Executive Religiosity and Disclosure Tone Ambiguity of Annual Reports
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Background Literature and Hypothesis
2.1. Religiosity Literature in Business
2.2. Disclosure Tone Research
2.3. Hypotheses
3. Materials and Method
3.1. Sample Selection
3.2. Methodology
4. Results
4.1. Overall Findings
4.2. Subsample Analysis—Individual Executive Groups
4.3. Robustness Tests
5. Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Variable | Definition |
Negative Tone | Word-list counts of negative words (Fin-Neg list) relative to the total number of words appearing in a firm’s 10-K (Loughran & McDonald, 2011). |
Uncertain Tone | Word-list counts of uncertain words (Fin-Unc list) relative to the total number of words appearing in a firm’s 10-K (Loughran & McDonald, 2011) |
Disclosed Religiosity | A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has one or more religious C-suite executives (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
Gross File Size | Natural Log of 10-K file size (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | Number of the firm’s 10-K exhibits (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
Tangibility | Net PPE/Total Assets (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
Profitability | Operating Income Before Income Tax and Depreciation/Total Assets (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
Size | Natural Log of Total Assets (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
Firm Age | Age of Firm (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
Cash Flow Volatility | Measured as the standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by total assets in 5-year rolling windows with a minimum of 5 observations and winsorized at percentiles 1 and 99 (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
Book Leverage | Current Liabilities + Long-Term Debt/Total Assets (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
Debt Issue | This dummy variable takes a value of 1 if long-term debt issuance, less long-term debt reduction, is more than 1% of the firm’s total assets (Baxamusa & Jalal, 2016). |
Capital Expenditure | Capital Expenditures/Total Assets (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
SGA Expense | Selling, General and Administrative Expenses/Total Assets (Nazrul et al., 2022) |
Location Religiosity | The overall religiosity of a county per 1000 members of the population, as reported by the ARDA (Hilary & Hui, 2009). |
1 | Typically, tobacco, gambling, and alcohol, as well as industries with emerging environmental, social, and ethical issues (e.g., oil, firearms, etc.) are considered sin industries (Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2021). |
2 | A good example of this is Mount Sinai Hospital in New York (Nazrul et al., 2022). |
3 | The GuideStar directory can be found at: https://www.guidestar.org/NonprofitDirectory.aspx (accessed on 18 February 2022). |
4 | The CEO, CFO, CIO, COO, and CTO. |
5 | The Loughran and McDonald data are available at: https://sraf.nd.edu/sec-edgar-data/lm_10x_summaries/ (accessed on 27 March 2022). |
6 | ARDA data can be found at: https://www.thearda.com/data-archive/browse-categories?cid=B-A#B-A (accessed on 23 May 2022). |
7 | https://pcaobus.org/About/History/Documents/PDFs/Sarbanes_Oxley_Act_of_2002.pdf (accessed on 1 December 2024). |
