2.1. Project Success Definition and Project Metrics
We assumed, according to the author of [
4], that project success is measured by the value delivered by the project to project stakeholders, and this value will be measured by the weighted sum of the values of
n success criteria
. The criteria weights will be a consequence of stakeholder decisions and weights.
The success criteria may be of a quantitative or qualitative nature, but we assumed that in each case their value can be assessed on a 6-value scale. Thus, the criteria will take on values from the set , where 0 represents the situation when the respective criterion is completely unfulfilled and 5 when it is completely fulfilled. Let denote the specific project or project phase we are dealing with. , will denote the value of the i-th criterion taken at the end of the project.
Each criterion will be linked to a weight
, such that
. Value
is the representation of the value delivered by the project. A threshold
for
should be set by the stakeholders, which defines project success as the situation when
.
Formula (1) represents the ultimate value delivered by the project. Its predicted value in time moments
t prior to the project end, and also those before the project is fully defined (
, where 0 is the beginning of the period when the project is under consideration—project idea birth moment included—and
T is the end of the project life cycle), will be given by formula (2):
where
are the predicted values of the respective criteria in moment
t.
For each project success criterion a set of the metrics will be defined. Their values may be measured in an arbitrary moment. is the set of all possible values of the metric . We assumed that for , there exists a function defined on such that . The value is an estimation attempt of the eventual value of the i-th criterion, based on the value of metrics in moment t. Its accuracy will vary, depending on the project stage and on the metrics nature, but values , observed over time (in groups, within the sets for individual ) will be a valuable indication of the ultimate value of the respective criterion, if the metrics are selected carefully, in cooperation with the sustainably chosen stakeholders.
By tracking the metrics values at any moment, and also by simulating them before the project has been even defined, we can see which metric values would have to be changed to increase the respective criterion value (2), and consequently, with a high probability, also (1). We would be able to concentrate on those metrics whose contribution is the highest and of course on the criteria whose weight is the highest.
The metrics have to be selected in cooperation with the respective stakeholders [
4].
2.4. The Project Case
2.4.1. Description of the Project
The project aimed to monitor the implementation of the rights of people with disabilities and to adapt the existing measures to the provisions resulting from the ratification by Poland of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in selected Polish government and local government units. The project was financed under the Knowledge Education Development Operational Program (EU Program) and was implemented from April 2017 to March 2019 in Lower Silesia (a district in Poland). Its minimum assumptions and course were specified in the Project Methodology prepared by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (acting as an institution commissioning project implementation through an open competition, supervising the correct implementation of project recommendations, and monitoring the achievement of indicators adopted in the project). Its actual implementation in Lower Silesia was undertaken by a non-governmental organization selected in a competition (hereinafter referred to as organization X), experienced in activities for the benefit of disabled people. A total of 30 randomly selected institutions were selected for monitoring, with a threshold of 13 as the minimum requirement: it was required by the Ministry that at least 13 institutions signed the contract and were subject to monitoring.
The main aim of the project was to increase the capacity of monitored institutions to implement the provisions of the CRPD by analyzing the activities of these institutions, formulating recommendations regarding these activities, and verifying their use. First, the selected institutions had to be persuaded to participate and sign a contract. Subsequently, in the institutions that signed the contract, several monitoring activities were carried out in line with the methodology. It defined the following stages of the study: (1) analysis of existing data for each of the monitored institutions; (2) in-depth interviews with representatives of people with disabilities in the environment of each of the monitored institutions; (3) in-depth interviews with representatives of each of the monitored institutions; (4) initial reviews in each of the monitored institutions to identify problem areas; (5) monitoring visits to each of the monitored institutions to establish and refine specific recommendations for changes; (6) in-depth interviews with representatives of each institution and from people with disabilities from the environment, to support the implementation of selected recommendations; (7) visits to verify the implementation of the recommendations, along with the preparation of reports verifying the implementation process of the recommendations.
Monitoring was carried out with the use of various methods, with particular emphasis on the credibility of the information sources, access to relevant information sources, and the possibility of documenting monitoring tasks. The conducted analysis covered a wide range of areas, including, in particular:
architectural adaptation of buildings;
adapting forms of informing citizens about the needs of disabled people;
actions for the employment of disabled people in the institution;
information activities aimed at combating stereotypes, raising awareness of the rights and dignity of people with disabilities, and promoting the employment of people with disabilities;
social consultation;
competencies of the institution’s employees;
fulfillment of the general obligations under the CRPD.
