Unidirectional Communications in Secure IoT Systems—A Survey
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. IoT Security Issues
1.2. Unidirectionality of a Network
- We commence by visiting the source node (1) and adding its neighbors (5 and 6) to the stack.
- Subsequently, node 6 is visited, and its neighbor node 5 is added to the stack.
- Subsequently, node 5 is visited, and its neighbors (2, 3, and 7) are added to the stack.
- Subsequently, the node at position seven is visited, and its neighbors at positions 8 and 9 are added to the stack.
- Upon visiting node 9, it was determined that it had no unexplored neighbors.
- Upon visiting node 8, it was determined that it had no unexplored neighbors.
- Subsequently, node 3 is visited, and then its neighbors, specifically nodes 4 and 8, are added to the stack.
- Finally, node 4 is visited and the target node is located.
1.3. Current Techniques
1.4. Security Models
- 1.
- Simple security rule (no read-up): A subject cannot read information classified at a higher level than the subject’s allowed level of access.
- 2.
- Star (*)-property (no write-down): A subject cannot write data to a lower security level, thereby preventing the leakage of sensitive information.
- Two networks (high-security network and low-security network) are considered, and a data diode connects them.
- One-way data flow (no write-down): The data diode is designed to permit the transfer of data from a lower-security-level network to a higher-security-level network. This design is directly compatible with the Bell–LaPadula model’s *-property, which restricts writing data to a lower security level to prevent data leakage.
- No read-up: The data diode physically prevents return data flow from the low-security network to the high-security network, avoiding the possibility of reading up. The simple security rule is intrinsically respected since data cannot move from one security level to another, ensuring that persons at a higher level cannot read data from a lower level.
1.5. Related Surveys
1.6. Contributions and Innovative Aspects
- Highlights the lack of previous analysis on unidirectional communication methods, noting this as a narrowly defined field of study.
- Evaluates the state of research and development in unidirectional communications, focusing on solutions and their ability to meet IoT security needs and requirements.
- Provides a comprehensive literature evaluation, classifying unidirectional communication solutions based on security, reliability, and device type.
- Conducts a comprehensive analysis and categorization of the evaluation metrics employed by unidirectional communication solutions.
- Analyzes the areas of application where unidirectional communication methods have been used, presenting their utilization rate.
- Classifies commercial unidirectional communication products based on their application area, supported protocols, and covered attacks.
- Identifies a series of challenges and unresolved issues, summarizing potential research directions.
2. Unidirectional Communication Solutions and Their Classification
2.1. Systems Without Feedback
2.1.1. Blind Data Diodes
Hardware-Based Solutions
- Discussion
Software-Based Solutions
- Discussion
2.1.2. Unidirectional Gateway
- Discussion
2.1.3. Unidirectional Protocols
- Discussion
2.2. Systems with Feedback
2.2.1. Data Diode with Feedback
2.2.2. Network Pump
- Discussion
3. Performance Evaluation and Metrics
- Initialization and configuration time represents the period of time for the initial setup and configuration of a system (e.g., diode) before it can start operating.
- Time of each cycle/transmission time is the time period required for a cycle of operations to be completed or for a packet to be sent from source to destination.
- Data rate is represented by the number of bits that can be processed and transmitted per time unit [3] (usually, the second is used as a time unit).
- Latency/delay is the time period when the package is sent and when it reaches its destination [6].
- Maximum bandwidth used/network usage represents the maximum amount of data that can be used for transmission during a time interval.
- Cost and rentability are defined as the cost of implementation, operation, and maintenance of a solution compared to its benefits and cost effectiveness relative to other existing solutions.
- Throughput means the amount of data that the system successfully processes and transfers in a given time.
- Packet size is the quantity of data in the transmitted packet, measured in bits [2].
- File loss rate (loss file/send file) is the ratio of the number of lost files to the total number of sent files [40].
