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Volume 8
Issue 5
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Philosophies, Volume 8, Issue 5 (October 2023) – 24 articles

Cover Story (view full-size image): There is a lot of academic literature, mostly from the social sciences and social epistemology, which presents itself as addressing a very general problem: the problem of excessive falsehood and/or insufficient truth. Of course, falsehood is not new, but it is often now treated as a curable, or at least treatable, problem (sometimes referred to as the problem of ‘misinformation’ or ‘fake news’). I argue we should reject the idea that falsehood is a problem. I also argue that the idea that falsehood is a problem is a natural consequence of the misguided idea that it is virtuous to love truth and hate falsehood. Although there are several virtues related to truth (such as the intellectual virtue of curiosity and the moral virtue of honesty), love of truth and hatred of falsehood are not themselves virtues. View this paper
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14 pages, 264 KiB  
Article
Self-Transcendence and the Pursuit of Happiness
by Andrea Hurst
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 98; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050098 - 18 Oct 2023
Viewed by 2875
Abstract
This philosophical investigation is motivated by the common association between happiness and self-transcendence, and a question posed by Freud: “Why is it so hard for men to be happy?” I consider the answers given in three key texts from the psychoanalytic tradition, Daniel [...] Read more.
This philosophical investigation is motivated by the common association between happiness and self-transcendence, and a question posed by Freud: “Why is it so hard for men to be happy?” I consider the answers given in three key texts from the psychoanalytic tradition, Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow, Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents, and Abraham Maslow’s The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. Based on a distinction between opposing forms of self-transcendence, ego-actualisation and ego-dissolution, the authors articulate the relation between self-transcendence and happiness in different, but equally unsatisfactory, ways. In all three texts, a dominant ideological framing is discernible, which prioritises the present/positive and ignores the work of the absent/negative, ironically leaving us with a sense of futility concerning the pursuit of happiness. I propose that an approach influenced by Lacanian ideas, which acknowledges the role played by unhappiness in producing happiness, plausibly challenges the traditional conception of happiness that places it out of human reach as the effect of a perfectly self-transcendent state. Instead, understood as the effect of resistance to the notion of self-transcendence as self-perfection, happiness, while still difficult to achieve because it requires another kind of self-transcendence, becomes attainable here and now by ordinary individuals. Full article
18 pages, 516 KiB  
Article
Plant-Centered Virtue Ethics: A Cross-Talk between Agroecology and Ecosophy
by Sylvie Pouteau
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 97; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050097 - 17 Oct 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1936
Abstract
The claim that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) is anthropocentric appears inherently aporetic since it implies that either anthropocentrism is virtuous or the whole environmental issue is anthropocentric, thus translating vices into virtues or vice versa. Another interpretation is that both the environment and [...] Read more.
The claim that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) is anthropocentric appears inherently aporetic since it implies that either anthropocentrism is virtuous or the whole environmental issue is anthropocentric, thus translating vices into virtues or vice versa. Another interpretation is that both the environment and humanity are thought with a vicious conception of centeredness. Conversely, if centeredness is rightly addressed and humanity and its environment are considered as one and the same issue, the focus on anthropocentrism should also be different. By drawing on Felix Guatttari’s ecosophy, this paper proposes that EVE needs to be based on a philosophical understanding of agriculture. Thus, agriculture is the organic and epistemic matrix of our relation to the environment and not merely a section of an abstract environment nor one economic area among others. The environmental crisis is primarily a crisis of humanity within its agricultural matrix. To be an environmentally virtuous human being, a requirement is to face again the burden of our absolute need for food and for fruitful cooperation between farmers and plants, not only animals. This paper discusses the importance of plant ethics and plant topology to understand the specificities of the agricultural matrix. The emphasis will be placed on plant-centered virtue ethics and reframing anthropocentrism by drawing on transdisciplinary conversation with plant practitioners in the context of a research action project. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is Environmental Virtue Ethics a "Virtuous" Anthropocentrism?)
