The Interaction of Continental and Analytical Philosophy in the Development of the Philosophy of Dialogue

Abstract

In continental and analytical philosophy, which developed in parallel in the 20th century, there was a turn to language, which in particular was marked by the creation of a philosophy of dialogue in continental philosophy and dialogical logic in analytical. Despite their significant differences, these two directions have much in common and can significantly complement each other. The philosophy of dialogue considers reality as the subject of dialogue between persons—I, Thou, He/She, We. World, activity and culture are dialogic and interpersonal in nature. Languages and texts are the basis for understanding reality and activity. Dialogical logic describes reality as an object of a dialogical game. This allows us to consider rationality, activity and communication from a unified perspective. The article compares these two directions of dialogical thought with each other and examines the aspects in which they can complement each other.

1. Introduction. Facets of the Linguistic Turn of the Early 20th Century

The linguistic turn, which was proclaimed by Richard Rorty [1], occurred not only in analytical, but also in continental philosophy. Back in the 18th and 19th centuries, the voices of Hamann, Herder and then Humboldt were heard, who saw language as the main subject of philosophy. In the 20th century, in parallel with the Oxford and Viennese schools of analytical philosophy, representatives of a variety of philosophical movements spoke about the paramount importance of language, including the philosophy of life (Dilthey), neo-Kantianism (Cassirer) and phenomenology (Heidegger). We can say that the problem of language at the beginning of the 20th century found itself at the center of philosophy; it was formulated and studied in both continental and analytical philosophy in full force. One might suppose that the problem of language might unite these two directions. But so far this has not happened. Their understanding of the nature of language and research methods were too different. However, there is one very interesting exception—the philosophy of dialogue¹. Basically, this direction was born within the framework of continental philosophy. But the central figure in the emergence of analytical philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein, served as the starting point for the emergence of dialogical logic in the second half of the 20th century as a special direction in analytical philosophy, which, at the same time, is based on the ideas of Martin Buber and the concept of the dialogue between I and Thou. Two ways of understanding dialogue have much in common², and they have been developing independently of each other.

In fact, at the beginning of the 21st century we can talk about two parallel philosophies of dialogue—continental and analytical. The main goal of this article is to compare them and assert their mutual complementarity.

2. Main Ideas and Authors of Continental Philosophy of Dialogue

At first glance, the philosophy of dialogue is a set of disparate philosophical concepts that view the world as a subject of interpersonal dialogue. I offer a brief overview. For the most part, they originated in Germany³ and Russia⁴ at the beginning of the 20th century and subsequently developed in France⁵ the USA⁶ and Israel⁷. Meanwhile, a detailed comparison of these concepts, both historically and systematically, allows them to be considered as different branches of the same direction of philosophy⁸: Below I offer a brief overview of the main concepts of continental philosophy of dialogue in order to relate them to the concepts of dialogue in analytical philosophy.

The main direction of efforts of the philosophy of dialogue from the very beginning of the 20th century should be considered the shift in emphasis from ontology to dialogue between persons, from the problem of the subject to the problem of the other, from the epistemology of thinking to the hermeneutics of language. This process occurred gradually and differed among distinct authors. Hermann Cohen should be considered the first systematic philosopher who laid the foundations of the philosophy of dialogue [14]. Although he remained a neo-Kantian and a classical philosopher all his life, already in his early works he makes the subject of epistemology not knowledge about an object, but knowledge as a process of approximation. In the work The Principle of the Infinitesimal Method in Its History, Cohen examines the differences in the understanding of the infinitesimal between Newton and Leibniz. Cohen focuses on the procedural nature of the infinitesimal and its role in relation to the conceivable and the real [15] (p. 23). In the The Logic of pure knowledge [16], Cohen develops a systematic epistemology based on the idea of a procedural correlation between the knower and the known. Cohen’s main work, which actually laid the foundations for the philosophy of dialogue, is The Ethics of Pure Will. There, Cohen directly states that the self-consciousness of the human I is formed in its relationship with Thou and It [17] (p. 234). And together they form a united personality We [17] (p. 260). Cohen developed these ideas in even greater detail in his last book, “Religion of Reason out of the Sources of Judaism” [18].