4. Areas of Application
5. Unidirectional Communication Products
5.1. Waterfall Security
5.1.1. WF-600
5.1.2. WF-500/WF-500 DIN Rail
5.1.3. WF for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
5.2. Owl Cyber Defense
5.2.1. Owl Perimeter Defense Solution-1000 (OPDS-1000)
5.2.2. XD Verge
5.2.3. XD Prism MPP
5.3. OPSWAT—NetWall USG
5.4. FOX-IT—Fox Data Diode
5.5. Siemens—Siemens DCU
5.6. Fend Incorporated
5.7. Arbit
Producer | Model Name | Supported Protocols | Covered Attacks | Areas of Application | Ref. |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Waterfall Security | WF-600 | NS | Remote attacks, malware, DOS attacks, ransomware, human errors from breaching the protected network | Electrical power plants, gas and oil industry, rails, water utilities, manufacturing, facilities, mining metal, hydropower-generating utilities | [41,42] |
WF-500/ WF-500 DIN Rail | FTP, SMTP, SNMP Traps, Syslog, RSV, OSIsoft PI, Modbus, WMQ, eDNA, ICCP, OPCDA | Targeted attacks, secure enterprise-wide visibility, safe remote access | [43,44,45] | ||
WF for IDS (INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS) | NS | Remote attacks, malware, DOS attacks, ransomware, human errors originating on external networks from compromising or impairing industrial operations | [46,47] | ||
Owl Cyber Defense | Owl Perimeter Defense Solution-1000 (OPDS-1000) | TCP, UDP, Syslog, RFTS, SNTS, SNMP Traps, SMTP, FTP | NS | NS | [48,49] |
XD Verge | UDP, ARP (Source Side) | NS | NS | [50,51] | |
XD Prism MPP | UDP, TCP-based file transfers or data streams, Utilize Owl RFTS | NS | NS | [52,53] | |
OPSWAT | NetWall USG | FTP, SFTP, folder and file transfers/copying, SMB, CIFS | MITRE ATTCK for ICS | NS | [54,55] |
Fox-IT | Fox Data Diode | TCP, UDP, SMB, FTP, SCP | NS | NS | [56,57] |
Siemens | Siemens DCU | NS | NS | Transportation industry | [58] |
Fend Incorporated | SE15 | FTP, FTPS, TCP, UDP, Modbus TCP, Modbus RTU, BACnet (in), LON-IP (in) | DOS attacks | Manufacturers, oil and gas, water treatment, electric infrastructure | [59,60] |
SE5 | [61,62] | ||||
XE5 | [62,63] | ||||
CE5 | FTP, FTPS, TCP, UDP, Modbus TCP, BACnet (in), LON-IP (in) | [62,64] | |||
XE15 | [60,65] | ||||
CE15 | [60,66] | ||||
Arbit | The Arbit Data Diode 10 GbE | SMTP, FTP, SFTP, SMB, NFS, NTP, Streaming (TCP, UDP), REST API Forwarder (HTTP, HTTPS) | NS | NS | [67] |
6. Open Issues
- 1.
- Data security and confidentiality
- In unidirectional communications, devices transmit data without receiving acknowledgment from the destination, making it difficult for attackers to detect data interception or alteration. Solutions to this problem include strong data encryption, but implementing these solutions on resource-constrained devices remains a challenge.
- 2.
- Transmission reliability
- Unidirectional communications do not allow acknowledgment of data reception, so lost packets cannot be retransmitted. Faulty error coding methods (FEC) and data redundancy can be used to alleviate this problem, but they may increase power consumption and bandwidth requirements.
- 3.
- Power management
- Energy-efficient communication is essential for IoT devices, especially battery-powered ones. Unidirectional communication should minimize energy use for transmission and use communication protocols that allow devices to save energy.
- 4.
- Scalability
- Collecting and processing data from several unidirectional IoT devices necessitates algorithms capable of handling huge amounts of data and providing usable results in real time. These solutions must be resource-efficient while maintaining the integrity and security of the aggregated data.
- 5.
- Interoperability
- The absence of a unified set of metrics prevents a comprehensive validation of unidirectional communication security methods for IoT devices and systems.
- The lack of common standards among different IoT device manufacturers can lead to interoperability and integration issues between various systems. Adopting open standards is essential to ensure interoperability.
- Choosing and implementing appropriate communication protocols for different unidirectional IoT applications can be complicated. Protocols must be efficient in terms of power consumption and latency and compatible with other networks and devices.
- 6.
- Network configuration and management
- Identifying and fixing problems in IoT devices that use unidirectional communication is difficult without a second communication channel. Solutions may include regularly monitoring device status and using anomaly detection algorithms to identify problems without requiring direct feedback.
