Toward an International Grundnorm for Climate Change: Ensuring Sustainability Away from the Traditional Notion of Security

Abstract

Climate change has been considered a critical challenge that transcends traditional notions of security, demanding a shift in perspective toward environmental sustainability. Historically, security has been viewed as an inviolable boundary, shaped significantly by the aftermath of World War II, when the international community prioritized peace, territorial integrity, and political independence. However, humanity now faces unprecedented threats that cannot be addressed through rigid or outdated definitions of security. Climate change impacts the entire planet, affecting both living and non-living organisms, and has arisen primarily from anthropogenic activities over the past two centuries. Consequently, solutions must originate from within human societies, emphasizing sustainability alongside action. Despite extensive discourse, meaningful progress remains limited. This paper, drawing on scientific data about climate change’s far-reaching consequences, aims to highlight that climate change, despite theoretical and practical challenges, has the potential to supplant traditional State-centered security as the Grundnorm of international law, serving as the critical threshold that demands a comprehensive reform and reimagining of the international legal framework. It concludes that climate change’s new normativity represents opportunities to reform law and order to ensure life and sustainability.

1. Introduction

Climate is a broad word and it encompasses all the surrounding air, soil, water, etc. The climate has been affected by human-based actions and interactions and has changed significantly in the last few decades. According to the definition proposed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992, climate change refers to alterations in climate that are caused by the activities of humans either in direct or indirect manners (art. 1, para. 2). The UNFCCC is ultimately targeted at stabilizing the concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) within the atmosphere to an extent that risky anthropogenic interference to the climate system is prevented (art. 2). Humans’ role in damaging the surrounding environment and natural systems is obviously admitted therein. At the same time, they are, or they need to be, the key actors protecting climate systems and environmental preservation, as states that ratified the UNFCCC are committed to protecting the climate system for current and future generations (Preamble). That indicates, despite the argument that humans are among the very active causes of climate change, they have been engaged in solving environmental issues, from the Trail Smelter case to the most recent ones, through international law and its institutions [1]. According to the prevalent perspective, it is humans who enjoy exclusive rights and have ‘intrinsic value’ while the other elements of the entire ecosystems have solely an ‘instrumental value’ to serve and help satisfy the requirements of the current and subsequent generations of people.

Although several soft instruments had been proposed, and some of them were categorized as ‘constitution’, none of the environmental law instruments, either binding or otherwise, has become globally binding inasmuch as to label it as a constitutional rule or a Grundnorm (basic norm) dictating the form and the content of international norms or a State’s behavior. Immanuel Kant formulated a moral philosophy in which the categorical imperative plays a central role. This categorical imperative is a principle that commands actions as universally binding, irrespective of personal desires or consequences. It provides a framework for ethical behavior based on rationality and universality. ‘Every thing in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the faculty to act in accordance with the representation of laws, i.e., in accordance with a principle, a will’, ‘the representation of an objective principle is called a ‘command’ (of reason) and the formula of the command is called an imperative’ [2]. Examples of such imperatives are preserving ‘life’ and ‘keeping promises’, as Kant himself gives. Wasting lives and continuance of breaking promises could lead to outcomes contrary to universal natural laws, as such actions will cause chaos and inherent contradictions as to the very nature of life and promise [2]. Imagining the climate change law under the light of these commands, or categorical imperatives—which will be called Grundnorm—is the aim here.

It will be argued that, relying on the bulk of State participation in the climate-related conventions and protocols (the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement) and the scientific evidence of climate change’s effect on the life-circles and ecosystems, it can be a basis for an international environmental Grundnorm to shape a State’s behavior and international law. The article argues that the current international Grundnorm orbits and serves security, which needs to be altered with climate change that necessitates international cooperation instead of competition.

The following section will set the ground by arguing that security (mostly national) has always been a critical and significant matter of concern to all States and that such a notion serves limited action regarding threats facing the contemporary international community. Then, it will proceed to suggest climate change as the new Grundnorm that will re-shape international law and direct efforts toward common goals based on its wide impacts, and it will discuss several challenges that such a process may face before concluding with some remarks.

2. Security as the Grundnorm

2.1. The Pre-UN Era

For centuries, security remained the main subject of interest for international law theorists, political philosophers, and policymakers. Legally speaking, it remained the central theme, the Grundnorm on which orders were constructed. For quite a long period of history, world and regional (super)powers, mostly European—as Europe is considered the birthplace of modern international law—were discussing, agreeing, and arguing about agreements for the sake of several reasons, mostly security-related ones [3].

