Cloud Digital Forensics: Beyond Tools, Techniques, and Challenges
Abstract
:1. Introduction
Contributions
2. Related Surveys
3. Cloud Computing
3.1. Various Aspects of Data Security and Protection in the Cloud
- Security objectives: In cloud computing, data are stored in remote locations, the physical locations of which are unknown and managed by the service provider. The risk factor here is that data may become compromised. Confidentiality is one of the hottest topics these days. Confidentiality means data can only be accessed by authorized users. Preservation of confidentiality increases the trust level of customers in the cloud service providers (CSPs) [35]. Integrity states that there should be no corruption or modification to the data placed in a remote location. Only authorized users and the data owner can recognize that data are in their original form and, after authorized modification, the latest version should be available. This ensures that the data are trustworthy and consistent [36]. Availability ensures that at the time of access, reliable access to the entire data is available for authorized users [37]. Data privacy refers to the extent of information a user wants to share publicly, and private data should remain inaccessible to anyone on the internet [38].
- Methods to achieve security objectives: Data confidentiality is safeguarded through encryption, where a private key transforms the data into an incomprehensible format during transmission. The security of this process hinges on the complexity of the key, affecting decryption time [39]. In cloud computing, identity-based encryption (IBE) verifies the identities of receivers during decryption for varied data access [40]. Alternatively, attribute-based encryption (ABE) links decryption to specific user attributes, allowing access only if attributes match, thereby enhancing data security [40].
- Identity and access management (IAM): Identity and access management (IAM) is a security feature in cloud computing that ensures secure access to cloud resources while maintaining the CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) triad. It verifies user identity through federated directory services or directory as a service (DaaS) using SSO (single sign-on), authenticates login using modern authentication features, and provides access based on access rights defined through CSP (cloud service provider) management console [41]. IAM also includes role-based access management (RBAC) and privilege access management (PAM), allowing users to access resources based on their roles and administrative control [42].
- Information protection: Data are classified based on information sensitivity. For example, if the word salary is detected in any file, then the service provider will automatically mark this file as confidential and process it according to predefined rules. Microsoft offers “Azure Information Protection”, which allows the creation of two types of sensitivity labels: one with predefined rules, so that once a label is selected, the rule is deployed on the file. Another is post-defined, in which the author of the file sets the information protection rule, as shown in Figure 3. The author will enter the email address of the designated recipient, select the permission level (owner, co-owner, read-only, view-only, etc.), and set the expiry date. Figure 3 represents a security label that protects the file, regardless of whether the data server is breached or if the file is moved to unsafe hands. This protection label will allow the file to be opened only by the designated recipients [43].
- Shared responsibility model: In a local environment, the organization is solely responsible for all types of environmental and data security. However, when infrastructure moves toward a private or hybrid cloud environment, the responsibility is shared between the CSP and the organization’s IT team. Now, both parties work hand in hand to ensure the security of data and infrastructure. Roles are well-defined for the organization’s representatives by the CSP, and data owner rights are duly assigned [44]. Figure 4 represents the cloud-shared responsibility model.
- Malicious insiders: Insider risk is one of the major data risks nowadays. Competitors may hire such employees or some employees might, for their personal benefits, provide data or their passwords to outside users to access data on their behalf. To mitigate this, security policies like Azure information protection, multi-factor authentication, data classification, etc., are deployed to secure data within organizational boundaries [45].
- Intentional data remanence: This occurs when data removed from the data servers or cloud data repository reside somewhere in the internal memory or cache, which can be recovered by competitors. CSPs provide this feature to automatically run a removal cycle after a specific period to clear such data from memory [46].
- Recovery plan objective (RPO): A policy is defined to store a copy of the critical data in a remote location with minimum RTO (recovery time objective). In cases of ransomware or cyber-attacks, when data services go down and data becomes unavailable, CSPs provide some disaster recovery plans, and customization options are also available. Data recovery is dependent on cost, RPO, latency, and geographic separation. Organizational IT representatives, along with other stakeholders, work to reduce these dependencies to achieve maximum RPO with minimum RTO. In case of any incident, a proper incident plan should be followed, and a report must be generated [47].
- Data segregation/multi-tenant services: CSP service provides a multi-tenancy feature in which multiple copies of data are created and stored at different storage locations. In case of a cyber-attack on one storage location, and it is down, the data will be available to the authorized user from another storage location [48].
