Social Capital: Higher Resilience in Slums in the Lagos Metropolis

Abstract

Different slums exhibit different levels of resilience against the threat of eviction. However, little is known about the role of the social capital of the slum community in this context. This study investigates the factors contributing to slum resilience in the Lagos Metropolis, Nigeria, through a social capital lens. This study first investigates land allocation in slums, then the available social capital, and subsequently how this capital influences resilience to the threat of eviction in slums. Data were collected in two slum communities, in Lagos, through in-depth interviews and focus groups discussion. This study shows that land allocation is done by the traditional heads, contrarily to the mandate of the Nigeria Land Use Act of 1978. Furthermore, there is a form of structural social capital through the presence of government registered community development associations in the slums; however, their activities, decision-making process and the perception of the residents’ towards their respective associations, differs. This led to differences in trust, social cohesion and bonding ties among residents of the slum, thereby influencing resilience to the threat of eviction in slums. Since community group associations, through the appointed executives, drive the efficient utilization of social capital in slums, this study therefore recommends their restructuring in order to support a sustainable solution to the threat of eviction in slums in Lagos.

1. Introduction

One of the consequences of urbanization with limited development in the Global South is slum proliferation [1]. Thus, the discourse on curbing the growth of slums has become popular internationally. Cities Without Slums (1999), the Millennium Development Goals (2000) and, more recently, the Sustainable Development Goals (2015), have all focused on reducing slum formation [2,3]. In general, slum upgrading is preferred to slum clearance, as it is cheaper and supports resident participation, especially when dealing with the urban poor [4,5]. Yet, many countries in the Global South are tuned towards redeveloping existing slums into high income residential areas, which entails eviction of slum dwellers from the existing slums [6,7,8]. These evictions create a myriad of problems, especially for the evicted slum dwellers who are left homeless, financially worse off and even dead (in cases where violent means are employed to evict them) [9,10]. Evictions also trigger the emergence of new slums [10].

There is no unified description of slums because of their complexity and manifestation [11]. The terms “squatter settlements”, “informal settlements” and “shanty towns” have all been used interchangeably to describe slums [12]; however, many studies have tried to differentiate between these terms using their legal status. For example, in slums, many residents have security of tenure and cannot be forcefully evicted, whereas most residents of informal settlements have no security of tenure and are usually threatened by evictions [13,14,15]. Similarly, the description of a slum as a physical and spatial manifestation of urban poverty and intra-city inequality [16] shows that it is not farfetched to loosely interchange the term “slum” with “informal settlement” as they have similar characteristics. Furthermore, regardless of whether slums are viewed as informal settlements or as a single entity, both represent deprived communities with social, economic and environmental problems [17,18]. It is also important to note that informal settlements, depending on their scale, may contain slum housing dispersed throughout them [15]. Therefore, this study uses the term slum to denote the local interpretation of communities that are underserved by government and lack basic services and infrastructure.

Communities can be defined as place-based, i.e., as a neighborhood or, in social terms, as a group of people that share common ties either in close proximity or farther away [19]. The emphasis on ties in the description of communities shows that a community cannot exist or develop without people and their connections. These connections, i.e., social and community ties, develop under the premise of the idea of social capital, which is defined as the “glue” that holds a society together [20]. According to Brown as cited by [21], social capital also promotes a rich social fabric and strong community voice. See [22] for further discussion on social capital.

In the past, social capital was used as an individual construct, but it is now increasingly considered to be a collective attribute of a community [23]. Thus, it is one of the assets used to evaluate community development [24]. Similarly, it is recognized as one of the vital assets for achieving sustainable livelihoods [25]. It also serves as a basis for other assets (i.e., the human, cultural, natural, political, financial and built) to build upon [19,26]. For instance, effective use of social capital can aid economic investment in a community [27]. It can also lead to strong political capital that a community can use to influence decisions at the upper level [21].

There are two dimensions to social capital: The cognitive and the structural. The cognitive [23] dimension is based on the subjective nature of humans and the assumption that humans have the natural predisposition to socialize and associate because of the similar characteristics that they possess [28,29]. These characteristics affect social relationships and are assessed based on norms, values, trust, goodwill, social cohesion and reciprocity within a community [29,30]. The structural dimension of social capital assumes that social capital is derived from participating in a social network and is measured based on the type of social networks, group memberships and civic engagement within a community [23,30,31].

Earlier studies on the drivers of slum development were loosely based on institutional [32,33], economic [34,35,36], and locational [37,38] factors. However, recent studies have shown that socio-demo-cultural factors such as ethnicity, religion, family and community ties, etc., can influence decision to either move in, remain or leave a particular slum [39,40,41]. The implication is that there are some underlying bonds, which can be loosely put under the umbrella of social ties, as they emanate from the socio-demo-cultural characteristics of slum dwellers and, if employed, are likely to influence the development and resilience of slums. In addition, high poverty level in slums restricts access to other forms of capital, so therefore, slum dwellers rely on social capital to achieve their goals [42].