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Panel A: Sampling Table | ||||||||||||||
Details | Count | |||||||||||||
C-Suite Executives With Disclosed Religiosity | 552 | |||||||||||||
Total No. of C-Suite Executives | 7409 | |||||||||||||
CEOs With Disclosed Religiosity | 494 | |||||||||||||
Total No. of CEOs | 6489 | |||||||||||||
CFOs With Disclosed Religiosity | 20 | |||||||||||||
Total No. of CFOs | 470 | |||||||||||||
Total No. of Firm-Year Observations (n) | 12,736 | |||||||||||||
Total No. of Firms | 2515 | |||||||||||||
Panel B: Summary Statistics | ||||||||||||||
No. of Firm Year Observations (n) | Mean | SD | p25 | Median | p75 | |||||||||
Negative Tone | 12,736 | 0.016 | 0.003 | 0.014 | 0.016 | 0.019 | ||||||||
Uncertain Tone | 12,736 | 0.012 | 0.002 | 0.010 | 0.012 | 0.014 | ||||||||
Disclosed Religiosity | 12,736 | 0.068 | 0.252 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||||||
Gross File Size | 12,736 | 14.978 | 1.463 | 13.906 | 14.722 | 16.382 | ||||||||
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | 12,736 | 10.705 | 5.071 | 7 | 11 | 14 | ||||||||
Tangibility | 12,736 | 0.269 | 0.237 | 0.085 | 0.187 | 0.392 | ||||||||
Profitability | 12,736 | 0.073 | 0.257 | 0.063 | 0.115 | 0.166 | ||||||||
Size | 12,736 | 6.904 | 2.092 | 5.422 | 6.968 | 8.289 | ||||||||
Firm Age | 12,736 | 24.346 | 17.086 | 10 | 20 | 36 | ||||||||
Cash Flow Volatility | 12,736 | 0.065 | 0.107 | 0.023 | 0.039 | 0.07 | ||||||||
Book Leverage | 12,736 | 0.252 | 0.282 | 0.065 | 0.219 | 0.367 | ||||||||
Debt Issue | 12,736 | 0.32 | 0.466 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ||||||||
Capital Expenditure | 12,736 | 0.048 | 0.058 | 0.016 | 0.031 | 0.058 | ||||||||
SGA Expense | 12,736 | 0.277 | 0.301 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.353 | ||||||||
Location Religiosity | 12,736 | 0.587 | 0.159 | 0.461 | 0.584 | 0.671 | ||||||||
Panel C: Pearson Correlations | ||||||||||||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | |
Negative Tone (1) | ||||||||||||||
Uncertain Tone (2) | 0.727 | |||||||||||||
Disclosed Religiosity (3) | −0.027 | −0.042 | ||||||||||||
Gross File Size (4) | 0.363 | 0.555 | −0.012 | |||||||||||
No. of Exhibits in 10-K (5) | 0.514 | 0.493 | 0.003 | 0.648 | ||||||||||
Tangibility (6) | −0.039 | −0.042 | 0.01 | 0.045 | 0.07 | |||||||||
Profitability (7) | −0.063 | −0.089 | 0.046 | −0.014 | 0.011 | 0.132 | ||||||||
Size (8) | 0.262 | 0.301 | 0.038 | 0.328 | 0.341 | 0.17 | 0.37 | |||||||
Firm Age (9) | 0.003 | −0.032 | 0.047 | 0.234 | 0.21 | 0.066 | 0.179 | 0.419 | ||||||
Cash Flow Volatility (10) | 0.002 | −0.005 | −0.04 | −0.093 | −0.097 | −0.162 | −0.598 | −0.389 | −0.189 | |||||
Book Leverage (11) | 0.162 | 0.154 | 0.036 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.194 | −0.111 | 0.202 | 0.03 | 0.011 | ||||
Debt Issue (12) | 0.038 | 0.052 | 0.013 | 0.066 | 0.069 | 0.101 | 0.034 | 0.177 | 0.048 | −0.06 | 0.226 | |||
Capital Expenditure (13) | −0.054 | −0.018 | −0.011 | −0.035 | −0.017 | 0.594 | 0.075 | 0.046 | −0.049 | −0.05 | 0.08 | 0.133 | ||
SGA Expense (14) | −0.097 | −0.147 | 0.001 | −0.13 | −0.125 | −0.239 | −0.461 | −0.416 | −0.168 | 0.492 | −0.016 | −0.117 | −0.075 | |
Location Religiosity (15) | −0.049 | −0.076 | 0.071 | −0.04 | −0.003 | 0.018 | 0.04 | 0.076 | 0.071 | −0.03 | 0.054 | 0.037 | −0.016 | −0.007 |
