Enhanced Authentication for Decentralized IoT Access Control Architecture
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. Contributions
- A blockchain-based decentralized OAuth authorization system is presented to address issues with centralized servers.
- Smart contracts on the blockchain are used for automated authentication and authorization performance management.
- A DID system is used to provide strong authentication for all participants involved in access control management.
- By implementing a secure token called the PoP token, proof of user ownership is achieved, which mitigates security threats.
1.2. Organization
2. Related Work
3. Background
3.1. IoT
3.2. Blockchain
Smart Contract
3.3. OAuth
Secure Token
3.4. DID
4. System Architecture
- User: Service users who want to register and access the IoT to use IoT devices and multiple applications on IoT devices (e.g., e-health, smart home, auto driving car, etc.). It is the owner of the resources that the IoT wants to access.
- IoT device: This is an IoT device that a user wants to access, and the access authority is delegated from the user to access and use the user’s information on the resource server. Various IoT devices such as wearable devices such as smartwatches, self-driving cars, and smart home systems are included.
- Blockchain and smart contract: Blockchain nodes use smart contracts to authenticate and authorize users and IoT devices. Users and IoT devices verified through smart contracts are submitted transactions on the distributed ledger, and blockchain issues tokens for access, and records them on the ledger. The secure token key, requested by the resource server, is also verified, and recorded to serve as an authentication server.
- DID resolver: A DID document containing the authentication keys and authentication methods of users and the IoT is found through DID and delivered to the blockchain.
- Resource Server: This stores and manages the user resource. When IoT accesses it through tokens, it calls smart contracts on the blockchain to verify the integrity and possession of the tokens and delivers protected user resource to the IoT.
4.1. Security Requirements
- Flexibility: In the IoT authentication environment, users should possess compatibility and scalability, enabling them to freely register and access any IoT device while appropriately managing their permissions. Additionally, IoT devices should exhibit flexibility in accommodating users’ resource usage and support various authentication methods tailored to both users and IoT devices. The proposed framework effectively leverages decentralized identifiers (DID) and OAuth-based secure tokens to perform authentication and access control at a superior level.
- Authentication: Whether a legitimate user enrolls in an access control framework or whether a legitimate IoT device uses the user’s resources is very important. The proposed framework goes through an authentication process through smart contracts on the authentication blockchain to see if both users and IoT devices who want to enroll are legitimate.
- Integrity: The integrity of the authentication information of the user requesting authentication or IoT is very important. Since the proposed framework uses DID, authentication credential information for users and IoT can be recorded in blockchain to ensure integrity, and other authentication and authorization information can also be hashed and recorded on the authentication blockchain.
- Data confidentiality: The user’s critical data should be encrypted, safely stored, and safely transmitted to the authenticated IoT. The user’s data to be accessed by the IoT is encrypted in the resource server and stored safely. In addition, the resource server can maintain the confidentiality of the data by providing protected information after verifying the ownership proof of the access authority token using the key contract of the authentication blockchain of IoT.
- Key agreement: Access control management uses encryption keys for encryption, authentication, and authorization. In the proposed framework, users and IoT proceed with signatures using public key algorithms to authenticate each other, and also use security tokens to prove ownership using symmetric keys. Public keys for authentication are exchanged using DID, and symmetric keys for token ownership proof are encrypted and delivered using public keys of authenticated users and IoT by the authentication blockchain.
- Decentralization: Various security threats from authentication servers that perform authentication of users and IoT devices can be prevented by decentralizing the server. In the proposed framework, blockchain, a decentralized authentication server, can eliminate the threat of a centralized authentication server.
- Traceability: Access control management using blockchain, a distributed ledger, should be able to record and track logs for users and IoT devices to access and users and devices to authenticate and enroll. The proposed framework provides traceability to accessors by recording values encrypted with public keys of authenticated and registered users and IoT devices.
4.2. The Proposed Protocol
- User sends a request message, denoted as , to the IoT device. The request includes the user’s DID and the signed hash of the DID using the user’s secret key.
- When the IoT device receives the request, it adds its own DID and the signed hash of its DID using the IoT’s secret key to the user’s request. Subsequently, the IoT device sends the resource access request transaction, denoted as , to the blockchain. In this transaction, the IoT device includes the user’s DID, the IoT device’s DID, and the signature of the set comprising the signed hash of the user’s DID and the hash of the IoT device’s DID.