Community resilience is the ability of a community to respond to disturbances or shock, either through adaptation and/or occasional changes, to maintain their socio-spatial characteristics [43,44]. Social capital can strengthen a community’s resilience in that it can influence how a community will react to a shock. It also provides a means for adapting to that shock by coordinating local processes and strengthening the community’s collective voice [45]. Furthermore, it helps to create neighborhood cohesion that communities can use to develop a sense of belonging, which can take the form of emotional connections [20]. These connections allow a resident to believe that their needs can be met within the community [46] and, therefore, motivate them to fight for the community’s continued existence.

A resilient slum community is assumed to withstand/adapt to different shocks (e.g., environmental, economic or eviction threat) by either maintaining their current location or replicating itself in another location. However, different slums exhibit different levels2 of resilience against shocks. In the same vein, little is known about the role of the social capital of the slum community in this context. Understanding what drives these differences is crucial to policy makers and urban planners [35], as it can support tailored slum management policies for individual slums. Yet, there are few studies focusing on this phenomenon, i.e., social capital and resilience in slums.

Some studies have bridged this gap by showing how social capital is employed in slums for community development and interaction among communities members. Ref. [47] showed that increased participation in local associations among slum dwellers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, created a bonding and bridging type of social network that has contributed to the development of social trust and confidence in the government. Ref. [48] investigated how the structure of social capital influenced resilience among slum dwellers in Dhaka during the flooding of the Dhaka megacity. They reported that the high prevalence of trust and informal ties aided slum dwellers in combatting the shock of the flooding. Previous authors [45] showed in their analysis in Kibera, Kenya, that slum upgrading has the potential to reduce risks in slums, e.g., conflicts and flooding, if processes such as building social contracts and social ties are incorporated into interventions. Ref. [49] identified social networks, especially rotating credit schemes and ethnic alliances, as social security and insurance mechanisms for the urban poor of Lagos. Ref. [50] showed that former slum inhabitants who had been evicted from Badia-east relied on family and friendship ties as coping strategies. While these studies have demonstrated the importance of social capital to slum community development and as a form of coping strategy after eviction, none of them have addressed how slum dwellers and their local organizations can use their social capital to promote higher resilience in slums and also to respond to the threat of vulnerability to eviction.

The vision of Lagos’ state government is to transform the city into the “Africa model megacity, and a global economic and financial hub” [51] (p. 1). In order to achieve this, new developments are strategically proposed in the city to attract investment opportunities [52]. Many slums in Lagos, where two out of three people dwell [53] are, therefore, reserved for such proposed developments, due to their location on prime lands [54]. To make slum land available for new development, slum dwellers are usually evicted and the land is cleared [54,55]. Although some of these evictions have been completed as planned (e.g., Maroko, Ilubirin, Otodo-Gbame, etc.), many slums still exist in Lagos [56], either through resisting eviction or bouncing back after eviction. However, little is known about the factors that may have contributed to a higher resilience against eviction in specific slums. This study, therefore, aims to investigate the factors that contribute to the resilience of slum communities, through a social capital lens. The sub-questions are: (i) How is land allocated in slums? (ii) What elements of social capital are available in slums? (iii) How did the residents utilize social capital to influence resilience to the threat of eviction in slums in Lagos?

This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 presents the introduction and aim of study; Section 2 presents the land tenure and its influence land accessibility in Lagos; Section 3 presents the conceptual framework guiding the study; Section 4 describes the study area and method utilized in the study; Section 5 presents the results; Section 6 gives the discussion and recommendation; and Section 7 gives the conclusion.

2. Land Tenure System in Lagos

Before 1978, the distribution and use of land in Lagos was governed by both the customary and statutory tenure system. This dual mechanism created a complex system, with respect to land transaction and interpretation, which became a major obstacle to the access of land by the poor [57]. In the customary land tenure system, the use of land was controlled by traditional rulers and family heads who held it in trust for the community or family members, respectively [58]. The statutory tenure system, derived from England and local legislation in Nigeria, aimed to protect both the individual right to freely acquire (or discard) land and the state access to land through the power of acquisition [57,59].

Customary land tenure allows low-income earners to access land (Rakodi, 1997 in [57]). However, increases in population and urbanization pressure have resulted in an exponential increase in land price, based on exchange value rather than use value [59]. The consequences of these changes include increases in the amount of land speculation, land title risk (as a single piece of land could be sold to more than one person), increased litigation and, for the poor, difficulties in accessing land [58,59]. To make matters worse (for the poor), the government, under the statutory land tenure, only provided land to build estates for the elites in Lagos [57].