The Austrian thinker Ferdinand Ebner expresses the idea that it is the interpersonal relationship between I and Thou that is the basis of spirituality. As Abner writes, “I and Thou form a language” [19] (p. 29). The Protestant theologian of Jewish origin, Eugen Rosenstock-Hüssy, held ideas close to Ebner. He views language as a divine reality that determines the spiritual life of man [20]. His interlocutor and friend Franz Rosenzweig, who was also a follower of Hermann Cohen, in his main book The Star of Redemption sets out a detailed doctrine of dialogue, which turns out to be the expression of transcendental processes occurring on paths. Rosenzweig consciously rejects the ontological tradition (Philosophy from Parmenides to Hegel [21] (pp. 20–22)) and describes language as the result of a dynamic relationship between the root words “Good” (Gut) and “I” (Ich) [21] (pp. 139, 187). He develops his “grammatical organon” [22], in which he describes dialogue as the result of relations between the persons I, Thou, He, She, It, They, We. According to Rosenzweig, language describes the form of interpersonal relations and thus turns out to be the basis not only of human cognition, but also religion.

The Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin came to very similar ideas [9,23]. Like Rosenzweig, he was an ardent follower of Hermann Cohen, although they were not familiar with each other [24]. Already in his first work, published posthumously, Philosophy of Act Bakhtin tries to build a new first philosophy, which should confront Aristotelian metaphysics and hermeneutics [25] (pp. 19–21, 27–28). Its basis is the idea of participation. A person is realized not in his autonomous essence, but in a moral act in relation to the Other. Bakhtin’s philosophy is defined by the outstanding Russian researcher Makhlin as an ontology of participatory thinking or as a social ontology [23] (pp. 268, 274). I’m not sure that the term “ontology” is entirely appropriate here. But even if this is ontology, then it is a new dialogic ontology that shifts attention from being to event (in Russian the word event is read as “being with”, that is, participation, correlative being). Bakhtin develops a new hermeneutics as an aesthetics of verbal creativity, in which speech is understood as an expression of interpersonal relationships. On this basis, Bakhtin builds a theory of speech genres, which had a huge influence on literary studies of the 20th century.

We find a completely different expression of the philosophy of dialogue in Martin Buber, who, being an outstanding original thinker, addressed the idea of dialogue not without influence of his friend and interlocutor Franz Rosenzweig [26,27]. In 1923, Buber wrote the brilliant treatise “I and Thou”, which became one of the most important works of philosophy of the 20th century. In this book, Buber sharply contrasts the I–Thou relationship with the I–It relationship. The first is considered as personal, and the second as subject–object. Even before the publication of the book, Rosenzweig sharply criticized the distinction between the Thou and the It, which is Buber’s main idea [28]. In a letter to Buber from 1922, Rosenzweig writes that having lost the It, Thou is deprived of reality [29] (p. 825).

If Rosenzweig’s criticism was mainly personal in nature and carried out within the framework of communication and correspondence, it became known to researchers many decades later, then Levinas directly criticizes Buber’s distinction between Thou and It. Levinas notes that the relation of proximity between the first two persons is realized thanks to the third person (l’ilteite) [30] (pp. 619–623). Despite the fact that Levinas’s thinking, unlike the listed authors, is based on phenomenological methodology, he builds his own approach to the philosophy of dialogue, that has a lot in common with these authors [31].

Speaking about the philosophy of dialogue, I cannot help but mention the Soviet philosopher V. S. Bibler, who developed his own philosophy of dialogue of cultures, the starting point of which is the criticism of Marxism [32]. Bibler’s philosophy, like that of other philosophers of dialogue, is systematic; it contains many important points for understanding the nature of culture, history, processes of cognition, and education.

Despite the diversity of approaches and schools, all ideas of the philosophy of dialogue fit well into a single whole. Already in 1967, B. Casper wrote The Dialogical Principle where he compared the teachings of Buber, Rosenzweig and Ebner [6]. In 1997 Makhlin added Bakhtin and compared him with the first three authors [33]. Subsequently Sokuler described her version of the philosophy of dialogue in which she selected Cohen, Rosenzweig and Levinas [34]. A comparison of all these works and directions led me to understand the unity of the philosophy of dialogue [13] and their relationship with the problems of dialogue in analytical philosophy. Are these two schools of thought completely independent and the coincidence is limited to the use of the word “dialogue” or is there a connection and mutual complementarity between them?

3. Analytical Philosophy and the Concept of Dialogical Logic

Dialogical logic as a special discipline was proposed in the works of P. Lorenzen and K. Lorentz in the 1960s [35]. It was based on the idea of a language game carried out on the basis of propositional logic. Dialogical logic developed intensively in all subsequent years [36].

