Cybersecurity Risk Assessments within Critical Infrastructure Social Networks
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- Safety, aimed at ensuring the protection of the system from random failures;
- (2)
- Security, aimed at protecting the system from intentional attacks.
2. Materials and Methods
- An overview of cybersecurity;
- An explanation of the relationship between cybersecurity and other types of security;
- A definition of stakeholders and a description of their roles in cybersecurity;
- Guidance for addressing common cybersecurity issues;
- Identification of critical resources and their vulnerabilities.
- Determination of threats, the implementation of which violates the functioning of critical resources.
- Risk estimation and determination of damage from the implementation of threats.
3. Results and Discussion
- Adversarial arguments and behavioral game theory for predicting the subjective utilities of attackers and the decision probability distribution;
- The human factor of cyber tools for solving the problems of integrating human systems, assessing the cognitive states of the defender, and the possibility of automation;
- Dynamic simulation involving attacker, defender, and user models for profound inquiry into cyber epidemiology and cyber hygiene;
- Evaluation of the effectiveness of training and learning scenarios for solving cybersecurity problems, enhancing cybersecurity skills, and making effective decisions.
- (a)
- Cognitive flexibility means the ability to exercise cognitive control and change mindsets, as well as overcome automatic or dominant reactions.
- (b)
- Cognitive exposure stands for receptivity to new ideas, experiences, and perspectives.
- (c)
- Focused attention is the ability to note the relevant drivers and ignore the distractions.
- The more complex the social network is, the higher the number of vulnerabilities to potential attacks and unintentional mistakes.
- Social networks interconnected with other networks, which can also occupy multiple “smart” network domains, increase the likelihood of cascading failures.
- A large number of interconnections between software components increase the vulnerability of the program code, which expedites the introduction of malicious code and vulnerabilities into the program code by attackers.
- The larger the number of social network nodes, the greater the number of access points to the system there are for intruders [17].
- Identification of dangers/threats/possibilities (sources).
- Cause-and-effect analysis, including vulnerability analysis.
- A fractal stratifiable model of knowledge breakdown;
- A system of cybersecurity ontologies (see Figure 8);
- A probability model of scenarios of extreme situations caused by the implementation of cyberthreats built using Bayesian belief networks;
- A numerical approach for determining the cybersecurity risk level;
- Cybersecurity risk analysis methodology.
3.1. Methodology for Assessing the Risks of Cybersecurity Breaches of the Critical Infrastructure of a Social Network
- Qualitative;
- Quantitative.
3.2. Features of the Social Network Cybersecurity Risk Assessment
- Incomplete information about risk components and their ambiguous properties;
- The complexity of creating a social network model and assessing its vulnerability;
- The duration of the evaluation process and the rapid loss of relevance of its results;
- The complexity of aggregating data from various sources, including statistical information and expert assessments;
- There a need to involve several specialists in risk analysis to improve the adequacy of the assessments.
- –
- Evaluating indicator p1, for which you need to know X.
- –
- Forming X, taking into account those risk factors that may appear in the real conditions of the system’s functioning.
- –
- Ensuring a sufficient value for the indicator p2.
- –
- Reviewing and analyzing the set to evaluate the effectiveness of the methods.
- –
- Negligible (0): The risk can be neglected.
- –
- Very low (0.10): If the information is regarded as having a very low risk, it is necessary to determine whether there is a need for corrective actions or whether it is possible to accept this risk.
- –
- Low (0.25): The level of risk allows you to work, but there are prerequisites for disrupting normal work.
- –
- Below average (0.375): It is necessary to develop and apply a corrective action plan within an acceptable period of time.
- –
- Moderate (0.5): The level of risk does not allow stable operation. There is an urgent need for corrective actions that change the mode of operation in the direction of risk reduction.
- –
- Above average (0.625): The system can continue to function, but the corrective action plan must be applied as soon as possible.
- –
- High (0.75): The level of risk is such that business processes are in an unstable state.
- –
- Very high (0.875): It is necessary to immediately take measures to reduce the risk.
- –
- Critical (1): The level of risk is very high and unacceptable for the organization, which requires the termination of the operation of the system and the adoption of radical measures to reduce the risk.
3.3. Cybersecurity Risk Assessment for Critical Social Network Infrastructure
- –
- X1: vulnerabilities at the security level of the software products used.
- –
- X2: vulnerabilities in the protection level of the engineering and technical means used.
- –
- X3: impact on the level of protection of the social network’s information and communication infrastructure.
- –
- Y1 is the probability of a threat to the confidentiality of information.
- –
- Y2 is the probability of a threat to accessibility.
- –
- Y3 is the probability of a threat to integrity.
- –
- R: risk.
- –
- Three input variables (threat, damage, and vulnerability) and one output variable (risk).
- –
- Type of fuzzy inference system: Mamdani (Sugeno).
- –
- The and method (method of logical conjunction); the prod method (method of algebraic product).
- –
- Or method (method of logical disjunction): probor (algebraic sum method).
- –
- Implication (conclusion output method): min (minimum value method).
- –
- Aggregation (method of aggregation); max (method of maximum value);
- –
- Defuzzification (method of defuzzification): WTAVER (weighted average method).
