

Article

# Suárez' Minimal Realism of Artifacts

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**Abstract:** The article places Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) and his position on the ontological status of artifacts against the Medieval philosophical background. It is concluded that Suárez is an artifact realist. However, Suárez' realism concerning artifacts is of a minimalist kind. Inscripting himself into the realist tradition, Suárez affirms that an artifact has an “artificial form”, a ‘forma artificialis’. However, this form is not a thing in its own right, but rather has the status of a *mode*. Further, the artificial form is not a mode of substance, but rather of quantity. Hence, Suárez can rightly be called a minimal realist concerning artifacts. In an additional section, the role of the exemplar in the production of an artifact is explored. Suárez counts the exemplar among the efficient causes, and so, the exemplar in the mind of the artisan is one of many efficient causes that together produce and determine the artifact.

**Keywords:** Francisco Suárez (1548–1617); artifacts; ontology; transcendentals; modes; exemplary cause

## 1. Introduction

From the earlier medieval debate over artifacts, one can delineate two main positions: realism and nominalism<sup>1</sup>. In this debate, Suárez basically sides with the realists<sup>2</sup>. However, the story is more complicated. Through his account of one-ness (*unum*), and the relation of multiplicity to unity, Suárez has a novel way to incorporate artifacts into that which is treated within the framework of metaphysics. Although an artificial form, a ‘*forma artificialis*’, is employed to explicate the status of the artifact as something over and above the mere sum of its parts (against an artifact nominalism, then), this form—although a quality—is not a “thing” over and above the constituting parts, but is rather a *mode*. Further, the artificial form is not a mode of a substance, but rather of an accident, namely quantity. Thus, while following in the footsteps of the realist tradition, Suárez is a minimalist with respect to that which arises over and above the parts of an artifact.

The following paper is divided into two main parts: a first longer, part tracing the status of artifacts in the *Disputationes metaphysicae*, and a second shorter, part, dealing with the question of the production of artifacts as this is explicated in the work. The first part, concerning ontological status, is in its turn divided into three sub-parts: on the artifact as a unity (i.e., on the “one-ness” of artifacts), on the artificial form as a kind of quality, and on the status of figure or shape (the kind of quality under which the artificial form falls).

## 2. Artifacts and Unity

An initial question that arises with respect to artifacts is: what kind of unity are we dealing with in this case?<sup>3</sup> Everything that *is* has unity as one of its transcendental properties or “passions”, together with truth and goodness<sup>4</sup>. This unity of that which is belongs to it precisely as something that *is*<sup>5</sup>, and does not arise over and above it<sup>6</sup>.

As will be seen, artifacts are what Suárez—following the Aristotelian tradition—calls “one by accident”<sup>7</sup>. The basic division Suárez makes as to different kinds of unity is between being “one in itself” (*unum per se*) or just “simply one” (*unum simpliciter*), on the one hand, and “one by accident” (*unum per accidens*) or “in a qualified sense” (*secundum quid*), on the other<sup>8</sup>. That which is one in itself is the basic case, for Suárez. A being that is one



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in itself has “entity or essence”<sup>9</sup>, whereas a being that has accidental unity lacks such an entity or essence<sup>10</sup>. Making room for the form-matter union as a per se unity, Suárez adds that beings in themselves are either “simple” or “composite”<sup>11</sup>, where the composite beings consist of “incomplete” entities (i.e., form and matter) that stand as act and potency to each other<sup>12</sup>.

Just as “one by accident” is defined in contrast with “one in itself”, so also is “a being by accident” described in contrast with “a being in itself”. Briefly, that which is a “being by accident” is that which consists of distinct things, where these distinct things are not joined by a “physical and real union”<sup>13</sup>. However, having established this, Suárez goes on to offer an interesting discussion of “degrees” of one-ness in anything which has mere accidental unity. At the very “lowest” level with regard to unity, then, we find “mere aggregations”, such as “heaps of wheat or of stones”<sup>14</sup>. Moving up one step in the degree of one-ness, we arrive at an assemblage with some order in it. It is here that we find artifacts<sup>15</sup>. Suárez gives as examples an army, a commonwealth (*respublica*), a house, “and other similar artifacts” as these “beings by accident” that, although they do not have a mutual “physical union”, still have “some order”<sup>16</sup>. And here Suárez also makes explicit comparisons within these accidental unities that have “some order”<sup>17</sup>. A house is more of a unity than an army, for example. The highest degree of one-ness when it comes to accidental unity, though, one finds in the case of a tree onto which a branch from another tree has been grafted. This shows, then, that Suárez also considers the manipulation and/or cultivation of nature as belonging to the artificial<sup>18</sup>.