Before the twentieth century, remarkable philosophers of international law and politics undertook arguments that set common grounds for sovereignty and security preservation. Hugo Grotius—known as the father or founder of international law—justified war on the basis of self-defense and the protection of sovereignty [4]. Thomas Hobbes portrayed a society revolving around a state of nature and hence some natural laws, in which life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’, and in case States wanted to escape such a nasty world, they must preserve their security through power and sovereignty [5,6]. The same notion of security persisted up to the nineteenth century when, for instance, it was exemplified in the Concert of Europe of 1815. The main objective of the Concert of Europe was to ensure collective security through enacting and emphasizing the balance of power [7]. In the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, national security and its related concerns remained at the heart, and the conferences’ outcomes were eventually rooted in preserving national security [8].

In the pre-United Nations (UN) era, security was defined and understood as military capabilities, material resources as resembled in soldiers, weapons, etc., and security threats or risks were only those related to war and armed attack against the State territory or its political organization. Although an international dimension of military security—the collective security principle in the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations of 1920—and several internal risks other than military were taken as ‘security’ issues and led to an expansion of the concept, as in the case of economic stability [9], civil unrest and social order [10], and health and diseases [11], the traditional national, materialistic, and militaristic notions of security remained prevalent in the legal and political domains. A realist conception of relations, intra-States and inter-States, has prevailed since Machiavelli and Hobbes’ depiction of the State and war [12,13,14]. To paraphrase Karl Marx, a specter has haunted the world: the specter of security (self-defense, collective security, and peace). It is, as Hans Kelsen argues, related to World War II, after which the UN legal system was established by which:

‘Not only war as the use of armed force but also the threat of force was forbidden and a system of international security established which displayed the highest degree of centralization reached until that time in the history of international law [15]’.

Centralization has a twofold meaning. Security is centralized institutionally with the UN Security Council (UNSC) that is empowered, according to the UN Charter (the Charter), to decide the breadth and type of threats posed on international peace and security; and thematically, security appears to crown State priorities.

2.2. The Post-UN Era

For realistic reasons, the Charter is, first and foremost, founded and focused on security concerns—preserving international peace and security. This cannot be separated from the fact of founding the organization in 1945 after two devastating world wars in only 25 years that affected all humanity. Therefore, the people of the United Nations are determined ‘to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind’ and to unite their strength ‘to maintain international peace and security’ [the Charter’s Preamble]. To these ends, the UN was founded to obtain four main purposes outlined in the Charter (art. 1), three of which are security-related: (a) to maintain international peace and security; (b) to develop friendly relations among nations; and (c) to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character. All three purposes can be re-phrased into one certain objective: to maintain international peace and security and to solve problems in civil, peaceful ways without necessarily the use or threat of the use of force. Thus, security, in its traditional meaning—territorial conflicts among nations—serves as the golden purpose of the UN [16].

The Charter established a broader and institutionalized concept of security, emphasizing collective security and linking it to peace and development. Article 1(1) defines the primary purpose of the UN as maintaining “international peace and security” through collective measures to prevent and address threats to peace; article 39 empowers the UNSC to identify threats to peace and decide on measures to address them, including sanctions and the use of force; and it introduces non-military notions of security too, as in article 55, which links security to economic, social, and cultural progress, emphasizing human rights and fundamental freedoms as essential components of peace. Broadly speaking, the Charter shifts the focus from individual State sovereignty to a collective responsibility to maintain peace, distinguishing it from the balance-of-power strategies in the pre-UN era [17]. In other words, the Charter reconceptualized security as a shared, multidimensional construct, setting it apart from the State-centered and militarily oriented approaches of the pre-UN era, making room for expanding the concept.

2.3. Expansion of Security

After the 1980s, new concepts and dimensions were added to security that include, but are not limited to, human security, environmental security, cyber security, regime security, and terrorism [16]. These debates continue on the academic and diplomatic levels, as in the UNSC. In the UNSC, although some of those new dimensions are discussed in thematic and open debates, it is still not found that the entity is entitled to react to those issues in accordance with the principles of the Charter (art. 2) because those principles, as was shown, were created in a certain period of time in which security denoted solely ‘political independence and territorial integrity’ through upholding the principle of non-intervention [18].