11 pages, 430 KiB  
Article
Procreative Generosity: Why We Should Not Have Children
by Matti Häyry
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 96; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050096 - 16 Oct 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4493
Abstract
We should not have children because (i) we have no child-regarding reasons to do so, (ii) we have child-regarding reasons not to do so, and (iii) although we have other-regarding reasons to do so, these reasons are not decisive. Objections to (i) include [...] Read more.
We should not have children because (i) we have no child-regarding reasons to do so, (ii) we have child-regarding reasons not to do so, and (iii) although we have other-regarding reasons to do so, these reasons are not decisive. Objections to (i) include that life is always good and that possible individuals would choose life if given the opportunity. These fail if there is no duty to create even a good life (the argument from asymmetry), all lives are bad (the argument from quality of life), and potential parents are not entitled to produce lives without the permission of the offspring (the argument from assumed consent). The failure of the objections is not, however, self-evidently inevitable if a hedonistic axiology is used. It becomes inevitable with a switch to an autonomy-respecting, need-based theory of value. There is no need to become existent (i), and there is a need to avoid frustration, pain, and suffering once an individual has been brought into existence (ii). Since any life can be or turn out to be very bad, potential parents put their children in harm’s way by creating them (the argument from risk). To see this and to see how the preferences of the potential parents do not change the situation (iii), it is necessary to assume a concept of gambling that allows genuinely serious harm in case the player loses. Full article
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8 pages, 221 KiB  
Article
Exilic Ecologies
by Michael Marder
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 95; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050095 - 9 Oct 2023
Viewed by 1949
Abstract
A term of relatively recent mintage, coined by German scientist Ernst Haeckel in 1866, ecology draws on ancient Greek to establish and consolidate its meaning. Although scholars all too often overlook it, the anachronistic rise of ecology in its semantic and conceptual determinations [...] Read more.
A term of relatively recent mintage, coined by German scientist Ernst Haeckel in 1866, ecology draws on ancient Greek to establish and consolidate its meaning. Although scholars all too often overlook it, the anachronistic rise of ecology in its semantic and conceptual determinations is noteworthy. Formed by analogy with economy, the word may be translated as “the articulation of a dwelling”, the logos of oikos. Here, I argue not only that a vast majority of ecosystems on the planet are subject to environmental upheavals and ecological crises, but also that ecology as the crossroads of dwelling and articulation is in crisis, having come into its own and made explicit what was silently present in its historical enunciation. As a result, ecology needs to be deromanticized, decoupled from the bucolic and the picturesque, and dissociated from nativism and autochthony. Every organism, ecosystem, or place is affected by the forces of unsettlement and displacement; all dwellings and their articulations are shaken to the core and set in motion, rendering ecologies exilic. Ecologies today share the exilic condition, which also threatens to level the differences among them, without the chance of returning to a stable origin, itself nothing other than a theoretical fiction. In what follows, I propose to chalk out the outlines of exilic ecologies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Environmental Philosophy and Ecological Thought)
26 pages, 349 KiB  
Article
Epistemic Challenges in Neurophenomenology: Exploring the Reliability of Knowledge and Its Ontological Implications
by Anna Shutaleva
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 94; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050094 - 3 Oct 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2918 | Correction
Abstract
This article investigates the challenges posed by the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology and its connection to reality. Neurophenomenological research seeks to understand the intricate relationship between human consciousness, cognition, and the underlying neural processes. However, the subjective nature of conscious experiences presents [...] Read more.
This article investigates the challenges posed by the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology and its connection to reality. Neurophenomenological research seeks to understand the intricate relationship between human consciousness, cognition, and the underlying neural processes. However, the subjective nature of conscious experiences presents unique epistemic challenges in determining the reliability of the knowledge generated in this research. Personal factors such as beliefs, emotions, and cultural backgrounds influence subjective experiences, which vary from individual to individual. On the other hand, scientific knowledge aims to uncover universal truths based on empirical observations and objective principles. Reconciling the subjective and objective realms presents a significant challenge in determining the reliability of knowledge generated through neurophenomenological research. This article aims to examine the inherent limitations and challenges of neurophenomenological research to shed light on the complexities involved in understanding the nature of knowledge itself. This article highlights that the ontological implications of the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology arise from the question of how subjective experiences relate to objective reality. Understanding the neural correlates and mechanisms behind subjective experiences can provide insight into the underlying ontological nature of consciousness. Full article
18 pages, 333 KiB  
Article
From “Whither” to “Whence”: A Decolonial Reading of Malabou
by Rachel Cicoria
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 93; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050093 - 28 Sep 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1723
Abstract
A turn from the “whither” to the “whence” of anarchism is at stake in Catherine Malabou’s interpretation of Latin American decolonial theory. This is a turn from a materialist philosophy that seeks to open the space of anarchism within the modern state toward [...] Read more.