- Data loss prevention: Data loss prevention (DLP) protects sensitive data at rest, in transit, and on endpoints to mitigate the risk of data loss, data theft, and cyber-attacks. The two most significant features are data classification and CASB (cloud access security broker). In data classification, rules are defined based on keywords; when any listed keyword is found in a file, the CSP will process that file according to predefined rules. CASB acts like a proxy server that monitors all activities and implements security policies defined by the CSP. With the emergence of BYOD and the rising aspect of shadow IT, tools like CASB must be implemented to add a security layer for data protection [49,50].
3.2. Data Protection Compliance Recommendations
3.3. Attacks and Solutions
- Data encryption and privacy preservation: Utilize advanced encryption techniques to secure data during transmission and while at rest, rendering sensitive information unreadable and unusable in case of unauthorized access [68]. However, it is vital to acknowledge the limitations of encryption in isolation. The LastPass password manager data breach [67,69] serves as a significant case, demonstrating that encryption, while fundamental, might not guarantee absolute protection. This breach underscores the importance of complementing encryption with robust additional security measures, such as multi-factor authentication, stringent access controls, routine security assessments, and proactive breach response strategies. By integrating encryption within a comprehensive security framework, organizations can enhance their resilience against potential vulnerabilities and address evolving threats more effectively.
- Proactive security audits and vulnerability assessment: Conduct regular security audits and vulnerability assessments to identify potential weaknesses promptly. Penetration testing should be employed to simulate real-world attacks and uncover hidden vulnerabilities [72].
- Timely patch management: Keep software and applications updated with the latest security patches to prevent the exploitation of known vulnerabilities by malicious actors.
- Real-time security monitoring and incident response: Employ robust monitoring tools and intrusion detection systems to detect abnormal activities early. Establish a comprehensive incident response plan that outlines communication protocols, containment strategies, and recovery techniques.
- Employee education and training: Continuously educate and train employees in security awareness, familiarizing them with potential threats, phishing attacks, and best practices in data protection.
- Vendor assessment and compliance: Rigorously assess third-party cloud providers to ensure their security practices, certifications, and compliance align with the framework’s principles [73].
3.4. Incident Response in the Cloud
- Isolate affected resources: Swiftly isolate compromised resources within the cloud environment to prevent the breach from spreading further.
- Alert relevant teams: Notify the incident response team, IT personnel, and pertinent stakeholders to ensure a coordinated response.
- Collect evidence: Initiate the collection of digital evidence related to the breach, which may involve capturing logs, system snapshots, and network traffic data.
- Preserve evidence: Maintain the integrity and chain of custody of digital evidence by adhering to best practices in forensic data handling.
- Forensic analysis: Engage cloud forensic experts to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the collected evidence. This analysis aims to delineate the breach’s scope, pinpoint vulnerabilities, and elucidate the methods and motivations of the attacker.
- Containment and remediation: Formulate and implement a strategy to contain the breach, remove malicious elements, and remediate vulnerabilities to prevent future incidents.
- Legal and regulatory compliance: Comply with relevant legal and regulatory obligations, including breach notification requirements that may vary based on jurisdiction and industry.
- Communication: Maintain open and transparent communication with stakeholders, including customers, partners, and regulatory authorities, providing updates on the incident, its repercussions, and the steps being taken to address it.
3.5. Cloud Security vs. Cloud Forensics: Understanding the Distinction
4. Cloud Services and Regulatory Landscape
- European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA): ENISA is entrusted with enhancing the overall cybersecurity of the European Union. It produces guidelines, recommendations, and best practices to address cybersecurity and regulatory challenges related to cloud services within the EU [78].
- General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): While not a regulatory body itself, GDPR is a landmark data protection regulation established by the EU [79]. It has significant implications for cloud services by setting stringent standards for the processing and protection of personal data, even when they are stored or processed in the cloud.
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): NIST [80], under the U.S. Department of Commerce, provides a comprehensive framework for cloud computing that covers security, privacy, and interoperability. Their guidelines assist organizations in managing cloud-related risks effectively.
- International Organization for Standardization (ISO): ISO has developed various standards addressing cloud services, such as ISO/IEC 27017 [81] for security controls and ISO/IEC 27018 [82] for protecting personal data in the cloud. These standards offer a global benchmark for cloud-related best practices.