After a brief treatment of the question of mixed liquids, where Aristotle’s treatment and his argumentation for why these might be called one in themselves is referred to, Suárez ends his treatment of accidental unity by suggesting that the kind of accidental unity that can most properly be called “one in itself” is the union of a substance with its accidents<sup>19</sup>. This is an at once ironic and very important suggestion. It is ironic since it is precisely in relation to accidents of substances that Aristotle originally introduces the accidentally one (“Socrates sitting”, e.g.), and Suárez has to explicitly state that this case is even included. And it is important, in the history of metaphysics, since it addresses the worry about the “splitting up” of the whole thing into a “hidden” substance or subject, on the one hand, and accidents severed from this substance, on the other<sup>20</sup>.

In view of that which is “one by accident”, Suárez thinks that being, understood under the aspect of being one, is analogous, “and almost equivocal”. This is so because that which is one accidentally is not really *a being*, but is rather better understood as *beings*. That which is one “by accident” is only said to be so by a “proportional analogy” and by an “imitation” of things<sup>21</sup> that are one in themselves. A being that is one by accident is not strictly *a thing*, but could rather be said to be *things*<sup>22</sup>. However, artifacts can be *conceptualized* under one concept (e.g., “a hammer”), and could therefore be viewed as being *one*, in some sense, also making it possible for us to have knowledge of them (as being *true*) or directing our will toward them (as being *good*). This is also why the treatment of artifacts *does* fall under the scope of metaphysics (unlike beings of reason)<sup>23</sup>.

But if an artifact is accidentally one, what is the status of the accident due to which it has this accidental unity?

### 3. The Artificial Form

One can obtain clues to the answer to this question from Suárez’ disputations on the material and formal causes of accidents (DM 14 and 16, respectively). In the disputation on the material cause of accidents, he returns to the question of what kind of unity we find in artifacts. He establishes, once again, that we do not find “real and physical” unity there. Therefore, neither do we find true material causation in the case of artifacts. Instead, it is rather the “constituting parts” (*partes integrantes*) that are like the material cause of the “proper artificial form, that is, the figure” (*propriam formam artificialem, quae est figura*)<sup>24</sup>.

The artificial form, then, serves like an accident to the parts that make up the artifact, according to Suárez. We shall later return to the ontological status of the figure.

In the disputation concerning the *formal* cause of substance, Suárez both reinforces and (seemingly, at least) contradicts his position above. When it comes to the production of accidental forms, some occur naturally, others supernaturally. However, there is a third way, namely *artificially*. So, we have a reinforcement of the view that the artificial form is an accident. However, to this Suárez adds that artificial forms do not belong to the “proper forms” or “accidental beings”. This is so, because there is nothing “made” (*proprie fiat*) in the practice of an art. What we have are “physical and natural forms”, but ordered in a certain way. Artificial forms “are actually only modes”, and only consist in “figure”. The human power to “make” through art does not extend further than this—to arrange certain physical and natural things—and this is what we understand by the notion of “figure”<sup>25</sup>. Through art, then, humans cannot make things in their “proper being and entity”, but only in some “shape and figure”<sup>26</sup>.

There seems to be a tension here, however. On the one hand, there seems to be an accident—the artificial form, that is a figure—that comes into being when an artifact is constructed<sup>27</sup>. On the other hand, Suárez *denies* that something (*aliquid*) is made or comes into being when an artifact is made, and that artificial forms are only “modes”, that are explicitly distinguished from proper accidental forms in this context. How do these claims square?

#### 4. The Ontological Status of Shape

The answer lies in the ontological status of shapes or figures. A shape or a figure is a kind of quality, in the scheme Suárez adopts from Aristotle<sup>28</sup>. The different kinds of qualities—each presented in pairs—are as follows (DM 42.2.1)<sup>29</sup>:

1. Habit and disposition (*habitus et dispositio*);
2. Natural power and powerlessness (*naturalis potentia et impotentia*);
3. Passivity and passive quality (*passio et passiva qualitas*); and
4. Figure and shape (*figura et forma*).

Suárez discusses in different instances how the pairs relate. As for the fourth kind of qualities—that is of special interest to us here—he writes that “shape” (*forma*<sup>30</sup>) here basically signifies the same as “figure” (*figura*)<sup>31</sup>.

