | A: Document not available | Backup, provide information classification procedure | A.6. Organization Information Security A.8. Asset management A.12. Operations security |
I2 | Availability Report | Data Lost | No Update | A: Document not available | Backup, provide information classification procedure | A.8. Asset management A.12. Operations security |
I3 | E Ticketing | System Down, Data Lost/Breach | No system Ticketing | C: Data breach A: Service not available | Backup and Capacility Planning | A.8. Asset management A.12. Operations security |
P1 | IT Manager | Social Engineering | NDA | C: Data leak | Awarness and NDA | A.7. Human resource security |
P2 | Help desk | Social Engineering | NDA | C: Data leak | Awarness and NDA | A.7. Human resource security A.12. Operations security A.16. Information security incident management |
P3 | Security Network | Sabotage | NDA | C: Network traffic data leaked from outside, sabotage from internal I: Data can be changed trough network probe A: System compromised and not available | Awarness and NDA | A.7. Human resource security A.11. Physical and environmental security A.12. Operations security A.13. Communications security A.16. Information security incident management |
H1 | Server 1 | Psychical Threat, Sabotage | No server room | A: service not available | Provide Secure Areas for server, Hardware Maintaining | A.11. Physical and environmental security A.13. Communications security A.15. Supplier Relationship |
H2 | Server 2 | Compromised, Sabotaged | No log report | C: Server Sabotage I: Data can be changed by unauthorized parties A: Data losses | Provide log activity, log server, password, log Monitoring | A.11. Physical and environmental security A.13. Communications security A.15. Supplier Relationship |
H3 | Security Aplliances Firewall | Compromised | No Install Firewall | C: Compromised Network and network Traffic I: No Firewall can cause malicious packet going in trough network traffic A: Service availability is threatened | Install and Configure Firewall Feature, Configure Firewall rules | A.10. Cryptography A. 13. Communications security |
H4 | Network Appliance Router | Compromised | No password | C: Confidentiality data are threatened A: Compromised router can cause Network Services Down | Give strong password for router admin login | A.11. Physical and environmental security A.13. Communications security |
H5 | Network Appliance Switch | Compromised | Sabotase | A: Service availability is threatened | Physical protectionto Switch device | A.11. Physical and environmental security A.13. Communications security |
H6 | Network Appliance Access Point | Compromised | Sabotase | A: Service availability is threatened | Physical protectionto the device, and give strong password for admin login | A.11. Physical and environmental security A.13. Communications security |
H7 | UPS1 | Broken Device | Not Available | A: Service availability is threatened | Hardware Maintaining and Renewal | A.11. Physical and environmental security A.13. Communications security |
H8 | Computer1 Destop | Compromised and Sabotaged | No Password | C: accessed by unauthorized people I: Incomplete Data A: Data not available | Enable password and lock screen features, Clear desk and Screen Procedure | A.9. Access control A.11. Physical and environmental security |
S1 | Software for Wifi | Compromised | No Update | A: Service availability is threatened | Update Software Patch | A.13. Communications security |
T1 | Network | third party fraud | NDA | C: Data Leak A: Services Not Available | Provide NDA Vendor, Procedure Third Party/Outsourcing Vendor | A.15. Supplier relationships |
R1 | Reputation | Data Breach, Business Continuity | No Public Communication | C: Data Accidentally Leaked by Internal Employee | Communicate with client and public Provide Customer Service Provide Awarness for employee Provide Communications security Procedure | A.7. Human resource security A.13. Communications security A.17. Information Security aspects of business continuity A.18. Compliance |
No. | Control Objectives | Risk Treatment Plan for Network Security | Testing Result (V Related), (X Not Related) | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Audit | Exercise | Penetration Testing | |||
A.5 | Information security policies | A set of policies for information security, published, communicated, and review | V | X | X |
A.6 | Organization of information security | Jobdesciption, Stakeholder contact, Rule, Policy to Teleworking, and mobile device | V | V | X |
A.7 | Human resources security | NDA, Background Checking, Disipline, Exit Clearance | V | V | X |
A.8 | Asset management | Asset Register, classification information, media handling | V | X | X |
A.9 | Access control | User Access Policy | V | V | V |
A.10 | Cryptography | Crypthography policy and key management | V | X | V |
A.11 | Physical and environmental security | Security Area, Removal Asset, Cabling Security, Clear and Desk Policy | V | X | X |
A.12 | Operations security | Operating Procedure, protection from Malware, Back Up, Log Monitoring, Control of sofware for networks, technicals vulnerabiliy, and audit | V | V | X |
A.13 | Communications security | Networks Security and Information Transfer | V | X | V |
A.14 | System acquisition, development, and maintenance | Application related with security, Securing application services on public networks, Test of data | V | X | X |
A.15 | Supplier relationships | NDA, Supplier Relationship and Delivery | V | V | X |
A.16 | Information security incident management | Incident and Improvement | V | X | X |