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
ARP | Address Resolution Protocol |
BACnet | Building Automation and Control Network |
CIFS | Common Internet File System |
eDNA | Enterprise Distributed Network Architecture |
FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
FTPS | File Transfer Protocol Secure |
HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
HTTPS | Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure |
ICCP | Inter-Control left Communications Protocol |
LON-IP | Local Operating Network over Internet Protocol |
Modbus RTU | Modbus remote terminal unit |
Modbus TCP | Modbus Transmission Control Protocol |
NFS | Network file system |
NTP | Network Time Protocol |
OPCDA | OLE for Process Control Data Access |
OSIsoft PI | OSIsoft PI System (PI Historian) |
REST API | Representational State Transfer Application Programming Interface |
RFTS | Owl Remote File Transfer Service |
RSV | Remote screen viewing |
SCP | Secure Copy Protocol |
SFTP | SSH File Transfer Protocol |
SMB | Server Message Block |
SMTP | Simple Mail Transfer Protocol |
SNMP Traps | Simple Network Management Protocol Traps |
Syslog | System Logging Protocol |
TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
WMQ | IBM WebSphere MQ (formerly known as MQSeries) |
References
- Koohang, A.; Sargent, C.S.; Nord, J.H.; Paliszkiewicz, J. Internet of Things (IoT): From awareness to continued use. Int. J. Inf. Manag. 2022, 62, 102442. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Lee, H. Home IoT resistance: Extended privacy and vulnerability perspective. Telemat. Inform. 2020, 49, 101377. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Alrawais, A.; Alhothaily, A.; Hu, C.; Cheng, X. Fog Computing for the Internet of Things: Security and Privacy Issues. IEEE Internet Comput. 2017, 21, 34–42. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Dang, V.A.; Vu Khanh, Q.; Nguyen, V.H.; Nguyen, T.; Nguyen, D.C. Intelligent Healthcare: Integration of Emerging Technologies and Internet of Things for Humanity. Sensors 2023, 23, 4200. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Alalwany, E.; Mahgoub, I. Security and Trust Management in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV): Challenges and Machine Learning Solutions. Sensors 2024, 24, 368. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- el Hajal, G.; Daou, R.; Ducq, Y.; Boercsoek, J. Securing an IoT Medical System Using AI and a Unidirectional Network Device: Application to a Driver. In Proceedings of the CECNet 2021, Beijing, China, 18–21 November 2021. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Nguyen, D.C.; Ding, M.; Pathirana, P.N.; Seneviratne, A.; Li, J.; Niyato, D.; Dobre, O.; Poor, H.V. 6G Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Survey. IEEE Internet Things J. 2022, 9, 359–383. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Dantas Silva, F.S.; Silva, E.; Neto, E.P.; Lemos, M.; Venancio Neto, A.J.; Esposito, F. A Taxonomy of DDoS Attack Mitigation Approaches Featured by SDN Technologies in IoT Scenarios. Sensors 2020, 20, 3078. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Yun, J.H.; Chang, Y.; Kim, K.H.; Kim, W. Security Validation for Data Diode with Reverse Channel. In Proceedings of the Critical Information Infrastructures Security; Havarneanu, G., Setola, R., Nassopoulos, H., Wolthusen, S., Eds.; Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer: Cham, Switzerland, 2017; pp. 271–282. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Security, H. Recommended Practice: Improving Industrial Control System Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies. 2016. Available online: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf (accessed on 12 February 2024).
- Kang, M.; Moskowitz, I.; Lee, D. A network pump. IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 1996, 22, 329–338. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Kang, M.; Moskowitz, I.; Chincheck, S. The Pump: A decade of covert fun. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC’05), Tucson, AZ, USA, 5–9 December 2005; pp. 7–360. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Stallings, W. Network Security Essentials: Applications and Standards, 6th ed.; Pearson: Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 2017. [Google Scholar]
- Eck, N.v.; Waltman, L. Software survey: VOSviewer, a computer program for bibliometric mapping. Scientometrics 2009, 84, 523–538. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Bell, D.E.; LaPadula, L.J. Secure Computer Systems: Mathematical Foundations. MITRE Tech. Rep. 2547 1973, 1, 14–18. [Google Scholar]
- Bell, D. Looking Back at the Bell-La Padula Model. In Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC’05), Tucson, AZ, USA, 5–9 December 2005; pp. 337–351. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Elgazzar, K.; Khalil, H.; Alghamdi, T.; Badr, A.; Abdelkader, G.; Elewah, A.; Buyya, R. Revisiting the Internet of Things: New Trends, Opportunities and Grand Challenges. Front. Internet Things 2022, 1, 1073780. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Dutta, A.; Kant, S. Implementation of Cyber Threat Intelligence Platform on Internet of Things (IoT) using TinyML Approach for Deceiving Cyber Invasion. In Proceedings of the 2021 International Conference on Electrical, Computer, Communications and Mechatronics Engineering (ICECCME), Mauritius, Mauritius, 7–8 October 2021; pp. 1–6. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Tariq, U.; Ahmed, I.; Bashir, A.K.; Shaukat, K. A Critical Cybersecurity Analysis and Future Research Directions for the Internet of Things: A Comprehensive Review. Sensors 2023, 23, 4117. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
- Tawalbeh, L.; Muheidat, F.; Tawalbeh, M.; Quwaider, M. IoT Privacy and Security: Challenges and Solutions. Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, 4102. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Kaur, B.; Dadkhah, S.; Shoeleh, F.; Neto, E.C.P.; Xiong, P.; Iqbal, S.; Lamontagne, P.; Ray, S.; Ghorbani, A.A. Internet of Things (IoT) security dataset evolution: Challenges and future directions. Internet Things 2023, 22, 100780. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Fend Incorporated. What Are Data Diodes? Learn About Diodes & Uses|Fend. Available online: https://www.fend.tech/about-diodes (accessed on 10 March 2024).
- Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative. Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy; Technical Report NIST SP 800-37r2; National Institute of Standards and Technology: Gaithersburg, MD, USA, 2018. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Ha, S.S.; Beuster, H.; Doebbert, T.R.; Scholl, G. A New Approach to Secure Industrial Automation Systems Based on Revolution Pi Modules. In Proceedings of the 2022 IEEE 27th International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA), Stuttgart, Germany, 6–9 September 2022; pp. 1–4. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Malatji, M. Application of data diodes in Internet of Things security. In Proceedings of the 2021 International Conference on Electrical, Computer and Energy Technologies (ICECET), Cape Town, South Africa, 9–10 December 2021; pp. 1–4. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Krause, A.F.; Essig, K. Protecting Privacy Using Low-Cost Data Diodes and Strong Cryptography. In Proceedings of the Intelligent Computing; Arai, K., Ed.; Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems. Springer: Cham, Switzerland, 2022; pp. 776–788. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Larkin, R.D.; Wagner, T.J.; Mullins, B.E. Securing Photovoltaic System Deployments with Data Diodes. In Proceedings of the 2020 47th IEEE Photovoltaic Specialists Conference (PVSC), Calgary, AB, Canada, 15 June–21 August 2020; pp. 2525–2531. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- De Freitas, M.B.; Rosa, L.; Cruz, T.; Simões, P. SDN-Enabled Virtual Data Diode. In Computer Security; Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Springer: Cham, Switzerland, 2019; Volume 11387. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Geiger, C. Cyber Diode: Animated 2D Barcodes as a Mobile and Robust Data Diode. In Proceedings of the 2018 9th IEEE Annual Ubiquitous Computing, Electronics & Mobile Communication Conference (UEMCON), New York, NY, USA, 8–10 November 2018; pp. 516–519. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Moussi Djeukoua, C.L.; Guiraud, T.; Bajramovic, E.; Schindler, J.; Waedt, K. Secure Unidirectional Security Gateways for Industrie 4.0; Gesellschaft für Informatik: Bonn, Germany, 2021; ISSN 1617-5468. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Kim, B.K.; Heo, Y.J.; Na, J.C.; Chung, T.M. Unconstrained File Transfer Scheme in Unidirectional Security Gateway System. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Security Technology (SecTech 2016), Jeju, Republic of Korea, 24–26 November 2016; pp. 360–363. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Azarmipour, M.; Trotha, C.v.; Gries, C.; Kleinert, T.; Epple, U. A Secure Gateway for the Cooperation of Information Technologies and Industrial Automation Systems. In Proceedings of the IECON 2020 The 46th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society, Singapore, 18–21 October 2020; pp. 53–58. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Lin, K.; Fan, Z.; Liu, B.; Chen, Y.; Liu, Z. Design of gateway nodes for wireless sensor networks based on microservice architecture. In Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Computer Engineering and Intelligent Communications (ISCEIC 2022), SPIE, Xi’an, China, 16–18 September 2023; Volume 12462, pp. 30–36. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Sharma, P.; Pandey, I.; Pradhan, P.M. Hardware Implementation and Comparison of IoT Data Protocol for Home Automation Application. In Proceedings of the 2022 IEEE Delhi Section Conference (DELCON), New Delhi, India, 11–13 February 2022; pp. 1–6. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Genua. An Industrial Data Diode for Especially Critical Plants and Processes. 2021. Available online: https://www.genua.eu/fileadmin/Loesungen/Downloads/WP_en_genua-data-diode-for-critical-plants-and-processes.pdf (accessed on 21 May 2024).