- Cloud Security Alliance (CSA): Although not a regulatory body, CSA [83] is an industry association that produces research, tools, and best practices to help organizations address cloud security challenges. Their guidance aids both cloud service providers and users in navigating security concerns.
- Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP): Operated by the U.S. government, FedRAMP standardizes the security assessment and authorization process for cloud services used by federal agencies [84]. It ensures that cloud services meet stringent security requirements.
- Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS): Notable beyond finance, MAS has issued guidelines on the adoption of cloud services for financial institutions [85]. These guidelines offer insights into managing risks and maintaining regulatory compliance while embracing cloud technology.
5. Cloud Digital Forensics
5.1. The Cloud Digital Forensic Process Model
- Identification: Cloud forensics involves identifying and locating relevant cloud-based systems and applications, examining the service provider, services, and data types. Detecting crimes in the cloud is more challenging than traditional forensics, often starting with unauthorized resource usage complaints. New methods are needed to efficiently use existing tools and isolate cloud evidence.
- Preservation: The preservation stage is crucial for safeguarding digital evidence’s integrity, ensuring its legal use. It involves systematic data capture, secure storage, and documentation, acting as a digital custodian.
- Examination and analysis: The analysis phase in cloud forensics involves using tools and methodologies to examine digital evidence, uncovering insights through log files, network activity patterns, metadata decoding, and data recovery. This phase requires technical prowess and a discerning eye.
- Presentation: Cloud forensics aims to present investigative findings in a clear, concise manner, leveraging information as credible evidence in legal proceedings. This involves creating comprehensive reports, using visual aids, and offering expert testimony.
5.2. Cloud Digital Forensics Tools and Technologies
- Magnet AXIOM cloud: This tool offers comprehensive cloud data collection and analysis capabilities [95]. It supports various cloud services like AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud, allowing users to recover, examine, and preserve cloud-based evidence.
- Cellebrite UFED cloud analyzer: The UFED cloud analyzer enables the acquisition and analysis of data from cloud accounts, including social media, email, and storage services [96]. It supports a wide range of cloud providers and helps in uncovering digital evidence.
- Mandiant CloudLens: This tool by Mandiant, a FireEye company, provides visibility into cloud environments for security purposes [97]. It helps in detecting and investigating threats by monitoring cloud activities and analyzing logs.
- Volatility framework: Although not exclusively for the cloud, Volatility is a popular open-source memory forensics framework [98]. It is used to analyze memory dumps of virtual machines, including those in cloud environments, to identify signs of compromise.
- AccessData cloud extractor: This tool facilitates the collection and preservation of digital evidence from cloud storage services, social media platforms, and webmail providers [99]. It assists in building a comprehensive picture of a user’s online activities.
- AccessData cloud extractor: This tool facilitates the collection and preservation of digital evidence from cloud storage services, social media platforms, and webmail providers [99]. It assists in creating a comprehensive forensic copy of a user’s online activities.
- Oxygen forensic cloud extractor: Oxygen forensic cloud extractor [100] supports over 20 cloud services, enabling investigators to gather data from cloud storage, social media, and email accounts for digital forensics purposes.
- Autopsy: While not exclusively designed for cloud forensics [101], Autopsy is an open-source digital forensics platform that allows examiners to analyze evidence from various sources, including cloud storage services.
- BlackBag BlackLight: BlackLight [102] is a digital forensics solution that supports the analysis of data from both traditional devices and cloud services. It aids in extracting and interpreting data from cloud accounts.
- X-Ways Forensics: X-Ways Forensics is a versatile digital forensics tool that supports the examination of evidence from cloud storage services, email accounts, and other sources [103].
- Azure Security Center: Microsoft’s Azure Security Center [104] provides a cloud-native solution for threat protection across Azure and hybrid environments. It helps in detecting and responding to threats in cloud infrastructure.
- AWS CloudTrail: Amazon Web Services CloudTrail [105] logs all API calls made on an AWS account, allowing for detailed forensic analysis and audit trail creation.
- EnCase Forensic: EnCase is a widely used forensic software that provides comprehensive capabilities for acquiring, analyzing, and reporting digital evidence from various devices and file systems.
- AccessData forensic toolkit (FTK): FTK is a powerful forensic tool that allows investigators to collect, analyze, and examine data from computers and mobile devices. It includes advanced searching and analysis features.