A turn from the “whither” to the “whence” of anarchism is at stake in Catherine Malabou’s interpretation of Latin American decolonial theory. This is a turn from a materialist philosophy that seeks to open the space of anarchism within the modern state toward one that discerns anarchism as already operative in the modern state given the social implications of colonial legacies. In tracing this turn, I propose a development of Malabou’s work insofar as I put her in dialogue with María Lugones, who is much closer to Malabou than the more canonical decolonial figures she actively engages, especially in view of anarchism as a form of social–political plasticity. Understanding Lugones’ critique of earlier iterations of decolonial theory helps make explicit an immanent anarchic resistance to domination as an explosive inhabitation of everyday loci of tension. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Imagining Anarchist Futures: Possibilities and Potentials)
17 pages, 966 KiB  
Article
The Paradox of Fictional Creatures
by Louis Rouillé
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 92; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050092 - 28 Sep 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1740
Abstract
Authors create fictional characters; that is a “creationist locution”. Artefactualism takes such statements very seriously and holds that fictional characters are abstract artefacts, i.e., entities that are both created and abstract. Anti-creationists, by contrast, deny that we need to postulate such doubtful entities [...] Read more.
Authors create fictional characters; that is a “creationist locution”. Artefactualism takes such statements very seriously and holds that fictional characters are abstract artefacts, i.e., entities that are both created and abstract. Anti-creationists, by contrast, deny that we need to postulate such doubtful entities to explain creationist locutions. In this paper, I present this debate in the form of a paradox, which organises the many existing theories of creationist locutions in a single logical space. This new way of framing the problem displays the crucial role of so-called “linking principles”. In general, it seems that fictionality entails nonexistence, while creation entails existence. This is why “fictional creatures” are puzzling. I further argue that to create means to invent and to realise, and finally, that fictional characters are invented but not created, contra artefactualism. I thus advocate for a new kind of anti-creationism about fictional characters. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
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14 pages, 847 KiB  
Article
Prudence, Rules, and Regulative Epistemology
by Miguel García-Valdecasas and Joe Milburn
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 91; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050091 - 27 Sep 2023
Viewed by 2262
Abstract
Following Ballantyne, we can distinguish between descriptive and regulative epistemology. Whereas descriptive epistemology analyzes epistemic categories such as knowledge, justified belief, or evidence, regulative epistemology attempts to guide our thinking. In this paper, we argue that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on [...] Read more.
Following Ballantyne, we can distinguish between descriptive and regulative epistemology. Whereas descriptive epistemology analyzes epistemic categories such as knowledge, justified belief, or evidence, regulative epistemology attempts to guide our thinking. In this paper, we argue that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on what we call epistemic prudence. Our argument proceeds as follows: First, we lay out an objection to virtue-based regulative epistemology that is analogous to the no-guidance objection to virtue ethics. According to this objection, virtue-based regulative epistemology cannot offer us useful guidance in our deliberations, because an abstract knowledge of virtue does not tell us what we should do here and now, especially in hard cases. We respond to this objection by showing that our making good epistemic decisions cannot simply be a matter of our following the right epistemic rules. In order to reliably inquire and deliberate well, we need epistemic prudence. Thus, while virtue-based regulative epistemology fails to determine how we should inquire and resolve deliberation here and now, this is also true of norm-based regulative epistemology. The upshot of this argument is that regulative epistemologists should focus their attention on understanding the nature of epistemic prudence and on understanding how we can promote its development in ourselves and others. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Between Virtue and Epistemology)
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10 pages, 255 KiB  
Article
An Interpretation of the Deep Disagreement between Plato and Protagoras from the Perspective of Contemporary Meta-Ethics and Political Epistemology
by Manuel Knoll
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 90; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050090 - 25 Sep 2023
Viewed by 2619
Abstract
Since the early 20th century, two new disciplines emerged in the tradition of analytic philosophy: meta-ethics and political epistemology. Nevertheless, debates on such questions go back to the ancient Greeks and, in particular, to the debates between Plato and Protagoras. This article elucidates [...] Read more.
