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Philosophical Aspect of Emotions
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Philosophical Aspect of Emotions

A special issue of Philosophies (ISSN 2409-9287).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (30 June 2022) | Viewed by 25325

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Dina Mendonça

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
ArgLab, Nova Institute of Philosophy (IFILNOVA), NOVA FCSH, Universidade Nova de Lisboa (UNL), 1099-032 Lisbon, Portugal
Interests: philosophy of emotions; philosophy of mind; pragmatism; philosophy of education; philosophy for children

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Affectivity is conceptualized in a variety of ways making the emotional landscape especially insightful for a great variety of philosophical issues. Since emotions and feelings are present in almost every aspect of life it is not surprising that the different theoretical proposals for emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiments have a great variety of applications in many different areas of philosophical research. Importantly, the philosophy of emotions is inevitably linked to the question of what it means to do philosophy, and each philosophical reflection is inescapably tied to specific philosophical commitments.

This Special Issue aims to capture some of the ways in which the emotional landscape is pertinently insightful for philosophical issues. Showing how the philosophical analysis of emotion illuminates a great variety of philosophical topics such as the nature of the mind, intentionality, on meaning in thought and language, on understanding of the self, on the notion of rationality, on aesthetic quality of experience, and so on.

Papers can address the following topics (though not limited to these):

  • What the nature of emotion reveals about intentionality and the nature of the mind.
  • How a philosophy of emotion points to a reconceptualization of rationality and reasonableness.
  • How emotions are part of processes of decision-making and deliberation, and their role in argumentation.
  • What insights emotion theory provides for a better understanding of analogical thinking and metaphor.
  • What the social sphere reveals about the nature of emotion
  • What the personal and biographic experience of emotion uncovers about the self and intersubjectivity.
  • How the reflexive and layered nature of emotion can provide further complexities for the emotional landscape.
  • How feelings, emotions, moods, and sentiments interfere and mold perception, thinking, and imagination.

This issue will provide reflection in two directions. First, it will be concerned with showing how the philosophy of emotions contributes to an understanding of the philosophical activity. Second, it will simultaneously show how it raises important issues, distinctions, and reflections for Emotion Theory in general. Thus, the topics will deal with Specific Issues in the philosophy of emotions and its insights for philosophy and specific areas of philosophical research, while at the same time, they will reflect on how to better understand emotional phenomena.

Dr. Dina Mendonça
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a double-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Philosophies is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • affectivity
  • mind
  • emotions
  • feelings
  • moods
  • consciousness

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Published Papers (7 papers)