What, then, is a figure or shape?<sup>32</sup> Figure, according to Suárez, properly signifies “some mode resulting in a body from the termination of magnitude”<sup>33</sup>. It is like the other qualities as it “affects or perfects” (*afficiendi et perficiendi*) the subject. As was related above, “shape” in this context denotes just the figure of something. However, they differ in that figure denotes this “mathematically and abstracting from matter”, whereas “shape” signifies this as it finds physical expression<sup>34</sup>.

The shape—taken in this sense—is, so to say, the *Gestalt* of that which appears or is presented to us physically. In this way, this accident collects and gathers many other accidents in itself, “especially color”. Although constituted by many other accidents, it can still be taken as a quality in itself; Suárez mentions health and beauty as examples of accidents falling into this category<sup>35</sup>.

So shape is a quality. However, as has already been seen, it also has a close relation to quantity. Figure “terminates and informs” quantity. It is also related to the matter in which the quantity inheres. The other qualities, by contrast, are related to the conservation and operation of the substance. As such, they rather are related to the form. The figure or shape therefore differs greatly from the other qualities. It also differs in that the figure or shape does not have its own “proper entity”, but is rather a “mode” of quantity<sup>36</sup>.

Figure or shape almost seem to “vanish” ontologically, then, considered as entities in their own right. It does not have its own proper entity, but is rather reducible to quantity, of which it is a mode<sup>37</sup>. Suárez affirms this minimal reality, also, and writes that it is the

“lowest” of all qualities, “in perfection as well as its entitative mode”, so that one could question whether it even merits the name “quality” used in a strict (or “univocal”) sense<sup>38</sup>.

How one evaluates the “thickness” of Suárez’ realism of artifacts depends, then, on how one interprets his teaching on modes and the modal distinction<sup>39</sup>. It would take us too far here to investigate this question into any depth. It is sufficient for our purposes that a modal distinction, by which a mode is distinct from that of which it is a mode, is in-between a real distinction—as this obtains between two different, independent things—on the one hand, and a mere rational distinction on the other<sup>40</sup>. In explicitly rejecting that the artificial form is merely rationally distinct from the quantity—an option that is open to him—, Suárez cannot be said to be a nominalist regarding artifacts. However, in emphasizing the dependence of the artificial form or shape upon the quantity, in counting it as a mode, his realism must on all accounts be said to be of the minimal kind.

## 5. The Production of Artifacts

Let us now, after this exposition of the ontological status of artifacts, also look at the relation between the artifact, on the one hand, and the artisan (*artifex*), on the other. What kind of causation does the artisan exert to bring about the artifact?<sup>41</sup>

Suárez treats this question in disputation 25, on the exemplary cause. The treatment of exemplary cause is perspicuous as it comes after the treatment of all the other causes, and right before the treatment of the interrelation of the different kinds of causes.

To jump immediately to the main point Suárez makes here, exemplary causation does not constitute its own kind of causation beside the other four. Rather, *the exemplary cause is a kind of efficient cause*<sup>42</sup>. Suárez portrays his as a minority view, referring only to Alexander of Hales (ca. 1170/1185–1245), Bonaventure (1221–1274), Duns Scotus (ca. 1265/1266–1308), and Hervaeus Natalis (ca. 1260–1323) as previous thinkers who had held it. The working of an artisan is likened, by Suárez, to the working of God creating the things in the world from, precisely, exemplars. However, just as created things are different from the ideas in the mind of God<sup>43</sup>, so also is the exemplar in the mind of the artisan—directing his or her action—different from that which is produced by the artisan. Actually, the artisan cannot preconceive what comes out of this process. So although the artisan works on the model of an exemplar, what results is not determined merely by this exemplar, but also by other circumstances<sup>44</sup>.

To be more precise, the exemplar is a formal concept existing in the mind<sup>45</sup>, rather than a (future) artifact existing objectively in the mind of the artisan<sup>46</sup>. The exemplar rather plays a causal role in the production of the artifact, as the exemplar is part of the art that directs the will, which in turn elicits the executing power<sup>47</sup>. The resulting artifact is the terminus of the chain of efficient causes where the exemplar plays a role, and where the artifact usually ends up “imitating” the exemplar<sup>48</sup>; but this does not mean that the resulting artifact was somehow already present in that which was in the mind of the artisan in this production<sup>49</sup>.