(Source: Authors). Bolded values represent statistical significance at the 1% level. |
Variables | Negative Tone | Uncertain Tone |
---|---|---|
Disclosed Religiosity | −0.021 *** | −0.017 *** |
(−3.011) | (−3.087) | |
Gross File Size | 0.026 *** | 0.017 *** |
(8.695) | (12.129) | |
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | 0.014 *** | 0.003 *** |
(29.129) | (9.461) | |
Tangibility | −0.019 | −0.013 ** |
(−1.315) | (−2.019) | |
Profitability | −0.041 *** | −0.040 *** |
(−3.632) | (−5.918) | |
Size | −0.003 | 0.009 *** |
(−0.984) | (13.070) | |
Firm Age | −0.010 | −0.001 *** |
(−1.460) | (−13.207) | |
Cash Flow Volatility | 0.079 *** | 0.076 *** |
(2.699) | (4.390) | |
Book Leverage | 0.049 *** | 0.020 *** |
(5.607) | (4.663) | |
Debt Issue | −0.004 ** | −0.002 |
(−1.993) | (−1.108) | |
Capital Expenditure | −0.088 *** | 0.044 * |
(−2.877) | (1.850) | |
SGA Expense | 0.013 | −0.005 |
(1.291) | (−1.315) | |
Location Religiosity | −0.016 | −0.004 |
(−0.839) | (−0.697) | |
Constant | 0.002 | −0.134 *** |
(0.014) | (−6.460) | |
Industry FE | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y |
Observations | 12,736 | 12,736 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.626 | 0.601 |
Variables | Negative Tone | Uncertain Tone |
---|---|---|
Disclosed Religiosity | −0.024 *** | −0.018 *** |
(−3.022) | (−3.268) | |
Gross File Size | 0.026 *** | 0.017 *** |
(8.627) | (26.443) | |
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | 0.014 *** | 0.003 *** |
(29.215) | (15.553) | |
Tangibility | −0.018 | −0.038 *** |
(−1.293) | (−10.978) | |
Profitability | −0.040 *** | −0.056 *** |
(−3.613) | (−12.544) | |
Size | −0.003 | 0.008 *** |
(−0.989) | (22.370) | |
Firm Age | −0.010 | −0.001 *** |
(−1.482) | (−24.393) | |
Cash Flow Volatility | 0.073 ** | 0.070 *** |
(2.407) | (6.897) | |
Book Leverage | 0.050 *** | 0.016 *** |
(5.618) | (6.387) | |
Debt Issue | −0.004 * | −0.005 *** |
(−1.949) | (−5.246) | |
Capital Expenditure | −0.089 *** | 0.106 *** |
(−2.880) | (7.241) | |
SGA Expense | 0.011 | −0.027 *** |
(1.116) | (−9.517) | |
Location Religiosity | −0.019 | −0.003 |
(−1.004) | (−0.704) | |
Constant | 0.005 | −0.104 *** |
(0.030) | (−11.042) | |
Industry FE | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y |
Observations | 11,207 | 11,207 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.624 | 0.543 |
Variables | Negative Tone | Uncertain Tone |
---|---|---|
Disclosed Religiosity | −0.041 * | −0.016 ** |
(−1.947) | (−2.247) | |
Gross File Size | 0.034 *** | 0.004 |
(3.498) | (0.804) | |
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | 0.012 *** | 0.004 *** |
(4.833) | (6.731) | |
Tangibility | −0.038 | −0.022 |
(−1.005) | (−0.792) | |
Profitability | −0.066 * | −0.061 *** |
(−1.877) | (−3.691) | |
Size | 0.012 ** | 0.015 *** |
(2.327) | (4.049) | |
Firm Age | −0.001 | −0.001 ** |
(−1.048) | (−2.670) | |
Cash Flow Volatility | 0.069 | 0.058 |
(0.975) | (1.282) | |
Book Leverage | 0.053 * | −0.017 |
(1.738) | (−0.848) | |
Debt Issue | −0.010 | 0.003 |
(−0.962) | (0.476) | |
Capital Expenditure | 0.091 | 0.100 ** |
(0.875) | (2.677) | |
SGA Expense | 0.002 | −0.015 |
(0.081) | (−1.523) | |
Location Religiosity | −0.004 | −0.003 |
(−0.076) | (−0.149) | |
Constant | −0.427 *** | 0.002 |
(−3.779) | (0.035) | |
