Air Transport System Agility: The Agile Response Capability (ARC) Methodology for Crisis Preparedness
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. Organizational Agility and Resilience
1.2. Crisis Exercises and Scenario-Based Training for Experiential Learning
1.3. Functional Modeling and Analysis of Complex Systems’ Variability
2. Materials and Methods
3. Results
3.1. ARC Methodology
3.1.1. Parameters
- State: This typically describes the state of the crisis, or the state of the crisis organization. Examples are that the organization is formally in “crisis mode” or any other alert status that a team, organization, or set of organizations may have defined. The state often classifies the severity or scale of the crisis.
- Information: This parameter describes information aspects about the information that is known or not known, or needs to be known, in order to take action on the crisis. This can mean any information that in the context of the crisis is relevant, which may be information that is collected or monitored on a regular basis (e.g., an airline’s information about their flights, aircraft, passengers, and cargo), as well as information not commonly available (e.g., ash particle density during the first volcanic ash crisis).
- Resources: This parameter is about what the organizations meeting the crisis have to work with in terms of materiel, personnel, time, money, etc., that are applied, used, or consumed for resolving the crisis. It thus concerns questions such as what the crisis teams have to work with, what they need, and how to obtain it.
- Goals: This parameter describes in which direction the organizations want the crisis to develop, and what desired and undesired states are. For example, these could be to reduce flight delays below an acceptable number of delay minutes, saving lives, restarting traffic as usual, etc.
- Coordination: This parameter describes inter-organizational and collaborative aspects, as well as information exchange and collaboration between organizations, teams, and roles. Thus, issues such as who needs to communicate with whom, how actors work together, how responsibilities and mandates are arranged, and which information is exchanged are considered.
- Expertise: This parameter describes the expertise of personnel that is available and/or needed. For example, volcanic ash experts of various kinds were necessary to understand the potential impact of volcanic ash on air traffic, which was not readily available to all actors that needed to make decisions to cope with the first volcanic ash crisis.
3.1.2. Guidewords
- Magnitude: How much/serious? (e.g., the organization’s crisis state, the magnitude of closed-off airspace, the capacity set for an airspace sector or airport).
- Timing: When? What is “the right time”, what is early/late? (e.g., of a decision).
- Availability: Is it available? (e.g., availability of information, resources, expertise).
- Uncertainty: Is it certain? (e.g., uncertainty of information, unclarity of crisis state).
- Duration: How long has it lasted, or is it going to last? (e.g., duration of technical failure, duration of crisis state).
- Rate of change: How can the situation change and how fast does it change? (e.g., how does the crisis state change, how fast do actors act, how does the weather change, how does a nuclear spill cloud travel?).
3.1.3. Parameters and Active Verbs
3.1.4. Using Parameters, Guidewords, and Active Verbs for ARC Analysis Questions
3.2. The ARC Approach to Exercises: ARC-MEX
- Force participants to collaborate with partners they do not normally work with.
- Create a need for information that is not available from single sources but must be aggregated from different sources and stakeholders.
- Create situations that challenge prioritization so that different organizations must negotiate, compromise, or otherwise focus on global rather than local goals.
- Create situations where the chain of command is ambiguous, encouraging self-synchronization and coordination.
- Create situations where responsibility for handling the critical event may be unclear, encouraging initiative and assuming responsibility when facing uncertainty.
- Create situations that challenge information management in the involved organizations.
- Create situations that demand an understanding of the collective of organizations involved in the crisis response, in order to respond rapidly and efficiently.
3.2.1. ARC-MEX Step 1: Focus Groups and Workshops: Theme, Objectives, Participants
3.2.2. Case 1: ARC-MEX Step 1: ANSP1 Focus Group Crises/Challenges
- General airport accident
- Unknown radar target in airspace
- Big VIP (Very Important Person) event, e.g., many heads of state
- One runway available and landing gear problem
- Radar problem at adjacent ATSU (TWR-ACC or ACC1-ACC2)
- Major disturbance in part of the ACCs own airspace, for example industrial accident
- Severe weather
- Emergency evacuation of ACC
- 9.
- Difficulty to close the sector at the end of the shift due to lack of personnel, in response to unexpected traffic demands
- 10.
- Changes in new IT systems at ATSUs
- 11.