There is an interesting contrast here with final causation. An end exists precisely objectively in the mind, and it (metaphorically) “moves” the will toward it<sup>50</sup>. The exemplar, though, does not play this “passive” role, as does the end, of “being willed”, but rather is that—once again—that plays an “active” part in directing the will toward a certain (practical) terminus<sup>51</sup>.

Note, though, that an artifact could *also* be an end. Insofar as it has unity, it can both be known (as being true) and willed (as being good). Hence, we can know about a hammer and understand what it is (the true), and we can also wish to have it and to hammer with it (the good)<sup>52</sup>. In this latter role, the hammer functions as an end. It could even be the case that the wish for a hammer leads us to construct one. There must, though, be two clearly separated stages in this process, for Suárez: one leading us to the point of constructing it, the other the construction itself. It is in the second stage that the exemplar plays its role.

To sum up, Suárez distinguishes the exemplary cause from the final cause, and counts it as a kind of efficient cause. The exemplar in the mind of the artisan is in no way

identical to the artifact produced, but plays the role of one efficient cause among many in the production of this artifact. Though the unity of the artifact might play a role in the leading up to the production of it (in that the artisan *thinks* of it—the true—and then *wants* to produce it—the good), the exemplar rather plays its role in the stage of the actual production of the artifact.

## 6. Concluding Summary

In the debate inherited from the Middle Ages on the ontological status of artifacts, between artifact realists and artifact nominalists, Suárez clearly sides with the realists. However, in this realism, Suárez wants to keep the “added element” in artifacts to a minimum, placing him more precisely as a minimal realist on artifacts. The artificial form, that accounts for a unity in a qualified sense of artifacts, is a kind of a quality. As opposed to the other kinds of qualities, though, the kind of quality that an artificial form belongs to—figure or shape—is not its own “thing”; it does not have its own entitative being. It is rather a mode of quantity. This accidental unity is acquired through the process of production, and through the exemplar existing in the mind of the artisan.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For these views, see [1,2]. For an account of a paradigmatically nominalist view, that of Ockham, see [3].

<sup>2</sup> The only earlier extensive treatment of Suárez on artifacts is, as far as can be ascertained, [4]. Suárez’ view on the subject matter is also referred to in [5]. The secondary literature relating to different *aspects* of the question of the ontological status of artifacts is, of course, extensive, and will be referred to below.

<sup>3</sup> ‘*Unum*’ as a transcendental in Suárez has been treated extensively in the secondary literature. For some of the main treatments of this transcendental, within the context of a treatment of the transcendentals as a whole, see, e.g., [6,7], ch. 5 (pp. 197–261), and [8], ch. 14.4.1 (pp. 612–615).

<sup>4</sup> DM 3.2.3. ‘tres tantum esse proprias passiones entis, scilicet, unum, verum et bonum.’ (Quoted from [9]. For quotations *starting* mid-sentence, the first word will have an initial minuscule. For quotations *ending* mid-sentence, they will not have an ending full stop.) Cf. also [7] (pp. 139–141).

<sup>5</sup> DM 3.1.11. ‘per ea tamen explicatur realis positiva perfectio entis, non secundum aliquid reale superadditum ipsi enti, sed secundum ipsammet formalem seu essentialem rationem entis.’ On the primacy of one-ness over truth and goodness, see [7], ch. 4.V (pp. 186–190).

<sup>6</sup> DM 3.1.8. ‘dico primo ens ut ens non posse habere veras et omnino reales passiones positivas ex natura rei ab ipso distinctas.’ This runs against the view of Scotus. See, e.g., [7]. On Scotus: “Der Unterschied zwischen dem Seienden und seinen *passiones* ist ihrzufolge nicht nur ein begrifflicher, sondern auch ein realer” (Ibid., p. 109). On Suárez: “Die Bemerkung macht deutlich, daß die Erwägung von einem Standpunkt aus geführt wird, der im Verständnis des Suárez außerhalb der scotischen Seinslehre liegt und sich kritisch zu dieser erhält” (Ibid., p. 120).

<sup>7</sup> For the novel way in which Suárez uses the ‘*unum per se*’—‘*unum per accidens*’ distinction in his treatment of unity, see [7] (pp. 230–241).

<sup>8</sup> DM 4.3.1. ‘Et prima divisio eius est, unum quoddam esse per accidens, aliud per se. Et merito hanc divisionem primo loco ponit, quia et videtur esse valde analogā; nam unum per se est simpliciter unum, per accidens vero tantum secundum quid, et per quamdam proportionem ad unum per se.’