- After receiving the transaction, the IoT authentication contract code is executed by blockchain nodes. The IoT authentication contract uses DID documents from the IoT DID identifier addresses through DID resolver to authenticate the IoT device. The IoT device’s DID document includes the authentication methods; the IoT authentication is performed using the IoT device’s public key. The IoT authentication contract authenticates the IoT by verifying the signature of the request through the public key of the IoT device. If the DID hash of the signed IoT device matches, the verification is successful.
- If the IoT device’s validation is successful, the blockchain nodes execute the next user authentication contract code to verify the user. The same as the IoT authentication contract, the user authentication contract obtain the user’s DID document via DID resolver, and then verifies the user. The user authentication contract authenticates the user by verifying the signature of the request through the public key of the user. If the DID hash of the signed user matches, the verification is successful. Based on OAuth 2.0, the proposed framework uses tokens for delegation of authority. Thus, the user authentication contract code also generates the random PoP key, access token, random session ID r, and user’s public key encryption of r. The access token (CWT), which is the payload of the PoP token, must have four fields: issuer (ISS), audience (AUD), expiration time (EXP), and confirmation (CNF). The framework uses the PoP key to make a secure token that proves ownership, to delegate authority, and to access resources. Access through PoP tokens, which are security tokens using access tokens and PoP keys, can achieve security on constrained IoT devices because they require PoP keys as well as tokens.
- If the user’s validation is successful and all the authentication contracts are closed, the node submits the transaction to the blockchain. This transaction includes the user’s public key encryption of the access token and PoP key, the IoT’s public key encryption of the access token and PoP key, the hash of the access token, the hash of r, and the hash of the PoP key.
- After the transaction recording is complete, the node sends a response message to the IoT device. The response message , contains the encryption of PoP key, access Token, r, and the user’s public key encryption of r.
- The IoT can decrypt and obtain the access token, PoP key, and session ID r if the IoT device is a legitimate device. The IoT device sends an authorization granted reply and encrypted r, , to notify the user that authentication and authorization were successful.
- The IoT device makes the PoP token using the access token and the PoP key obtained, that is made up of the access token and encrypts the access token with the PoP key. The encryption parts of the PoP token assure the integrity and authentication of the access token. In the IoT system, to access the resource, a proof of possession (PoP) token and are sent to the resource server. The PoP token comprises an access token and an encrypted access token with the PoP key. The PoP key is further encrypted with the resource server’s public key.
- When the RS receives the PoP token and the RS’s public key encryption of the PoP key, the hash of the PoP key, the RS can obtain the PoP key and send the key verify request transaction to blockchain.
- The RS only sends the hash of the PoP key, and requests the transaction to execute the key contract to verify the PoP key.
- The key contract checks the previous transaction record on blockchain to verify the PoP key. If key validation is successful, the node submits the hash of the PoP key , transaction.
- The RS sends the protected resource to the IoT device.
5. Discussion
5.1. Using Decentralized Authorization
5.2. Using Smart Contract
5.3. Using Secure Token
5.4. Using DID for Authentication
6. Security Analysis
- Flexibility: The flexibility of the IoT authentication and authorization system should ensure compatibility and scalability within a narrow scope, as well as appropriate authorization and resource accessibility, along with support for various authentication methods in a broader context. The proposed framework utilizes decentralized identifiers (DID), allowing all IoT devices to authenticate and establish connections with users, thus guaranteeing compatibility and scalability. Moreover, the authentication identifiers for IoT are encrypted and recorded within the DID, ensuring data integrity, while IoT devices only store the DID identifier. This approach enhances security measures significantly compared to conventional authentication environments. Furthermore, as DID enables owners to manage authentication identifiers, diverse authentication methods can be supported. Additionally, the adoption of OAuth-based proof of possession (PoP) tokens in the framework enables granting precise authorization and secure resource access.
- Authentication: In the proposed framework, both IoT and user authentication credentials are securely managed within decentralized identifiers (DID), ensuring tamper resistance. The authentication process is securely conducted using automated mechanisms, such as smart contracts within the blockchain nodes, preventing any intervention by attackers or malicious insiders. With vulnerabilities in the authentication process also adequately protected, the proposed framework guarantees reliable authentication.
- Integrity: The authentication credentials used in the framework are recorded on the blockchain, ensuring integrity and immutability. Furthermore, all authentication and authorization processes are recorded on the blockchain, guaranteeing the integrity of the authentication.