Industry FE | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y |
Observations | 623 | 623 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.527 | 0.466 |
Variables | Negative Tone | Uncertain Tone |
---|---|---|
Disclosed Religiosity | −0.007 | −0.012 |
(−0.150) | (−1.568) | |
Gross File Size | 0.051 *** | 0.019 *** |
(6.560) | (5.224) | |
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | 0.010 *** | 0.002 *** |
(7.462) | (2.935) | |
Tangibility | −0.056 | 0.017 |
(−1.555) | (1.016) | |
Profitability | −0.075 *** | −0.061 *** |
(−2.889) | (−5.168) | |
Size | 0.008 ** | 0.011 *** |
(2.457) | (7.243) | |
Firm Age | −0.001 * | −0.001 *** |
(−1.824) | (−3.688) | |
Cash Flow Volatility | 0.008 | 0.001 |
(0.151) | (0.041) | |
Book Leverage | −0.048 * | −0.021 * |
(−1.959) | (−1.922) | |
Debt Issue | 0.024 ** | 0.007 |
(2.104) | (1.412) | |
Capital Expenditure | 0.026 | −0.067 |
(0.256) | (−1.426) | |
SGA Expense | −0.029 | −0.024 ** |
(−1.387) | (−2.510) | |
Location Religiosity | −0.038 | −0.011 |
(−0.558) | (−0.702) | |
Constant | −0.574 *** | −0.146 *** |
(−5.427) | (−2.805) | |
Industry FE | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y |
Observations | 906 | 906 |
Adj. R-squared | 0.624 | 0.494 |
Variables | Negative Tone | Uncertain Tone |
---|---|---|
Disclosed Religiosity | −0.014 *** | −0.008 *** |
(−3.788) | (−4.710) | |
Gross File Size | 0.004 ** | 0.018 *** |
(2.037) | (23.203) | |
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | 0.012 *** | 0.003 *** |
(15.002) | (10.162) | |
Tangibility | −0.007 | −0.020 *** |
(−0.596) | (−4.155) | |
Profitability | −0.091 *** | −0.051 *** |
(−6.205) | (−7.104) | |
Size | 0.013 *** | 0.007 *** |
(8.821) | (10.032) | |
Firm Age | −0.001 *** | −0.001 *** |
(−9.442) | (−13.591) | |
Cash Flow Volatility | 0.284 *** | 0.096 *** |
(6.784) | (5.302) | |
Book Leverage | 0.052 *** | 0.018 *** |
(5.035) | (3.838) | |
Debt Issue | −0.012 *** | −0.003 * |
(−2.994) | (−1.918) | |
Capital Expenditure | −0.107 ** | 0.045 * |
(−2.080) | (1.861) | |
SGA Expense | −0.030 *** | −0.029 *** |
(−4.027) | (−8.479) | |
Location Religiosity | 0.015 | −0.001 |
(1.315) | (−0.187) | |
Constant | 0.005 | −0.123 *** |
(0.159) | (−10.319) | |
Observations | 12,736 | 12,736 |
R-squared | 0.358 | 0.47 |
Variables | Negative Tone | Uncertain Tone |
---|---|---|
Disclosed Religiosity | −0.021 *** | −0.006 *** |
(−3.098) | (−3.440) | |
Gross File Size | 0.037 *** | 0.018 *** |
(8.339) | (22.455) | |
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | 0.014 *** | 0.003 *** |
(15.547) | (9.820) | |
Tangibility | −0.002 | −0.025 *** |
(−0.044) | (−4.859) | |
Profitability | −0.060 ** | −0.041 *** |
(−2.350) | (−4.978) | |
Size | −0.016 *** | 0.006 *** |
(−2.736) | (7.967) | |
Firm Age | 0.007 | −0.001 *** |
(0.696) | (−13.932) | |
Cash Flow Volatility | 0.124 * | 0.109 *** |
(1.922) | (5.550) | |
Book Leverage | 0.015 | 0.022 *** |
(0.770) | (4.399) | |
Debt Issue | −0.001 | −0.005 ** |
(−0.213) | (−2.523) | |
Capital Expenditure | −0.164 *** | 0.055 ** |
(−2.631) | (2.081) | |
SGA Expense | −0.047 ** | −0.029 *** |
(−2.197) | (−8.273) | |
Location Religiosity | 0.004 | 0.005 |
(0.117) | (0.845) | |
Constant | −0.506 | −0.125 *** |
(−1.633) | (−10.002) | |
Observations | 11,207 | 11,207 |
R-squared | 0.336 | 0.468 |
Variables | Negative Tone | Uncertain Tone |