A.17 | Information security aspects of business continuity management | Business Continuity Plan and Redunance | V | V | X |
A.18 | Compliance | Compliance Legal and Review | V | X | X |
Appendix B
No. | Tabletop Exercise Results | Disaster Type | Team | Endsley’s Situational Awareness Factor | Annex ISO 27001:2013 | Risk Value | Risk Level | Recomendation |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Some users do not fully understand about ransomware | ransomware | user | situational awareness | A.7. Human resources security | 50 | medium | Raising user awareness through ransomware threat training and campaigns |
2 |
| ransomware | disaster recovery team | system | A.17. Information security aspects of business continuity management | 50 | medium | Improved disaster recovery plan documents covering ransomware threat situations resulting in service outages, cybercrime, recovery processes, and equipment used for shutdown and disaster recovery |
| ransomware and earthquakes | 50 | medium | |||||
| ransomware | 50 | medium | |||||
3 | Requires training on rules and responsibilities related to recovery of ransomware threats that result in service outages and cybercrime | ransomware | human resources | knowledge | A.6. Organization of information security | 50 | medium | Training and improvement of duties and responsibilities related to handling the threat of ransomware attacks |
4 | The vendors involved already have a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) | ransomware | procurement | system | A.15. Supplier relationships | 100 | low | NDA expiration monitoring |
5 | Back up data has been performed regularly | ransomware | operational | system | A.12. Operations security | 100 | low | maintain |
6 | The mechanism for teleworking regulations is not yet clear | ransomware | operational | system | A.6. Organization of information security | 50 | medium | Need improvement of teleworking rules policy |
7 | Assignment of user access privileges has been set and is running well | ransomware | operational | system | A.9. Access control | 100 | low | maintain |
8 | Data center vendor control, servers have been evaluated regularly and are running well | ransomware and earthquakes | operational | system | A.12. Operations security | 100 | low | maintain |
9 | Information coordination mechanisms between OSH and IT recovery need to be established | earthquakes | operational | system | A.6. Organization of information security | 50 | medium | Improvement of Disaster Recovery Plan document covering earthquake threat situation |
10 | Provision of a crisis place in the event of an earthquake that results in an incapable building needs to be evaluated by a safer location from the earthquake | earthquakes | operational | system | A.17. Information security aspects of business continuity management | 50 | medium | Improvements for evaluating the location of the crisis center in the event of an earthquake |
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Phase PDCA | Main | Clause | Element Requirements of ISO 27001 |
---|---|---|---|
Plan | Plan | 6.1 | Actions to address risks and opportunities |
6.2 | Information security objectives and planning to achieve them | ||
Do | Support and Operation | 7.1 | Resources |
7.2 | Competence | ||
7.3 | Awareness | ||
7.4 | Communication | ||
7.5 | Documented information | ||
8.1 | Operational planning and control | ||
8.2 | Information security risk assessment | ||
8.3 | Information security risk treatment | ||
Check | Performance evaluation | 9.1 | Monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluation |
9.2 | Internal audit | ||
9.3 | Management review | ||
Action | Improvement | 10.2 | Nonconformity and corrective action |
10.3 | Continual improvement |
No. | Clauses | Control Objectives | Control |
---|---|---|---|
A.5 | Information Security Policies | 1 | 2 |
A.6 | Organization of information security | 2 | 7 |
A.7 | Human resources security | 3 | 6 |
A.8 | Asset management | 3 | 10 |
A.9 | Access control | 4 | 14 |
A.10 | Cryptography | 1 | 2 |
A.11 | Physical and environmental security | 2 | 15 |
A.12 | Operations security | 7 | 14 |
A.13 | Communications security | 2 | 7 |
A.14 | System acquisition, development and maintenance | 3 | 13 |
A.15 | Supplier relationships | 2 | 5 |
A.16 | Information security incident management | 1 | 7 |
A.17 | Information security aspects of business continuity management | 2 | 4 |
A.18 | Compliance | 2 | 8 |
Total | 35 | 114 |
Endsley Model | Cyber Situation Awareness Testing Model |
---|---|
State of Environment | Context of risk treatment plan |
Perception | Testing Tools |
Comprehension | Summary of testing findings |
Projection | Risk Projection |
Decision | Decision for risk treatment plan |
Action | Correction Action |
Risk Level | Color Code | Weight | Risk Acceptance Level | Audit Criteria | Exercise Criteria | Penetration Testing Criteria |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
High (Red) | 0 | Unacceptable | System failure, affecting business termination or financial loss | Team awareness of cyber disasters does not exist such as knowledge, concern for reading the situation, mental condition, and support system | Impact on business termination or financial loss | |
Medium (Gree) | 50 | Acceptable | System inconsistencies or performance disruptions but no significant impact on the business | There is team awareness of cyber disasters but needs improvement | Performance disruptions but no significant impact on the business | |
Low (Yellow) | 100 | Acceptable | Opportunities for improvement or disruption but no impact on cybersecurity performance | Team awareness of cyber disasters is adequate and need to be maintained | Disruptions but no impact on cybersecurity performance |
