Corporate Governance vs. Financial Performance for Intensity of Innovation Investments
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Background
Measurement Methodology of Corporate Governance | |
---|---|
Variables of Boards: | Evaluation’s Description |
Functions | The clarity, validity, and consistency of the company’s management functions must be precisely defined and recorded to avoid unnecessary ambiguities. |
Structure | The company’s management structure must be efficient, logical, and able to generate new ideas and implement those ideas by consensus on the company’s growth. |
Compensation Policy | The company’s management compensation policy must be consistent and not contradict the management’s ambitions and the company’s growth aspirations. |
Strategy and Vision | The company’s management strategy and vision must be based on innovations that create high added value, which would not contradict the general goal of the country—environmental protection and social responsibility. |
Rights of Shareholders | Company shareholders should be given equal lefts based on the desire to increase their invested assets. |
3. The Research Hypotheses Based on the Literature
4. Research Methodology
5. Results
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Significant Variables | Reason of Significant Impact on Corporate Innovation Investment Intensity and Risk |
---|---|
Corporate governance | Board members (among whom various company directors) can make important effect on the whole value chain of innovation investments |
Corporate size | Significant impact on the volume of innovation investments |
Debt ratio | Important influence on external sources of financing for investments |
Return on assets | Significant effect on corporate development and market prestige |
Cash ratio | Significant impact on internal sources of financing for investments |
Tobin’s q ratio | Important influence on corporate value. Corporate could increase the intensity of innovation investments, if asset’s market value is bigger than asset’s book value. |
Region | Countries |
---|---|
Western Europe (17 countries) 34% | Austria (AUT), Belgium (B.E.L.), Switzerland (C.H.E.), Germany (D.E.U.), Denmark (D.N.K.), Spain (E.S.P.), Finland (FIN), France (F.R.A.), United Kingdom (G.B.R.), Greece (G.R.C.), Ireland (IRL), Italy (I.T.A.), Luxembourg (LUX), Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Portugal (P.R.T.) and Sweden (S.W.E.) |
Eastern Europe (4 countries) 8% | Czech Republic (C.Z.E.), Hungary (H.U.N.), Poland (P.O.L.), and Russia (RUS) |
North America (2 countries) 4% | United States of America (U.S.A.) and Canada (CAN) |
Latin America (5 countries) 10% | Brazil (B.R.A.), Chile (C.H.L.), Colombia (C.O.L.), Mexico (MEX), and PER (Peru) |
Asia (18 countries) 36% | United Arab Emirates (A.R.E.), China (C.H.N.), Hong Kong (H.K.G.), Indonesia (IDN), India (IND), Israel (I.S.R.), Japan (J.P.N.), North Korea (KOR), Kuwait (K.W.T.), Malaysia (M.Y.S.), Philippines (P.H.L.), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Arabia (S.A.U.), Jordan (JOR) Singapore (S.G.P.), Thailand (T.H.A.), Taiwan (T.W.N.) and Turkey (TUR) |
Africa (2 countries) 4% | Egypt (E.G.Y.) and South Africa (Z.A.F.) |
Oceania (2 countries) 4% | Australia (AUS) and New Zealand (N.Z.L.) |
Ratio | Name | Methodology (Measurement) |
---|---|---|
Intensity of innovation investments | INNOVATION_INVESTMENTS_INTENSITY | R&D EXPENDITURE/ASSETS (COEFF.) |
Corporate governance | CG | AVERAGE OF 5 SUB-DIMENSIONS OF BOARD’S (functions; structure; compensation policy; vision and strategy; shareholder rights) (SCORE FROM 1 TILL 100) Board (COEFF) |
Return on assets | ROA | NET INCOME/ASSETS (COEFF) |
Debt ratio | DEBT RATIO | DEBT/ASSETS (COEFF) |
Corporate size | CORPORATE SIZE | L.N. (ASSETS) (COEFF) |
Cash ratio | CASH RATIO | CASH/ASSETS (COEFF) |
Tobinq ratio | TOBINQ RATIO | (ASSETS + MCAPx1000-COMMON EQUITY)/ASSETS (COEFF) |
Number of Obs = 42,160 | Prob > F = 0.0000 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
No. of Categories = 6033 | R-Squared = 0.9128 | |||||
F(21, 6032) = 5.23 | Adj R-Squared = 0.8981 | |||||
Root MSE = 0.0136 | ||||||
INNOVATION_ INVESTMENTS_ INTENSITY | Coef. | Robust | t | P > t | [95% Conf.] | [Interval] |
Std. Err. | ||||||
CORPORATE_SIZE | −0.0040083 | 0.0008018 | −50.00 | 00.000 | −0.0055802 | −0.0024364 |
DEBT_RATIO | −0.0069972 | 0.0024296 | −2.88 | 00.004 | −0.01176 | −0.0022343 |