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20 pages, 334 KiB  
Article
The Science of Emotion: Mind, Body, and Culture
by Cecilea Mun
Philosophies 2022, 7(6), 144; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7060144 - 13 Dec 2022
Viewed by 2939
Abstract
In this paper, I give readers an idea of what some scholars are interested in, what I found interesting, and what may be of future interest in the philosophy of emotion. I begin with a brief overview of the general topics of interests [...] Read more.
In this paper, I give readers an idea of what some scholars are interested in, what I found interesting, and what may be of future interest in the philosophy of emotion. I begin with a brief overview of the general topics of interests in the philosophy of emotion. I then discuss what I believe to be some of the most interesting topics in the contemporary discourse, including questions about how philosophy can inform the science of emotion, responses to aspects of the mind–body problem, and concerns about perception, cognition, and emotion, along with questions about the place of 4E approaches and meta-semantic pluraliste approaches in the embodied cognitive tradition. I also discuss the natural kind–social construction debate in the philosophy of emotion, the emerging field of cultural evolution, the import of a dual-inheritance theory in this emerging field, and I propose a possible way to integrate the frameworks of dual-inheritance theory and meta-semantic pluralisme to demonstrate at least one way in which the philosophy of emotion can contribute to the emerging field of cultural evolution. I conclude with a brief summary of this paper and note at least one significant implication of my proposal for the natural kind–social construction debate in the philosophy of emotion. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophical Aspect of Emotions)
23 pages, 356 KiB  
Article
Paradoxes of Emotional Life: Second-Order Emotions
by Antonio de Castro Caeiro
Philosophies 2022, 7(5), 109; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7050109 - 30 Sep 2022
Viewed by 4547
Abstract
Heidegger tries to explain our emotional life applying three schemes: causal explanation, mental internalisation of emotions and metaphorical expression. None of the three schemes explains emotion though. Either because the causal nexus does not always occur or because objects and people in the [...] Read more.
Heidegger tries to explain our emotional life applying three schemes: causal explanation, mental internalisation of emotions and metaphorical expression. None of the three schemes explains emotion though. Either because the causal nexus does not always occur or because objects and people in the external world are carriers of emotional agents or because language is already on a metaphorical level. Moreover, how is it possible that there are presently emotions constituting our life without our being aware of their existence? From the analysis of boredom in its three varieties (“bored by X”, “get oneself bored”, and “it is boring”) we will get to the depth where emotions lie, trying to rouse them and to keep them awake. Although it surfaces with the force and energy of the present, every emotion has its past and future constitution. How can we understand the future of a present emotion along with its past? Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophical Aspect of Emotions)
17 pages, 304 KiB  
Article
Self-Pity as Resilience against Injustice
by Dina Mendonça
Philosophies 2022, 7(5), 105; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7050105 - 17 Sep 2022
Viewed by 3766
Abstract
This paper proposes that being able to feel self-pity is important to be resilient against injustices because it enables self-transformation. The suggestion for this reassessment of self-pity as a crucial self-conscious emotion for a more humanistic world aims to be an example of [...] Read more.
This paper proposes that being able to feel self-pity is important to be resilient against injustices because it enables self-transformation. The suggestion for this reassessment of self-pity as a crucial self-conscious emotion for a more humanistic world aims to be an example of how philosophical reflection can be insightful for emotion research. The first part of the paper outlines a general introduction of philosophy of emotions and a description of how Hume’s analysis of pride changed its meaning and pertinently linked it to human agency. The second part of the paper is devoted to self-pity and aims to offer a modified interpretation of its experience, ultimately suggesting that it is a way to cultivate resistance and endure injustices in the world. It begins by putting forward the generally accepted take on self-pity and then suggests that dismissing self-pity may increase its duration, and ultimately work as a type of denial of the world’s injustices. After describing how self-pity can be seen as a tour de force where the self is in a relationship of pity with itself, it further elaborates how self-pity may be taken as a type of calibration similar to how sleep works for the functioning organism. This makes it possible to interpret self-pity as a way to resiliently resist injustices while not dismissing them and keeping up the struggle to make the world a better place. Finally, the concluding remarks point out some consequences for the education of emotions and possible future research directions to be explored. Analogously to the undeniable way by which Hume changed the meaning of the emotion of pride, the conclusion hopes that a new way to understand self-pity is available. The overall goal is to amplify the already existing psychological descriptions showing the complementary role of philosophical research for the development of emotion research in general. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophical Aspect of Emotions)
15 pages, 278 KiB  
Article
Epistemic Emotions Justified
by Laura Silva
Philosophies 2022, 7(5), 104; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7050104 - 16 Sep 2022