Since the early 20th century, two new disciplines emerged in the tradition of analytic philosophy: meta-ethics and political epistemology. Nevertheless, debates on such questions go back to the ancient Greeks and, in particular, to the debates between Plato and Protagoras. This article elucidates the controversy between Plato and the influential sophist Protagoras from the perspective of contemporary meta-ethics and political epistemology. It argues that the main motivation of Plato’s philosophical endeavors is to overcome Protagoras’s skeptical claims that no moral facts and no moral knowledge applicable to political issues exist. The paper defends the thesis that there exists a deep disagreement between Protagoras and Plato on the existence of moral facts and moral knowledge. A deep disagreement is a disagreement that cannot be resolved through the use of reasons and arguments. Applying the foundationalist approach Robert J. Fogelin proposes in his seminal paper “The Logic of Deep Disagreements”, this article argues that the deep disagreement between Protagoras and Plato exists because their political thought is based on “underlying principles” that clash. While Plato’s political philosophy rests on his religious and theological convictions, the political thought of Protagoras is based on his skepticism, relativism, and agnosticism. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Plato’s Influence on Western Philosophy and Scientific Thought)
21 pages, 345 KiB  
Article
Artificial Forms of Life
by Sebastian Sunday Grève
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 89; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050089 - 22 Sep 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2300
Abstract
The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as ‘strong’ AI is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit [...] Read more.
The logical problem of artificial intelligence—the question of whether the notion sometimes referred to as ‘strong’ AI is self-contradictory—is, essentially, the question of whether an artificial form of life is possible. This question has an immediately paradoxical character, which can be made explicit if we recast it (in terms that would ordinarily seem to be implied by it) as the question of whether an unnatural form of nature is possible. The present paper seeks to explain this paradoxical kind of possibility by arguing that machines can share the human form of life and thus acquire human mindedness, which is to say they can be intelligent, conscious, sentient, etc. in precisely the way that a human being typically is. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Wittgenstein’s “Forms of Life”: Future of the Concept)
8 pages, 216 KiB  
Article
Directions for Anarchist Studies
by Kathy E. Ferguson
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 88; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050088 - 21 Sep 2023
Viewed by 2776
Abstract
Anarchism is a fertile site for nurturing the sorts of encounters that feminists have called intersectionality. Anarchism and intersectionality share the goal of critically examining familiar as well as emergent flows of power and meaning, and understanding their relations to one another. This [...] Read more.
Anarchism is a fertile site for nurturing the sorts of encounters that feminists have called intersectionality. Anarchism and intersectionality share the goal of critically examining familiar as well as emergent flows of power and meaning, and understanding their relations to one another. This paper focuses on three compelling directions for anarchist studies: Indigenous anarchism, anarchism developing with new materialism, and anarchism emergent in radical book arts. Each thread has established roots while also moving in new directions. Anarchist encounters with Indigeneity, new materialism, and book arts resonate with each other: they can foster “a commitment to the particular” through which we can immerse ourselves in rich and dense worlds where specific Indigenous theories and practices, detailed encounters with non-human things, and particular artistic + intellectual productions of materials can emerge. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Imagining Anarchist Futures: Possibilities and Potentials)
18 pages, 305 KiB  
Article
Public Justification, Evaluative Standards, and Different Perspectives in the Attribution of Disability
by Elvio Baccarini and Kristina Lekić Barunčić
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 87; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050087 - 17 Sep 2023
Viewed by 1406
Abstract
This paper proposes a novel method for identifying the public evaluative standards that contribute to the classification of certain conditions as mental disabilities. Public evaluative standards could contribute to ascertaining disabilities by outlining characteristics whose presence beyond a threshold is fundamentally important for [...] Read more.