Nowadays, at least theoretically, security is not limited to national interests and boundaries. There are common issues, such as environmental degradation, that are global in nature and hence require global action. There have been issues that no single State is capable of dealing with them unilaterally, ranging from economy, food, health, and environment to personal, community, and political securities. As Beres contemplates, however, world leaders continue to act as if the security of their respective States is based upon national military power [19]. The nature and type of more recent challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, necessitate another perspective based on prioritizing a global network of cooperation and response [20]. These new global threats reinforce another definition of security in a way that the security of a particular State cannot be maintained regardless of the security of other States, as we live in a world marked by interdependence and interconnectedness [21].

Therefore, the Charter’s vision of a traditional, militaristic notion of collective security proved narrow in containing all contemporary global challenges as they came to the fora of international debates a few decades after the establishment of the UN, notably in the 1970s and 1980s. These newly introduced ideas or redefinitions of security are, basically, new interpretations of the concept to make it adaptable to the new international dynamics and challenges. Today, there is literature discussing varied dimensions of security encompassing varied dimensions [22,23]. Even the traditional notion of collective security in the Charter, or non-intervention, has changed, and it was redefined to include human rights and human security, as reflected through the new concept of responsibility to protect, which envisions new definitions of State sovereignty and just war [24].

Environmental security, or climate security in our case, is a matter of interest. Although definite data linking climate change directly to security in such a traditional meaning, requiring the interference of the UNSC, does not exist, there are endeavors to make it such. Moreover, whatever the connection between the two, the military and soldiers seem powerless in solving environmental or climate change issues [25]. Above that, answering the question of whether climate change or environmental degradation will lead to interstate armed conflicts per se is not obvious, even though climate-related outcomes, such as natural disasters, sea level rises, temperature rises, and climate-related migration, can lead to an increase in crises rates [26]. Thus, it becomes clear that, although environmental challenges are serious and their threats can be existential, they cannot be evaluated through the lens of traditional security. They are global threats of another type, seeking global cooperation of another type instead of armed or defense alliances [27,28].

2.4. The Dilemma of Security

Security is a multi-layer, multi-level, and multi-fold concept. It is national security and international security, as well. Balancing these two, which are mostly contradictory poles, seems not an easy task. Security and environment can complete and reinforce each other and may differ at the roots, especially if the two concerns may lead to or cause different results. In 1945, on the one hand, there was no clear vision of environmental problems, as those problems were not present as they are nowadays. On the other hand, environmental problems, as can be understood from the Charter, are deemed part of the domestic jurisdiction of States, something other States should refrain from intervening into. Despite the absence of ‘environment’, ‘nature’, or ‘ecology’ connotations in the Charter, the situation seems different now.

Security, in its traditional sense, as enshrined in the Charter, remains a priority to the world’s countries. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the total military expenditures in the world have risen in 2023 compared to 2022 and the previous years in all countries and regions, with major spending increases recorded in Europe, Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East [29]. The global military burden is estimated to have risen from 2.2% of GDP in 2022 to 2.3% in 2023. The rise in global military spending in 2023 can be attributed primarily to the ongoing war in Ukraine and escalating geopolitical tensions in Asia, Oceania, and the Middle East [29]. Eventually, world military expenditure increased for the ninth consecutive year in 2023, reaching a total of USD 2 trillion and 443 billion. The 6.8% increase in 2023 was the steepest year-on-year rise since 2009 and pushed global spending to the highest level [29]. Due to security concerns, there are threats encountered by the world’s free trade system led by the World Trade Organization (WTO). This pushed the WTO to count for a re-globalization path, denouncing the restrictions placed on free trade by the world’s biggest economies, namely, the United States (US) and China, which are prone to lead to trade fragmentation and increased challenges in the economy and other sectors as well [30].

As indicated by academic writings and institutional reports, security, for most of the world’s States and populations, is a thick red line. States see their choices and evaluate their decisions through a security lens. The economy and environment are parts of the traditional, State-centric, anthropocentric concept of security, backed by the principle of non-intervention. New legal developments in the US and China, for instance, in pursuit of their bilateral economic decoupling, such as the ‘Made in China 2025’ initiative in 2015 and the technological restrictions of the US on Chinese manufacturers, described as ‘American techno-nationalism’, are pushing international relations to a new Cold War era scenario [31]. In legal terminology, security serves as the international Grundnorm laid down in the Charter in the principle of equal sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, non-intervention, and collective security, and has since been asserted by State practice erga omnes and opinio juris. All these resources are spent and allocated for military might while an urgent global issue like climate change lurks on the horizon, but it does not gain the same momentum.