If we compare the turn to language in the 20th century in continental and analytical philosophy, we can see that it arises from the same source—the revision of Aristotle’s ontological philosophy. Moreover, if continental philosophy focused on understanding the first part of the word “ontology”, i.e., problems of being, then analytical philosophy grew out of the development of the second part of this word, i.e., “logos”. Its main banner was logicism, which tried to reformulate the question of the nature of language.

One of the most important properties of the system of Aristotle’s philosophy is the fundamental agreement between logic and metaphysics. The basis of Aristotelian logic is his treatise “Hermeneutics” (Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, On Interpretation), which interprets the relationship between being, thinking and speech. According to Aristotle’s hermeneutics, speech is primarily a distorted copy of thinking, and thinking reproduces existing objects (Aristotle, On Interpretation, 16a 3). Of all types of speech, the author selects “propositional speech” (λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς), i.e., a proposition that can only be true or false (Aristotle, On Interpretation, 17a 3). According to Aristotle, this should turn speech into the accurate reproduction of thinking and being. Aristotle deals with the description of Being in his theoretical works, the chief of them is Metaphysics. It proclaims that “the subject of first philosophy is Being as Being (τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὂν)” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1003a20). In his practical writings, which are completely consistent with logic and metaphysics, Aristotle goes beyond propositions and adds rhetorical, dialectical and poetic speech. However, Aristotle’s precise propositional speech has become the ideal of scientists for all times. The problem is that the world is not so easily reduced to a collection of propositions. By identifying language and thinking, Aristotle’s hermeneutics led to the exclusion of language as a specific reality from philosophy.

Starting in the 19th century, propositional logic developed intensively, and in the 20th century it became the basis of analytical philosophy. At the same time, most of its creators rethink the role of language in expressing reality. As is known, Frege distinguishes between sign and its concept. As a result, the logical plan of the world becomes a non-trivial subject of research, and language as an expression of the formal structure of reality acquires special importance. The creators of logicism, Frege and Russell, were mathematicians and followed the set-theoretic concept of Georg Cantor. Along with Cantor’s central role in the formation of modern mathematics, it is necessary to note his importance in philosophy. Cantor believed that human thinking is capable of comprehending actual infinity, that is, presenting the world as a formal system. The set theory he developed served as the basis for the formalization of mathematics. The creators of analytical philosophy, Frege, Russell and then Wittgenstein, considered logic as a way of representing mathematics, and therefore, in accordance with Cantor’s thought, all reality in general. One of the attempts to formally represent the world is contained in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. But over time, the author of this work decided that the world is not just a logical system, but the subject of a language game⁹.

Based on Wittgenstein’s ideas in combination with Buber’s concept of dialogue, the outstanding philosopher and logician Paul Lorenzen and his student and colleague Kuno Lorenz developed a special dialogical logic, which considers the reasoning process as a dialogical game.

The dialogical logic of Lorenzen and Lorenz in its problematics is very far from the continental philosophy of dialogue. It is a branch of formal logic, which is also defined as game theoretical semantics (GTS). However, the formalization of the dialogue process as a language game creates new opportunities for understanding the nature of dialogue.

Let us briefly consider the main philosophical provisions of dialogical logic. Dialogue in it is presented as a game based on first-order predicate calculus, which is an extension of ordinary propositional logic. There are two participants in the game—the Proponent attacks and the Opponent defends. The game consists of exchanging formulas built according to certain rules. The result of the game is to decide whether a particular formula is true or false. As Lorenz notes, the participants in the game implement two roles in it—the I-role and the You-role [38] (p. 212). Thus, the game turns out to be a formal description of the dialogue process. Dialogical logic allows us to consider any propositional structure as a formula that is derived through some dialogic process. This allows for a constructive justification of mathematics as a single formal whole.

The description of logical reasoning as a process of interaction between several subjects gives rise to a new type of relationship between logic and ethics. Since the time of Kant, ethics has dealt with the relationship between different empirical subjects. Translation of logical reality into the intersubjective domain through a language game transfers an effect of one of them on the other (ethical) into the logical domain. In both Kantian and Aristotelian terms, it denotes the interaction between theoretical and practical reason. A completely similar process is observed in the continental philosophy of dialogue, in which the concept of interpersonal interaction leads to a rethinking of the concept of Being. Thus, both versions of dialogical philosophy become the basis for rethinking the entire systematic philosophy. Both of them include not only a description of the world of objects, but also the reality of acts and deeds.