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 2041
Abstract
The view that emotions can provide defeasible justification for evaluative beliefs is widespread in the emotion literature. Despite this, the question of whether epistemic emotions can provide defeasible justification for theoretical beliefs has been almost entirely ignored. There seems to be an implicit [...] Read more.
The view that emotions can provide defeasible justification for evaluative beliefs is widespread in the emotion literature. Despite this, the question of whether epistemic emotions can provide defeasible justification for theoretical beliefs has been almost entirely ignored. There seems to be an implicit consensus that while emotions may have justificatory roles to play in the former case, they have no such roles to play in the latter case. Here, I argue against this consensus by sketching a proposal for securing epistemic emotions justificatory roles. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophical Aspect of Emotions)
16 pages, 262 KiB  
Article
Situated Affectivity, Enactivism, and the Weapons Effect
by Michelle Maiese
Philosophies 2022, 7(5), 97; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7050097 - 31 Aug 2022
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2647
Abstract
Existing research on the “weapons effect” indicates that simply seeing a weapon can prime aggressive thoughts and appraisals and increase aggressive behavior. But how and why does this happen? I begin by discussing prevailing explanations of the weapons effect and propose that these [...] Read more.
Existing research on the “weapons effect” indicates that simply seeing a weapon can prime aggressive thoughts and appraisals and increase aggressive behavior. But how and why does this happen? I begin by discussing prevailing explanations of the weapons effect and propose that these accounts tend to be over-intellectualistic insofar as they downplay or overlook the important role played by affectivity. In my view, insights from the fields of situated affectivity and enactivism help us to understand how cognitive and affective processes jointly contribute to the weapons effect. Insofar as the presence of weapons alters subject’s bodily-affective orientation and thereby brings about embodied mindshaping, it changes the way they engage with and understand their surroundings. To understand the weapons effect, we will need to examine the constitutive interdependency of appraisal and affectivity and the way in which they jointly motivate action. My proposed account emphasizes the role of affectivity in affordance perception and the way in which subjects gauge the meaning of an object according to its action-possibilities. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophical Aspect of Emotions)
12 pages, 234 KiB  
Article
What Philosophy Contributes to Emotion Science
by Ronald De Sousa
Philosophies 2022, 7(4), 87; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies7040087 - 8 Aug 2022
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2453
Abstract
Contemporary philosophers have paid increasing attention to the empirical research on emotions that has blossomed in many areas of the social sciences. In this paper, I first sketch the common roots of science and philosophy in Ancient Greek thought. I illustrate the way [...] Read more.
Contemporary philosophers have paid increasing attention to the empirical research on emotions that has blossomed in many areas of the social sciences. In this paper, I first sketch the common roots of science and philosophy in Ancient Greek thought. I illustrate the way that specific empirical sciences can be regarded as branching out from a central trunk of philosophical speculation. On the basis of seven informal characterizations of what is distinctive about philosophical thinking, I then draw attention to the fact that scientific progress frequently requires one to make adjustments to the way its basic terms are conceptualized, and thus cannot avoid philosophical thought. The character of emotions requires attention from many disciplines, and the links among those disciplines inevitably require a broader philosophical perspective to be understood. Thus, emotion science, and indeed all of science, is inextricably committed to philosophical assumptions that demand scrutiny. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophical Aspect of Emotions)
14 pages, 263 KiB  
Article
Safety Valves of the Psyche: Reading Freud on Aggression, Morality, and Internal Emotions
by Daniel O’Shiel
Philosophies 2021, 6(4), 86; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies6040086 - 14 Oct 2021
Viewed by 4625
Abstract
This article argues for a Freudian theory of internal emotion, which is best characterised as key “safety valves of the psyche”. After briefly clarifying some of Freud’s metapsychology, I present an account regarding the origin of (self-)censorship and morality as internalised aggression. I [...] Read more.
This article argues for a Freudian theory of internal emotion, which is best characterised as key “safety valves of the psyche”. After briefly clarifying some of Freud’s metapsychology, I present an account regarding the origin of (self-)censorship and morality as internalised aggression. I then show how this conception expands and can be detailed through a defence of a hydraulic model of the psyche that has specific “safety valves” of disgust, shame, and pity constantly counteracting specific sets of Freudian drives. This model is important for explicating Freud’s crucial concept of sublimation, which continues to have key therapeutic and normative relevance today, which I show through the case of jokes. I finish with the argument that largely happy, productive lives can be seen as in a dynamic between the release of too much (perversion) and too little (neurosis) psychical pressure through these mechanisms. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Philosophical Aspect of Emotions)
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