At the 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in November 2024, a heated debate was carried out between developed and developing countries, as the former eventually offered and agreed on USD 300 billion annually to be paid to the latter as part of climate action [32]. The developing countries were demanding a budget close to at least USD 1 trillion. That is why some delegations from developing countries, like India, Bolivia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, and the group of small island States (SISs) as well as other civil society representatives, felt disappointed and called the deal ‘insultingly low’, ‘too little too late’ [32], and ‘a compromise’ to climate finance [33]. Climate change thus appears to be a matter of concern, though to different degrees to its subjects. It requires reimagination and redefinition of the current norms and beliefs on which international order is sustained. The international community is in need of finding an answer to the dilemma of political independence and territorial integrity (non-intervention principle) on the one hand, and the environmental degradation (climate change) that threatens all life forms, on the other.

3. Climate Change as the New Grundnorm

3.1. Climate Change as an Anthropogenic Issue

Sufficient scientific evidence exists on the negative role humans are playing in affecting the climatic system of Earth. The purpose of this sub-section is to show and highlight the anthropocentric lifestyle humans have followed and that humans are the main drivers behind the contemporary climate change crisis, and therefore, the responsibility also lies with them.

The term Anthropocene first appeared in 2000 when it was coined by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer when they used the term as a reference to, and an emphasis on, the central role humans play in both geology and ecology [34]. Since then, there seems to be enough scientific evidence supporting the existence of such a geological epoch and that the planet has already entered the Anthropocene: the era when humans have a substantial impact on the planet, more and bigger than any other factor [35]. This implies that, despite all the natural, effective factors in changing the climate, the role of humans remains central. Although there is no general consensus as to when this epoch began (certain scholars refer to the first agricultural revolution thousands of years B.C., while others suggest the modern industrial revolution in the 1700s), its outcomes and impacts on the environment are well established, and many geological and climatic changes are due to major drivers, primarily population and economic growth [34]. For this reason, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) titled its 2020 annual Human Development Report ‘Human Development and the Anthropocene’, which is the formal, institutional naming of the Earth’s new geological epoch in the 21st century [36]. In its most recent reports, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded that human activities caused an increase in the climate temperature through greenhouse gases (GHGs), mainly CO₂, in a way unprecedented in the last 2000 years, which makes human influence in warming the atmosphere, land, and oceans ‘unequivocal’ [37,38].

Religions, specifically Christianity, are leading in proposing and advocating for anthropogenic notions. In Christianity, the entire natural world, the irrational world, is created for the sake of humans so that humans can conquer and dominate all the other living and non-living creatures. Historically and politically, the tripartite relationship between Christianity, anthropocentrism, and capitalism should be considered. It was Max Weber who elaborated on the relationships between Protestantism and Christianity and capitalism—the latter emerging from the cloak of the former—both dominating the developed industrialized Western States [39].

In its 2022 report, the IPCC first and foremost recognizes the interrelatedness of climate change and human societies, and climate change with ecosystems and biodiversity [40]. The report does not employ the term Anthropocentrism; however, it uses similar vocabularies, such as mainly ‘human-induced’ climate change, and it often recognizes such human-induced factors as the source of widespread, pervasive impacts on ecosystems, people, settlements, and infrastructure [38,40]. These phenomena can come in several forms, such as hot extremes on land and in oceans, heavy precipitation events, drought, and fire weather [40]. The report emphasizes ‘tipping points that have already been reached in ocean systems include the melting of sea ice in the Arctic, thermal bleaching of tropical coral reefs and the loss of kelp forests. Human-induced climate change will continue to force ecosystems into abrupt and often irreversible change, without strong mitigation and adaptation action’ [40]. The IPCC, in the 2023 report once again, asserts the short- and long-term impacts of climate change when it says, with medium to high confidence, that:

‘Hazards and associated risks expected in the near term include an increase in heat-related human mortality and morbidity, food-borne, water-borne, and vector-borne diseases, and mental health challenges, flooding in coastal and other low-lying cities and regions, biodiversity loss in land, freshwater, and ocean ecosystems, and a decrease in food production in some regions [38]’.