<sup>9</sup> These will be shown to be merely rationally or conceptually distinct in DM 31.

<sup>10</sup> DM 4.3.6. ‘Cum ergo ens dicatur illud quod entitatem seu essentiam habet, illud erit ens per se proprie et in rigore quod unam essentiam vel entitatem habet. Illa autem essentia seu entitas una propriissime erit, quae in suo genere habet quidquid ad eius

intrinsicam rationem seu consummationem spectat; ergo illud ens, quod huiusmodi est, sub ea ratione erit proprie ac per se ens; omne autem illud, quod ab hac unitate defecerit, dicetur ens per accidens.'

- 11 DM 4.3.7. 'Potest autem hoc amplius explicari, si ens per se dividamus in simplex et compositum, quae divisio etiam de uno per se dari potest'
- 12 DM 4.3.8. 'De ente autem composito certum imprimis est posse vere ac proprie esse ens per se ac unum per se, ut omnes philosophi docent de natura substantiali, quatenus materia et forma constat, et de supposito quatenus ex natura et subsistentia suo modo componitur. Cum enim neque materia neque forma per se sint entia completa et integra in suo genere, sed ad illud componendum natura sua institutae sint, merito illud quod ex eis proxime componitur, essentia et natura per se una dicitur et est.'
- 13 DM 4.3.13. 'Ex his quae dicta sunt de ente et uno per se, colligere licet quid sit dicendum de ente et uno per accidens, quod ab illo distinguitur; nam imprimis omne id, quod ex rebus distinctis constat absque physica et reali unione earum inter se, est in rigore ens per accidens et non per se.'
- 14 DM 4.3.14. 'Quoddam enim est ens omnino per aggregationem, in quo multa entia per se integra et perfecta, sine ulla unione et sine ullo ordine congeruntur, et hoc videtur esse maxime per accidens, quia omni ex parte opponitur enti per se proprie sumpto, et huiusmodi est acervus tritici aut lapidum.'
- 15 It is interesting that in the medieval debate, three different kinds of artifacts were considered: (1) the moulding of a material to an artifact (e.g., a bronze statue), (2) the taking away of material to produce an artifact (e.g., a stone statue), and (3) the putting together of different materials and/or artifacts to make a new artifact (e.g., the making of a house). (See [1], p. 38) One can note that Suárez seems to primarily—or even exclusively?—have case number 3 in mind when considering artifacts.
- 16 DM 4.3.14. 'Aliud vero est ens per accidens, constans quidem ex integris entibus per se, non habentibus inter se physicam unionem, habentibus autem inter se aliquem ordinem, ut est exercitus, respublica, domus, et al.ia similia artificialia'
- 17 One can see here how that which is one in itself is the standard against which is measured that which is one by accident.
- 18 DM 4.3.14. 'et hoc modo videtur magis una arbor, cui ramus alterius speciei est insitus, quam domus, et domus magis quam exercitus; et sic de aliis.'
- 19 DM 4.3.14. 'Tamen hac consideratione et comparatione ens compositum ex substantia et accidente sibi inhaerente, multo magis videtur posse vocari ens per se; hoc enim est tertium genus entium per accidens quod magis videtur recedere ab illo primo et infimo ente per aggregationem, magisque accedere ad unum per se, quia, et ea quibus constat, non distinguuntur supposito, sicut in aliis, et habent inter se maiorem physicam unionem, et unum revera est in potentia ad aliud, quamvis accidentali, et al.terum natura sua est ordinatum ad aliud, et in unione ad illud habet suam perfectionem connaturalem, in quibus omnibus huiusmodi ens imitatur illud quod est proprie ac per se unum; quamvis simpliciter absolute unum per accidens sit.'
- 20 In this, he follows earlier lines of development in philosophy. See, e.g., [10], ch. 7 (pp. 115–134, "The Veiled Subject"). Dominik Perler (in [11] (p. 167)) makes the following assessment of Suárez' method in metaphysics: "If metaphysics aims at explaining what carves nature at its joints, it should no longer focus on substances. Of course, substances mark some joints in reality. However, these are only the most visible and superficial joints. The crucial joints are to be found at a more fundamental level, namely at the level of entities and modes. It is therefore to these building blocks of reality that we need to turn".
- 21 For the synonymy between 'ens'/'entia' ("being"/"beings"), on the one hand, and 'res'/'res' ("thing"/"things"), on the other, cf. [7] (p. 155), as well as—as is referred to there—DM 3.2.10. To be a 'res', a "thing", is not a "passion" of being, then—as it is to be one, true and good—but is rather identical with being. As is pointed out in [7] (pp. 155–156), this identity has to do with the two ways in which one can understand "being" ('ens'), laid out by Suárez in DM 2.4. On the one hand, one can understand it in relation to actual or real being, as contrasted with that which exists only potentially. On the other hand, one can understand "being" ('res') as referring to that which has "real essence" ('essentia realis'). (DM 2.4.5–6) In this second sense, it is identical with "thing" ('res'), as this points to the real essence being firm ('firmus') and determined ('ratus'), as opposed to that which pertains to the merely fictitious ('fictus'). (DM 2.4.15)
- 22 DM 4.6.2. 'Respondetur, si intelligatur in posteriori sensu, esse analogam et fere aequivocam, quia divisio entis in ens per se et ens per accidens, cui praedicta divisio aequivalet in illo sensu, ut dictum est, analogica est, analogia quadam proportionalitatis, ita ut enti sic sumpto non respondeat unus communis conceptus, quia ens per accidens, ut sic, revera non est ens, sed entia, solumque appellatur ens propter quamdam proportionem, vel imitationem entis per se.'
- 23 DM 4.5.4. 'haec entia concipiuntur ut aliquo modo per se una, propter quod supra diximus probabile esse sub ea ratione directe contineri sub objecto metaphysicae, et de illis ut sic posse esse scientiam' As pointed out by a reviewer, it is hard to see how this could be reconciled with Suárez' explicit *exclusion* of the which is merely accidentally one from the area of metaphysics in DM 1.1.26. Suárez also follows Aristotle in refusing that which is artificially one is part of the subject matter of metaphysics, in DM 1.1.5. However, in DM 1.1.5, Suárez might also give a further clue as to how this is reconciled. He writes there that, although accidental beings are not treated in metaphysics, "[i]f such a being is considered insofar as it is in some way *one*, and its unity is in some way in the thing, then such a being is already not considered as wholly a being per *accidens*, but as in some way contained in the breadth of beings per se, although perhaps an imperfection of some degree pertains to it". (DM 1.1.5. 'Quod si tale ens consideretur quatenus aliquo modo unum est eiusque unitas aliquo modo est in re, iam non consideratur tale ens ut omnino per