This paper proposes a novel method for identifying the public evaluative standards that contribute to the classification of certain conditions as mental disabilities. Public evaluative standards could contribute to ascertaining disabilities by outlining characteristics whose presence beyond a threshold is fundamentally important for the life of a person and whose absence or reduced occurrence constitutes a disability. Additionally, they can participate in determining disabilities by delineating particularly grave difficulties, impairments, or incapacities. Our method relies on a model of public justification of evaluative standards that is inspired by Gerald Gaus’s theory of public reason. Thus, our approach recommends the justification of evaluative standards through sound deliberative routes from reasons accessible to all persons who participate in the process of justification and the convergence of what is justified in this way to each of them. We deem that disabilities could be caused both by problems in the internal characteristics of a person as well as by unfairness or a lack of hospitality in external circumstances. This is why the method of justification is applied to the assessment of those circumstances as well. If social or environmental circumstances cannot be justified through the convergence of reasons accessible to all persons involved in the process of justification, we have reasons to exclude the presence of a disability and ascertain the presence of inadequate external conditions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Political Philosophy and Bioethics)
13 pages, 275 KiB  
Article
The European Educational Policy and Early School Leaving: A Conceptual Analysis from the Perspective of the Leaving Subject
by Laura Guerrero Puerta
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 86; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050086 - 17 Sep 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1919
Abstract
This article presents a conceptual analysis of the European educational policy concerning the phenomenon of early school leaving (ESL). It addresses the literature on ESL, emphasizing the importance of studying policies from the perspective of the constructions made of the leaving subject. The [...] Read more.
This article presents a conceptual analysis of the European educational policy concerning the phenomenon of early school leaving (ESL). It addresses the literature on ESL, emphasizing the importance of studying policies from the perspective of the constructions made of the leaving subject. The concept of lifelong learning is examined, along with its relevance in shaping the subject who leaves within European policies. Additionally, the presence of “double gestures” in educational policies is explored, where, while promoting inclusion, they simultaneously produce exclusion of certain individuals. The influence of the neoliberal approach on the conception of ESL is discussed, and the need to consider alternative approaches to avoid homogenizing the group of young individuals who leave school prematurely is proposed. Full article
15 pages, 292 KiB  
Article
Nature, Artifice, and Discovery in Descartes’ Mechanical Philosophy
by Deborah Jean Brown
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 85; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050085 - 14 Sep 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2815
Abstract
It is often assumed that in the collapse of the Aristotelian distinction between art and nature that results from the rise of mechanical philosophies in the early modern period, the collapse falls on the side of art. That is, all of the diversity [...] Read more.
It is often assumed that in the collapse of the Aristotelian distinction between art and nature that results from the rise of mechanical philosophies in the early modern period, the collapse falls on the side of art. That is, all of the diversity among natures that was explained previously as differences among substantial forms came to be seen simply as differences in arrangements of matter according to laws instituted by the “divine artificer”, God. This paper argues that, for René Descartes, the collapse occurs on both sides. Natures are artefacts of God, and human artefacts, under some conditions, can be classified as natures or, at least, continuous within nature. Drawing on developments across both horticulture and engineering in the 16th and 17th centuries, as well as Descartes’ mechanical philosophy, this paper explores challenges to the Aristotelian nature/art distinction. The question then is what, in the advent of this collapse, are human artificers doing when they construct artefacts? Are they replicating God’s powers by creating new natures, or are they doing something else, and if so, what might that be? It is argued that we should view human invention for Descartes not as creating new natures so much as discovering them. These findings have consequences for how we interpret Descartes’ use of the term “nature” in relation to automata and other artefacts produced by human hands. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Art vs Nature: The Ontology of Artifacts in the Long Middle Ages)
13 pages, 270 KiB  
Article
The Vices and Virtues of Instrumentalized Knowledge
by Job Siegmann and James Grayot
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 84; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050084 - 14 Sep 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2394
Abstract
This article starts by defining instrumentalized knowledge (IK) as the practice of selectively valuing some set of reliable beliefs for the promotion of a more generally false or unreliable worldview. IK is typically exploited by conspiratorial echo chambers, which display systematic distrust and [...] Read more.