In a nutshell, no community of people, plants, or animals is safe considering the devastating global effects of climate change unless net-zero GHGs are guaranteed. As the IPCC suggests, global modeled pathways that limit warming to 1.5 °C (>50%), with no or limited overshoot, or limit warming to 2 °C (>67%), are characterized by deep, rapid, and, in most cases, immediate GHG emission reductions [38].

In terms of policies and legal instruments to suspend or delay climate change, the IPCC hails the climate-related treaties, although only few countries amended their laws and policies to reduce GHGs:

Policies implemented by the end of 2020 are projected to result in higher global GHG emissions in 2030 than emissions implied by NDCs, indicating an ‘implementation gap’. Without a strengthening of policies, global warming of 3.2 [2.2 to 3.5] °C is projected by 2100. The UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement are supporting rising levels of national ambition. Multiple lines of evidence suggest that mitigation policies have led to several Gt CO₂-eq yr of avoided global emissions [38].

Human-induced climate change is the biggest compared to the natural causes of climate change, such as volcanic eruptions and fluctuations in the climate system itself; the observed data collected since the 1800s reveal the huge impacts of humans on nature in terms of releasing tones of CO₂ and other GHGs into the atmosphere annually [40]. It is not solely nature that is impacted but societies, too. Ironically, laws and policies are insufficient in holding or slowing down climate change, which makes the necessity of a new paradigm toward nature a must [41].

Therefore, international cooperation is a critical enabler for achieving ambitious climate change mitigation, adaptation, and climate-resilient development: enhancing international cooperation on finance, technology, and capacity building can enable greater ambition and can act as a catalyst for accelerating mitigation and adaptation and shifting development pathways towards sustainability [42].

3.2. The Universal Nature of Climate Threats

3.2.1. Human Rights: People

The adverse impacts of climate change on the full enjoyment of internationally recognized human rights, including the right to life, housing, health, food, water, sanitation, self-determination, employment, and a clean and healthy environment, have been admitted in several UN Human Rights Council (HRC) resolutions and reports [43,44]. The IPCC asserts that these impacts are not suffered equally. Rather, due to historical, geographical, and societal factors, they are affecting populations differently and the most vulnerable are the poor populations [38]. This is attributed to some historical causes, such as colonialism. As Mason-Case and Dehm clarify, the US alone is responsible for 20% of the total global cumulative CO₂ emissions, the European Union for about 17%, and 90 transnational corporations that are generally based in the Global North countries for 63% of GHG emissions from 1751 to 2010 [45]; making the Global North countries and corporations therein those who are primarily responsible for climate change.

According to the HRC, in 2023, more than 333 million people were experiencing acute food insecurity. This is a nearly 200 million increase over pre-pandemic (COVID-19) levels. By 2030, about 600 million people are expected to be food insecure. Climate change is one of the primary drivers of the enormous increase in world hunger [46]. Currently, around 75% of the global food supply comes from merely 12 plant species and five animal species. The combined impacts of climate change and unsustainable land use, driven by industrialized food production, are fueling the sixth mass extinction, severely impacting biodiversity, including the diversity of food sources [43,44]. Climate change affects the realization of many social, economic, and non-economic human rights, too. This includes the right to health, housing, development, decent work, and an adequate standard of living [45]. Non-economic loss and damages may include loss of life and health for individuals, as well as a loss of territory, cultural heritage, and societal identity for societies. The Philippines, for instance, lost around USD 12 billion between 2011 and 2021 due to climate-related loss and damages accompanied by thousands of deaths and trauma [45].

The Paris Agreement does not refer to human rights, except when it acknowledges in the preamble that climate change is a common concern for humankind; therefore, parties should respect, promote, and consider their respective obligations on human rights. The Cancun Agreements contain a clause on human rights, where it is emphasized that ‘Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully respect human rights’ [47].

Moreover, the case law suggests relevant outcomes from national and regional courts. In the Netherlands, the Urgenda Foundation case, and in Germany, the Neubauer et al. v Germany case set similar legal criteria based on human rights in dealing with GHG emissions [48,49]. The Dutch government, on behalf of 900 Dutch individuals, and the German Federal Government, on behalf of the children and young from Germany, Bangladesh, and Nepal, as well as institutional complainants and organizations, were accused of failing to make bold measures to cut GHG emissions under the Paris Agreement [48,49]. Regionally, the Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland case of the European Court of Human Rights involved a complaint by four women and a Swiss association, Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz, whose members were concerned about the impact of global warming on their health and living conditions. They argued that the Swiss authorities were not taking adequate action to address climate change. The European Court concluded that Switzerland had failed to meet its ‘positive obligations’ under the Convention regarding climate change [50]. The European Court dismissed other cases due to inadmissibility based on the absence of individual or direct effect and extraterritoriality [51,52,53]. The path taken by the European Court in dismissing such cases, although legal in terms of its applicable conventions and statutes, has been criticized for being static and individualistic [54].

