1. Introduction
With the enhanced pursuit of environment preservation and new energy exploitation, the integration of renewable energy in the distribution networks (DN) is more prevalent. In addition, the loads that are strongly related to the weather, such as electric heating, electric air-conditioning, and electric vehicles, are ever increasing. These circumstances lead the DN to more randomness and uncertainties [
1]. Meanwhile, the abundant, flexible loads (FLs), energy storage as well as distributed generations (DGs) have also improved the activity of DN. The DN gets more flexible and controllable [
2]. Influenced by stronger uncertainty, the risk of overloading violations (OV) to the limits of the lines is enhanced. Conventionally, the OV in the DN mainly concerns the security of N-1. Deterministic criterion has been used generally just for planning [
3]. With the increased uncertainties in the DN, the security in the normal state (N-0) gets much more complex. Thus, the risk of the N-0 state under uncertainties should be paid attention to in the DN schedules [
4].
In order to deal with uncertainty issues, multi-time-scale optimization methods are used widely, which employ ahead schedule combined with deviation correction in shorter time scales, thereby reducing the effect of uncertainty by employing more definite short-time-scale scheduling combined with long-time-scale optimization to overcome the adverse impact of the uncertainties. For example, a scheduling scheme of an integrated energy system with a multi-time scale was constructed in [
5] considering V2G and the dynamic characteristic of gas pipelines, ref. [
6] provided a schedule of muti-time scale for microgrids. The day ahead schedule was combined with the intraday schedule to reduce deviation. However, multi-time-scale treatments are incapable of eliminating the risk of uncertainties ultimately. Robust scheduling methods use intervals to describe the uncertainty variation ranges of the quantities and ensure the security constraints in the worst case of the intervals. In reference [
7], a two-stage coordinate robust algorithm was established to maximize the profit of the microgrid. Reference [
8] proposed a robust optimal for the active distribution network. The minimum confidence interval of Beta distribution for distributed energy was employed to guarantee stable and efficient operation. It is worth mentioning the intervals in robust should be taken as the belief intervals. In addition, the sub-optimal solution that was compromising the economy and security will be chosen within the intervals in order for the quantities to comply with security constraints in the whole intervals. The chance-constrained optimization is another approach to cope with uncertainties. The chance-constrained method solves uncertainties by introducing probability constraints instead of rigid constraints. The ref. [
9] used the Monte Carlo to sample finite scenarios and transform the uncertainty problem into a deterministic problem with change constraints for power grids with massive electric vehicles and renewable energy resources. In ref. [
10], a double-iterative algorithm was proposed for chance-constrained optimal power flow of integrated transmissions and distributions. With the chance-constrained method, the constraints are relaxed to probability form and are guaranteed in the probability of belief. From the characteristics of the two methods, we can conclude that the robust optimization method compromises the economy to guarantee security, whereas the chance-constrained optimization method relaxes security to pursue the economy. Both methods require to be provided with probability conditions such as belief intervals or belief degrees within which security constraints must obey. Whereas, if the quantities happen to occur outside the designated intervals in robust or lower than the degrees of probabilities in chance constraints are regarded as an occasional occurrence at very small probabilities. The probability of these events is below a given belief level and thus are deemed as risk events. For risk events, whether the security constraints are met or not is regardless of robust and chance-constrained methods. Therefore, the prevailing uncertainty methods concern only believable events. Neither the robust nor the chance-constrained methods are able to deal with risk.
The risk cost of an uncertain OV problem can be mitigated certainly by planning enough margins for the DN, but this is costly, obviously. Another approach is a risk tolerated schedule. Namely, accepting the risk of OVs exists and adds the risk cost to the total cost of scheduling. Several research works have been performed on uncertainties risk.