4. Subjectivity, Intersubjectivity, Transsubjectivity

The concept underlying various areas of philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries, including its analytical and continental branches, is the idea of subjectivity. Almost everyone agrees that we study not the world directly, but the world processed by our feelings, imagination and thinking. The only question is how different sources of knowledge relate to each other. In his work Fundamentals of the Future Doctrine of Manifolds: A Mathematical and Philosophical Essay on the Doctrine of the Infinite [39], G. Cantor raises the question of the ability of thinking to express the data of experience as a problem of the relationship between intersubjectivity and transsubjectivity. Intersubjective or immanent reality (intrasubjektive oder immanente Realität), according to Cantor, is a reality comprehended by reason and not requiring recourse to experience. This type of reality is characterized by its internal consistency and intelligibility. Transsubjective reality (transsubjective Realität), unlike intersubjective reality, goes beyond pure thinking and is associated with experience.

“For me”, writes Cantor, “there is no doubt that both of these types of reality always coincide” [39] (p. 18).

Believing in the omnipotence of human reason, Cantor believes that any transsubjectivity can potentially be identical to intersubjectivity. Thus, it turns out that all reality comprehended by experience and relating to reality external to the subject can potentially be perceived by reason and be formalized. Despite the tempting nature of this idea, the philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries was not so optimistic and reserved fundamental significance for experience. However, based on Cantor’s ideas, at the beginning of the 20th century an attempt was made to completely formalize mathematics.

The concept of intersubjectivity and transsubjectivity¹⁰ goes back to the idea of subjectivity in Kant and Fichte. The position of the knowing I (Ego cogito) was discovered by Descartes. It was theoretically studied by Kant as the concept of transcendental subject. Kant considers the Cartesian I to be empirical. The transcendental subject, as the basis of all knowledge, is united and gathers around itself all cognizable objects. However, unlike the transcendental, there are many empirical subjects, because everyone has their own I. Thus, the relationship between subjects is an important topic in the Critique of Practical Reason. A similar problem arises in relation to the empirical subject with external reality. This topic is important for Kant’s critique of judgment¹¹. The problem of intersubjectivity and transsubjectivity arises in an even more acute form in the philosophy of Fichte. Considering the I as an absolute subject, Fichte falls under the charge of solipsism, which leads him to the need to consider the relationships between different Is and between I and the external world [42].

The issues of intersubjectivity and transsubjectivity are closely related. As we have seen, Cantor considers intersubjectivity to be an immanent property of the subject. The main question of the theory of knowledge is not what each empirical subject knows, but what is knowable in principle. Thus, the property of the transcendental subject to be the basis of all knowledge is realized precisely in intersubjectivity, and the subject’s orientation towards the world external to him is realized in transsubjectivity. It should be noted that neither Kant nor Fichte use these terms. Cantor, as I mentioned, states this question directly.

The ideas of transsubjectivity and intersubjectivity were more thoroughly developed in the philosophy of the 20th century. E. Cassirer in his book Cognition and Reality engages in a detailed discussion of transsubjectivity [43] (pp. 293–302). And intersubjectivity becomes one of the stumbling blocks of Husserl’s phenomenology as he tries to overcome solipsism [44].

Turning to language, speech and dialogue bring the problem of intersubjectivity and transsubjectivity to the level of the most important philosophical topics. Dialogue always takes place between different subjects, and the subject of dialogue, as a rule, is the transsubjective reality common to the interlocutors.

In the final philosophical work devoted to the origins and foundations of dialogical logic, Lorenz dwells in detail on the problem of transsubjectivity [38]. Its essence, according to Lorenz, lies in commonality between subjects of the world of objects and actions. In this context, Lorenz asks the question:

“How can I know that my object is also your object?” [38] (p. 211).

And then he reformulates it in accordance with the approach of the Erlangen school:

“How is it possible to share individual experiences and thus to create a common world step by step?” [38] (p. 211).

Answer:

“By two persons acquiring a common action competence in a situation of teaching and learning. […] And this is effected not by transferring an individual competence from one person to another one, but by using a procedure that incorporates from the very beginning the two dialogical roles inherent in any action, be it a simple action, or, later on, a sign action, e.g., a verbal one: the I-role or role of the agent in executing an action […] and the You-role or role of the patient in executing an action. […] It needs further steps to enlarge the common two person-world in order to reach an essentially transsubjective world” [38] (pp. 211–212).