- Forensic Falcon: This hardware-based solution offers both offline and live forensic capabilities, allowing investigators to analyze and image digital media in the field.
- Paladin Forensic Suite: Paladin is a live forensic system that can be booted from a USB drive. It includes a variety of open-source forensic tools and utilities for evidence collection and analysis.
- DEFT (Digital Evidence and Forensics Toolkit): DEFT is a Linux distribution specifically designed for digital forensics and incident response. It includes a collection of pre-installed forensic tools and utilities.
- Bulk Extractor: Bulk Extractor is a command-line tool designed to quickly and efficiently scan disk images for specific types of information, such as email addresses, credit card numbers, and URLs.
- Digital Forensics Framework (DFF): DFF is an open-source digital forensics platform that provides a modular and extensible framework for conducting forensic investigations.
6. Cloud Forensic Challenges
6.1. Identification Phase
- Retrieval of information from log files: Log files are crucial for investigations, but gathering them from cloud computing environments is complex due to cloud haziness and multi-tenant simulations, as clients have access to the application programming interface (API) only, making monitoring impossible [107]. In the IaaS cloud model, logs are essential for understanding virtual machine (VM) behavior, but their effectiveness may be limited due to restrictions imposed by cloud providers on storage, access, or sharing among multiple users [108,109]. Cloud service providers often neglect or conceal log collection services, posing challenges such as decentralization, fluctuation, preservation, accessibility, non-existence, lack of important data, and non-compatible log forms [110].
- Transient data: Cloud forensic challenges involve navigating the diverse behaviors of virtual machines (VMs) in IaaS service structures, such as Azure, Digital Ocean, and AWS, to preserve data during shutdown or restart phases. Understanding these nuances is crucial for forensic professionals to identify and preserve volatile data instances [111,112,113,114].
- Lack of physical accessibility: Data localization in the cloud is complex due to the global deployment of hardware equipment. Digital forensics assume direct access to hardware, but cloud forensics struggle due to the storage of information on physical devices and the fixed settings [112]. Data-containing hardware cannot be seized due to dispersed systems in separate jurisdictions. This issue is not relevant for geographically spread firms, where resources are housed on their premises [115].
- Identification at the client side: Proof can be found on both the supplier and client sides of the interface, particularly in SaaS and PaaS contexts. Investigators must quickly capture sterile data for forensic analysis, as the criminal may destroy it. Client-side data identification is crucial in investigations, but often difficult due to multiple jurisdictions [111,116].
- Vendor dependency-trust: The research emphasizes the importance of cloud service providers (CSPs) in the forensic process, but challenges arise when they hesitate to release information, especially in multi-tenant systems [117]. Dependence on CSPs in SaaS and PaaS models for evidence discovery raises authenticity concerns and reliance on non-expert personnel, potentially impacting the validity of forensic findings [107,118].
- SLA (service level agreement: Service level agreements (SLAs) may not include details about forensic investigations, as failure to provide such information can result in a cloud service provider’s lack of contractual obligation [119]. This is often due to a lack of customer understanding, lack of transparency, limits on trust, and foreign legislation. CSPs may not have the necessary knowledge or appropriate procedures to conduct forensic investigations in cloud systems [120].
6.2. Preservation and Collection Phase
- Integrity and stability in multi-tenancy and privacy: The quality and durability of proof are critical in cloud inquiries for IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS. Data retention, essential for evidence in multi-jurisdictional situations, poses challenges in compliance with laws. The reliability of evidence can be compromised, potentially rendering it inadmissible in court [108]. Authenticity issues further complicate cloud forensics, requiring increased trust from investigators in third parties for data authentication [118]. Ensuring data consistency in the dynamic cloud environment is also challenging [121].
- In-house staffing: This challenge spans all service types and stages, necessitating collaboration among technical researchers, legal consultants, and external experts with expertise in new technologies [120].
- Crime scene reconstruction in criminal investigations: In cloud forensics, reconstructing the crime scene is challenging, and recreating the entire sequence may be impossible if the responsible virtual machine terminates after malicious activity.
- Chain of custody: Maintaining the chain of custody is crucial for presenting evidence in court. Challenges arise from multi-jurisdictional legislation and CSP engagement, with the initial potential failure point often identified as the cloud service provider [119].