In ref. [
11], the day-ahead and intraday scheduling solution against uncertainties was proposed, and the day-ahead scheduling utilized conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) approximation to obtain robust risk property. In ref. [
12], a CVaR-based risk control model with renewable energy is presented to determine the power of DGs. Q-learning powered adaptive differential evolution algorithm is used to solve the optimization problem. The risk of power loss and voltage deviation of a grid with DGs and EVs were expressed with CVaR in [
13] to minimize the total cost. The literature [
14] related to risk analysis and mitigation for storage to optimize the charging and to discharge in order to prolong storage life. The risk-averse schedule was also introduced for uncertain responses of virtual power plants. Ref. [
15] proposed a two-stage risk-constrained stochastic VPP scheduling method that considered the uncertainty of the energy and reserve prices, resource production, load consumption, as well as reserve services. Ref. [
16] provided a flexible risk aversion operation model for a P2G-based virtual power plant. In the electricity market aspect, ref. [
17] proposed cooperative day-ahead uncertainty transactions with CVaR theory; ref. [
18] designed a risk prevention linkage of credit for retailers. In ref. [
19], the uncertainty radius for wind farms and load demands were proposed based on gap decision theory and decision-making. From the literature, we can conclude that current research on the risk of power systems are mainly related to power balancing problems in the whole system with uncertainty DGs and/or other components. If the power of DG generation is larger than the load consumed, there is a risk of abandoning renewable generation. On the contrary, if the power of DG generation is smaller than the load consumed, there is a risk of load loss. The other literature also concerns risk from the aspect of equipment, such as storage, or concern risk from power losses and voltage violations caused by uncertainties. We know that the detrimental uncertainties to power systems include mainly power balancing problems and violation problems. Voltage violations are one behavior, and the OVs are another. As far as the authors’ knowledge, none of the literature focuses on OV risk research and the related schedule referring to security region (SR).
The definition, model, and assessment approach of SR for a distribution network were originally presented in [
20]. The SR is a close region in multi-dimensional spaces for the power ranges of the DN with no OV on any components [
20]. The existence of a security boundary in a given DN for N-1 was proven in [
21], and an approximation method based on N-1 simulation was proposed to obtain the boundary of SR. In [
22], the concept of SR was further extended to N−0 to describe the range of DN constraints in normal operating status and then provided the security distance from the operating point to the security boundaries to establish awareness of the security situation. Ref. [
23] presented several definitions of security distance to measure the distances of the operating point to the SR. Obviously, the SR provides a reference for the loading limits of the lines but is incapable of dealing with the risk of OV based on it.
In view of the OV problem, we proposed a risk-tolerated schedule method based on the SR. The SR was constructed with bidirectional power of DN for the N-0. The forward and reverse violation degree of the DN was quantitatively formulated in bi-directions. The distributions of OV distance probability were deduced based on power flow equations and employing a cumulant algorithm. The outside events of the intervals, namely, confidence below designated values, were regarded as risk events of OV and took part in the risk cost calculation. The optimal anti-violation strategies (AVS) were formulated in the optimization model to obtain the most economical AVS. Depending on the probability distributions of the OV distances as well as the cost of the AVS, the risk cost of OV was arrived at. The CVaR index was introduced for calculating the risk cost. The risk cost of OV was incorporated into the operating cost, and thus the schedule method was established to restrict the risk cost appropriately.
Obsequiously, the OV problem is significant for DNs. Whereas determining and eliminating the OV of a line is laborious. Because merely the probability densities of nodal power injections can be available commonly, formulating the line power distributions based on nodes are tough due to the complicated relationships. This paper presents a feasible scheme for this problem. The main contributions of this study were as follows.
Aiming at the OV risk problem, a risk scheduling method was proposed to minimize the total cost, including both the OV risk cost and the operating cost. The proposed method took SR as the reference frame of OV and integrated the risk cost with economic indices. With this method, the risk cost was restricted appropriately by balancing the risk cost and operating cost of the DN.
The optimization model to determine the optimal AVS, as well as the corresponding cost, was established. Relying on the cost of AVS, the severity of OV risk events was obtainable.
Formulated the model of power probability densities of the lines with a cumulant algorithm. Based on these results, the probability of OV distances could be determined and referred to as the SR. The cost assessment of OV risk was derived further, and the CVaR index was used in the calculation.
2. Analysis of Violation Risk Referred to SR with Cumulant
2.1. The Bidirectional SR for the DN
The security of N-0 is the ability to maintain normal operation in the condition that no components are lost. Normal operation requires the constraints of both loads and voltages to be satisfied. The load constraints imply the power flows that pass through any components in the DN do not exceed the carrying limits or the relay settings, whereas the voltage constraints mean the voltage is within the acceptable ranges. Voltage regulation in the DN is commonly achieved by separate approaches such as VAR. This paper defines the SR especially for the suffering from OVs in the lines.
The SR is capable of describing the relative position between the operating point and the boundary of security. It is helpful for depicting the state analysis and the overall security situations of the DN. Considering the bidirectional property of power flows with DGs, the OVs to the SR can be divided into forward violation and reverse violation. The bidirectional boundaries for forward and reverse violation limits in a DN may be different. The forward violation is produced mainly by excessive loading of the nodes, while the reverse violation is mainly produced by excessive generation of DGs. By taking no account of the voltages, the N-0 security constraints with bidirectional OVs can be expressed in the following equality and inequalities:
where
and
represent the number of nodes and lines respectively;
represents the operating point of the DN;
is the loading vector of lines in the DN, where
are loads of line
comprising the magnitude and direction, whereas
and
are the upper and lower limits of line
respectively. If
conforms to the constraints defined in Equation (1), the operation states of the DN are deemed to be N-0 secure. Otherwise, it is N-0 insecure.