3.2.2. Economic Growth: Prosperity

The economic dimension of climate change further illustrates the reason it must be elevated to the status of a Grundnorm. The Stern Review established that the economic costs of inaction on climate change far exceed the costs of mitigation and adaptation [55]. More recent economic analyses suggest that climate change could reduce the global GDP by 10–23% by 2050, far exceeding the economic impact of traditional security threats [56]. Mandelsohn believes, regarding the alarming statements on the impact of climate change on economic growth, that low-latitude countries shall be affected the most and shall bear the brunt of climate change damage in the agricultural sector immediately [57]. The low-latitude areas include Africa, Latin America, and China. The rest of the economy shall not be affected, or the effect is predicted to be mild. Besides agriculture, Mandelsohn argues, timber, water, coastal, and recreation are the sectors expected to be damaged [57].

William Nordhaus, a pioneer in assessing the economic impacts of climate change, along with Andrew Moffat, conducted a meta-study estimating that climate damages could cause a permanent 2% reduction in global GDP [58]. Similarly, the IPCC predicts that a 4 °C rise in global temperatures could result in global GDP losses ranging from 1 to 5% [59]. Both studies emphasize the uncertainty of these projections. Although the percentages may seem small, they represent significant figures; for instance, 2% of the global GDP amounts to USD 1.62 trillion [60]. Additionally, the economic burden will not be equally shared. For instance, Burke et al. predict that by 2100, with unchecked climate change, GDP per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa could fall by 80%, while it could rise by 70% in Europe [61]. Beckenfelder et al. suggest that fossil fuels—coal, oil, and natural gas—serve as a key link between the economy and climate due to their significant contribution to GHG emissions [60]. The main concern for the climate is, they argue, that fossil fuel reserves are too vast, and if fully utilized, they would cause a sharp rise in global temperatures. For instance, current coal reserves could last another 500 years, which would result in excessive global warming [60].

According to the WTO, climate change presents a significant risk to the global economy, as an increase in temperature (between 1.6 °C and 3.6 °C above pre-industrial levels by 2060) could lead to global annual GDP losses ranging from 1 to 3.3%, compared to a scenario where the impacts of climate change are absent [62]. Projections suggest that a 2.5 °C rise in global temperatures by 2060 could lead to a decline in export volumes of 5 to 6% for countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, 3 to 4% for the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia, and 2% in Latin America, while Europe and North America would see less than a 1% decrease [63]. That is for the effects and losses, but for the causes, sources, or the largest polluters, it is submitted that nearly 75% of global GHGs are attributed to energy consumption, with an additional 18.4% coming from agriculture, forestry, and land use, with industrial processes accounting for 5.2%, while 3.2% stem from waste [64].

According to the McKinsey Institute, keeping the temperature well below 1.5 °C would require investing around USD 275 trillion between the periods 2021 to 2050, which means an average of 9.2 trillion per year, an annual increase of as much as USD 3.5 trillion than nowadays [65]. It is estimated that global funding for the energy transition toward a low-carbon economy will total USD 131 trillion over the next 30 years. To achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, the annual investment in clean energy worldwide would need to reach more than triple to approximately USD 5 trillion by 2030 [64]. Nonetheless, it is not merely the developing or least developed nations that will suffer climate change effects. As Wade and Jennings argue, a high-latitude country like the United Kingdom (UK) is likely to allocate something between 0.2% to 0.4% of its GPD annually as the cost of losses caused by extreme weather (flooding, water availability issues, milder winters, etc.) by 2050 in case of 3 °C or 4 °C degrees of warming, especially in certain parts like Yorkshire and Humberside in England [66].

Consequently, climate change, through its impact on nature (biodiversity, desertification, land degradation, ocean acidification, etc.), humans and society (impeding individuals and societies from some of their basic rights, such as right to life, food, shelter, employment, etc.), and economy and trade (as illustrated in the cases of GDP allocation to transit economies to low carbon, or to make an economy more resilient to the impacts, etc.), poses direct and indirect threats to security.