So, the transsubjective world is comprehended not as a result of the expansion of the world, not as a result of the exchange of information, but as a result of the dialogic process of interaction between two partners, I-role and You-role. But how to describe this process? According to Lorenz, we need to go

“to a broad perspective of treating Dialogical Philosophy as an outcome of combining the basic strategies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Buber.” [38] (p. 214).

According to Lorenz, the alignment of Wittgenstein and Buber helps us to unite two ways of relating theoretical and practical philosophy: theoretical—addressed to objects, concepts, signs; practical—to actions, deeds, relationships. Characterizing the early Wittgenstein, Lorenz writes about

“reduction of sign acting to merely acting” [38] (p. 214).

Whereas, according to Lorenz,

“In the later Wittgenstein we are faced with a reduction of theory to praxis” [38] (pp. 214–215).

Lorenz considers the transformation of the concept of signification into a language game. Buber shows the opposite movement. Expressive interpersonal attitude

“doing and suffering lose their distinctive feature from saying (something) and understanding (what has been said). In the later” which signifies “theorization of praxis” [38] (pp. 214–215).

As Lorenz notes, both movements are one-sided and the philosophy of dialogue should unite them.

“You have just to pay attention to the pragmatic character of signs and to the semiotic character of actions”. [38] (p. 215).

At the same time, the interpersonal process combining the activity and conceptual plans must be reciprocal and symmetrical:

“Humans become persons by mutual recognition that comes about by a process of developing the ability to play both dialogical roles [I-role and You-role] at the same time”. [38] (p. 206).

Essentially, the philosophy of dialogue, as understood by Lorenz, combines theoretical and practical philosophy and thereby forms a philosophical system.

To summarize, Lorenz views dialogue as a form of unity of intersubjectivity and transsubjectivity. At the same time, the transsubjective world of experience and deeds is reflected in the framework of intersubjectivity of interpersonal relations. The above question “How can I know that my object is also your object?” has a simple answer: this object is part of our common external world in the process of interpersonal dialogue.

5. Hidden Third Person of Dialogue

The great advantage of the analytical concept of dialogue, discussed above, is joint consideration of rationality and activity. Both are understood as an interpersonal dialogical multi-step process. However, upon closer examination, this concept reveals some problems. Firstly, the world is understood as a set of objects and actions described by a set of propositions. The task of cognition is only to determine which of these propositions are true. In practice, we know that dialogue is never reduced to the exchange of propositions. The process of cognition consists not only in determining which concept corresponds to which, but also in forming these concepts themselves. Aristotle’s hermeneutics of propositional speech has limitations that Aristotle himself knew well¹² and which are often forgotten by his modern followers.

To overcome these shortcomings, we must turn to the philosophy of dialogue from a broader perspective. Lorenz relied on Buber’s concept of the relationship between I and Thou, but as I mentioned before the philosophy of dialogue is not limited to this concept. The core of Buber’s approach is the idea that reality is not the totality of objects, but the realization of relationships: “In the beginning is relation” [45] (p. 18). This idea was most profoundly developed in the concept of correlation by Hermann Cohen. Cohen also most thoroughly explored the relationship “Thou in a duality with I.” [17] (p. 235). But if Cohen distinguishes between I–Thou and I–It, Buber actively contrasts them. This allows Buber to present the concept of the dialogue between I and Thou in a very distinct form. However, important points related to It are missed. Following Buber, Lorenz conceptualizes the I-role and the You-role, while the fundamental significance of the third person, which is actually the theme of the dialogical game, is not taken in account. But precisely the third person is the subject of the dialogical game. Unlike Buber, Cohen examines in detail all persons—I, Thou, It. The first person plural We is also added to them, which is very important in dialogue, because it describes a community, a speaking collective. Only the interaction of all persons, including the third person, is a dialogue; Rosenzweig also examines all persons in detail, while unlike Buber, he emphasizes the fundamental importance of the third person¹³. For Rosenzweig, the connection between individuals is not limited to correlation as in Cohen, but is realized in a dynamic process that unfolds along the path [48]. Levinas further sharpens the question of the significance of the third person, which he defines as l’ilteite. Thanks to him, intimacy and relationships arise between the first and second persons. Unlike Buber, Levinas considers the I–Thou relationship to be asymmetrical [49] (p. 246). In order to enter into a dialogue with someone, I must realize that he is another person, different from me, and this reveals itself in the third person.