This article starts by defining instrumentalized knowledge (IK) as the practice of selectively valuing some set of reliable beliefs for the promotion of a more generally false or unreliable worldview. IK is typically exploited by conspiratorial echo chambers, which display systematic distrust and opposition towards mainstream epistemic authorities. We argue that IK is problematic in that it violates core epistemic virtues, and this gives rise to clear and present harms when abused by said echo chambers. Yet, we contend, mainstream epistemic authorities (MEAs) are also complicit in practices resembling IK; we refer to these practices as instrumentalized knowledge* (IK*). IK* differs from IK in that the selective valuing of beliefs corresponds to a ”reliable” worldview, namely, one independently verified by the relevant epistemic experts. We argue that IK*, despite its apparent veracity, is also problematic, as it violates the same epistemic virtues as IK despite its aim of promoting true beliefs. This, we argue, leads it to being counterproductive in its goal of producing knowledge for the sake of the pursuit of truth, thereby raising the question of what distinguishes virtuous from nonvirtuous practices of instrumentalized knowledge. In an attempt to avoid this violation and to distinguish IK* from IK, we investigate whether and how IK* could still be epistemically virtuous. We conclude that IK* can be virtuous if its goal is to produce understanding as opposed to mere knowledge. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Between Virtue and Epistemology)
18 pages, 320 KiB  
Article
Moral Partiality and Duties of Love
by Berit Brogaard
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 83; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050083 - 13 Sep 2023
Viewed by 1626
Abstract
In this paper, I make a case for the view that we have special relationship duties (also known as “associative duties”) that are not identical to or derived from our non-associative impartial moral obligations. I call this view “moral partialism”. On the version [...] Read more.
In this paper, I make a case for the view that we have special relationship duties (also known as “associative duties”) that are not identical to or derived from our non-associative impartial moral obligations. I call this view “moral partialism”. On the version of moral partialism I defend, only loving relationships can normatively ground special relationship duties. I propose that for two capable adults to have a loving relationship, they must have mutual non-trivial desires to promote each other’s interests or flourishing and to respect each other’s core values. Along the way, I critically ascertain three alternative accounts of what normatively grounds special relationship duties and argue that my proposed view avoids the problems plaguing the alternatives. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Philosophical Richness and Variety of Sex and Love)
12 pages, 264 KiB  
Article
Why Realisms about Fiction Must (and Can) Accommodate Fictional Properties
by Frederick Kroon and Paul Oppenheimer
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 82; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050082 - 7 Sep 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1220
Abstract
The topic of fictional objects is a familiar one, the topic of fictional properties less so. But it deserves its own place in the philosophy of fiction, if only because fictional properties have such a prominent role to play in science fiction and [...] Read more.
The topic of fictional objects is a familiar one, the topic of fictional properties less so. But it deserves its own place in the philosophy of fiction, if only because fictional properties have such a prominent role to play in science fiction and fantasy. What, then, are fictional properties and how does their apparent unreality relate to the unreality of fictional objects? The present paper explores these questions in the light of familiar debates about the nature of fictional objects. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Fiction and Metaphysics)
21 pages, 508 KiB  
Article
Pruning of the People: Ostracism and the Transformation of the Political Space in Ancient Athens
by Emily Salamanca
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 81; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050081 - 31 Aug 2023
Viewed by 2490
Abstract
Athenian ostracism has long captured democratic imaginations because it seems to present clear evidence of a people (demos) routinely asserting collective power over tyrannical elites. In recent times, ostracism has been particularly alluring to militant democrats, who see the institution as [...] Read more.