- Diversity of tasks within roles and shared responsibilities between several different roles in the ops room
- Time pressure
- ∘
- No time for procedure as planned (Goals, timing)
- ∘
- Little time for coordination (Coordination, timing)
- ∘
- No time for brainstorming/coordination before decision (Coordination, timing)
- Limitations of redundancy of ops equipment (Resources, availability)
- Priorities between flights uncertain (Goals, uncertainty)
- Challenges in (ATS) systems understanding (Expertise, availability/uncertainty)
- Uncertainty of duration, managing expectations (State, uncertainty/duration)
- Large consequences of classification of ”small” event (State, magnitude/uncertainty)
- Lack of reliable information and prognosis difficulty (Information, uncertainty)
- New coordination paths between stakeholders (Coordination, availability)
- Challenges of information dissemination, uncertainty of how information is interpreted (Information/Coordination, uncertainty)
- Overlap between perceived coordination responsibilities (Coordination, uncertainty)
- Role/responsibility uncertainty (Resources/Goals/Coordination, uncertainty)
- Time delay in coordination between multiple stakeholders (Coordination, timing)
- Propagation of expectation and prediction needs across stakeholders (Information/Coordination, uncertainty/timing)
- Limited training and joint exercises (Expertise/Coordination, availability)
- Legal requirements on scarce or unexpected personnel involved (Resources/State, availability)
- Old procedures that are not updated for changing operational reality (Resources, rate of change)
- Limitations of planning/preparation/procedures, only handling based on experience (Expertise, availability)
- Delays due to propagating unexpected circumstances, affecting capacity (Coordination/Resources, timing/uncertainty)
- Differences in traffic handling between units, need for harmonization (Coordination, availability/uncertainty)
- Unexpected interdependencies (Coordination, uncertainty)
3.2.3. Case 2: ARC-MEX Step 1: ANSP2 Workshop on “Reduced Modes” Training
3.2.4. ARC-MEX Step 2: Workshops: Detailed Scenario
3.2.5. Case 1: ARC-MEX Step 2: ANSP1 Exercise Scenario What-If Elements
- Time needed to organize, considering all actors involved
- Quality of abstract plan of action
- Ask, what was the most difficult experience in the exercise?
- ∘
- Ask what information would have helped
- ▪
- Trace back how this information would have helped
- Communications trace
- Checklist use
- Relay of non-standard information, considering access restrictions
- Effectiveness of coordination
- ∘
- Time
- ∘
- Quality of coordination answer
- Follow-up of timetable (plan)
3.2.6. ARC-MEX Step 3: Running the Exercise
3.2.7. ARC-MEX Steps 4–6: Debriefing and After-Action Review, Analysis, Lessons
3.2.8. Case 2: ARC-MEX Steps 4, 5: ANSP2 Post-Exercise Questionnaire on “Reduced Modes” Training
3.3. The ARC Approach to Planning for and Understanding Actual Events: ARC-COPE
- Had stakeholders experienced a similar event before?
- What were the new demands on information exchange between stakeholders?
- What “data/variables” are monitored to detect if there is a crisis? What aspects are difficult to capture into “data”? What defines a “crisis state”?
- From whom is data and other input available and necessary? What are the uncertainties and unknowns about the situation?
- What were the main tasks that needed to be performed and in what way are they interdependent (preconditions, timing, etc.)?
- When was the crisis considered “under control”?
- Uncertainty concerning the ash cloud. Experts were unsure about its exact dispersion and content. No one knew which sectors might be closed, when, or for how long. The lack of relevant guidelines created a deadlock among the stakeholders.
- Uncertainty concerning the consequences for jet engines at different ash concentrations.
- Uncertainty of responsibility, e.g., concerning who was in charge/who could be held accountable for the economic consequences of the standstill.
