Integrating Neurocognitive Knowledge into Psychology

A special issue of Brain Sciences (ISSN 2076-3425). This special issue belongs to the section "Cognitive, Social and Affective Neuroscience".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (20 May 2022) | Viewed by 13219

Special Issue Editors


E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Experimental Psychology Unit, Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, 22043 Hamburg, Germany
Interests: cognitive neuroscience; neuroimaging; learning and memory; executive function

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Experimental Psychology Unit, Helmut Schmidt University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg, 22043 Hamburg, Germany
Interests: cognitive neuroscience; executive function; visual attention; eye tracking; visuospatial attention

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Psychology, the scientific study of experience and behavior, strives to build models of the mental processing architecture. It has its vantage point with the first-person perspective, the mind perspective of the mind/brain. It starts at this side of the psychophysical divide. Since the late 1950s, the cognitive paradigm, which holds a functionalistic account of mental processes as representations and computations over them, holds the reign. It assumes that these computations are largely independent of the hardware they are implemented on.

Brain sciences, on the other hand, starts at the other side of the psychophysical divide, using the third person perspective to elucidate biological processes—neurobiology, in particular. Interestingly, the cognitive paradigm, from early on, was developed into cognitive science which has been an interdisciplinary endeavor from the get-go, including the neurosciences.

To date, psychology is characterized by varying degrees of integrating neurobiological knowledge into the theoretical accounts of mental functions. While, on the one hand, a wealth of neurobiological accounts are integrated into theories of perception, in particular visual perception, on the other hand, this is far less the case for processes of judgment and decision making, as well as apparently, even simpler accounts of information selection in selective attention.

This Special Issue will review the status quo and elucidate trajectories of integration of neurocognitive knowledge into psychology.

Prof. Dr. Thomas Jacobsen
Mr. Michael Sprengel
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Brain Sciences is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 2200 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • perception, visual
  • perception, auditory
  • perception, other
  • attention
  • awareness
  • learning
  • memory
  • language
  • cognitive control
  • thinking
  • judgment
  • decision making
  • action
  • motivation
  • emotion
  • social
  • personality
  • developmental

Benefits of Publishing in a Special Issue

  • Ease of navigation: Grouping papers by topic helps scholars navigate broad scope journals more efficiently.
  • Greater discoverability: Special Issues support the reach and impact of scientific research. Articles in Special Issues are more discoverable and cited more frequently.
  • Expansion of research network: Special Issues facilitate connections among authors, fostering scientific collaborations.
  • External promotion: Articles in Special Issues are often promoted through the journal's social media, increasing their visibility.
  • e-Book format: Special Issues with more than 10 articles can be published as dedicated e-books, ensuring wide and rapid dissemination.

Further information on MDPI's Special Issue polices can be found here.

Published Papers (3 papers)

Order results
Result details
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Review

24 pages, 1421 KiB  
Review
A Scientific Approach to Conscious Experience, Introspection, and Unconscious Processing: Vision and Blindsight
by Reinhard Werth
Brain Sci. 2022, 12(10), 1305; https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci12101305 - 27 Sep 2022
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2815
Abstract
Although subjective conscious experience and introspection have long been considered unscientific and banned from psychology, they are indispensable in scientific practice. These terms are used in scientific contexts today; however, their meaning remains vague, and earlier objections to the distinction between conscious experience [...] Read more.
Although subjective conscious experience and introspection have long been considered unscientific and banned from psychology, they are indispensable in scientific practice. These terms are used in scientific contexts today; however, their meaning remains vague, and earlier objections to the distinction between conscious experience and unconscious processing, remain valid. This also applies to the distinction between conscious visual perception and unconscious visual processing. Damage to the geniculo-striate pathway or the visual cortex results in a perimetrically blind visual hemifield contralateral to the damaged hemisphere. In some cases, cerebral blindness is not absolute. Patients may still be able to guess the presence, location, shape or direction of movement of a stimulus even though they report no conscious visual experience. This “unconscious” ability was termed “blindsight”. The present paper demonstrates how the term conscious visual experience can be introduced in a logically precise and methodologically correct way and becomes amenable to scientific examination. The distinction between conscious experience and unconscious processing is demonstrated in the cases of conscious vision and blindsight. The literature on “blindsight” and its neurobiological basis is reviewed. It is shown that blindsight can be caused by residual functions of neural networks of the visual cortex that have survived cerebral damage, and may also be due to an extrastriate pathway via the midbrain to cortical areas such as areas V4 and MT/V5. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Integrating Neurocognitive Knowledge into Psychology)
Show Figures

Figure 1

20 pages, 1388 KiB  
Review
From Action to Cognition: Neural Reuse, Network Theory and the Emergence of Higher Cognitive Functions
by Radek Ptak, Naz Doganci and Alexia Bourgeois
Brain Sci. 2021, 11(12), 1652; https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci11121652 - 17 Dec 2021
Cited by 12 | Viewed by 4239
Abstract
The aim of this article is to discuss the logic and assumptions behind the concept of neural reuse, to explore its biological advantages and to discuss the implications for the cognition of a brain that reuses existing circuits and resources. We first address [...] Read more.
The aim of this article is to discuss the logic and assumptions behind the concept of neural reuse, to explore its biological advantages and to discuss the implications for the cognition of a brain that reuses existing circuits and resources. We first address the requirements that must be fulfilled for neural reuse to be a biologically plausible mechanism. Neural reuse theories generally take a developmental approach and model the brain as a dynamic system composed of highly flexible neural networks. They often argue against domain-specificity and for a distributed, embodied representation of knowledge, which sets them apart from modular theories of mental processes. We provide an example of reuse by proposing how a phylogenetically more modern mental capacity (mental rotation) may appear through the reuse and recombination of existing resources from an older capacity (motor planning). We conclude by putting arguments into context regarding functional modularity, embodied representation, and the current ontology of mental processes. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Integrating Neurocognitive Knowledge into Psychology)
Show Figures

Figure 1

23 pages, 757 KiB  
Review
The Mechanisms Underlying Interference and Inhibition: A Review of Current Behavioral and Neuroimaging Research
by Oliver Kliegl and Karl-Heinz T. Bäuml
Brain Sci. 2021, 11(9), 1246; https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci11091246 - 20 Sep 2021
Cited by 10 | Viewed by 4910
Abstract
The memory literature has identified interference and inhibition as two major sources of forgetting. While interference is generally considered to be a passive cause of forgetting arising from exposure to additional information that impedes subsequent recall of target information, inhibition concerns a more [...] Read more.
The memory literature has identified interference and inhibition as two major sources of forgetting. While interference is generally considered to be a passive cause of forgetting arising from exposure to additional information that impedes subsequent recall of target information, inhibition concerns a more active and goal-directed cause of forgetting that can be achieved intentionally. Over the past 25 years, our knowledge of the neural mechanisms underlying both interference-induced and inhibition-induced forgetting has expanded substantially. The present paper gives a critical overview of this research, pointing out empirical gaps in the current work and providing suggestions for future studies. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Integrating Neurocognitive Knowledge into Psychology)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Back to TopTop