Element | Control Objectives | Risk Value | |
---|---|---|---|
Score | Risk Level | ||
A.5 | Information security policies | 0 | High |
A.6 | Organization of information security | 0 | High |
A.7 | Human resources security | 0 | High |
A.8 | Asset management | 0 | High |
A.9 | Access control | 50 | Medium |
A.10 | Cryptography | 50 | Medium |
A.11 | Physical and environmental security | 50 | Medium |
A.12 | Operations security | 50 | Medium |
A.13 | Communications security | 50 | Medium |
A.14 | System acquisition, development, and maintenance | 100 | Low |
A.15 | Supplier relationships | 50 | Medium |
A.16 | Information security incident management | 50 | Medium |
A.17 | Information security aspects of business continuity management | 50 | Medium |
A.18 | Compliance | 50 | Medium |
No. | Findings | Annex A ISO 27001 | Risk Level | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | ScMM DSL Modem/Router Backdoor Detection | A.13. Communications security | High | Attackers can infiltrate the device and access sensitive data when the exploit is successfully executed |
2 | MS12-020: Remote desktop vulnerability that could allow executing code remotely | A.9. Access control | High | Attackers can infiltrate and access the target |
3 | Weak user dan password | A.9. Access control | High | Attacker can access web application with admin level |
4 | SNMP Agent Default Community Name (public) | A.13. Communications security | High | The attacker can obtain all the sensitive information contained in the target |
5 | Indikasi mining crypto currency | A.10. Cryptography | Medium | The device can run cryptocurrency mining automatically, draining hardware and CPU resources and internet connection |
No | Non-Conformance of Testing Findings | Testing Type | Initial Scores | Initial Risk Level | Annex of ISO 27001:2013 | Corrective Action | Personal in Charge | Status of Corrective Action | Residual Scores | Residual Risk Level |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Information security policy has not been established | Audit | 0 | High | A.5. Information security policies | Establish an Information Security Policy, socialized, reviewed regularly regarding the effectiveness of the policy and documented. | Networks Security | Information security policy has been established | 100 | Low |
2 | Employee recruitment is carried out using an existing mechanism following regulations, namely ISO 27001:2013 requiring a screening/background checking process to ensure potential criminal acts; however, there has been no statement regarding organizational confidentiality that has been included in the statement and is connected to company regulations regarding indiscipline actions following information security rules. Information security competency standards have not yet been established | Audit | 0 | High | A.7. Human resource security | Make a statement letter to maintain the confidentiality of information assets and competency standards related to information security | Human Resources | A letter of agreement has been set for maintaining confidentiality and setting competency standards | 100 | Low |
3 | Some users don’t fully understand attack ransomware | Tabletop Exercise | 50 | Medium | A.7. Human resource security | Raising user awareness through ransomware threat training and campaigns | Human Resources | Training and campaigns have been conducted and the team more understanding of ransomware and how to prevention | 100 | Low |
4 | The mechanism for teleworking regulations is not yet clear | Tabletop Exercise | 50 | Medium | A.6. Organization of information security | Improvement of teleworking rule policy | Networks Security | Rule and Policies for teleworking have been established and socialization | 100 | Low |
5 | ScMM DSL Modem/Router Backdoor. Detection.Attackers can infiltrate the device and access sensitive data when the exploit is successfully executed | Penetration Testing | 0 | High | A.13. Communication security | Related devices need to be updated | Networks Security | Vendor device-related have been conducted updated | 100 | Low |
6 | Weak user dan password. The user credentials used are still too weak and general | Penetration Testing | 0 | High | A.9. Access control | passwords can’t be easy predictable and too general. password using standard password complexity so that it is not easy to guess | Networks Security | Passwords have been changed with rules that are not easy to guess. Recommendations for more than 6 numbers and combinations of numbers, symbols, uppercase, and lowercase lette | 100 | Low |
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Chandra, N.A.; Ramli, K.; Ratna, A.A.P.; Gunawan, T.S. Information Security Risk Assessment Using Situational Awareness Frameworks and Application Tools. Risks 2022, 10, 165. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks10080165
Chandra NA, Ramli K, Ratna AAP, Gunawan TS. Information Security Risk Assessment Using Situational Awareness Frameworks and Application Tools. Risks. 2022; 10(8):165. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks10080165
Chicago/Turabian StyleChandra, Nungky Awang, Kalamullah Ramli, Anak Agung Putri Ratna, and Teddy Surya Gunawan. 2022. "Information Security Risk Assessment Using Situational Awareness Frameworks and Application Tools" Risks 10, no. 8: 165. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks10080165
APA StyleChandra, N. A., Ramli, K., Ratna, A. A. P., & Gunawan, T. S. (2022). Information Security Risk Assessment Using Situational Awareness Frameworks and Application Tools. Risks, 10(8), 165. https://doi.org/10.3390/risks10080165