- Data confidentiality: In the proposed framework, the user’s sensitive data are securely stored in an encrypted form on the resource server. However, during the transmission process to the authenticated IoT devices, the confidentiality of the user’s information may be compromised. To address this issue, the framework ensures that only authorized IoT devices, which have undergone thorough authentication processes, can access the resource server. Authorization is achieved using secure tokens, specifically PoP (proof of possession) tokens. These tokens are verified using PoP keys to confirm the ownership and legitimacy of the token holder. Upon receiving the token, the resource server further validates the IoT device’s authorization status through the authentication blockchain’s key contract, ensuring that the IoT device has been granted appropriate privileges. As a result, the resource server provides the encrypted user data only to the legitimate IoT devices, effectively preventing security incidents where sensitive information is exposed to malicious attackers. Through the implementation of encryption techniques and rigorous authorization management, the proposed framework ensures data confidentiality.
- Key agreement: The proposed framework aims to generate the necessary secret keys for encrypted communication of devices in IoT access control management. This framework allows owners to directly manage authentication identifiers and utilizes decentralized identifiers (DID) generated through key agreement to enable registered IoT devices and users to create and manage keys for communication. DID leverages distributed ledger technology to enhance the reliability of keys and enables efficient and stable key exchange. This framework is expected to contribute to improved security and performance of IoT systems through fast responsiveness and secure communication.
- Decentralized: Identity verification, authentication information encryption, and log auditing are crucial elements in the authentication and authorization processes. Decentralizing the authentication server helps to protect these vital elements and mitigates various security threats that may arise during the authentication and authorization procedures. This framework leverages distributed identifiers (DID), a decentralized ledger technology, to ensure identity verification and safeguard authentication information against tampering through encryption. Additionally, the authentication and authorization logs are recorded on a decentralized authentication blockchain, preventing log tampering, modifications, or deletions, and enabling transparent log auditing. Moreover, traditional centralized authentication systems suffer from a critical flaw, as a single vulnerability or system failure can render the entire authentication system inoperative. Conversely, a decentralized authentication system such as the authentication blockchain operates in a distributed manner, thus mitigating such vulnerabilities. Furthermore, by utilizing smart contracts functioning on the distributed ledger, the authentication process can be automated without requiring the involvement of third-party trust entities. This automation eliminates security threats that may arise from third-party involvement, facilitating efficient authentication procedures.
- Traceability: The proposed framework records all processes in the authentication system’s log for access control management through the authentication blockchain and smart contracts, enabling the traceability of incidents. The authentication contract, authorization contract, and key contract thoroughly document all relevant information, including users and IoT devices as authentication subjects. Sensitive information is securely protected by being encrypted with public keys or hashed and stored on the blockchain, ensuring its safety from external threats. Additionally, the blockchain’s immutable nature guarantees the integrity of the logged data, preventing any tampering attempts. As a result, the framework ensures accurate and reliable traceability, enhancing preparedness against potential security incidents. Access control management plays a pivotal role as a core element of the framework, reinforcing data security and trustworthiness.
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Decentralized Authorization | Smart Contract | Secure Token | DID Authentication | |
---|---|---|---|---|
[5,6,7,8,9] | N | N | N | N |
[11,12,13,14,15] | N | N | Y | N |
[16] | Y | N | N | N |
[17,18,19,20,21,22,23] | Y | Y | N | N |
[24,25] | N | Y | Y | N |
[26,27] | Y | Y | Y | N |
[28] | N | N | N | Y |
[29] | N | N | Y | Y |
[30] | N | Y | N | Y |
Ours | Y | Y | Y | Y |
Description | |
---|---|
Signature of user (client) using user’s secret key | |
Signature of the IoT using user’s secret key | |
Encryption using the user’s public key | |
Encryption using the IoT’s public key | |
Encryption using the PoP key | |
Encryption using the resource server’s public key |
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Kang, J.H.; Seo, M. Enhanced Authentication for Decentralized IoT Access Control Architecture. Cryptography 2023, 7, 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography7030042
Kang JH, Seo M. Enhanced Authentication for Decentralized IoT Access Control Architecture. Cryptography. 2023; 7(3):42. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography7030042
Chicago/Turabian StyleKang, Jeong Hwa, and Minhye Seo. 2023. "Enhanced Authentication for Decentralized IoT Access Control Architecture" Cryptography 7, no. 3: 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography7030042
APA StyleKang, J. H., & Seo, M. (2023). Enhanced Authentication for Decentralized IoT Access Control Architecture. Cryptography, 7(3), 42. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography7030042