The inefficiencies of the two land tenure systems led to the promulgation of the Land Use Act of 1978 by the Federal Government of Nigeria (The detail of the Nigeria Land Use Act of 1978 can be find at http://www.jstor.org/stable/745083, accessed on 11 May 2020) [60]. This act aims to create uniform laws governing access to land, thus making land available to all. The law ensures that land is acquired properly and put to proper use for needed development [61]. The law vested control of land to the state and local government in urban and rural areas, respectively. The state grants the statutory right of occupancy for a specific period, subject to payment of rent to the state, while the customary right is granted for agricultural and residential purposes but without any statutory right on the land.

While the mandate of the Nigeria Land Use Act of 1978 was to allow access to land for all, in practice this was not the case, especially for the poor and low-income earners. Rather than creating a smoother land management system, the Land Use Act is rife with controversies with respect to the acquisition, disposal, use and administration of land, especially in urban areas [62]. This has been attributed to higher demand for land due to the high rate of urbanization [62]. In addition, the law has been criticized as mainly benefitting the elite and better-off members of Nigerian society [57]. Furthermore, the procedure for obtaining a land title is very difficult, expensive and time consuming, especially in Lagos where all land was declared as “urban” [59,63]. In addition to the tedious process of acquiring land rights, the pricing of land has also increased. Therefore, many housing developments have targeted high- and middle-income groups [57,64].

Consequently, the poor and low-income groups have become more vulnerable because of difficulties in accessing formal housing and land. Thus, alternatives to access land and housing have risen, such as the informal land and housing markets, which promote irregular settlements, such as slums, in the cities [64]. These informal land and housing markets, in many cases, have insecurity of tenure because of no government-recognized land title, thus residents of such land or housing are vulnerable to threat of eviction [65]. For instance, insecurity of tenure is a basis for most of the slum evictions in Lagos [55].

3. Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework utilized in this study was modified from the risk and resilience framework for slums as developed by Kounkuey Design Initiative (KDI)/International Alert and cited in [45] (Figure 1). This approach was chosen because it highlights social capital as a mediating component that links risk to resilience in slums. The study first examines land allocation in slums to give a general overview of land management within them. It then proceeds by investigating the social capital elements and how slum residents utilize them to influence slum resilience.

This study focuses on the threat of eviction in slums, which is a common risk in Lagos that is caused by insecurity of tenure [55]. Furthermore, we study social capital as an asset that a slum community can employ to encourage higher resilience, i.e., to maintain their current location. Social capital in this study is seen as a form of collective community capability, which is defined as an asset that is available to a community for achieving their goals [66]. The extent to which a community can mitigate a risk is based on its capability [44].

A local/community association is a group/organization that works for the benefit of its members or a particular community. A community rich in structural social capital stock is assumed to be characterized by the strong engagement of residents in their local associations [46,47]. This strong engagement can be utilized to protect households from evictions [64]. Thus, we assess social capital through community group associations and how their activities impact on trust, social cohesion and bonding among slum dwellers. Their influence is used to assess higher resilience in the individual slums studied.

This study defines trust as believing that other persons or groups have the capacity to control risk through their commitment [67]. Because of this belief, members of a group are willing to cooperate with one another to achieve a set of common goals, bringing about social cohesion in a community [68] and, finally, a stronger bonding tie between members of the community [19]. Similarly, as many projects in slums focus on self-help [33], it is assumed that bonding has priority over other types of social networks in slums [23].

4. Materials and Methods

4.1. Study Area

This study was carried out in Lagos, a megacity in south-western Nigeria (Figure 2). The city has developed from a coastal village to one of the fastest growing cities in the world with an estimated population of 25,615,703 in 2018 and an annual population growth rate of 3.2%, attributed to be the major economic and former political center of Nigeria [69,70,71].

The earliest recognized profiling of slums in Lagos was carried out in 1984, where 42 of such communities were identified and ranked based on their level of degradation [72]. Over time, the number has increased to more than 100 [56]. Some of these new slums have emerged due to the physical expansion or clearance of existing slums that had been previously identified [73,74]. This study was carried out in Badia-east, one of the earlier identified slums in 1984, and Otto-Ilogbo, a slum community that developed after 1984. The communities were selected as two contrasting examples of slum communities because they have both undergone forceful evictions and have both been to court to contest this action. However, the outcomes were different, despite both being considered as slums in Lagos (

Table 1. Characteristics of the study area.