- Kang, M.; Moskowitz, I.; Montrose, B.; Parsonese, J. A case study of two NRL Pump prototypes. In Proceedings of the Proceedings 12th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, San Diego, CA, USA, 9–13 December 1996; pp. 32–43. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Gorantla, S.K.; Kadloor, S.; Kiyavash, N.; Coleman, T.P.; Moskowitz, I.S.; Kang, M.H. Characterizing the Efficacy of the NRL Network Pump in Mitigating Covert Timing Channels. IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2012, 7, 64–75. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Gorantla, S.K.; Kadloor, S.; Coleman, T.P.; Kiyavash, N.; Moskowitz, I.S.; Kang, M.H. Directed information and the NRL Network Pump. In Proceedings of the 2010 International Symposium On Information Theory & Its Applications, Taichung, Taiwan, 17–20 October 2010; pp. 343–348. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Khusanboyevich, R.D. Application of data diodes in protected network segments. Gospod. I Innow. 2022, 24, 152–156. [Google Scholar]
- Huyen, P.T.; Cuong, D.T.; Hung, D.T.; Anh, L.D.; Chinh, D.X. Design of unidirectional security GATEWAY device for secure data transfer. In Proceedings of the 14th National Conference on Fundamental and Applied Information Technology Research, Hochiminh City, Vietnam, 13–14 December 2021. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Waterfall. WF-600. Available online: https://waterfall-security.com/technology-and-products/wf-600/ (accessed on 24 September 2023).
- Waterfall. WF-600-Brochure. Available online: https://waterfall-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/WF-600-Brochure.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2023).
- Waterfall. WF-500. Available online: https://waterfall-security.com/technology-and-products/wf-500/ (accessed on 24 September 2023).
- Waterfall. WF-500-Brochure. 2023. Available online: https://waterfall-security.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/WF-500-Brochure.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2023).
- Waterfall. UNIDIRECTIONAL SECURITY GATEWAY WF-500-Data Sheet. 2020. Available online: https://waterfall-security.com/wp-content/uploads/WF-500_Datasheet.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2023).
- Waterfall. WF for IDS. Available online: https://waterfall-security.com/technology-and-products/wf-ids/ (accessed on 24 September 2023).
- Waterfall. WF-Intrusion Detection Systems. 2018. Available online: https://softprom.com/sites/default/files/materials/WF-Intrusion-Detection-Systems_FINAL.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2023).
- Owl Cyber Defense. Owl Perimeter Defense Solution-1000 Datasheet. 2022. Available online: https://owlcyberdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/19-OWL-0105-Data-Sheet-Redesign-OPDS-1000-V12.pdf (accessed on 21 July 2023).
- Owl Cyber Defense. OPDS-1000 All-in-One Data Diode Solution. Available online: https://owlcyberdefense.com/product/opds-1000/ (accessed on 24 September 2023).
- Owl Cyber Defense. XD Verge. Available online: https://owlcyberdefense.com/product/xd-verge/ (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- Owl Cyber Defense. XD Verge Datasheet. 2023. Available online: https://owlcyberdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/22-D120-OWL-XD-Verge-Data-Sheet.pdf (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- Owl Cyber Defense. XD Prism MPP. Available online: https://owlcyberdefense.com/product/xd-prism-mpp/ (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- Owl Cyber Defense. XD Prism MPP Datasheet. 2023. Available online: https://owlcyberdefense.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/23-OWL-0105-Data-Sheet-XD-Prism-MPP-V71.pdf (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- OPSWAT. Unidirectional Security Gateway for IT & OT-Netwall USG. Available online: https://www.opswat.com/products/netwall/usg (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- OPSWAT. Super NetWall Datasheet. 2023. Available online: https://static.opswat.com/uploads/files/SuperNetWall_Datasheet_EN.pdf (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- Fox IT. Fox DataDiode-Fox IT. Available online: https://www.fox-it.com/nl-en/fox-crypto/fox-datadiode (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- IT, F. Fox DataDiode Datasheet. Available online: https://respubca.home.xs4all.nl/pdf/FoxDataDiode_en.pdf (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- Siemens Mobility GmbH. CoreShield Data Capture Unit-Datasheet. Available online: https://dq3yfnoirppqu.cloudfront.net/dex-assets/03-catalog-section/03-applications/coreshield-data-capture-unit/DCU%202.0_datasheet_EN.pdf (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- Fend Incorporated. SE15 Data Diode-Data Diode Technology. Available online: https://www.fend.tech/fend-se15-data-diode (accessed on 2 October 2023).