- Data imaging: In IaaS, creating a forensic image of a system or instance involves capturing a disk image of the virtual machine (VM) in a defined file format like EWF. Restarting or shutting down the VM does not destroy evidence, but if destroyed, it would be lost. In PaaS environments, relying on the central service provider (CSP) for data collection is crucial, but presents challenges, especially when data are managed by a third-party subcontractor [115].
- Bandwidth constraints: The amounts of data are rapidly expanding, leading to an increase in evidence. In the preceding paragraph, we discussed VM cloning within the IaaS model. Researchers need to obtain a forensic copy of the VM instances to collect information. While acquiring such extensive data imaging, they have to consider the available bandwidth due to the substantial volume of data involved.
6.3. Examination and Analysis Phase
- Insufficient forensic toolset: In cloud forensic investigations, the use of forensic tools is crucial, with various technologies designed for cloud-based digital forensics actively employed. However, a significant challenge lies in the lack of comprehensive vetting for accuracy and error rates in several commercial tools designed for remote investigations [115]. Initiatives like the computer forensics tool testing (CFTT) program, supported by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Institute of Justice, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), aim to address this gap by providing measurable assurance of the accuracy of computer forensics tools used in cloud investigations [122]. The CFTT program develops specifications and test methods, and evaluates specific tools against these standards to enhance the reliability and credibility of forensic tools. These efforts are crucial for ensuring that forensic tools meet stringent accuracy benchmarks, supporting investigators and the legal community in effectively utilizing these tools within cloud forensic investigations [115].
- Large data volumes: The data volumes held in CSP storage facilities are enormous and are growing daily. Finding meaningful digital evidence might be complicated by the large amounts of data (petabytes of information) [123]. This has a direct impact on data processing to identify meaningful evidence for the purpose of the inquiry. Quick and Choo [124] further discuss this issue, noting that research gaps in data reduction methods, data mining, intelligence evaluation, and the utilization of open and closed-source information still exists. Appropriate collection and filtering of information must be created and implemented to handle the data quantity that exists in cloud infrastructures [112].
- Encryption: Cloud clients use encryption to protect against illegal activities. Investigating encrypted material requires expertise in obtaining keys and analyzing content. Accessibility of encryption keys is crucial, and evidence may be undermined if only the data owner can provide the key. Many CSPs also use encryption technologies [125,126].
- Log format standardization: Analyzing data obtained from service models is a costly operation, particularly when dealing with and identifying a variety of log types. When we are able to access a large number of various resources, combining log forms in the cloud is a complex process [120].
6.4. Presentation Phase
- Password or key retrieval: Cloud forensic investigations encounter distinct challenges, especially in accessing encrypted data without cooperation from involved parties. Advanced tools, such as John the Ripper and Hashcat [127], provide critical support by enabling password retrieval. Additionally, analyzing memory dumps offers avenues for retrieving encryption keys, enhancing investigators’ capabilities to overcome challenges posed by encrypted data in cloud forensic examinations.
- Testimonial complexity: The complexity of technical details may pose challenges in court comprehension, especially considering that juries typically consist of individuals with minimal understanding of computer systems. Therefore, it becomes crucial for investigators to transparently disclose their methods and procedures [115]. They must be prepared to provide a clear and easily understandable explanation of the cloud, digital forensics, and how they work, as well as clarify how the evidence obtained throughout the inquiry was preserved and recorded. Cloud computing is one of the more complex computer circumstances, and it can stump even the most technically savvy jury. As a result, every piece of evidence must be presented with care, and testimony from experts should be comprehensible to the members of the jury [128].
- Documentation and record keeping: Another issue is convincing the jury that the proof obtained throughout the investigation has been properly documented and that there had been no modifications to the evidence in prior phases. Researchers must ensure that all parties who participated in the investigation followed methodologies and standards to preserve the chain of custody of the obtained evidence. Electronic documentation encompasses all stages.
7. Cloud Legal and Privacy Concerns
- Data ownership and control: When data are uploaded to the cloud, it is essential to understand that ownership and control can become somewhat blurred. Users technically own their data, but they delegate control over its storage and management to the cloud service provider. This delegation can complicate the process of accessing and analyzing data during a forensic investigation.
- Access rights: Investigating digital incidents in the cloud requires considering who has access to the data. Cloud service providers typically have physical and administrative access to the servers, and users access their data via web interfaces or APIs. Forensic experts must understand how these access mechanisms work and who has the authority to grant or revoke access.