	Badia-East	Otto-Ilogbo
Local government Area	Apapa	Lagos Mainland
Identified	Before 1984	After 1984
Land Tenure System	Customary/Ojora of Ijora	Customary/Oloto of Otto
* Size (ha)	<12	<7
Legality	Squatter	Squatter
Location	Central	Central
Biophysical Characteristics	Swampy	Swampy
Current Situation	Mostly Cleared	Existing

* Area is given as approximate as there is no official documents to back up the claim.

).

4.1.1. Badia-East

Badia-east is one of the slum communities already identified in 1984. It is located in the Apapa local government area in Lagos. It consists of three sub-communities: Oke Ilu-eri, Ajeromi and Railway Line. It is bordered on the North by the Lagos Badagry Expressway, in the east by a railway line, running parallel with the Apapa road and, in the south, by Ajegunle (another slum community).

The earliest settlers of the Badia-east were displaced from the present-day location of the Nigeria National Art Theatre, Iganmu, Lagos (formally known as Oluwole village), after the federal Government acquired the land through forceful eviction without adequate consultation or compensation in order to build the theatre [56]. Due to protests by the residents, the federal government resettled them and allocated vacant land to them in Badia-east [56]. As there was no major improvement on the land, it was mostly waterlogged and flooded, the earlier settlers started by building shanties that, over time, expanded to become a large settlement due to the presence of low-cost housing and proximity to the Nigeria Port Authority [56]. Before the significant clearances in the community that occurred between 2013 and 2017, the residents worked in both the formal (e.g., white-collar jobs) and informal sectors [75]. However, after the clearance, most residents are now predominantly engaged in informal jobs such as trading, selling fish, as artisans, etc. The community lacks toilets, water and road facilities [76]. Badia-east was one of the communities that benefitted from the World Bank-sponsored Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project (LMDGP). However, the project, which started as slum upgrading, resulted in collateral damage due to the forced eviction of residents [77]. Furthermore, funds earmarked for upgrading were used to compensate some of the displaced persons, which was clearly contrary to the intent of the project [77,78].

The status of the ownership of Badia-east land is unclear. The Ojora family has continued to exercise customary ownership right over Badia-east due to winning a court case concerning its ownership [79]. Yet, the federal government continues to claim ownership of Badia-east through the relocation of the earlier slum dwellers in 1973 and the construction of railway facilities in Badia-east. Similarly, prior to the court case, which finally upheld the right of ownership to the Ojora family, the Lagos state government regarded the area as state land. Although, by the virtue of the Nigeria Land Use Act of 1978, the state government can compulsorily acquire Badia-east for public purposes, the state has not exercised this right. Similarly, current developments on the land, such as the 1008 Housing Estate, show collaboration between the state government and the Ojora family. See further discussion on conflict of land ownership in Badia-East in [80].

Subsequently, one of the implications of the conflict over land ownership in Badia-east is uncertainty as to who exactly is the landlord for the residents. For instance, some of the relocated residents from Iganmu were granted a “temporary occupation license” in Badia-east by the Lagos state government [80]. However, the outcome of the court case, which gave right of land ownership to the Ojora family, likely made such settlers illegal tenants. This can be observed after the court case where the Ojora family erected notices within Badia-east and referred to the community residents as trespassers [80]. As a result of this, the Railway-Line and Ajeromi sub-communities in Badia-east were cleared and residents were forcefully evicted from their homes in 2015.

4.1.2. Otto-Ilogbo

Otto-Ilogbo slum extension, popularly known as Otto-Ilogbo, is located in the Lagos mainland local government area. It got its name from being bounded by both the Otto and Ilogbo communities. It also shares a boundary with Ilaje-Otumara, another slum community. The settlement came into existence about 30 years ago (i.e., after 1984), due to the inability of the earlier settlers to afford private government housing in Lagos [81]. Over time, the population increased due to the aforementioned reasons and its location, i.e., its closeness to Oyingbo Market, Lagos Island, etc. Initially the land area was predominantly swampy, so residents filled the land with refuse and sand which enabled them to build homes that were primarily wooden shacks. The community lacks infrastructural facilities such as roads, toilets, water, etc. [81]. Most of the residents are traders, artisans and some work within the formal sector.