accidens, sed ut aliquo modo comprehensum sub latitudine entis per se, quamvis fortasse in illa imperfectum aliquem gradum teneat') Suárez then also refers the reader to the treatment of unity later in the DM, that has been related above.

24 DM 14.1.7. 'In compositione autem artificiali solet intercedere quaedam maior coniunctio et subordinatio partium, non tamen vera et physica unio; atque ita neque vera causalitas materialis; quod intelligitur comparando partes integrantes artificium inter se, nam si comparetur totum artificium ad propriam formam artificialem, quae est figura, respectu illius est magis propria causalitas materialis, quatenus figura comparatur ad suum subiectum tamquam verum accidens realiter unitum.'

25 DM 16.2.3. 'Et addere hic possumus tertium membrum, nam quidam modi dicuntur esse non naturales nec supernaturales, sed artificiales, quod membrum non habet locum in propriis formis seu entitatibus accidentalibus, quia nulla est quae per artem proprie fiat, nisi fortasse vel quatenus ars adiuvat naturam, ut in sanitate, vel quatenus per artem applicantur activa passivis, ut si aurum fit per artem alchimiae, et hoc modo fiunt alia mixta, ut liquores, etc. Quae formae omnes non sunt artificiales proprie, nisi fortasse per quamdam denominationem extrinsecam; intrinsece enim sunt formae physicae ac naturales, non solum accidentales, sed interdum etiam substantiales esse possunt et eiusdem rationis cum iis quae naturaliter fiunt. Unde, quod applicatio agentium et patientium per artem fiat, nil obstat quominus per veram educationem fiant. Propriae ergo artificiales formae tantum sunt quidem modi, omnes enim in figura aliqua consistunt; quia virtus effectiva humana, quae arte regi aut dirigi potest, non potest amplius extendi, cuius rationem infra videbimus; figura autem quaelibet solum est modus quidam rei quantae, ut per se constat.'