- Data encryption and privacy: Many cloud service providers implement robust encryption measures to protect user data. This encryption ensures that even if unauthorized parties gain access to the physical servers, the data remain encrypted and unreadable. While encryption enhances privacy and security, it can pose challenges for forensic investigations, as gaining access to decryption keys may be difficult.
- Compliance and regulations: Various regions have distinct data protection and privacy regulations. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [132] in the European Union establishes rigorous requirements for data management and privacy. While conducting investigations in cloud environments, forensic investigators must be mindful of and comply with these regulations. However, it is important to note that when authorized by a court to conduct digital forensics, investigators might operate under legal mandates that supersede certain privacy laws, prioritizing compliance with the court’s directives while maintaining confidentiality and following due legal processes.
- Cloud service provider policies: Cloud service providers often have their own terms of service and policies regarding data access and disclosure. These policies can impact the process of acquiring data for forensic analysis. Investigators need to be familiar with these policies and work within their constraints.
8. Economy Factor: Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR)
9. Open Problems and Future Trends in Cloud Forensics
Future Trends
- The landscape of cloud digital forensics is continually evolving, and researchers are actively exploring future directions to enhance forensic practices in the cloud. As cloud computing technologies advance, there is a growing need to adapt forensic methodologies to address emerging trends.
- One key area of exploration is the impact of emerging cloud technologies, such as containerization, microservices, and serverless computing [143], on digital forensics. These technologies introduce new challenges, particularly in the analysis of ephemeral and highly distributed computing environments. Researchers will need to develop techniques to effectively extract and preserve digital evidence in these dynamic settings.
- Technological advancements, including serverless computing, edge computing, and artificial intelligence (AI), are reshaping forensic practices in the cloud [144]. Serverless computing brings challenges related to event-driven architectures and the reconstruction of execution flows, which researchers will need to address. Edge computing, with its decentralized data processing, requires investigators to adapt to distributed environments. AI, on the other hand, has the potential to automate the detection of security incidents and anomalies, streamlining forensic processes.
- Advanced cryptographic techniques like federated learning, multi-party computation (MPC), and homomorphic encryption are also influencing cloud and digital forensics [145]. Federated learning enables model training without exposing raw data, posing questions about accessing and analyzing model updates while preserving data privacy. MPC allows secure computations on encrypted data, and homomorphic encryption enables computations on encrypted data without decryption. These techniques introduce both challenges and opportunities for forensic investigators, particularly in scenarios where data privacy is paramount.
- Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) [146] are gaining prominence in various industries and hold promise for digital forensics. Researchers are exploring how blockchain can be used to create tamper-proof logs and audit trails, enhancing the integrity and traceability of digital evidence. The decentralized nature of DLTs may also influence evidence collection and preservation, ensuring reliability and authenticity.
10. Strategizing for Emerging Challenges in Cloud Digital Forensics
11. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Sr. No | Authors | Breaches | Tools | Challenges | Security Aspects | Legal and Privacy Concerns | CAGR |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Ramachandra [16] | ✓ | X | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X |
2 | Mozumder [17] | ✓ | X | X | ✓ | X | X |
3 | M. Ahmed [18] | ✓ | X | ✓ | X | X | X |
4 | Srijita Basu [19] | ✓ | X | ✓ | ✓ | X | X |
5 | Monjur et al. [20] | ✓ | X | ✓ | X | X | X |
6 | Manral et al. [21] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X |
7 | Lei Chen et al. [22] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X |
8 | M Khanafseh et al. [10] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X | X |
9 | Y Khan and S Varma [23] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X | X |
10 | Fei Ye et al. [24] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X |
11 | Sebastian et al. [25] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X |
12 | Tummalapalli and Chakravarthy [26] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X | X | X |