However, first of all, the institutions had to be persuaded to cooperate and sign the contract. Here, much resistance was encountered, or at least a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the selected institutions. Moreover, the mere fact of obtaining the contract signature was not a guarantee that the institution in question would participate with due involvement. Thus, among all the project phases, Phase 1 was of crucial importance for the whole project. Below we present all the project phases.
Phase I: getting to know the monitored institution and signing an agreement between Organization X and the institution regarding participation in the project;
Phase II: planning of the monitoring, covering the development of tools, research techniques, analysis of existing data, and collection of important information;
Phase III: implementation of monitoring in institutions;
Phase IV: verification of the implementation of monitoring recommendations.
Each of these stages was associated with certain difficulties, some of which turned out to be crucial for the course and success of the whole project. At the same time, each of the stages was implemented without a systematic operational and contingency plan. After the project end, the team of Organisation X saw numerous aspects of the project where they could have proceeded more efficiently if the project had been better planned. That is why, post factum, the project team saw potential benefits from applying simulation in or even before the definition stage of the project.
In this paper, we concentrate on Phase I and treat the other stages only superfluously. That is why in what follows the problems related to this phase are described more in detail.
Phase I: In this phase, the aim was to sign a contract for participation in the project by at least a certain number of public institutions (13 at the minimum, and they were to be selected from a pool of 30 institutions drawn at random). The phase turned out to be surprisingly difficult. Institutions (beneficiaries of the project), despite repeated attempts to negotiate and persuade, did not decide to join the project, or resigned from participation, mainly at the initial stage of the project, although there were also resignations in the last stages of the project. The refusals were due to political instability, additional unpaid work, low awareness of the needs of people with disabilities, the need for lengthy administrative procedures for signing contracts, etc. This significantly extended the recruitment process and led to excessive involvement and stress among the project staff from organization X. It was necessary, often even several times, to renew invitations in writing, to contact the institution in other ways, to look for substitutes in case an institution was not willing to cooperate, to intervene in the formal issues related to signing the contract, and to repeatedly explain the purpose of joining the project. For these reasons, the recruitment of institutions for the project (Phase 1), which was planned for 2 months, was extended to the whole duration of the project, intensively for the first half of the year, and less intensively for the next half year, and occasionally, in the event of later withdrawal, even longer. In this phase, as with in the other phases, no conscious choice of implementation form and no systematic analysis of the potential problems was performed: the project team reacted spontaneously each time a problem arose. Regardless of the reasons for refusing to participate in the project, the recruitment process, and the ongoing possibility of refusal, constituted a significant difficulty and risk factor for achieving project success.
However, it is important to place the problem in the context of the whole project, and to also describe the challenges and problems linked to the other phases. In Phase II, there were problems related to the lack of regulations regarding the involvement, remuneration, and delegation of the personnel of the monitored units to work in the project.
These problems were related to the nature of the project itself—the long duration of monitoring, its meticulousness, and the need to involve numerous employees because of the intensive work required. In fact, the project implementation process required the monitoring teams to establish other monitoring teams, which unfortunately was not possible. As a result, the persons appointed to contact the monitoring teams often perceived participation in the project as additional work and an additional burden, which resulted in the need to considerably extend the implementation of individual stages of the project. In Phase III, problems related to specific procedures and conditions on the part of the monitored institutions were encountered. They were related to the lack of, in a large part of the monitored institutions, employees who would be disability-oriented and who would feel empowered to make decisions at the same time. As a result, the monitored institutions gave a relatively low priority to the project. Additional problems were related to the issues regarding the legal and administrative conditions in the monitored institutions that were related, among others, to the problems of planning expenses, the administration of historic buildings, or buildings not owned by the monitored institution. In Phase IV, difficulties related to the fulfillment of recommendations, caused by the lack of interest or the nonavailability of technical or financial means for implementing the recommendations, occurred. On the whole, it has to be stated that the whole project was far from delivering the right value to its most important stakeholders, although it fulfilled all ministry-set indicators.
2.4.2. Stakeholders, Success Criteria and Metrics for the Case Project
There were four basic stakeholder groups in the project: the government, organization X, public units which should be monitored, and finally, disabled people. The sustainability principle requires subgroups of those stakeholders, e.g., individual members of the project team from organization X or various groups (with various disability types and degrees) of disabled people to be taken into account.