26 DM 21.2.17. 'supposita aliqua imperfectione nimirum in artifice, quod non possit efficere rem aliquam secundum proprium esse et entitatem eius, sed solum secundum quamdam formam et figuram consurgentem ex situ et ordine talium rerum'

27 Cf. DM 32, where it is stated that created beings ('entia') are properly divided into substance and accident. 'Quod ergo in rebus creatis quaedam sint substantiae, quaedam vero accidentia' (DM 32.1.4)

28 On the status of shape as a quality in medieval thinkers, Robert Pasnau writes the following: "The situation here was confused by Aristotle's having put shape into the category of Quality (*Cat.* 10a11), and one occasionally finds an author trying to make good on that claim. Paul of Venice, for instance, as a thoroughgoing category realist [ . . . ], argues that shapes are a distinct kind of Quality, distinct from the substance and the corpuscular structure of its parts, and also distinct from the primary and secondary qualities (*Summa phil. nat.* VI.20). The usual view, however, was that none of the geometric-kinetic properties could be counted as qualities" ([10], p. 470).

29 Taken from *Categories*, 8<sup>b</sup>26–10<sup>a</sup>11.

30 Note, then, the resulting ambiguity when it comes to the term 'forma artificialis'. The term 'forma'—rendered here by "form" as well as "shape" in English—could either be interpreted to be on the level of an accidental form, in the proper sense of the word, or it could be interpreted to be on the level of a sub-class of qualities that are themselves a kind of accidents, although improperly so, in a sense. 'Forma artificialis' could, then, be rendered "artificial form" as well as "artificial shape". At the very least, we have an equivocation of the term 'forma' that is worth noting.

31 See below. "Shape" and "figure", 'forma' and 'figura', would render the Greek 'morphe' and 'schema', respectively. *Categories* VIII, 10<sup>a</sup>12–13.

32 For the status of "the fourth species of quality", in Baroque Scholasticism and earlier, see [12].

33 DM 42.3.15. 'proprie significat modum quemdam resultantem in corpore ex terminatione magnitudinis'

34 DM 42.3.15. 'Formae vero nomen, licet alioqui valde generale sit, tamen prout inter has species numeratur, non aliud significat quam ipsam figuram, quia illa est veluti exterior forma quae in corporibus apparet. Unde idem videtur his duabus vocibus significari, nisi quod nomine figurae significatur more mathematico et abstrahendo a materia [ . . . ], qualitatem hoc modo reperiri in immobilibus; nomine autem formae significatur modo physico.'

35 DM 42.3.15. 'Et mihi improbable non est formam hoc modo dicere figuram, non utcumque, sed ut ornatam accidentibus, praesertim coloribus, ut Boetius in Praedicamentis indicavit. Sic enim imago sensibilis ad hanc speciem pertinere videtur ratione suae formae. Verum est huiusmodi formam non unam, sed plures videri includere qualitates; tamen sicut in aliis unitas artificialis, vel alicuius proportionis aut subordinationis sufficere censetur ad constituendam aliquo modo unam qualitatem, etiamsi ex multis consurgat, ut patet in sanitate, pulchritudine, et similibus, ita dici potest de eiusmodi forma.'

36 DM 42.5.7. 'Praeterea qualitas, quae per se primo ad hoc solum ordinatur, ut per suum esse formale ornet vel afficiat substantiam, vel est tantum modus quidam consequens quantitatem et quasi terminans et informans illam, et haec constituit ultimam speciem, quae est figura vel forma, quae multum differt a reliquis, tum quia solum est modus quidam quantitatis, alia vero habent suas proprias entitates; tum etiam quia aliae consequuntur formam, haec vero magis videtur sequi ex ratione materiae, quamvis etiam recipiat modum et determinationem ratione formae.'

37 To understand the artificial form as a mode has precedence in the Scholastic tradition. Most famously, Oresme holds this "modal" view of all accidents. That specifically shapes are modes was a view held by, e.g., Durand of St. Pourçain and Gratiadeus of Ascoli. See the excellent exposition in [1] (pp. 59–60). One can also note in this context that the artificial form is a mode of an accident, rather than a mode of a substance, according to Suárez. To be a mode of an accident is not unique for figure or shape, though. This status is also held by inherence (of an accident in a substance, then). See DM 37.2.9: 'Dico secundo: accidens quod ex se propriam habet entitatem realiter a substantia distinctam, de intrinseca sua essentia habet aptitudinalem inhaerentiam in substantia. Probat, nam imprimis certum est huiusmodi entitatem per seipsam esse aptam ad informandam substantiam tali modo ut inhaereat et ab ea sustentetur; non enim posset actu hoc convenire illi entitati, nisi in illa supponeretur aptitudo seu

capacitas ad illum modum; illa vero aptitudo non potest esse aliquid in re distinctum a tali entitate, ut facile patet rationibus quibus supra probavimus capacitatem materiae non distingui a materia, neque aptitudinem informandi a substantiali forma.’