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions
Supplementary Materials
Author Contributions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
References
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Purposes/Aims of ARC Methodology Per Crisis Phase and Type of Event | Exercises (Simulated Events) (E) (ARC-MEX) | Actual Events (A) (ARC-COPE) |
---|---|---|
Before (b) | Exercise design support to generate scenarios that challenge agility and design exercises that “raise the game” | Enhance preparedness through supporting requisite imagination during preparedness planning |
During (d) | Provide means for “controlling the heat” and collecting data | Through exercises and planning, improve agility during actual events |
After (a) | Exercise analysis support to inform lessons to be learned through analysis, debriefing, after-action review | Supporting retrospective analysis, and what-if analysis, informing lessons to be learned |
Parameter | Active Verbs |
---|---|
State | assess, define, revise, upgrade, downgrade, communicate, predict, anticipate, activate, declare, establish |
Information | collect, monitor, define, assess, share, dismiss, restrict, deny, receive, transmit, broadcast, delay, confirm, request, analyze |
Resources | assess, receive, maintain, deploy, mobilize, dismiss, share, activate, switch, request |
Goals | define, set, revise, remind, prioritize, communicate, share, agree, reduce, downgrade, re-establish, maintain |
Coordination | define, maintain, activate, revise, share, communicate, agree, remind, update, brief, publish |
Expertise | recruit, maintain, consult, mobilize, request, dismiss, engage |
Question: Was the Situation Challenging Because … | Parameters | Guidewords |
---|---|---|
… it was difficult to classify what kind of ”alert/crisis state” my organization was in? | State | availability, uncertainty |
… it was difficult to know which information I should monitor to be well-informed about the development of the ongoing crisis situation? | Information | magnitude, availability, uncertainty |
… of the uncertainty in the scenario? | Information | uncertainty |
… information that I needed was unavailable? | Information | unavailable |
… it was difficult to estimate how long the crisis situation would last? | Time | duration |
… it could easily escalate into a much more severe crisis situation? | State | rate of change, magnitude |
… I needed information or resources from other actors and I didn’t know how to contact them? | Information, Resources, Coordination | availability, uncertainty |
… it was difficult to know what the long-term effects of the crisis would be? | Time | magnitude, duration, uncertainty |
… it was difficult to know when the situation would be considered “under control”? | State, Goals | uncertainty |
… we have not experienced or exercised this kind of crisis before? | Expertise | availability |
Question: Was the Situation Challenging Because … | Parameters | Guidewords |
---|---|---|
… it was difficult to know what our goals were? | Goals | uncertainty |
… it required us to organize our work (roles, tasks, processes, etc.) in a new way? | Coordination | availability |
… it was not clear if we should act immediately or wait for the situation to develop before taking action? | Status, Goals | timing, uncertainty |
… the actors involved were not working towards the same goals? | Goals, Coordination | availability |
… roles and their responsibilities were not clearly defined? | Goals, Coordination | uncertainty |
… the media was difficult to handle in this scenario? | Information | magnitude, timing |
… difficulty with getting access to appropriate expertise? | Expertise | availability |
… of limitations in the usefulness of the tools we have available for analysis and decision support? | Resources, Information | availability |
… of complex interdependencies between tasks of the various roles and actors involved? | Coordination | uncertainty |
… the resources available were not sufficient? | Resources | availability, magnitude |
… it was difficult to find and use resources that we do not normally have available? | Resources | availability, magnitude |
… we had small margins or redundancies and overlaps in available resources? | Resources | availability, magnitude |
Summary of Focus Group Discussion on Situation No. 3 “Big VIP Event” | Parameters | Guidewords |
---|---|---|
A major international event where a lot of VIPs are arriving at the airport at the same time (for example, heads of state) may be challenging. Flow of traffic may be heavily affected by the fact that there are constraints on how many VIPs can be handled by the airport in a certain amount of time, and there may be special restrictions for higher separation needs, in which order and at which part of the airport the VIPs need to taxi or be towed, and which stands and taxiways to take due to ceremony planning, the use of holding patterns or other delays, among other challenges. | Resources | magnitude, availability, timing, duration |
In turn, these factors are all causing demands on separation and sequencing in TWR control and back to ACC sectors. Thus, constraints are put on several ATC units in TWR, TMC (Terminal Control), and ACC sectors (airspace sectors and corresponding controlling ATSUs at increasing distance from the airport) because of unusual ATC and non-ATC restrictions. Understanding of the various stakeholders’ challenges between ACC and TWR control and airport operations is critically important. | Coordination Expertise | |