In the original project success definition, there were two criteria: as mentioned above, the number of institutions participating in the project (i.e., with which a contract was signed), the number of recommendations planned to be implemented, and the number of recommendations that were confirmed to be implemented by the monitored institutions. For both numbers, thresholds were set. Phase I of the project, which is the object of the study here, influenced merely the first criterion. A threshold of 13 was set for it. The institutions were selected from a pool of 30 institutions that were previously picked at random.
After project completion, it was understood that such a project success definition was not coherent with sustainable project management or even with the basic principles of stakeholder management, apart from the value-based project success definition considered in this paper. The negative consequences of such an approach were diverse. For example, low-cost recommendations were preferred by the monitored institutions, independently of their actual (non-financial) value for the disabled people. Moreover, different groups of disabled people were not explicitly identified with their specific needs and some of them did not feel that an acceptable value had been delivered to them. The need to obtain a certain number of institutions to sign the contract exercised pressure on the project team, which, as it was understood afterward, could have been alleviated if the project team and the values expected from them had been taken into account in the project success definition. Additionally, if a public institution was forced in some way to sign the contract, they were often not very involved in the project and tended to cooperate with the project team without due care and enthusiasm, concentrating on the pure number of recommendations linked with low cost and low effort and refusing to cooperate after a long period of having done so, creating problems connected with deadlines, etc.
Hence, post factum, based on the opinion of a project expert (one of the co-authors of this paper) and the recommendations formulated by the author of [
4], it was proposed that project success was defined using the following criteria:
satisfaction with the number of confirmed recommendations (this criterion takes into account the expectations of the ministry but should also consider other stakeholders). For the Lower Silesia region, to which we limited our case study, 30 potential institutions were randomly selected as candidates and the ministry set the threshold at 13—thus, the ministry was satisfied with this number, but disabled people, for example, were not necessarily content.
satisfaction with the total of the value (not economic value, but subjective value from the point of view of disabled people) of the confirmed recommendations for individual groups of disabled people, weighted by the assumed “importance” of individual groups of disabled people (a deeper analysis of this criterion will be included in further research plans);
satisfaction with the involvement of the participating institutions (this criterion takes into account the satisfaction of two groups of stakeholders: the disabled people, who would desire to be the focus of interest of the involved public institutions (instead of pure numbers and economic aspects), and the project team, for whom working with the involved institutions is easier;
acceptable workload of the project team in organisation X during project realisation;
acceptable level of stress (due among others to a high risk that the threshold of signed contracts will not be met in due time) of the project team from organisation X during project realisation;
Weights should be agreed upon among project stakeholders.
Of course, the above proposal is merely tentative to formulate a project success definition which would be the best compromise for all stakeholders involved.
Then, for each criteria metrics would have to be defined. The metrics, controlled at certain intervals of time, should allow a prediction of the final value of the respective success criterion. Obviously, they will not be a very accurate estimate (especially at the end of Phase I), but they still would give an orientation of what we are heading at. Often a combination of several metrics would be most informative.
Below we present a far from exhaustive list of metrics for the selected success criteria. More metrics would have to be defined if we considered the whole project. Here, we concentrate on its first phase. We thus defined the following metrics:
for criterion
:
: the number of institutions which have agreed to participate by moment t;
: the number of institutions which have been contacted by moment t;
for criterion
we will not define any metrics here, as in the first phase of the project no recommendations were identified yet;
for criterion
:
: the number of institutions which have agreed to participate by moment t without the need for additional persuasion;
for criterion
:
—number of interventions to persuade a hesitant or unwilling institution (phone calls, emails, meetings, letters, appeals),
—number of invitations sent (
will take on the same value as
, but it will be interpreted in another way: in the case of criterion
the higher the metric value, the better, here the opposite is true);
for criterion
:
: number of institutions which have refused to participate by moment t;
: number of institutions contacted by moment t which exceeds the minimum set by the ministry (reserve),
: number of institutions which refused to participate in the second round, after negotiations or appeals,
: number of institutions that refused to participate after the contract was signed (late refusal).