Unlike Badia-east, where the land ownership is complicated, Otto-Ilogbo falls under the domain of the Oloto chieftaincy family [80], which allows them to exercise customary right. The earliest settlers met with the Oloto to announce their stay on his land. He acknowledged this by issuing a certificate based on two conditions: (i) That the landlords pay an annual fee to the Oloto, and (ii) that the Oloto will not come to their defense if the government needs to remove them. In exchange for this, the Oloto promised them representation at the state committees [82]. Since the Oloto did not comply with this agreement, the former settlers decided to stop paying the annual dues, which led to the first forceful eviction in 2002. The community, as a whole, immediately rebuilt their housing and still refused to pay the annual fee to the Oloto, due to the status quo. This led to constant conflicts between the residents and the Oloto. As other people moved in, they also followed the lead of the former settlers by not paying any fee to the Oloto [81]. During this period, the community head approached the government to seek official recognition of Otto-Ilogbo. This was granted in 2008, but the community still faced the threat of demolition. According to respondents in the community, there has been several attempts to evict them from the community by both the Lagos state government and the Oloto family. For instance, in 2011, the community filed a lawsuit against the Lagos state government to prevent the demolition of the community and a judgment was passed on 5th of March, 2013, which favored the slum community [83]. Additionally, another attempt to forcefully evict residents took place in 2014 after a fire outbreak in the community. The community filed a complaint (Otto Ilogbo Community vs. Lagos State Government & Ors. [forced eviction], Original Complaint to NHRC (filed May 2014)) against the Oloto and Lagos state government [84], this time through the national human rights group commission. All this demonstrates the legal skirmishes going on at Otto-Ilogbo.

4.2. Methods

The study utilized a qualitative research method to determine land allocation, social capital elements and how slum residents utilizes social capital to influence slum resilience, in Lagos slums. Qualitative methods give room for more in-depth analysis of specific phenomenon [85]. Since social capital embodies human relationship, information derived from group discussion are more detailed than survey [86]. Qualitative data were collected using semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions in Badia-east and Otto-Ilogbo between December 2019 and March 2020. Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) are both conversational and informal in tone [87]. They allow the respondents to speak freely about issues with less constraints, e.g., from the researcher [85]. They are also very useful for investigating complex behaviors, options, emotions and effects, and to collect diversified experiences [87].

In-depth interviews were conducted with the chairman of the Community Development Association (CDA) and community leaders (three from each community with no tie to the present CDA executives) to gain in-depth knowledge on the activities of the CDA, land allocation and actions during periods of eviction threat in each study area.

First, a reconnaissance survey was carried out to understand the socio-spatial and decision making structure of the sampled communities. This helped to get a general overview of the sampled communities and also to identify prospective participants for interview and focus group discussion.

As the focus was at the community level, in-depth interviews were conducted with the chairman of the Community Development Association (CDA) and community leaders (three from each community with no tie to the present CDA executives) to gain in-depth knowledge on the activities of the CDA, land allocation and actions during periods of eviction threat in each study area. The interview respondents were chosen because of their prior knowledge of the community activities.

FGDs were conducted in each community to gain detailed insight into the perception of the residents with respect to the activities of the CDA and the social capital available in the study area. The participants of the FGDs were a mixed group of people of different age (above 18 years), sex, ethnicity and occupation. The participants of the FGD (>12) were randomly selected from different part of the sample communities, after the reconnaissance survey in each community. This was important because of the socio-clustering in Lagos slums [41]. The goal of the diverse group was to gain deeper insight, based on different opinions.

The interviews and the FGDs were transcribed and analyzed using narrative analysis. Narrative analysis gives room to analyze a whole event, experience, action and its effect on plots, rather than placing more emphasis on just the just key words [88]. All ethical processes of confidentiality and informed consents were followed, and the names used in this study are pseudonyms.

5. Results

5.1. Land Allocation in Slums in Lagos

Based on the Nigeria Land Use Act of 1978, the state and local governments are entrusted with land ownership in Nigeria. However, land allocation in slums in Lagos is managed by the land-owning families and the traditional heads. In the case of Badia-east and Otto-Ilogbo, their land falls under the jurisdiction of the traditional heads, i.e., Oloto of Otto land and Ojora of Ijora, respectively. For many poor people who cannot access formal land in Lagos, the alternative is slums. Land is allocated to the prospective slum dwellers after they pay rents to the traditional head in order to build their homes. This was buttressed by a resident who said:

“When I came into this place, I paid money to the Oloto of Otto in order to have access to this land, so I am a tenant of the Oloto.”

(Mrs. Bidemi, Interview, Otto-Ilogbo, March 2020)

Also, the traditional heads played a conspicuous role during eviction processes in the slum as they orchestrated the evictions in the study area. This was supported by statements of the CDA chairmen of both communities:

“When the new Ojora of Ijora came to power, he asked that we residents should vacate the land.”

(CDA Chairman, Interview, Badia-east, January 2020)

“We took Oloto to court when he wanted to forcefully evict us.”

(CDA Chairman, Interview, Otto-Ilogbo, March 2020)

The implication of this land allocation by the traditional heads in the slums, backed by customary law, is that the traditional heads can decide who to evict or allow to remain on their land based on their perception of who is a legal or illegal tenant. For instance, the Oke-ilu Eri sub-community in Badia-east is still existing because they had an agreement with the Ojora family. The other sub-communities (i.e., Ajeromi and Railway), nonetheless, have been cleared for modern development and construction of a railway line. Ref. [89] also reported similar cases at Otodo-Gbame (a cleared slum in Lagos), where residents believed that the clearance of their community had the full backing of the traditional head.