Generally, this kind of event needs a lot of real-time problem solving. The event contains too many dependencies to be possible to fully plan beforehand. This could partially be solved by good planning in the strategic phase, but this can be difficult to achieve fully because of complexity and dynamics in the actual traffic situation. | State, Information, Coordination | uncertainty, magnitude, rate of change |
Follow-up requires an explicit effort after such an event, partly because if no safety incidents or big problems occur, this may not be seen as a crisis or an incident at all, but just as an unusual or high-workload situation. It is also very hard to evaluate an event like this as there are no everyday procedures describing how details should be handled and it affects many airport functions. | State, Goals, Expertise | Uncertainty availability |
Examples of the 22 ARC Challenging Aspects (Problem and Solution Space) and How They Apply to Case 2 |
---|
1. Classification of what kind of ”alert/crisis state” the organization is in. Generally, there are three main categories where a WS classifies the situation in a reduced mode: green (continue to handle traffic as usual), yellow (reduce capacity to a certain degree), red (evacuation of the airspace—‘clear the skies’). These categories are relatively well-defined since they occur in checklists, where separate technical failures are associated with suggestions of category and capacity. However, actual situations can have high complexity and contain several simultaneous failures (and checklists), so it may be difficult to determine the category/capacity. Further, assessments are changing over time when the situation is changing. WS and TWS will try to agree on a common assessment, but there can be differences in opinion. WS will in most cases determine category and capacity. (State, availability/uncertainty) |
3. The uncertainty in the scenario. The scenarios in all runs of this exercise include uncertainties. What aspects of the situation that are known, unknown, or uncertain are discussed for each run/scenario. Examples are access to spare parts internally or from a supplier, and in which order actions should be performed to reach desired results (there may be complex system dependencies with uncertain consequences). Participants discuss what each checklist aims to accomplish, or why the checklist is written in a specific way, aiming to contribute to an understanding for checklists’ applicability. (Information/Resources, uncertainty) |
5. Estimation of duration of the crisis situation. It is important for TWS to assess the duration of time that it can take to fix the failures and regularly communicate reassessments to WS. This is a part of the exercise, for both TWS and WS to think about what is most important (technically and operationally), to assess the impact of the duration of repairs and being in reduced modes, and regularly communicate about this. WS has a strong mandate and backing from management to put capacity restrictions in place and when needed, to demand more personnel. (State/Goals, availability/uncertainty; Collaboration, magnitude) |
6. Escalation into a much more severe crisis situation. During the exercise, it is discussed how several modes can become combined modes and how subsequent failures can arise, which can be regarded as an escalation of the situation. In practice and during the exercise, it may be that WS has decided on a reduced capacity and then that something more happens, with the result that WS needs to reassess the situation and revise the action taken. TWS and WS need to constantly assess if the situation gets worse (or better). (State/Information, rate of change) |
9. Knowing the long-term effects of the crisis. Long-term effects are not explicitly included as an aspect of this reduced modes exercise because of the practically limited duration of the exercise. In actual operational situations, this is, however, definitely a factor that WS and TWS must consider, for example when technical failures in the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN) occur. (State, duration) |
10. Knowing if and when a situation is considered “under control”. Among the first steps to get control of the situation in this exercise (and in an actual operational situation) is to sort out which checklists to use and what the technical failure(s) is/are and how long repairs will take. In turn, this information can generate several work tasks in order to get the situation under control. In addition, in many cases, personnel must be called in or rearranged in order to perform these work tasks. In a way, the situation is not fully under control before the situation is “green” again (no restrictions in traffic). This means that WS/TWS are not comfortable with the situation before all functionality is restored. (State/Goals, uncertainty; Resources, availability; Collaboration) |
18. Limitations in the usefulness of the tools available for analysis and decision support. WS can see much less of the technical information of the system failure than TWS, so WS is dependent on TWS to interpret status and error messages from the technical system. TWS and SysOp are the roles that monitor the system, therefore WS must blindly trust TWS. The central question is which systems are still running, and how the ACC in this situation can be run without risking safety. It is important to as accurately as possible understand the technical failure and redundancy in the functioning systems. Since there are many connected systems, it is difficult to understand all sub-systems and it may thus take time to understand the error and its consequences. (Resources, availability) |
ARC Questions (Selection) | Hypothetical Exercise Scenario No. 3 “Big VIP Event” Elements—Problem Space |