Let the generated space , thus is restricted by Equation (1). This space is defined as the N-0 security region. If the operating point satisfies Equation (1), the DN is operating within the SR of N-0; otherwise, the DN is operating out of the SR. Therefore, the SR of N-0 represents the security range the DN parameters must comply with. The following section omits N-0 for simplification. The SR also implies an N-0 state without specifying.
2.2. Distance Measures of the Bidirectional Violation
The above-discussed SR provides immediate expressions to the security of the DN. If the operating point of the DN tends to leave out of the SR, one or more lines would incline OVs. The degree of OVs is scaled in this paper with a distance of operating points apart from the boundary of the SR. There are several ways to scale distances. Feeder distance (FD) is one way introduced in [
23] to measure the security of the operating point that lies within the SR to the boundaries of SR. FD of security is defined as the distances from the operating point inner the SR to the correlated boundaries of SR along the coordinates. The FD of security represents the measures of security distance. The larger the FDs of security is, the more security the DN gets.
In this paper, we use FD measures to represent distances of OV, abbreviated as FDV. Explanations of the FDVs with three lines in a 3-dimensional coordinate system are shown in
Figure 1 and the three-view drawing in
Figure 2. The vertical distances from the operating point to the nearest upper or lower boundaries for all lines are the FDVs. Because the operating point is out of the upper limit of line 1 and the lower limit of line 2, there are FDVs against the upper limit of line 1 and lower limit of line 2. As there are no violations of either the upper and lower limits of line 3 or the lower limit of line 1 and the upper limit of line 2, the corresponding FDVs are zeros. For each line, there are forward and reverse FDVs, respectively. Thus, the total quantity of FDVs is twice the number of feeders. FDVs are non-negative numbers. The FDVs is zero if no OVs occur in the line; on the contrary, the FDVs are positive if OVs appear in that line.
The forward and reverse FDVs for each line is written in vectors as follows:
where
and
are the forward and reverse FDVs, respectively;
represents the forward FDV for line
;
represents the reverse FDV for the line
. Calculations of the forward and reverse FDVs are as follows:
where the meaning of
in line
, as well as
and
are explained in Equation (1).
2.3. Probability Density Calculation of Line Power with Semi-Invariant
Due to the uncertainties of DGs and loads, the power flows in the DN would be stochastic. For stochastic power flows, as discussed above, security constraints are not guaranteed in some cases. The probabilities and distribution densities of FDVs can be determined through probability power flow calculation.
This paper employs a cumulant algorithm to achieve the indeterminate algorithm. In this algorithm, by calculating the semi-invariant of the initial stochastic quantities, the semi-invariant results is obtained indirectly. According to the nature of semi-invariant, the semi-invariant, the initial stochastic quantities in limited order are substituted to the power flow models to solve the semi-invariant of power flow. Thus, the approximate distribution densities of results are solved with power flow. The following gives the detail of the cumulant algorithm for stochastic power flow.
Let the nodal power injection
and voltage
be divided into expected and random disturbances. Let the expects are denoted as
and
for power and voltage, respectively. The random disturbances are represented as
and
respectively. There are the following relationships between the expects and the random disturbances.
Establish power flow models of the DN and perform Taylor expansion to the quantities. Ignore the higher order terms of the expansion and remain the constant and the 1st order terms only. The power flow expansions with the abandonment of the high orders are as
where
is the vector of the nodal power equations;
is the vector of the line power flow equations;
is the Jacobian matrix of nodal power equations;
is a matrix determined by the following relationship as in Equation (8);
is the vector of the nodal power injections;
is the vector of the line power flows. Note that for approximation, generally, the active power is dependent on the voltage angle on both sides of the line, but the reactive power is dependent on the voltage magnitude. As
V is intermediate variable here, the voltage can be expressed no matter which form, such as phasor or power angle. The following equation can be acquired according to Equation (7) and
will be eliminated subsequently.
If the probability distributions of the initial random disturbances are known, orders of the semi-invariant quantities are determinable with the origin moments and central moments of the distributions. According to the features of homogeneity and additivity of the independent random semi-invariant quantities, sum the orders of the semi-invariant quantities and are substituted into Equation (7) to obtain each order of the semi-invariant . Since the numerical characteristics of the random variable , as well as the probability density function can be approximately obtained according to their numerical characteristics after the semi-invariant are determined.