5.2. Social Capital in Slums

5.2.1. Elements of Social Capital in the Slum Communities

The structural dimension of social capital is present in both Badia-east and Otto-Ilogbo as they both have community development associations (CDAs) registered with the Lagos state government;

“We registered our community group association with the Lagos state government”

(CDA Chairman, Interview, Badia-east, January 2020)

“We have meetings every Saturday and residents of the community are expected to attend”

(CDA Chairman, Interview, Otto-Ilogbo, March 2020)

The Community Development Association law, which was enacted by the Lagos State house of assembly and came into force in 2008, empowers local communities to organize themselves to follow objectives, which include the promotion of self-help efforts within the community, raising funds for the implementation of community projects and activities, and the initiation, execution and monitoring of community development projects (https://laws.lawnigeria.com/2019/04/03/community-development-associations-law (accessed on 10 August 2020)). The CDAs are overseen by executives, appointed either through voting or otherwise, and are mandated to manage and monitor development in their respective communities. The CDAs also interface with the local government for community development efforts and raise funds for local projects through levies on members.

The CDA meets periodically to deliberate on challenges facing the community at both the individual and community level. At the individual level, residents come together to help one another in times of need, which in many cases is facilitated by the CDA executives. For example, during the fire outbreak in Otto-Ilogbo in 2014, the community came together to assist members who were injured during the outbreak by donating small items. Furthermore, at the community level, the CDA executives in Badia-east sand-filled the primary school compound to prevent the invasion of dangerous reptiles with the help of a Chinese company in Lagos. Similarly, the Otto-Ilogbo CDA executives put notice boards around the community to dissuade people from dumping waste within the community, as they observed that people from outside the community contributed to the huge pile of refuse dump in their community (Figure 3).

While both communities show structural forms of social capital through the presence of registered CDAs, their mode of operation differs (

Table 2. Differences in the Community Development Association (CDA) activities in the study area.

	Theme	Badia-East	Otto-Ilogbo
1	Meetings	The executives only call meeting when there is need	The CDA meets every last Saturday of the month and at any other time
2	Presence of CDA	Most of the CDA executives do not live within the community, so are sometimes not available	The CDA executives live and work in the communities
3	Relationship between CDA and residents	Weaker connection between the CDA executives and residents	Stronger connection between the CDA and residents
4	Perception of government by CDA	The current CDA executives are supports the government action “no reasonable Government will want shanties to continue here” CDA Chairman	Current CDA executives support continued stay on the land “Government should pity us; we have spent a lot to be here” CDA Chairman
5	Type of election of executives	Executives are elected based on voting and interest	Elect their executives based on their previous work in the community (human rights activism)

). For instance, the CDA executives, in Badia-east, only call for a meeting when it is needed, whereas in Otto-Ilogbo, CDA meetings are held monthly and, additionally, at any time that is necessary. Furthermore, key members of the CDA executive in Badia-east do not reside in the community anymore and, subsequently, only come in when required. Thus, they may not have the same interest as the residents that have continued to live in Badia-east. This is not the case in Otto-Ilogbo where the key executive members still live in the same community. In comparison to Badia-east, this situation has aided bonding between the CDA executives and residents in Otto-Ilogbo, as the executives are readily available when needed.

The observed differences in the CDA activities demonstrate the complexity of slums, as no two slums are the same [90]. This likely led to the differences in the strength of the CDA, with respect to the commitment of the CDA executives.

5.2.2. Perception of Slum Residents on Activities of Community Group Association

Considering the functions of the CDA executives, one might assume that the residents’ perception of them should be similar. However, this is not the case in Badia-east and Otto-Ilogbo community. The perception of residents in Badia-east is that the CDA executives are not performing as well as expected. This claim is supported by the response from a community leader who has resided in Badia-east for many years:

“I have been living in this community for a long time and seen different executives in the CDA, but the current CDA executives are not doing much and I feel that they support government decision.”

(Mr. Dayo, Community Leader, Interview, Badia-east January 2020)

Interestingly, some residents are not even aware that they have a CDA nor do they know what its functions is. For instance, an old woman was asked if she knows if they have a CDA and her response was

“What is CDA?”

(Mrs. Jaiye, FGD, Badia-east, January 2020)

The situation in Otto-Ilogbo is different as residents think the CDA executives are performing well. These residents made reference to some of the CDA’s activities, such as building a school for the community, forming/joining a vigilante group and keeping the community in the loop through the dissemination of information at appropriate times. To support this claim, we provide some of the responses from residents living at Otto-Ilogbo.