- Fend Incorporated. SE15 Data Diode Datasheet, XE15 Data Diode Datasheet, CE15 Data Diode Datasheet. 2023. Available online: https://www.fend.tech/_files/ugd/e4f239_e0946ed3fa784923956494f9a596a705.pdf (accessed on 2 October 2023).
- Fend Incorporated. SE5 Data Diode-Data Diode Technology. Available online: https://www.fend.tech/fend-se5-data-diode (accessed on 2 October 2023).
- Fend Incorporated. SE5 Data Diode Datasheet, XE5 Data Diode Datasheet, CE5 Data Diode Datasheet. 2023. Available online: https://www.fend.tech/_files/ugd/e4f239_f1d7a2223fa846c7a5286dc49058c24a.pdf (accessed on 2 October 2023).
- Fend Incorporated. XE5 Data Diode-Data Diode Technology. Available online: https://www.fend.tech/fend-xe5-data-diode (accessed on 2 October 2023).
- Fend Incorporated. CE5 Data Diode-Data Diode Technology. Available online: https://www.fend.tech/fend-ce5-data-diode (accessed on 2 October 2023).
- Fend Incorporated. XE15 Data Diode-Data Diode Technology. Available online: https://www.fend.tech/fend-xe15-data-diode (accessed on 2 October 2023).
- Fend Incorporated. CE15 Data Diode-Data Diode Technology. Available online: https://www.fend.tech/fend-ce15-data-diode (accessed on 2 October 2023).
- Arbit. Arbit Data Diode Datasheet. 2022. Available online: https://arbitcds.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Arbit-Data-Diode-10-GbE-Data-Sheet-NEW-16052022.pdf (accessed on 1 October 2023).
- Lin, H. Research on Packet Loss Issues in Unidirectional Transmission. J. Comput. 2013, 8, 2664–2671. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Wang, M.; Zhu, T.; Zhang, T.; Zhang, J.; Yu, S.; Zhou, W. Security and privacy in 6G networks: New areas and new challenges. Digit. Commun. Netw. 2020, 6, 281–291. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Hussein, N.; Nhlabatsi, A. Living in the Dark: MQTT-Based Exploitation of IoT Security Vulnerabilities in ZigBee Networks for Smart Lighting Control. IoT 2022, 3, 450–472. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
- Rose, K.; Eldridge, S.; Chapin, L. The Internet of Things (IoT): An Overview. Internet Soc. 2015, 80, 1–53. [Google Scholar]
- Heo, Y.; Na, J. Development of unidirectional security gateway appliance using intel 82580EB NIC interface. In Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Information and Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC), Jeju, Republic of Korea, 19–21 October 2016; pp. 1194–1196. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
Ref. | Solution Features | Advantages | Disadvantages |
---|---|---|---|
[24] | Hardware–software data diode for unidirectional transmission from OT to IT. Tested on Zybo Z7 board, uses RS-485 channel. | The data diode is completely transparent between the OT and IT networks because all process data are quickly replicated into the IT network behind the data diode. PiBridge’s RS-485 channel is used to establish communication between IT and OT networks, leveraging a well-known communication standard. | The data diode has been developed and tested on the Zybo Z7 board. This may minimize its compatibility with various hardware setups, thereby limiting its usefulness in a variety of industrial applications. The paper does not specify the solution’s scalability. It is unknown whether the proposed data diode can be scaled to industrial systems or networks. |
[25] | Miniature data diodes for IoT devices provide security at the network’s edge. This ensures that data flows unidirectionally over the IoT network layer. | Small data diodes incorporated into IoT devices ensure that security protocols are directly entrenched in individual devices, resulting in a more comprehensive defense against potential threats. | The integration of small data diodes into IoT devices may present technological obstacles, particularly in terms of guaranteeing seamless interoperability and operation across multiple types of devices and platforms. |
[26] | This solution combines data diodes, robust encryption, and a genuine random number generator. Uses a serial port with the receive-data pin disabled, allowing for the insertion of a diode or digital buffer. | Data diodes and encryption work together to safeguard data monitoring. | This method entails purposely disconnecting the receive-data pin and establishing a direct connection, which may not be suitable for implementation in many instances and may limit the solution’s applicability in some contexts. |
[27] | Data diodes separate the PV system from the internet. They also separate the home network from the photovoltaic system. | Data diode in a daisy chain ring topology network means that the attacker has to perform more investigation to reach the ring from the end of the daisy chain if one of the daisy chain rings is compromised. | The cost is the main disadvantage of the solution. The data diode is suitable for PV networks (fields) rather than residential consumers due to its higher costs. Remote access to the system is limited. |