According to the above discussions, if the power flows to satisfy the N-0 security constraints, the operating point of DN will be located within the SR of N-0. Else, the OVs will occur. According to the definition of FDV in (3) and (4), the probability densities of FDVs are the same as
in the case of the OV state happen. For uncertainty circumstances, general methods such as robust optimization use intervals to treat the uncertainty quantities and deem the cases inner the intervals to have enough confidence to happen. In addition, the security is guaranteed in the worst case among these intervals. Whereas the cases out of the confidence intervals are deemed as risk events, and the security is regardless. After acquiring the power probability distributions of the lines, the power probability
of line
that meet the N-0 security constraints can be obtained with Equation (9)
The probability of forward and reverse OVs are
where
is the probability of forward OVs and
is the probability of reverse OVs;
is the density function of P
B,j.
Through the schedule of the nodal power vector , the line power , as well as the density function, are changed. Changing the probability of security and the bidirectional OVs, the risk conditions are also changed, thus, the operating cost and risk cost are regulated.
2.4. Risk Cost of the OVs
Once OVs occur in some cases, they will inevitably produce losses. Due to the random events that happen occasionally, such losses are risk losses. This paper concerns the OVs caused risk losses in the DNs. If the absorbed powers in some nodes become excessive, some lines may turn to an OV state in forward directions. These situations perhaps happen when the load power is heavy while the renewable DGs power is light. Risk losses caused by load curtailment will be produced. Whereas, if the power injection in some nodes gets excessive, some lines may turn to an OV state in reverse directions. These situations perhaps happen when the load′s power is light while the power of renewable DGs is heavy. Risk losses will be produced with DG generation curtailment and/or flexible load increase. The risk losses of bidirectional OVs are shown in
Figure 3.
The CVaR is used to measure the risk loss caused by the OV events referred to as N-0 SR in this paper. In order to obtain the CVaR, the VaR had to be obtained first. VaR is the maximum loss index at the confidence level. The calculation of VaR for power
is in Equation (12).
where
is the loss function while the OVs occur in the N-0 state;
are the decision variables, designating the scheduled nodal power in the DN for distributed resource;
is the VaR under confidence level
. CVaR of the PB is calculated with Equation (13)
The general process for calculating
is to construct a help function,
which is the probability density of power for the total line in a vector.
where
;
is an arbitrary real number as in Equation (13).
As there are complex correlations among the probability distributions of the power in each line, it is difficult to calculate with the integral operation. In this paper, Equation (14) is discretized into Equation (15) through typical probability scenarios. Therefore, the probability problem is transformed into a deterministic problem.
where
designates the probability of the scenario
,
designates the total quantity of typical scenarios.
3. Assessment of OV Loss Function for N-0
3.1. Strategies of Anti-Violation for DN
The risk of OVs is the product of the probability and severity of the OV events in reference to SR. When OV events occur in the DN, it is necessary to take action to eliminate the OV events. We call these actions anti-violation strategies (AVS). The more serious the OVs are, the greater the cost of the AVS will expend. In this paper, the severity of OVs is described by the cost of AVS. The available AVS are usually non-unique and with different costs. Therefore, the construction of the optimization model is necessary to obtain the optimal AVS with minimized cost. The loss function mentioned above section is, therefore, determined through optimization.
The AVS is mainly taken by reshaping the power distribution of the DN, including nodal power reshaping and network reshaping. Nodal power reshaping means adjusting the power injections of the DGs, the loads, and the storage of relevant nodes according to the correlation in the OV lines and the nodes, so as to eliminate the OVs. The available nodal power reshaping means comprise:
- (1)
active regulation of flexible loads;
- (2)
power curtailment of the rigid loads and the renewable DGs;
- (3)
altering the charging and discharging of storage;
Power regulations of flexible loads or storage area in bi-ways, namely, are able to be increased or decreased to eliminate the OVs. Such resources are flexible and are the major power reshaping resources. Regulation of rigid loads and renewable DGs are unidirectional, which can be decreased instead of increased. Power reduction in rigid load indicates loss of load and results in an outage of users. Thus, the cost is high. Similarly, power curtailment of renewable DGs implies unexpected abandonment of wind or Photovoltaic (PV) generations and causes penalty costs also. Nodal reshaping resources are multi-time scaled. Storage, DGs, and part of flexible loads can be regulated in real-time. Rigid loads and some flexible loads need to be notified in advance, which is non-real time. Network reshaping is realized through operating mechanical or soft switches to change the power flow distribution of the DN to eliminate the OVs. It is unsuitable for response to the OVs in real-time also. Therefore, this paper only considers the nodal reshaping of AVS. An optimization model is established for the optimal AVS.