What is a third person—He, She, It, They? We can assume that this is the transsubjective reality of the intersubjective reality of the first and second person. The third person is the world that is the subject of the dialogue. Therefore, it is impossible to consider these individuals separately. The third person is not always reducible to the first two and is significant in itself. The three persons are grammatical universals and together describe the dialogue in its entirety. To clarify the meaning of these three persons, we present their names in Arabic and Hebrew grammar [50,51]. The first person is defined as speaker, the second as present and the third as hidden¹⁴. As I mentioned, in Lorenzen–Lorenz dialogic logic the first two persons are defined as proponent and opponent (another version is agent and patient). These definitions are quite close to speaker and present. But what is the third hidden person in this context? Maybe this is the question or problem around which the dialogue unfolds?

The definition of the third person as hidden raises a number of very important questions! Third parties discussed in the dialogue can become first and second in the same or next dialogue. How does dialogue affect them? How do they, in their concealment, influence the dialogue? Third persons can be potential real participants in the dialogue, but even if they are inanimate things, behind them there are usually hidden but significant first persons.

Considering dialogue as an interaction of not two but three persons leads us to the fundamental question—is concealment, obscurity, uncertainty a secondary factor from which we can abstract, believing that everything hidden will someday become apparent? In fact, this question can be formulated differently—is transsubjectivity, as Cantor believed, always removed by intersubjectivity? Cantor was apparently a metaphysical optimist, but do we always have basis for such optimism? Doesn’t the thought of the potential knowability of everything lead us into an illusion that closes gates of knowledge?

Probably, the irreducibility of transsubjectivity to intersubjectivity leads to the need to include the fundamentally unknown or uncertain in the process of dialogue. Obviously, this does not make the dialogue meaningless, because essentially substantive dialogues are exactly like that. But this means that we need to expand the scope of the dialogue and consider it not between two, but between three persons. I believe that the inclusion of the fundamentally unknown and uncertain in the domain of dialogue is no less a transformation in logic than the inclusion of the unconscious in psychology.

6. What Is Dialogue

It would seem that considering dialogue as a process of interaction between all three persons should dramatically complicate the picture, but in reality the opposite happens. It is precisely because of the theme of dialogue and the very language in which it occurs are hidden and indefinite that dialogue is possible.

Language is not a system of signs that denote some material or ideal reality existing outside of us. The space of dialogue within which the interaction of group members occurs leads to the consolidation of a common meaning for this group. The meaning of all linguistic constructions is the result of the linguistic process, and not its original premise. This formulation of the question requires us to expand the formalism in which we consider the dialogue. He can no longer limit himself to the set theory, because whether or not an element belongs to the system may depend on the position of the participant in the dialogue. To describe this situation, we must use a mathematical formalism more abstract than set theory, namely the theory of categories and functors [52]. Its peculiarity is the ability to correlate different categories, which, being a combination of objects and morphisms, are not necessarily sets. Objects and morphisms of a category can be vague and fuzzy, but gain certainty and distinctness as a result of transformations. Isn’t that how language and linguistic communication work?

So, we will present all four persons known to us in the form of categories: first person I—I; second person You (Thou)—T; third person He—H; first person plural We—W.

Each of the categories denotes the representation of objects and morphisms for a given person. In this case, the external object Hi for person I will not automatically coincide with I’s representation of this object. After all, for any person it is clear that his idea of the object only approximately coincides with this object and, for example, another person T has a different idea.

We will consider the relation I to Hi as a functor I → Hi. Then the representation of the object for T will be Ht, the corresponding relation will be described by the functor T → Ht. Identifying the item H for I and T will be H = Hi = Ht. In this case, the dialogue process will be described by a natural transformation:

$$\begin{array}{ccc}\mathrm{I}& \to & \mathrm{T}\\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ \mathrm{H}& \to & \mathrm{H}\end{array}$$

(1)

We can now give the exact answer to Lorentz’s question above. Two interlocutors can ensure that they are discussing the same subject, if the above natural transformation is applied to it. Indeed, even if all three categories are uncertain the natural transformation makes them certain, since they are related to each other by three functors: three equations with three unknowns can be solved.