- 38 DM 42.5.9. ‘Quarta itaque species merito ultimum locum obtinuit tamquam omnium infima, et in perfectione et in modo entitatis, adeo ut aliquibus videatur vix mereri univoce nomen qualitatis.’
- 39 For a classic study on modes, see [13]. Suárezian modes are also treated extensively in [10], especially on pp. 253–258. More recent studies include [14,15].
- 40 The modal distinction is sometimes counted as a kind of real distinction, sometimes as something in-between a (“major”) real distinction and a rational distinction. This can be seen already in the introduction of the modal distinction, in DM 7.1.16: ‘Nihilominus censeo simpliciter verum esse **dari in rebus creatis aliquam distinctionem actualem et ex natura rei, ante operationem intellectus**, quae non sit tanta, quanta est inter duas res seu entitates omnino distinctas; quae distinctio, quamvis generali vocabulo possit vocari realis, quia vere est a parte rei et non est per denominationem extrinsecam ab intellectu, tamen **ad distinguendum illam ab alia maiori distinctione reali possumus illam appellare, vel distinctionem ex natura rei, applicando illi tamquam imperfectiori generale nomen (quod usitatum est), vel proprius vocari potest distinctio modalis**; quia, ut explicabo, versatur semper inter rem aliquam et modum eius.’ (emphasis added)
- 41 For a general treatment of the productivity of art in Suárez, see [16]. For a more recent study, see [17].
- 42 DM 25.2.8. ‘Mihi tamen magis probate sententia eorum qui negant exemplarem causam constituere proprium genus causae, sed illam pertinere dicunt ad causam efficientem.’
- 43 DM 25.1.11. ‘idea divina, iuxta sententiam magis consentaneam sanctis Patribus, magisque Theologis probatam, non est aliquid creatum vel creabile, sed ipsamet divina essentia increata.’
- 44 DM 25.1.21. ‘quia humanus artifex nunquam praeconcepit rem a se faciendam, omnino et in individuo eandem quam postea facit, quia nunquam potest certo scire quae et qualis sit in individuo futura res per artem a se elaboranda, nam terminatio effectus in individuo pendet ex variis circumstantiis, vel ex superiori agente, ut in praecedentibus tactum est.’
- 45 DM 25.1.26. ‘exemplar inest formaliter intellectui tanquam conceptus formalis eius.’
- 46 DM 25.1.10. ‘exemplar non est res obiective cognita, seu obiective tantum existens in mente artificis.’
- 47 DM 25.2.13. ‘ad actionem artificis tria concurrunt, ars, voluntas et potentia exequens; sed voluntas, ut movens potentiam exequentem, pertinet ad genus causae efficientis; ergo et ars ut dirigens et determinans illam; dirigit autem et determinat mediante exemplari; ergo exemplar ad idem genus causae pertinet.’
- 48 DM 25.2.2. ‘munus exemplaris esse dicitur, ut ad illius similitudinem vel imitationem effectus fiat’
- 49 DM 25.2.41. ‘et ideo sufficienter posset explicari ratio exemplaris, dicendo, esse illud quo artifex sibi repraesentat rem quam effecturus est, ut illud imitetur, seu potius ut illius repraesentationem expleat.’
- 50 See, e.g., DM 23.8.10. ‘motio hujus causae [finalis] metaphorice sit’ This view was also prominently held by Duns Scotus, who in his turn refers to Aristotle. See Scotus, *In Metaphysicam*, V.1, § 39.
- 51 DM 25.2.3. ‘Sed nihilominus auctores omnes longe diversam esse censent causalitatem exemplarem a finali, quia causalitas finis consistit in metaphorica motione voluntatis. Ratio autem exemplaris praecise consistit in hoc quod sit forma determinans actionem agentis’
- 52 For the true and the good as transcendentals in Suárez, see [7], ch. 6 (pp. 263–312, on truth) and ch. 7 (pp. 313–385, on goodness).

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