[6] | Unidirectional communication solution using a data diode and AI to protect driver’s medical data privacy. Unidirectional communication between the server and healthcare providers. | The approach reduces the risk of revealing personal information while focusing on delivering the required information for driver monitoring. | The success rate of the AI system in detecting non-compliant data may result in false positives or false negatives. This may result in unnecessary notifications or missed identification of proper concerns. The solution was tested only for denial-of-service and man-in-the-middle attacks, which may make the method vulnerable to other attacks. |
Ref. | Solution Features | Advantages | Disadvantages |
---|---|---|---|
[28] | Virtual data diode using distributed software-defined networking (SDN) controllers eliminates a single point of failure. It integrates directly with OSGi services and supports external interfaces such as REST, command-line, WebSockets, and a monitoring component for dynamic rule enforcement. | Distributed SDN controllers eliminate the risk of a single point of failure, enhancing system reliability and resilience. The monitoring component embedded into the virtual data diode allows for the dynamic insertion of new rules, ensuring that diode behavior is enforced for each new host added. | The virtual data diode is vulnerable to weaknesses that may not apply to its physical counterparts, posing security problems. |
[29] | Software data diode using barcodes as a communication channel. Data are received unidirectionally and asynchronously from the broadcaster. | As a software solution, it is easy to develop, deploy, and maintain the method. Asynchronous communication provides an additional layer of security, making it more difficult for potential attackers to identify data exchanges. | The data transfer rate is determined by the receiving camera’s frames per second (fps). This constraint may affect the overall pace of data transfer, potentially making it slower than alternative communication methods. |
Ref. | Solution Features | Advantages | Disadvantages |
---|---|---|---|
[30] | Fiber-optic network communication for CPS security Unidirectional gateways replace firewalls to protect OT networks. | The usage of fiber-optic network communication is intended to improve the security of cyber–physical systems by offering more robust protection against potential threats. Gateways improve industrial network security by protecting control systems against external threats. | The focus on designing a secure communication architecture includes a severely confined feedback loop, which may limit the system’s responsiveness. |
[31] | UNIWAY is a unidirectional security gateway with a proprietary file transmission mechanism. Two proxy systems are used to simulate FTP file transfers. Fiber-optic connectivity for “send only” and “receive only” interfaces. | Using two proxy systems, the sending proxy and the received proxy, enables successful file server/client replication. This emulation can improve the efficiency and reliability of the file transfer process. | While using the FTP protocol assures compatibility, it can also be a constraint, particularly if the protocol becomes outdated or if there are security issues associated with it. Depending on the design and execution, using proxy systems may result in single-point failures. If one of the proxy systems fails, it may impair the overall file transfer operation. |
[32] | Gateway to provide unidirectional communication between OT and IT systems. FIFO-based communication method integrated with the PikeOS hypervisor. Simulates IT response and ensures secure gateway communication. | The security of the process is reinforced through the authentication of an OPC UA client, which adds an extra layer of verification to ensure the legitimacy of the communication. | Implementing security protections, authentication processes, and feedback simulations may require additional resources from the whole system, thereby compromising performance and scalability. |
[33] | Unidirectional gateways for ICS protection, restricting data transfer back to the internal network. VRF as an option for smaller systems or as an alternative for unidirectional gateways. | VRF technology in routers allows for the simultaneous functioning of multiple routing tables within a single device. It isolates devices from various tables to prohibit communication even though they share the same hardware. | Unidirectional gateways may be economically impractical for smaller utility systems. The expense of acquiring and maintaining this technology could be a considerable challenge, limiting its use in some situations. |
Ref. | Solution Features | Advantages | Disadvantages |
---|---|---|---|
[34] | A comparison of IoT data protocols (MQTT, AMQP, CoAP, XMPP) and standard techniques (Websockets, DDS). Focus on smart home automation. | MQTT and CoAP have reduced transmission times, allowing for faster communication in smart home automation. These protocols take less time to create packets, implying faster data transmission. | Each protocol serves a distinct purpose, implying that the use case or application may determine the protocol used. |