Main operational location? Who? | At least TWR and one adjacent ACC, possibly several ACCs. |
General challenge? What? | Major event with many incoming VIPs (e.g., Heads of State) at airport. Amount of traffic involved—type of aircraft—and special requests for the VIPs that lay outside normal procedure that also can differ from VIP to VIP. For security reasons, classification “head of state” is used, which complicates prioritization. |
Timing of scenario? When? | Daytime, peak hour. |
What “data/variables” are monitored to detect if there is a crisis? | Information that this kind of event is coming a few days ahead. However, no details will be revealed. |
What aspects are difficult to capture into “data”? * | Dynamics of arriving VIP flights, late changes, interdependencies of VIP activities around and from the airport. |
What are the current and expected effects on own and other resources and assets (people, functions, material, etc.)? * | Only one runway and limited parking area. An additional complication can be that VIPs need further transportation, such as helicopter. Will cause traffic delays for other non-VIP traffic. Larger separation than normal will also create problems en route. Could be stressful on personnel, possible fatigue, due to sudden high demand and duration of possibly several days. |
What “category of crisis” is the own organization in? Others? | May not be crisis or incident at all, but just a “high workload event”. |
What are the uncertainties and unknowns about the situation? * | If it is unknown when which actors are arriving exactly, if flights are announced with short notice. |
What is the potential for events to escalate in scale or severity? * | Low Visibility Procedures (LVPs) or marginal weather (conditions close to LVPs). Unknown target visible on the situation display. Activities in other sectors. Special demands from the VIPs. Simultaneous medical transports (which also have high priority). |
Which stakeholders could become affected by the crisis? * | TWR, ACCs, all airport actors, police, security officers, event organizers, etc. |
When is the situation considered “under control”? What does “return to normal operations” mean? | Under control = Orderly flow of VIP and other traffic. Return to normal = VIP flights handled and back to normal traffic mix. |
ARC Questions (Selection) | Hypothetical Exercise Scenario No. 3 “Big VIP Event” Elements—Solution Space |
What pre-defined and exercised organizational structures exist? | Some related procedures, an exercise could be used in evaluating a way of handling these kind of events, a type of new “multiple VIP” procedure exercise. |
What information needs to be gathered before taking action? | Interdependencies can be difficult as some information may not be disseminated to the right persons due to lacking understanding. |
Are goals, roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities clearly defined, within organizations and between organizations? | Time delays in coordination between multiple stakeholders. Decisions could be changed in the last minute between different airport stakeholders. Could lead to role confusion. |
What expertise is necessary to be adequately informed about the crisis? Where is it available? | Knowledge about the actual state of flights’ interdependencies, other than ATC constraints (airport security, event organizers, etc.). |
What are the main tasks and in what way are they interdependent? | Main challenge is multiple interdependencies between actors that need to be coordinated. The other main challenge is dynamics, for example security may decide on sequence of landing, etc., without adjusting to air traffic control reality. |
What resources are available? Can they be re-allocated? Are there enough margins? | Towing tractors can be a problem unless they have the right configurations. Refueling can be challenging as some parking spaces cannot be used for fueling and the aircraft must therefore be moved before fueling. Possibly need to call in additional personnel. |
Top 7 Factors by Decreasing Difficulty, 14 WS Average | Top 7 Factors by Decreasing Difficulty, 6 TWS Average |
---|---|
#5 duration | #5 duration |
#6 escalation potential | #6 escalation potential |
#3 uncertainty | #9 long-term effects |
#1 state | #10 under control |
#18 tool constraints | #3 uncertainty |
#9 long-term effects | #18 tool constraints |
#10 under control | #1 state |
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Woltjer, R.; Johansson, B.J.E.; Oskarsson, P.-A.; Svenmarck, P.; Kirwan, B. Air Transport System Agility: The Agile Response Capability (ARC) Methodology for Crisis Preparedness. Infrastructures 2022, 7, 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/infrastructures7020011
Woltjer R, Johansson BJE, Oskarsson P-A, Svenmarck P, Kirwan B. Air Transport System Agility: The Agile Response Capability (ARC) Methodology for Crisis Preparedness. Infrastructures. 2022; 7(2):11. https://doi.org/10.3390/infrastructures7020011
Chicago/Turabian StyleWoltjer, Rogier, Björn J. E. Johansson, Per-Anders Oskarsson, Peter Svenmarck, and Barry Kirwan. 2022. "Air Transport System Agility: The Agile Response Capability (ARC) Methodology for Crisis Preparedness" Infrastructures 7, no. 2: 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/infrastructures7020011
APA StyleWoltjer, R., Johansson, B. J. E., Oskarsson, P. -A., Svenmarck, P., & Kirwan, B. (2022). Air Transport System Agility: The Agile Response Capability (ARC) Methodology for Crisis Preparedness. Infrastructures, 7(2), 11. https://doi.org/10.3390/infrastructures7020011