Some of the metrics will point directly to the ultimate value of the respective criterion, some will do it less directly:
criterion
:
will be closer to the ultimate value of the criterion, the later moment we consider, but even at the end of the considered phase it does not allow its ultimate value to be determined, because the institutions can quit the project even in later stages;
is a very rough indicator, which does not take into account the refusal rate. It is of the highest importance at the beginning and loses its importance with time;
criterion
:
will be a very imperfect indicator of the ultimate value of the criterion at the end of the considered stage, because the actual involvement of the institutions will be known only in the later stages of the project;
criterion
:
and
at the end of the considered project stage will represent the workload only in this stage, thus they will be very indirect indicators of the final criterion value; the value of the criterion diminishes with the values of the metrics (contrary to the metrics for
and
);
criterion : this criterion is of an exceptional nature: it is not enough to look at the final values of the metrics, but also at their distribution over time (stress during the whole project duration counts, not only that in the final moment). It is thus proposed that the integral of the value of the stress predicted in subsequent moments is taken. The predicted value of stress in individual moments will increase with , , and (number of refusals in various stages) and decrease with (indicator concerning the reserve with respect to the minimal requirement)
As defined above, we assume that the criteria express satisfaction with a certain project aspect in the given scale. The corresponding metrics have to be defined accordingly, so that they represent (individually or combined with other metrics) an estimation of the final criterion value. The following thresholds , , can thus be defined such that:
for criterion
:
if and only if
, s = 1, …, 4,
if and only if
,
if and only if
, for r = 1, 2;
We have then:
where symbol
R stands for
—the closest integer number, choosing the minimal one in case of ambiguity. Of course, formula (3) (such as formulae (4)–(6)) is merely a proposal. The formulae should be agreed upon among stakeholders.
where
is defined analogously as the respective values for criterion
;
for criterion
:
if and only if
, s = 1, …, 4,
if and only if
,
if and only if
, for r = 1, 2
for criterion
: Function
will be defined as the respective functions for criterion
for r = 1, 3, 4 and as the respective functions for
for r = 2. Then we will have (we assume that the satisfaction with the reserve has the highest weight as far as the stress is concerned):
2.4.3. Model and Possible Implementation Forms for Phase I of the Project
As explained above, in Phase I, whose planned duration was expected to be 2 months, but was extended to almost the whole project, numerous problems occurred. As a result, it was felt that the project was not quite successful according to the sustainable stakeholder management and the value-based project definition presented above. Post factum, it was realised that if this phase had been implemented differently, the result may have been more satisfactory. It was considered that the simulation of this project phase would have allowed the project team to plan and prepare for it much better.
In
Figure 1, we propose a model, worked out in the Vensima software, which we used for the simulation of the implementation of Phase 1 of the project to help the project team to choose its best implementation form and to help the stakeholders agree on the required value to be delivered by the project.
The model in
Figure 1, with its two loops, represents various modes of implementing Phase I of the project. Work to complete stands for the number of institutions that still have to be contacted and refers initially to the threshold set by the ministry for the minimal number of institutions with which a contract had to be signed (13 in our case). During the simulation it will be diminished by the number of units which have responded positively, denoted as Work completed.
The inner loop represents the problem of negative answers, in which case new invitations have to be sent. Level of Returning Works is changed from 0 to 1 if such a situation occurs, and the number of negative answers feeds the Work to complete. Work postponed represents the answers which are delayed and require several activities whose aim is to urge an institution to respond and to agree to sign the contract. The number of negative answers feeds the value of Work to complete.
The outer loop represents refusals that come after the initial acceptance of the invitation (late refusals). The number of the late refusals feeds Work to complete (new invitations have to be sent). The exit Level of Losses stands for the late refusals when it is too late to send a new invitation and the refusal is permanent (no substitute can be found).
The following implementation modes were identified:
Natural variant: invitations to 13 selected institutions are sent. If an institution refuses, another one from the pool of 30 is selected at random. No further persuasion is used;
Negotiation variant: same as the natural variant, but persuasion (negotiations) and appeals are used in case of negative answers;
Intermediate variant: invitations sent to 23 institutions selected from the pool of 30. The number of invited institutions is increased from 13 to 23 to create a reserve (over the threshold required by the ministry, which was 13), with the aim of reducing the stress of the project team. In case of the late refusal of one institution, an invitation to the other two is sent;
Power variant: invitations to all potential 30 candidates are sent right at the beginning.
Each variant represents a certain way of implementing the project phase in question. The simulation model can help us to decide, using the control of simulated metrics values, which variant to choose for the actual implementation. In reality, the phase was implemented according to a scenario close to the negotiation variant, but this happened rather accidentally, with a conscious decision-making process.