13 | Purnaye and Kulkarni [27] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X | X | X |
14 | Alenezi et al. [28] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | X |
15 | Proposed | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
Sr. No. | Aspect | Description |
---|---|---|
1 | Confidentiality | Data access restricted to authorized users. |
2 | Integrity | Data remains uncorrupted and in its original form. |
3 | Availability | Reliable access to data for authorized users. |
4 | Privacy | Protection of private data from unauthorized access. |
5 | Data encryption | Use of encryption for confidentiality and privacy. |
6 | Identity and access management (IAM) | Secure access to cloud resources, including authentication and access rights management. |
7 | Information protection | Classification and protection of sensitive data. |
8 | Shared responsibility model | Distribution of security responsibilities between CSP and organizations. |
9 | Malicious insiders | Mitigation of insider data risks. |
10 | Intentional data remanence | Secure removal of data from storage. |
11 | Business continuity plan | Data backup and recovery strategies. |
12 | Data segregation/multi-tenant services | Multiple copies of data in different storage locations. |
13 | Data loss prevention (DLP) | Protection against data loss and theft. |
14 | Data protection compliance recommendations | Policies for regulatory compliance. |
Year | Organization | Vulnerability | Data Loss | Financial Loss |
---|---|---|---|---|
2010 | Microsoft [55] | A configuration issue within its business productivity online suite (BPOS) | Employee contact data for a small number of users were stolen. | Around USD 1 million |
2012 | Dropbox [56] | End users and their security settings | A total of 68 million user accounts were hacked | Unknown |
2014 | Home Depot [57] | An attack exploited the Home Depot’s point-of-sale terminals | Information from 56 million credit cards was stolen | Over USD 100 million |
2016 | National Electoral Institute of Mexico [58] | Unsecured data were published online | A total of 93 billion voter registration records were compromised | unknown |
2016 | Uber [59] | Vulnerable Creepy Stalk version | 57 million users’ data and 60 million drivers’ license information were exposed | USD 148 million |
2017 | Yahoo [60] | Session Hijack | 3 billion user accounts hacked | USD 4.5 million |
2021 | LinkedIn [61] | Network Scraping | A total of 700 million user accounts posted for sale on the dark web | USD 5 million |
2021 | Microsoft [62] | The breach occurred due to a misconfiguration in one of Microsoft’s cloud databases, which left the data exposed without proper access controls | Sensitive data of over 38 million Microsoft users were exposed, including email addresses, account IDs, and support case details | $ unknown |
2022 | TBC Corporation [63] | Misconfigured AWS S3 Bucket | Approximately 17,000 customer records, including personally identifiable information (PII), such as names, addresses, and phone numbers | Est. USD 1.5 million |
2022 | Volkswagen Group of America [64] | Exposed Elasticsearch cluster | Over 3.3 million records, including customer information and internal data, were exposed. The exposed data included employee names, email addresses, and some customer data | Est. USD 5 million |
2023 | Microsoft Cloud [65] | Forged authentication tokens | It primarily targeted government agencies in Western Europe and focused on espionage, data theft, and credential access | unknown |
2023 | LastPass [66,67] | Targeted attack on a DevOps engineer’s home computer using a vulnerability in the Plex media server package. | Obtained password vaults with encrypted and plaintext data from 25 million users. Exposed seed phrases used for cryptocurrency investments, leading to significant theft | USD 35 million worth of crypto |
Aspect | Cloud Security | Cloud Forensics |
---|---|---|
Focus | Proactive measures and strategies to safeguard data and resources stored in the cloud | Reactive approach, investigating and analyzing incidents, breaches, or unauthorized activities within the cloud after they have occurred. |
Key objective | Prevent unauthorized access, data breaches, and potential threats | Investigate incidents, understand their nature and extent, and enhance overall security readiness. |
Key components | Cloud security involves network security measures like firewalls, robust data encryption protocols, and access control mechanisms to protect data at rest and in transit, ensuring a secure cloud environment. | Cloud forensics uses specialized tools for digital evidence collection and analysis, including software, data acquisition, and data interpretation, to reconstruct events in security incidents, enabling investigators to reconstruct the sequence of events. |