[30] | Fiber-optic communication for CPS security. Uses the LLC1 and LLC2 communication protocols. | Due to the lack of acknowledgment in data diode transfers, the method of sending each message numerous times with proper identifiers, hash values, and, optionally, encryption assures reliability. LLC1 and LLC2 allow for flexibility in communication protocols depending on the system’s requirements. | The need to transmit each message many times for dependability, with the presence of identities, hash values, and possible encryption, might result in more significant network traffic and resource use. |
Ref. | Solution Features | Advantages | Disadvantages |
---|---|---|---|
[12] | A battery solution is incorporated to prevent message loss during power outages. | Installing a battery into the network pump addresses the difficulty of a complete response queue buffer, increasing dependability by protecting against message loss during peak loads. | The pump’s most significant problem occurs when the response queue buffer fills up. This signals a potential bottleneck in handling message requests, which may affect the system’s responsiveness. |
[36] | Two pump prototypes: E-Pump and D-Pump. E-Pump uses process ACKs, D-Pump uses TCP ACKs. E-Pump runs on the XTS-300 platform; D-Pump runs on a 486-class single-board computer. | Operating at the process layer enables the E-Pump to adjust process layer acknowledgments, perhaps resulting in more efficient and specialized processing. The D-Pump acts at the transport layer and offers a different layer perspective than the E-Pump. | It is mentioned that E-Pump implies potential issues with implementation or maintenance. Modulating Transport Layer acknowledgments (TCP ACKs) may present additional difficulties or potential concerns compared to handling genuine process acknowledgments of D-Pump. |
[37] | Theoretic method to prevent covert time channels in the pump system. Buffers and injects noise into acknowledgment timings. The residual information flow rate is calculated using finite and infinite random noise. | The network pump improves security by including random noise in low-user-acknowledgment periods, potentially lowering the probability of covert transfer. Setting a maximum capacity for the communication channel serves as a control mechanism, assisting in the management and regulation of information flow. | The pump system and associated methods, such as buffers and noise injection, do not remove covert time transmission, indicating a potential gap in obtaining an enhanced security method. |
[38] | The pump is described as a feedback-driven communication mechanism. Reroutes packets and acknowledgments via an intermediary node. Evaluates the upper limit of data capacity for hidden channels. | The system successfully regulates data rates by rerouting packets and acknowledgments through an intermediary node (the pump), prohibiting high Users from communicating with low Users at non-zero rates. The method considers scenarios in which the pump’s buffer is fully utilized, offering a thorough review of the system’s performance under a variety of settings. | While the pump system tries to improve security, the use of noise and data rerouting raises worries about potential weaknesses or exploitation by attackers. |
Unidirectional Solution | Ref. | Area of Application | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Medical Systems | Industrial Automation Systems | Home Automation | Critical Infrastructure | Data and File Transfer Security | Process Control Systems | Secure Communication | Network Security | ||
Hardware data diode | [6,24,25,26,27] | ✓ | ✓ | ||||||
Software data diode | [28,29] | ✓ | |||||||
Unidirectional gateway | [30,31,32,33] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ||||
Protocols | [30,34] | ✓ | ✓ | ||||||
Network pump | [12,36,37,38] | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2024 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Share and Cite
Gaina, L.; Stangaciu, C.S.; Stanescu, D.; Gusita, B.; Micea, M.V. Unidirectional Communications in Secure IoT Systems—A Survey. Sensors 2024, 24, 7528. https://doi.org/10.3390/s24237528
Gaina L, Stangaciu CS, Stanescu D, Gusita B, Micea MV. Unidirectional Communications in Secure IoT Systems—A Survey. Sensors. 2024; 24(23):7528. https://doi.org/10.3390/s24237528
Chicago/Turabian StyleGaina, Lucian, Cristina Sorina Stangaciu, Daniela Stanescu, Bianca Gusita, and Mihai Victor Micea. 2024. "Unidirectional Communications in Secure IoT Systems—A Survey" Sensors 24, no. 23: 7528. https://doi.org/10.3390/s24237528
APA StyleGaina, L., Stangaciu, C. S., Stanescu, D., Gusita, B., & Micea, M. V. (2024). Unidirectional Communications in Secure IoT Systems—A Survey. Sensors, 24(23), 7528. https://doi.org/10.3390/s24237528