---|---|---|
Disclosed Religiosity | −0.053 * | −0.013 ** |
(−2.075) | (−2.093) | |
Gross File Size | 0.020 | 0.005 |
(1.626) | (0.852) | |
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | 0.013 *** | 0.004 *** |
(8.586) | (6.221) | |
Tangibility | 0.043 | −0.008 |
(0.749) | (−0.320) | |
Profitability | −0.061 * | −0.052 *** |
(−1.830) | (−3.515) | |
Size | 0.014 * | 0.014 *** |
(1.779) | (3.860) | |
Firm Age | −0.002 * | −0.001 ** |
(−1.897) | (−2.474) | |
Cash Flow Volatility | 0.133 | 0.046 |
(1.250) | (1.267) | |
Book Leverage | −0.015 | −0.011 |
(−0.506) | (−0.532) | |
Debt Issue | 0.008 | 0.006 |
(0.432) | (0.828) | |
Capital Expenditure | −0.087 | 0.034 |
(−1.374) | (0.897) | |
SGA Expense | −0.004 | −0.010 |
(−0.125) | (−1.093) | |
Location Religiosity | −0.037 | −0.048 |
(−0.484) | (−1.398) | |
Constant | −0.214 | 0.031 |
(−1.442) | (0.408) | |
Observations | 623 | 623 |
R-squared | 0.323 | 0.455 |
Overall Sample | CEO Sample | CFO Sample | |
---|---|---|---|
Variables | Net Negative Tone | Net Negative Tone | Net Negative Tone |
Disclosed Religiosity | −0.018 *** | −0.022 *** | −0.039 * |
(−2.973) | (−3.163) | (−1.919) | |
Gross File Size | 0.021 *** | 0.021 *** | 0.027 *** |
(8.114) | (8.048) | (3.283) | |
No. of Exhibits in 10-K | 0.012 *** | 0.012 *** | 0.010 *** |
(29.021) | (29.078) | (5.348) | |
Tangibility | −0.011 | −0.011 | −0.025 |
(−0.897) | (−0.891) | (−0.634) | |
Profitability | −0.037 *** | −0.036 *** | −0.042 |
(−3.796) | (−3.747) | (−1.228) | |
Size | −0.005 ** | −0.005 ** | 0.008 |
(−2.001) | (−1.984) | (1.521) | |
Firm Age | −0.008 | −0.008 | −0.000 |
(−1.565) | (−1.586) | (−0.607) | |
Cash Flow Volatility | 0.076 *** | 0.072 *** | 0.037 |
(3.109) | (2.816) | (0.438) | |
Book Leverage | 0.047 *** | 0.048 *** | 0.045 |
(6.136) | (6.142) | (1.671) | |
Debt Issue | −0.004 ** | −0.004 ** | −0.012 |
(−2.313) | (−2.296) | (−1.300) | |
Capital Expenditure | −0.085 *** | −0.085 *** | 0.057 |
(−3.181) | (−3.171) | (0.838) | |
SGA Expense | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.004 |
(0.829) | (0.730) | (0.217) | |
Location Religiosity | −0.005 | −0.008 | −0.013 |
(−0.343) | (−0.536) | (−0.172) | |
Constant | 0.003 | 0.005 | −0.362 *** |
(0.023) | (0.034) | (−3.763) | |
Industry FE | Y | Y | Y |
Year FE | Y | Y | Y |
Observations | 12,736 | 11,207 | 623 |
R-squared | 0.612 | 0.608 | 0.418 |
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Share and Cite
Nazrul, T.; Mousa, R. Executive Religiosity and Disclosure Tone Ambiguity of Annual Reports. J. Risk Financial Manag. 2025, 18, 54. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020054
Nazrul T, Mousa R. Executive Religiosity and Disclosure Tone Ambiguity of Annual Reports. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2025; 18(2):54. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020054
Chicago/Turabian StyleNazrul, Toufiq, and Rania Mousa. 2025. "Executive Religiosity and Disclosure Tone Ambiguity of Annual Reports" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 18, no. 2: 54. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020054
APA StyleNazrul, T., & Mousa, R. (2025). Executive Religiosity and Disclosure Tone Ambiguity of Annual Reports. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 18(2), 54. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm18020054