- –
- VL is on a very low level with an accessory function value range of {0; 0.1}.
- –
- L: low level with accessory function value range of {0.11; 0.25}.
- –
- M: medium level with a range of values for the accessory functions: {0.26; 0.5}.
- –
- H: high level with a range of values of the membership functions: {0.51; 0.75}.
- –
- VH: critically high level with a range of membership function values {0.76; 1}.
- Phasification, which consists of determining the degree of truth, i.e., the value of the membership function for the prerequisites (left-hand sides) of each rule.
- Fuzzy inference consists of applying to the conclusions (right-hand sides) of the rules the calculated truth-value for the premises of each rule. Mamdani’s algorithm uses a minimum (min) operation that “cuts off” the membership function of a rule’s conclusion by the height corresponding to the calculated truth-value of the rule’s premises.
- A composition that combines, using the maximum (max) operation, all fuzzy subsets defined for each inference variable and forms one fuzzy subset for each inference variable.
- Defuzzification implementing scalarization of the composition result, i.e., the transition from a fuzzy subset to scalar values.
- The assessment result is a range of risk rating values, which makes it possible to compare the assessment results and rank them according to their level of importance.
- It is possible to assess the dynamics of the risk level when a slight change in certain risk factors occurs.
- The methodology is applicable to any scale of assessment.
- The algorithm and evaluation criteria are clear enough for all users.
- The process of evaluation by experts does not require large time commitments, and is simple and convenient to use.
4. Conclusions
- (1)
- The application areas include cybersecurity risk analysis, assessment, and management.
- (2)
- According to the results of the computational experiment, the optimal methods for generating a set of training data for an artificial neural network and the method of its training are established.
- (3)
- The requirements for the social network security risk assessment model used to form a set of training data for an artificial neural network are determined.
- (4)
- The developed artificial neural networks can be used in real social networks to protect confidential information and build improved algorithms for their functioning.
- An intelligent software package capable of implementing the developed numerical method and probabilistic model.
- An intelligent software package for planning the technological business processes of social network objects in the context of digital transformation.
- Development and implementation of new models and algorithms for automated control tasks.
- Improvements in the software and hardware complexities of automated control systems.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Scale Levels | Threats | Damage | Vulnerabilities |
---|---|---|---|
Very low (from 0 to 0.2) | The event almost never occurs. | Insignificant loss of material and resources, which are quickly replenished, or insignificant impact on reputation. | Vulnerability that can be neglected. |
Low (from 0.2 to 0.4) | The occurrence is rare. | A more significant loss of tangible assets, a more significant impact on reputation, or an infringement of interests. | Minor vulnerability that is easy to fix. |
Average (from 0.4 to 0.6) | The event is quite possible under certain circumstances. | Sufficient loss of tangible assets or resources, or sufficient damage to reputation and interests. | Moderate vulnerability. |
High (from 0.6 to 0.8) | Most likely, the event will occur when an attack is organized. | Significant damage to reputation and interests, which may pose a threat to the continuation of activities. | There is a serious vulnerability, the elimination of which is possible, but associated with significant costs. |
Very tall (from 0.8 to 1) | The event is most likely to occur when an attack is staged. | Devastating consequences and the inability to surf the social network. | A critical vulnerability that calls into question the possibility of its elimination. |
Probability of Risk Occurrence | Level of Damage | ||||
Insignificant | Low | Medium | High | Very high | |
Extremely high | Low | Medium | High | High | High |
High | Low | Medium | Medium | High | High |
Medium | Low | Low | Medium | Medium | High |
Low | Low | Low | Low | Medium | Medium |
Extremely low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low |
Risk Rating | Low | Medium | High | Critical |
R | R < 0.25 | 0.25 ≤ R < 0.5 | 0.5 ≤ R < 0.75 | 0.75 ≤ R |
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Share and Cite
Aktayeva, A.; Makatov, Y.; Tulegenovna, A.K.; Dautov, A.; Niyazova, R.; Zhamankarin, M.; Khan, S. Cybersecurity Risk Assessments within Critical Infrastructure Social Networks. Data 2023, 8, 156. https://doi.org/10.3390/data8100156
Aktayeva A, Makatov Y, Tulegenovna AK, Dautov A, Niyazova R, Zhamankarin M, Khan S. Cybersecurity Risk Assessments within Critical Infrastructure Social Networks. Data. 2023; 8(10):156. https://doi.org/10.3390/data8100156
Chicago/Turabian StyleAktayeva, Alimbubi, Yerkhan Makatov, Akku Kubigenova Tulegenovna, Aibek Dautov, Rozamgul Niyazova, Maxud Zhamankarin, and Sergey Khan. 2023. "Cybersecurity Risk Assessments within Critical Infrastructure Social Networks" Data 8, no. 10: 156. https://doi.org/10.3390/data8100156
APA StyleAktayeva, A., Makatov, Y., Tulegenovna, A. K., Dautov, A., Niyazova, R., Zhamankarin, M., & Khan, S. (2023). Cybersecurity Risk Assessments within Critical Infrastructure Social Networks. Data, 8(10), 156. https://doi.org/10.3390/data8100156