Athenian ostracism has long captured democratic imaginations because it seems to present clear evidence of a people (demos) routinely asserting collective power over tyrannical elites. In recent times, ostracism has been particularly alluring to militant democrats, who see the institution as an ancient precursor to modern militant democratic mechanisms such as social media bans, impeachment measures, and lustration procedures, which serve to protect democratic constitutions from anti-democratic threats. Such a way of conceptualizing ostracism ultimately stems from Aristotle’s “rule of proportion,” or the removal of “outstanding” individuals in a polity who threaten to disturb the achievement of communal eudaimonia (Aris. Pol. 1284a). However, this way of interpreting the institution only presents a truncated view, one which is overly centered on the ultimate expulsion of an individual from the polity, rather than on its broader contextual telos—the transformation of the ostracized individual and of the community. To move past this simplified view, this paper considers all elements of ostracism with equal force, and argues that ostracism offered a shared opportunity and shared space for all members of the polis—citizens, non-citizens, and elite members alike—to reform the character of the subject individual and to instill and reaffirm democratic values in the community. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Ostracism in Ancient and Contemporary Times)
13 pages, 294 KiB  
Article
Repression and Return of Nature in Hegel and Beyond
by Marina Marren
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 80; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050080 - 31 Aug 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1804
Abstract
Taking its departure from the destruction of ethicality (Sittlichkeit), as envisioned by Hegel in the Phänomenologie des Geistes (PG §443–475), this paper constructs a concept of a contemporary subject whose self-reliant autonomy fractures in the face of the truth. This [...] Read more.
Taking its departure from the destruction of ethicality (Sittlichkeit), as envisioned by Hegel in the Phänomenologie des Geistes (PG §443–475), this paper constructs a concept of a contemporary subject whose self-reliant autonomy fractures in the face of the truth. This truth is revealed as an upsurge of nature, whose role and significance has been denied in favor of comfort and security of the subject. The move to yoke and subdue nature by placing science—as Bacon saw fit—in service of technology, and by placing technology in service of human comfort and safety, proved to bear fruit. However, this subjugation, and also the abuse of nature, in one and the same move, results in a subjugation and a denigration of the human self. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Environmental Philosophy and Ecological Thought)
16 pages, 247 KiB  
Article
Formation of Feminine Truth in Poststructuralism
by Abey Koshy
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 79; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050079 - 28 Aug 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2000
Abstract
This essay traces the origin of feminine thought in poststructuralism, which opens up new vistas of experience that differ from traditional philosophical thinking based on a conceptual grasp of the world. Rather than viewing the feminine as the essence of the woman gender, [...] Read more.
This essay traces the origin of feminine thought in poststructuralism, which opens up new vistas of experience that differ from traditional philosophical thinking based on a conceptual grasp of the world. Rather than viewing the feminine as the essence of the woman gender, it is seen here as the experience of a plurality of truths produced in the affectedness of the human body by the world. The representative function of language and methodology in traditional philosophy cannot capture the plurality of truths. Feminine experience is not a prerogative of women philosophers or feminist writers. It is accessible even to male philosophers. Since it is the outcome of the affectedness of the body by phenomena, it is accessible to all human beings, irrespective of their gender identities. The construction of the truth of entities in terms of their universal essence has a significant role in forming masculine and feminine experiences. Masculine experience is produced by the representation of conceptual truth by the self. Feminine is a kind of existence prior to self-formation that is in operation in all humans. The linguistic turn in philosophy created by Nietzsche and Saussure is the main force behind the growth of feminine thinking in poststructuralism. It marks the end of the abstract, concept-based thinking of the masculine sort and the formation of the differential thought of the feminine. Full article
7 pages, 194 KiB  
Article
Is It Virtuous to Love Truth and Hate Falsehood?
by David Coady
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 78; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050078 - 26 Aug 2023
Viewed by 1935
Abstract
There is a great deal of academic literature, much of it coming from the social sciences and from social epistemology, which presents itself as addressing a very general problem: the problem of excessive falsehood. Falsehood comes in two general forms: false statements and [...] Read more.