One of the respondents who was born and still lives in the community with his family said:

“When we had a security problem here, our CDA chairman was going out at night with other members of the community to ensure our safety.”

(Mr. Dada, Resident, Interview, Otto-Ilogbo, February 2020)

Another elderly woman who is a community leader also supported the claim by saying:

“We have only one school in this community which was built by the CDA chairman. Our children go to school here as it is cheap.”

(Mrs. Osho, Resident, Interview, Otto-Ilogbo, February 2020)

The differences in their perception likely led to limited motivation by slum dwellers to attend CDA meetings in Badia-east, compared to Otto-Ilogbo. The disparities among members of the community intensify the ambivalence of residents to the CDA meetings in Badia-east. This has, in turn, led to less trust and social cohesion in Badia-east. Without these elements among members of a community, it is difficult to build a strong bonding tie [45] needed to achieve a communal goal. For instance, some of the community projects embarked upon in Badia-east have been deemed to be unsuccessful. Although most of the unsuccessful projects have been attributed to political influence, there is a weaker tie among residents of Badia-east. This leads to a form of segregation within the community. To corroborate this, we provide the response of an older member of the community who migrated from Oluwole village to Badia-east in 1973:

“You see in the past we always scrutinized the person we wanted to elect as an executive member of our CDA, but now some people just sit in one room and pick themselves. We don’t even know how they are doing it and many of us here are not part of how this is done.”

(Mr. Dayo, interview, Badia-east, January, 2020)

Although there is a stronger tie among residents in Otto-Ilogbo through residents’ participation and awareness on development in the community, residents still complained about changes of plans that sometimes occur after decisions taken during CDA meeting:

“I have been living in this community with my parent since I was very young, so now I go to the CDA meeting to represent my father. During the meeting we all decide on something together, then sometimes the plan changes, though not every time.”

(Mr. Shayo, interview, Otto-Ilogbo, February 2020)

5.3. Leveraging on Social Capital to Slum Resilience in Lagos

Slum communities pushed back using different methods after been threatened by eviction, for example, by temporarily resettling at the fringe of demolished communities, protesting during demolition exercise, petitioning the government/land owners, etc. It is important to point out here that not all these methods are successful regarding slum resilience as observed in the study area. For instance, in 2013, the court ruled in favor of the Otto-Ilogbo community, which was allowed to remain in its present location, after filing a law suit (Agbodemu & Ors v Lagos State Environmental Sanitation Enforcement Agency & Ors (M-710-2011)) petitioning the government on the proposed forceful eviction. This, among other factors, was due to strong social capital, in the form of trust, that the residents had for their CDA executives. The CDA was able to leverage this trust to get monetary contributions from the residents, simultaneously creating financial capital for the community, which was then used to employ lawyers for the court case. In addition, many residents were present during the court proceeding to show social cohesion and support to achieve their common goal. Another important thing noted was that the CDA chairman, as observed in his statement, was well prepared for the court case:

“If you come to my office, you will see different research I have carried out. I have experience on issues like this, so I know how to mobilize our people to fight for what we want. Even when we went to court, I had evidence to back up our claims and the judge had no option but to rule in our favor.”

(CDA Chairman, Interview, Otto-Ilogbo, March 2020)

Whereas in the case of Badia-east (current home to the railway line and the 1008 Housing Estates), several issues disrupted the efficient use of their social capital during and after the eviction. For instance, residents do not believe they can influence the decision of the government. To support this claim, some of the responses given by residents are provided here:

“You know government, whatever they like is what they do, you cannot fight them, even if you attempt to you will get tired and you get discouraged.”

(Mr. John, Ex-CDA Chairman, Interview, Badia-east, January 2020)

“I usually attend their meeting and during meeting you must not talk against government, if not they will not allow you to attend meetings again.”

(Mr. Agun, Interview, Badia-east, January 2020)

These comments also show the residents’ fear of the government. According to [33], this fear is considered a form of social control used by governments to keep people docile and prevent formation of protests that can champion causes in a community. This fear reduces the available social capital in such community.

6. Discussion/Recommendation

Inaccessibility to land continues to be a problem for the poor in Lagos. While the Land Use Act of 1978 allowed the government to acquire vast amounts of land, much of this land is still undeveloped. Additionally, when the government sells land, it is at an exorbitant rate, which requires documentation that many poor do not have access to. Thus, land-owning families use this as an opportunity to continue to sell land at high prices without any recognizable title to those that buy from them. As a result of this, many slum dwellers have no security of tenure and are at the mercy of the traditional rulers. In the same vein, when there are land tussles between the government and the land-owning families, the casualties are usually the residents because they have no titled document. This is a consequence of dual land tenure system with weak statutory land law [91].This is also experienced in many sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) where land management is governed under two distinct land tenure system, i.e., customary and statutory land tenure [92]. This tenure dualism creates land ownership conflicts [92] especially on land that the government has vested interest in. Generally, the customary land tenure does not involve any legal documents [65], thus many people living under this system are at a risk of eviction. Considering that over 80% of the land transaction in SSA is still covered by the customary land tenure [93], land tenure insecurity continues to be a challenge in the region.