Role in incident response | Cloud security plays a critical role in establishing a robust defense mechanism to prevent security incidents and breaches. It focuses on proactive measures to minimize the likelihood of incidents occurring in the first place. | Cloud forensics is crucial in incident response, identifying the root causes of security incidents, holding responsible parties accountable, and implementing preventive measures. It collects and analyzes digital evidence post-incident. |
Typical activities | Implementing security layers, including network security, data encryption | Collecting and analyzing digital evidence, post-incident analysis. |
Expertise required | Security professionals, network administrators | Digital forensic analysts, incident responders |
Time frame | Ongoing process to maintain security | Typically initiated after a security incident occurs |
Regulatory Body | Geographical Focus | Key Regulations | Compliance Requirements | Certification Programs | Enforcement |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
GDPR [79] | European Union | Data Protection, Privacy Rights | Consent Management, Data Breach Notification | GDPR Certification | Fines up to 4% of global turnover |
HIPAA [86] | United States | Healthcare Data Privacy, Security Standards | Protected Health Information (PHI) Safeguards | HIPAA Compliance Certification | Fines up to USD 1.5 million per violation |
ISO/IEC 27001 [87] | International | Information Security Management | Risk Assessment, Security Controls | ISO/IEC 27001 Certification | Audits and Certifications |
FedRAMP [84] | United States | Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) for Federal Agencies | Security Controls, Continuous Monitoring | FedRAMP Authorization | Ongoing Assessments, Authorization Reviews |
CSA STAR [83] | International | Cloud Security, Risk Management | Security Controls, Transparency | CSA STAR Certification | Self-assessment and Third-party Audit |
ENISA [78] | European Union | Cybersecurity Guidelines, Best Practices | Compliance Frameworks, Regulatory Challenges | - | Guideline Adherence |
NIST [80] | United States | Cloud Framework (Security, Privacy, Interoperability) | Risk Management, Compliance Measures | - | Guideline Adherence |
MAS [85] | Singapore | Cloud Guidelines for Financial Institutions | Risk Management, Regulatory Compliance | - | Financial Compliance |
Category | Tools | Features |
---|---|---|
Cloud digital forensic tools | Magnet AXIOM cloud | Comprehensive cloud data collection and analysis |
Cellebrite UFED cloud analyzer | Acquisition and analysis of data from cloud accounts | |
Mandiant CloudLens | Visibility into cloud environments for security | |
Volatility Framework | Memory forensics framework for virtual machines | |
AccessData cloud extractor | Collection and preservation of digital evidence | |
Oxygen forensic cloud extractor | Supports over 20 cloud services for forensics | |
Autopsy | Open-source digital forensics platform | |
BlackBag BlackLight | Analysis of data from devices and cloud services | |
X-Ways Forensics | Examination of evidence from cloud storage, email, etc. | |
Azure Security Center | Threat protection in Azure and hybrid environments | |
AWS CloudTrail | API call logs in AWS accounts for forensic analysis | |
Offline digital forensic tools | EnCase Forensic | Comprehensive forensic software for evidence |
AccessData Forensic Toolkit (FTK) | Tool for collecting, analyzing, and examining data | |
Forensic Falcon | Hardware-based solution for offline and live forensics | |
Paladin Forensic Suite | Live forensic system bootable from a USB drive | |
Digital Evidence and Forensics Toolkit (DEFT) | Linux distribution for digital forensics | |
Bulk Extractor | Command-line tool for scanning disk images | |
Digital forensics framework (DFF) | Open-source digital forensics platform that provides a modular and extensible framework for conducting forensic investigations. |
Phases | Challenges | Recommendations |
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Identification |
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Preservation |
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Examination and Analysis |
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Presentation |
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© 2024 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Malik, A.W.; Bhatti, D.S.; Park, T.-J.; Ishtiaq, H.U.; Ryou, J.-C.; Kim, K.-I. Cloud Digital Forensics: Beyond Tools, Techniques, and Challenges. Sensors 2024, 24, 433. https://doi.org/10.3390/s24020433
Malik AW, Bhatti DS, Park T-J, Ishtiaq HU, Ryou J-C, Kim K-I. Cloud Digital Forensics: Beyond Tools, Techniques, and Challenges. Sensors. 2024; 24(2):433. https://doi.org/10.3390/s24020433
Chicago/Turabian StyleMalik, Annas Wasim, David Samuel Bhatti, Tae-Jin Park, Hafiz Usama Ishtiaq, Jae-Cheol Ryou, and Ki-Il Kim. 2024. "Cloud Digital Forensics: Beyond Tools, Techniques, and Challenges" Sensors 24, no. 2: 433. https://doi.org/10.3390/s24020433
APA StyleMalik, A. W., Bhatti, D. S., Park, T. -J., Ishtiaq, H. U., Ryou, J. -C., & Kim, K. -I. (2024). Cloud Digital Forensics: Beyond Tools, Techniques, and Challenges. Sensors, 24(2), 433. https://doi.org/10.3390/s24020433