There is a great deal of academic literature, much of it coming from the social sciences and from social epistemology, which presents itself as addressing a very general problem: the problem of excessive falsehood. Falsehood comes in two general forms: false statements and false beliefs. Of course, falsehood, in both these forms, has always been with us, but it is often supposed to be on the rise. I will argue that there is no new or growing problem of excessive falsehood (variously referred to as the problem of “misinformation” or “fake news”). Furthermore, we should reject the very idea that falsehood as such is a problem, and hence we should reject the idea of coming up with public policy responses to this so-called problem. I argue that the idea that falsehood is a problem is a natural consequence of the idea that it is virtuous to love truth and hate falsehood. I argue that, although there are several virtues related to truth (such as the intellectual virtue of curiosity and the moral virtue of honesty), a love of truth and hatred of falsehood are not themselves virtues. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Between Virtue and Epistemology)
13 pages, 275 KiB  
Article
The Normative Complexity of Virtues
by Giulia Luvisotto
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 77; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050077 - 25 Aug 2023
Viewed by 1338
Abstract
On what I will call the standard view, the distinction between the moral and the epistemic realms is both psychologically and conceptually prior to the distinction between any two given virtues. This widespread view supports the claim that there are moral and intellectual [...] Read more.
On what I will call the standard view, the distinction between the moral and the epistemic realms is both psychologically and conceptually prior to the distinction between any two given virtues. This widespread view supports the claim that there are moral and intellectual (or epistemic) virtues. Call this the fundamental distinction. In this paper, I raise some questions for both the standard view and the fundamental distinction, and I propose an alternative view on which virtues regain priority over the moral/epistemic divide. I suggest understanding them as normatively complex, distinctive sensitivities to both theoretical and practical reasons. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Between Virtue and Epistemology)
22 pages, 949 KiB  
Review
Ethics of Psychedelic Use in Psychiatry and Beyond—Drawing upon Legal, Social and Clinical Challenges
by Nuno Azevedo, Miguel Oliveira Da Silva and Luís Madeira
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 76; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050076 - 24 Aug 2023
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 6135
Abstract
Background: Psychedelics are known for their powerful mental effects due to the activation of 5HT-2A receptors in the brain. During the 1950s and 1960s, research was conducted on these molecules until their criminalization. However, their clinical investigation as therapeutic tools for psychiatric disorders [...] Read more.
Background: Psychedelics are known for their powerful mental effects due to the activation of 5HT-2A receptors in the brain. During the 1950s and 1960s, research was conducted on these molecules until their criminalization. However, their clinical investigation as therapeutic tools for psychiatric disorders has revived the deontological ethics surrounding this subject. Questions arise as research on their therapeutic outcome becomes a reality. We aim to explore deontological ethics to understand the implications of psychedelics for the clinician, patient, and society. Results: A total of 42 articles were considered for this review. Methods: A methodological search of psychedelic studies from 2017 to 2022 was conducted in PubMed, Scopus, EBSCOhost, and ScienceDirect to address the deontological ethics of clinical psychedelic use. Conclusion: Psychedelics need to be culturally contextualized, epistemic harm minimized and represented to ensure informed consent. Open data and commissions are needed to ensure safe and equal distribution. Full article
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17 pages, 452 KiB  
Article
Assessment of Cognitive Behavioral Characteristics in Intelligent Systems with Predictive Ability and Computing Power
by Oleg V. Kubryak, Sergey V. Kovalchuk and Nadezhda G. Bagdasaryan
Philosophies 2023, 8(5), 75; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8050075 - 23 Aug 2023
Viewed by 2150
Abstract
The article proposes a universal dual-axis intelligent systems assessment scale. The scale considers the properties of intelligent systems within the environmental context, which develops over time. In contrast to the frequent consideration of the “mind” of artificial intelligent systems on a scale from [...] Read more.
The article proposes a universal dual-axis intelligent systems assessment scale. The scale considers the properties of intelligent systems within the environmental context, which develops over time. In contrast to the frequent consideration of the “mind” of artificial intelligent systems on a scale from “weak” to “strong”, we highlight the modulating influences of anticipatory ability on their “brute force”. In addition, the complexity, the ”weight“ of the cognitive task and the ability to critically assess it beforehand determine the actual set of cognitive tools, the use of which provides the best result in these conditions. In fact, the presence of ”common sense“ options is what connects the ability to solve a problem with the correct use of such an ability itself. The degree of ”correctness“ and ”adequacy“ is determined by the combination of a suitable solution with the temporal characteristics of the event, phenomenon, object or subject under study. The proposed approach can be applied in the evaluation of various intelligent agents in different contexts including AI and humans performing complex domain-specific tasks with high uncertainty. Full article
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