A slightly more complex transformation will describe not an object common to two persons, but a joint action between them in relation to the object:

$$\begin{array}{ccc}\mathrm{I}& \to & \mathrm{T}\\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ \mathrm{H}\mathrm{i}& \to & \mathrm{H}\mathrm{t}\end{array}$$

(2)

Here, the object H remains uncertain for the interlocutors, but the natural transformation described by the functor Hi → Ht will be certain. These arguments confirm and illustrate Lorenz’s thesis that the formation of a common world by two persons is equivalent to action competence common to them.

M. Bakhtin also considers the world as a whole not as a set of external objects, but as the implementation of participative existence expressed in act:

“The world in which an act or deed actually proceeds, in which it is actually accomplished, is a unitary and unique world that is experienced concretely: it is a world that is seen, heard, touched, and thought, a world permeated in its entirety with the motional-volitional tones of the affirmed validity of values” [25] (p. 56).

Like Bakhtin, Levinas views reality in the context of an ethical dimension, that is, “the movement of the Self-identical towards the Other” [49] (pp. 246–247).

Thus, in both analytical and continental versions of philosophy, dialogue is understood as a dynamic process combining action and speech. Concepts and acts that have uncertainty in the beginning become definite in the process of dialogue.

7. Conclusions: Complementarity of the Philosophy of Dialogue and Dialogical Logic

The fact that dialogic ideas developed in the 20th century in parallel independently of each other in analytical and continental philosophy confirm the relevance of the philosophy of dialogue. The simultaneous development of this philosophy points to the urgent need for such an approach. The independent development of dialogic ideas in two competing directions of 20th century philosophy testifies to their ability to respond to current problems. Thus, we see the growing importance of combining the continental and analytical foundations of the philosophy of dialogue. This is the most important task of this article.

The philosophy of dialogue explores dialogue as a relationship between three persons singular and plural. At the same time, it is focused on the study of the dialogic reality of the world and the interaction of persons participating in the dialogue. Dialogical logic studies dialogue as a process.

Dialogical logic in the version of Wittgenstein, Lorenzen and Lorenz considers as partners in dialogue only two main persons I and You—Proponent and Opponent—in language games and does not attach much importance to the ontological meaning of the very content of the dialogue. The philosophy of dialogue in the versions of Cohen, Rosenzweig, Bakhtin and Levinas profoundly explores the third person as the hidden content of dialogue and reveals its connection with the first and second persons. Therefore, instead of the concept of intersubjectivity and transsubjectivity, which describes the correlation between subjects and objects, the authors of the philosophy of dialogue consider dialogue as a dynamic process of interaction between persons that goes beyond subjectivity.

Within the framework of the philosophy of dialogue, Cohen, Levinas and Bakhtin formulate the theory of dialogical action, which is based on relationships of persons. This leads these philosophers to realize the importance of responsibility and action as well as the central role of ethics in philosophy. Dialogical logic also shows the significance of action and deed as well as connection between logic and ethics.

Taking into account the important significance of the concept We in the philosophy of dialogue, the concept of creative community is formed. It allows us to consider We as a person of togetherness not reduced to the concept of collective subject. At the same time, within the framework of analytical and pragmatic philosophy, the concept of communicative action is being formed, which is consistent with the We theory.

In their concept of language games, Wittgenstein and the later authors of dialogical logic followed predicate logic, which ultimately describes language as a semiotic system through fixed meanings. The philosophy of dialogue, especially in the version of Rosenzweig and Bakhtin, creates the theory of language and literature as the dialogical system.

Common to continental and analytical philosophy is the change in the status of the subject compared to classical ancient philosophy. In analytical philosophy, the subject is no longer passive and becomes an agent of human action. In continental philosophy, the subject, through the persons I, Thou, He, acquires personality. Considering that activity and personality are expression of will and ethical orientation of dialogue, both positions can be combined.

The advantage of the philosophy of dialogue lies in the study of the synthesis and transformation of meanings. At the same time, within the framework of the analytical approach, dialogue as a process as well as game and probabilistic strategies are used to describe language as a changing system. Dialogue is not only a process of clarifying meanings, but also their generation according to the philosophy of dialogue.

Fuzziness and uncertainty of language, with which analytical philosophy struggles in the philosophy of dialogue, is considered as its fundamental property, allowing language to be the fundamental basis of cognition and communication.

Dialogical logic and philosophy of dialogue consider language and speech from different angles. But each has its own merits. Dialogical logic sees in them a multi-step language game built on the basis of predicate logic. The philosophy of dialogue applies holistic approaches to the description of language and literature that go beyond Aristotelian hermeneutics.