ROA | −0.0160227 | 0.0033633 | −4.76 | 00.000 | −0.022616 | −0.0094295 |
CASH_RATIO | −0.0096931 | 0.0033123 | −2.93 | 00.003 | −0.0161865 | −0.0031997 |
TOBINQ_ RATIO | 0.0012406 | 0.0004795 | 2.59 | 00.010 | 0.0003006 | 0.0021806 |
2003 | −0.0001045 | 0.0004124 | −0.25 | 0.800 | −0.000913 | 0.000704 |
2004 | −0.0011022 | 0.0007342 | −1.50 | 0.133 | −0.0025415 | 0.0003371 |
2005 | −0.0012909 | 0.0008681 | −1.49 | 0.137 | −0.0029927 | 0.000411 |
2006 | −0.0004248 | 0.0009834 | −0.43 | 0.666 | −0.0023526 | 0.0015031 |
2007 | 0.0005347 | 0.0010614 | 0.50 | 0.614 | −0.0015461 | 0.0026154 |
2008 | 0.0020361 | 0.001091 | 1.87 | 00.062 | −0.0001026 | 0.0041748 |
2009 | 0.0010794 | 0.0011594 | 0.93 | 0.352 | −0.0011934 | 0.0033522 |
2010 | 0.0003969 | 0.0012315 | 0.32 | 0.747 | −0.0020173 | 0.0028111 |
2011 | 0.0010641 | 0.0012792 | 0.83 | 0.406 | −0.0014436 | 0.0035719 |
2012 | 0.00153 | 0.0013164 | 1.16 | 0.245 | −0.0010505 | 0.0041105 |
2013 | 0.0012522 | 0.0012792 | 0.98 | 0.328 | −0.0012554 | 0.0037599 |
2014 | 0.001372 | 0.0012724 | 10.08 | 0.281 | −0.0011224 | 0.0038665 |
2015 | 0.0004368 | 0.001256 | 0.35 | 0.728 | −0.0020254 | 0.0028991 |
2016 | 0.0014684 | 0.0012788 | 1.15 | 0.251 | −0.0010385 | 0.0039753 |
2017 | 0.0013055 | 0.0012969 | 10.01 | 0.314 | −0.0012368 | 0.0038478 |
2018 | 0.0012531 | 0.0014233 | 0.88 | 0.379 | −0.001537 | 0.0040432 |
_cons | 0.0797208 | 0.0115003 | 6.93 | 00.000 | 0.057176 | 0.1022656 |
Number of obs = 42,160 | Prob > F = 00.0000 | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
No. of Categories = 6033 | R-Squared = 0.9128 | |||||
F(22, 6032) = 5.26 | Adj R-Squared = 0.8982 | |||||
Root MSE = 00.0136 | ||||||
INNOVATION_ INVESTMENTS_ INTENSITY | Coef. | Robust Std. Err. | t | P > t | [95% Conf.] | [Interval] |
CORPORATE_SIZE | −0.0040943 | 0.0008023 | −5.10 | 00.000 | −0.005667 | −0.0025215 |
DEBT_ RATIO | −0.0069896 | 0.0024302 | −2.88 | 00.004 | −0.0117537 | −0.0022254 |
ROA | −0.0159845 | 0.0033622 | −4.75 | 00.000 | −0.0225756 | −0.0093934 |
CASH_ RATIO | −0.0096373 | 0.0033123 | −2.91 | 00.004 | −0.0161306 | −0.0031441 |
TOBINQ_RATIO | 0.0012453 | 0.0004796 | 2.60 | 00.009 | 0.0003051 | 0.0021855 |
CG | 0.0024392 | 0.0009152 | 2.67 | 00.008 | 0.0006451 | 0.0042333 |
2003 | −0.0000851 | 0.0004129 | −0.21 | 0.837 | −0.0008946 | 0.0007244 |
2004 | −0.0013007 | 0.0007408 | −1.76 | 00.079 | −0.002753 | 0.0001515 |
2005 | −0.0015658 | 0.0008758 | −1.79 | 00.074 | −0.0032826 | 0.000151 |
2006 | −0.0006992 | 0.0009892 | −0.71 | 0.480 | −0.0026384 | 0.0012399 |
2007 | 0.0002449 | 0.0010625 | 0.23 | 0.818 | −0.0018379 | 0.0023277 |
2008 | 0.0017313 | 0.0010939 | 1.58 | 0.114 | −0.0004131 | 0.0038757 |
2009 | 0.0007517 | 0.0011629 | 0.65 | 0.518 | −0.001528 | 0.0030315 |
2010 | −0.00000882 | 0.0012342 | −00.01 | 0.994 | −0.0024282 | 0.0024106 |
2011 | 0.0006506 | 0.0012842 | 0.51 | 0.612 | −0.001867 | 0.0031681 |
2012 | 0.0011022 | 0.0013242 | 0.83 | 0.405 | −0.0014937 | 0.003698 |
2013 | 0.0008217 | 0.0012909 | 0.64 | 0.524 | −0.0017089 | 0.0033523 |
2014 | 0.0009118 | 0.0012842 | 0.71 | 0.478 | −0.0016056 | 0.0034293 |
2015 | −0.0000871 | 0.0012748 | −00.07 | 0.946 | −0.0025862 | 0.0024119 |
2016 | 0.0008755 | 0.0013011 | 0.67 | 0.501 | −0.0016752 | 0.0034261 |
2017 | 0.0006521 | 0.0013251 | 0.49 | 0.623 | −0.0019455 | 0.0032498 |
2018 | 0.0009113 | 0.0014239 | 0.64 | 0.522 | −0.00188 | 0.0037026 |
_cons | 0.0801549 | 0.0114946 | 6.97 | 00.000 | 0.0576214 | 0.1026884 |
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Benetyte, R.; Gonenc, H.; Krusinskas, R. Corporate Governance vs. Financial Performance for Intensity of Innovation Investments. Sustainability 2021, 13, 5014. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13095014
Benetyte R, Gonenc H, Krusinskas R. Corporate Governance vs. Financial Performance for Intensity of Innovation Investments. Sustainability. 2021; 13(9):5014. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13095014
Chicago/Turabian StyleBenetyte, Raminta, Halit Gonenc, and Rytis Krusinskas. 2021. "Corporate Governance vs. Financial Performance for Intensity of Innovation Investments" Sustainability 13, no. 9: 5014. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13095014
APA StyleBenetyte, R., Gonenc, H., & Krusinskas, R. (2021). Corporate Governance vs. Financial Performance for Intensity of Innovation Investments. Sustainability, 13(9), 5014. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13095014