3.2.3. States: Security

The case of the SISs exemplifies this paradigm shift with particular clarity. For these nations, climate change represents an existential threat that traditional security frameworks are powerless to address. The Republic of Maldives, Tuvalu, and other low-lying island states face the prospect of complete territorial submersion due to rising sea levels [67]. This situation challenges fundamental principles of international law, including permanent sovereignty over natural resources; the concept of statehood, which presupposes territory; the right to self-determination; and the protection of cultural heritage. The Marshall Islands v. India case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) marks a watershed moment in international environmental litigation, highlighting how climate change forces us to reconceptualize international legal obligations beyond traditional security paradigms [68]. The case demonstrates the inadequacy of existing legal frameworks to address situations where state existence itself is threatened not by military aggression but by environmental degradation.

Regarding inequality among States, Burzynski et al. conclude that climate change will worsen existing income inequalities between countries. Their estimates indicate that climate change will almost double the global population living below the relative extreme poverty line, increasing from 4 to 7.5% [69]. When it comes to climate-induced migration, they further project that, depending on future GHG concentration levels, there will be between 45 and 97 million working-age migrants across all education levels throughout the 21st century. In a moderate scenario, 24 million climate migrants are expected to move to Europe, while 17 million are projected to migrate to North America [69]. After factoring in migration, Burzynski et al. project that the global GDP will decline by 9% in 2070 and by 12% in 2100. The most significant losses are expected in Africa, Asia, and South America, where the GDP is predicted to drop by 40%, 25%, and 34%, respectively [69,70,71]. It is suggested that weather shocks that decrease the GDP per capita dramatically increase the likelihood of a coup attempt. A temperature increase of one standard deviation increases the likelihood of a coup by about 20%, indicating a significant impact [72]. Developed countries may also suffer. A 2015 report from the US finds the damage caused to the US coastal areas as the frontline of exposure to such impacts, as it would cause damage to airports, ports, rail roads, etc [73]. Additionally, the changing climate of the Arctic is mentioned as another vivid case of concern to US national security, wherein not only the coastal regions shall suffer but also farther parts of the country, too. These concerns, the report says, cannot be addressed without international cooperation in a way to meet the challenges of climate change [73].

The SISs are prone to special climate change-induced risks. As evidenced by the IPCC, these risks vary from warming generally to shifts in tropical cyclones, sea level rises, coastal erosion, marine flooding, drought, etc [37]. While comprising 2% of the total Earth’s terrestrial surface, the SISs are home to substantial proportions of species existing now, such as 25% extant global flora, 12% birds, and 10% mammals, and around half of all species that are considered as under threat of extinction [37]. That makes these islands a special place of interest, as any loss of those ecosystems may reflect negatively on humankind and nature. Despite their natural wealth, the SISs also suffer economically, as in the case of loss of tourism and heavy exploitation, mostly from external entities. All are leading to other issues, such as migration, and hence increase the possibility of inhabitability of those islands, or some of them [38].

Between 1998 and 2016, the Maldives Islands experienced three major climatic events. The 1997–1998 ENSO event had a severe impact on the Maldives, reducing living coral cover to less than 10%. The mid-2016 ENSO event further diminished coral cover by 75%. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2007 flood caused damage that was equivalent to 62% of the country’s GDP [74,75]. The tsunami also led to the Maldives being reclassified as a least developed country and triggered internal migration, displacing 30,000 people, or 9.6% of the population. These consecutive events underscored the risks associated with insufficient recovery time for the entire social-ecological system and highlighted the harmful impact of local human activities on the recovery of coral reefs [38,76,77]. In 2017, 22 of the 29 Caribbean SISs were struck by at least one category 4 or 5 tropical cyclone. These storms revealed a ‘cumulative community vulnerability’, where high exposure and inadequate preparedness amplified the impacts, worsening the long-term risks [78,79]. The concentration of populations and infrastructure in flood-prone coastal areas, along with poor housing and limited resources, led to widespread devastation. Environmental damage, such as the loss of mangroves, worsened the economic crisis. The destruction of buildings and cultural heritage and forced displacement further contributed to long-term non-economic losses, including the erosion of cultural identity and well-being [37,80,81].