3.2. Relationship of FDVs and Nodal Reshaping Power
Let the total lines in the DN are ; the total nodes are ; the power injection vector of nodes is , nodal voltage vector is ; power flow vector of lines is . Based on Equation (7), the power vector of lines can be determined with the power flow equations. Then the line′s power flow is substituted into the boundary of the SR, and the vector of FDV is obtained from Equations (3) and (4), where .
If OVs occur, the DN will actively adjust the nodal power to implement AVS. The power flow equations after implementing AVS are as
where
is the nodal power injection after implementation of AVS,
is the adjusted amount of nodal power required for AVS;
is the nodal voltage after implementing AVS,
is the variation amount of nodal voltage after implementing AVS;
is the power of lines after implementing AVS,
is the power variation amount of lines after AVS. If the power of the OV in a line is just on the boundary after AVS, then
where
is the regulating amount of power vector in lines exactly located in SR by the AVS. The following equation can be obtained according to (14)
Equation (18) depicts the relationship between FDVs and the variation of nodal power. Meanwhile, this relationship also explains the required quantity of nodal power modification with the AVS to eliminate the OVs. Based on this relationship, the nodal power modification is able to be determined. Note that Equation (18) has multi-solution. Therefore, the optimization method is imposed on it to solve the optimized solution as discussed in the next section.
3.3. Optimization Model of Nodal Reshaping for AVS
Assume the FDV in the DN for a scenario is . The nodal power regulation is taken to implement AVS. According to the relationship between the regulated power of the AVS as in Equation (17), represented as with , and the distance of OVs represented with , the optimization model of AVS is able to be established with the objective of minimizing the AVS cost.
Assuming the AVS cost of unit power for each node is
where
is the unit regulating the cost of the node. Then the total cost of nodal power reshaping in the DN is
Based on the analysis above, the optimization model of nodal power reshaping strategy with the objective of minimizing AVS cost can be established.
- (1)
The objective
- (2)
Equality constraints
The Equality constraints are the power flow relationship in Equation (18).
- (3)
Inequality constraints
The inequality constraints are the permeable forward and reverse range of the nodal power modification.
where
and
are the allowed range of forward and reverse power in node
.
By solving the above optimization model, the optimal modification quantity as of the nodal power to eliminate the OV is available. In addition, the minimum AVS cost can be obtained accordingly. Since the minimum AVS cost is a function of FDV, thus the loss function can be rewritten as .
6. Conclusions
In order to solve the uncertainty scheduling problem in complex scenarios of DN, this paper has proposed an economic scheduling method that considers both the risk cost of OV at N-0 and the conventional operating cost. The bidirectional distance of OV is constructed and referred to as SR, with which the overloading problem could be investigated in the SR framework. Performing the optimal AVS in the optimization formula and as the loss function, thus gaining the most economical anti-violation scheme, this way is in agreement with the overall objective and can lessen the total cost of the schedule further. In addition, the cumulant algorithm successfully accomplished the calculation of the probability density of line power according to nodal power. Similarly, the CVaR index is feasible in quantifying the cost of risk. The method incorporates the economic risk caused by AVS into the economic evaluation of the DN and constructs an optimal objective function considering the risk cost of OV. This paper also provides a strategy to solve the DN uncertainty. Instead of the traditional dispatch strategy with fixed security limits, the essence of this strategy is to adjust the security risk to the proper level from an economic aspect. Using the optimization algorithm to balance risk cost to obtain a more efficient dispatch strategy. The results show that the optimal scheduling model proposed in this paper formulates a more cost-effective distribution network scheduling strategy by reducing the serious OV risks to control the risk level and decrease the total cost, including risk cost and operating cost. According to the example, the method proposed in this paper can obtain a more efficient DN dispatching scheme compared with RO or TRO method.
This model considers the real power OV risk of the distribution network. Future research will focus on other security-affected factors that have less consideration in this paper, such as the definition of the feeder distance and anti-violation strategies of voltage and reactive power. Meanwhile, the influence of reactive power on the method and the tackle are owed to investigate deeply. In addition, for more complicated fluctuation characteristics and economic accounting indicators, DN system. Future research will work on how to provide a more precise description of the above parts based on existing models.