Though customary land tenure aids land accessibility and provide investment security, especially in the rural areas of SSA [65], it also promotes land speculation and insecurity of land tenure in cities [59]. In addition, customary land tenure is a significant component of the African society, and rather than overthrowing it, the government should embrace it, in order to create an efficient land management system in Africa [92]. In view of this, there is need to revisit the Nigeria Land Use Act of 1978 to account for the customary land tenure. This will help to clarify land rights and management, especially in the bigger cities like Lagos.

Bringing a community together requires a semblance of structure and this involves representation, which can be in the form of appointing executives. Generally, it is assumed that the CDA executives will build on their shared connection with other residents to actualize their collective goals. However, this study showed that the strength of the shared connection depends on how the CDA executives are appointed, their activities, decision-making process and the perception of the residents towards the CDA executives. For instance, both Badia-east and Otto-Ilogbo have registered CDA, yet there were disconnections between the CDA executives and the residents, attributed to the differences in the aforementioned factors in each slum community. Ref. [94] also observed a similar situation in three slums in Bangkok, whereby the establishment of community groups does not necessary lead to the actualization of community goals. Furthermore, [95] observed in some Mumbai slums that there was unbridgeable divide between the community executives and residents because the executives blocked the community progress for their personal gains. Similarly, CDA executives appointed by external agents such as the government or allied agencies advocate for the external agent’s agenda rather the community’s [96]. This implies that community groups, through the appointed executives, are like a double-edged sword that can either promote or reduce social capital (i.e., trust and social cohesion) in a community.

In view of this, there is need to change how the CDA executives are appointed (e.g., using past experience as a social activist like in Otto-Ilogbo, connection/reputation with other people, etc.), because of their important role in the community development. Moreover, residents should actively participate during and after the appointment of their executives, in order to checkmate the executives mode of operation. This can boost trust and social cohesion at the community level, which will invariably lead to stronger bonds and engagement among members of the community. This can also help to create platforms for the community to acquire other capitals [26] e.g., financial capital in the case of Otto-Ilogbo.

Slum resilience is the ability of a slum community to retain its current location. While the dual land tenure system in Nigeria promotes land insecurity in slums, this study showed that slum dwellers can retain their location by leveraging on their social capital; however, for how long, without titling, is uncertain. A slum can attain higher resilience if it is seen as a vote bank, though this will not diminish their vulnerability in the long run [97]. For instance, slums are allowed to grow in Mumbai because of political agendas [35]. This means slum dwellers can leverage their vote bank capability (i.e., political capital), and together with their social capital, demand for sustainable solutions to their land insecurity issues e.g., by applying for village excisions, legitimization of the slum community and, together with government support, embark on slum upgrading. The implication is that while social capital has assisted slum dwellers to overcome some of their challenges [45,49], combatting land tenure insecurity in slums will require combining other capitals with social capital to inform a sustainable solution.

7. Conclusions

This paper contributes to research on slum dynamics in cities. The distinct contribution of this study is the influence of social capital on slum resilience, as social capital is the major asset of slum residents. The study was carried out in two slums in Lagos: Badia-east and Otto-Ilogbo. The study first examined the land allocation in slums to give an overview of land management in slums, then proceeded by investigating the social capital elements and how they influence slum resilience in the sampled communities.

This study shows that land allocation is to a great extent done by the traditional heads, which is contrary to The Nigeria Land Use Act of 1978. Additionally, there is a form of structural social capital through the presence of government-registered community associations in the slums. However, their mode of operation led to differences in the perception of the residents for the CDA. This has led to reduced trust, social cohesion and bonding between residents of the slum, thereby reducing resilience to the threat of eviction. Thus, we recommend increasing community engagement in the community group association activities.

The threat of eviction will always be a major risk in slums, especially in communities where legal status is unclear. However, with the increasing interest in social responsibility and slums identified as vote banks, communities can tap into their social capital to combat such risk. This will require that communities first identify their social capital and how to utilize it for their community gains; especially when the threat arises from land-owning families.

Though this study found social capital to be an important factor in building community resilience to eviction, other factors such as location, size of slums, politics etc., may influence the severity of eviction threat in Lagos. Therefore, there is a need for further studies that examine such factors and that can bring further insight to complexities in slums, especially in sub-Saharan Africa where there are many slums.