As Hioureas and Camprubi point out, a sea level rise, as an outcome of climate change, poses an ‘existential’ threat to low-lying countries, as people and also as States [82]. They claim that such threats represent a challenge not solely to the continuity of those SISs but they also affect the very foundations of modern international law, especially the rules pertaining to statehood, state formation, and its functioning, as codified mainly in the 1933 Montevideo Convention (art. 1, which sets permanent population, defined/delimited territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other States as the qualifications of any State). As mentioned in the previous sections, the loss of territory/land and people/population of the SISs diminishes two to four of the statehood criteria. Without those two, no State shall have the capacity to enter into relations; to maintain or sustain those relations will be difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, Hioureas and Camprubi discuss several legal-escaping scenarios for those countries. These include protecting their maritime entitlements through maritime delimitation agreements, which are not absolute. These States will continue losing land and, likely, in the case of a business-as-usual scenario, experience submergence and, hence, reverse so many internationally sea-related principles, such as ‘the land dominates the sea’. Additionally, they may resort to the acquisition/purchasing of new territories, integrating into other States in the form of confederations, or creating artificial territories after the submergence of the original land, as in the case of French Polynesia in 2017; however, this is not easy, as according to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, art. 60(8)), ‘artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands’. These factors leave no substantial solution to the issue at hand, and it goes contrary to the principle of equal sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter. However, this sort of environmental risk may be affecting some small States, but ‘the paradigm symbolizes both the limits of international law and the excesses of our civilization’ [82].

The aforementioned remedies are divided between short- and long-term options. Although the available data show that the SISs have received around USD 1.7 billion between 2003 and 2018 from multiple climate finance sources used to implement around 255 projects in 38 SISs, these are all funded short-term projects [83]. The SISs need to consider more resilient and durable solutions as the sea level continues to rise up to 0.88 m by 2100 [84]. Such durable pathways may face legal dilemmas, as they may require amending the UNCLOS to adapt the SISs retaining the economic entitlements, such as exclusive economic zones through the permanent fixation of their coastal lines regardless of the sea level changes, or regardless of them being deterritorialized [85]. Such a remedy—freezing baselines or outer limits of maritime zones—may serve to maintain stability, certainty, and fairness in the global governance of oceans, as these represent the core objective of the UNCLOS [67]. The condition of endangered States and their populations—nations ex-situ—therefore, provides an opportunity to investigate the full scope of the international legal frontier while also learning critical lessons for future application [67].

This shows climate change as more than solely an environmental issue to be ‘managed’; it is rather a global issue affecting all life forms. Consequently, it requires more legal action, supported by moral principles, in order to be capable of facing its catastrophic impacts better than what has occurred so far.

3.3. Legal Evolution Toward Environmental Primacy

The evolution of international environmental law reveals a gradual but decisive shift towards recognizing climate change as a fundamental norm-generating principle. This transformation represents more than merely adding environmental considerations to existing legal frameworks; it signifies a fundamental reconceptualization of international law’s purpose and structure.

3.3.1. Environmental Obligations Erga Omnes and Judicial Decisions

The concept of obligations erga omnes, first articulated by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, has found new expression in environmental matters [86]. This evolution can be traced through several pivotal developments. First, the Nuclear Tests cases established that certain environmental obligations are owed to the international community as a whole [87]. This principle has been progressively reinforced through subsequent ICJ decisions, notably in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, where the court emphasized the importance of environmental concerns in international law [88]. Second, the concept of ‘common concern of humankind’, introduced in the UNFCCC and reinforced in the Paris Agreement, elevates climate change beyond traditional bilateral or multilateral frameworks [89]. This conceptual innovation represents a significant departure from the traditional understanding of international legal obligations, which typically operate on a reciprocal basis between states. Third, the development of the “no-harm” principle in environmental law has evolved from its origins in the Trail Smelter arbitration to encompass global environmental harm, particularly in the context of climate change [90]. This evolution reflects growing recognition that environmental damage cannot be confined within traditional territorial boundaries.

Recent judicial decisions have begun to recognize climate change as a fundamental consideration in international law, establishing precedents that support its elevation to Grundnorm status. The Urgenda Foundation v. State of the Netherlands case marked a watershed moment, establishing that states have a duty to protect citizens from climate change based on human rights obligations. This decision has influenced subsequent litigation globally, including, besides the Urgenda and Neubauer cases mentioned earlier, Sharma v. Minister for the Environment and Notre Affaire à Tous v. France recognized novel duties of care regarding climate change and established state responsibility for climate action. Regional human rights courts have played a crucial role in developing climate-related jurisprudence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 recognized the right to a healthy environment as fundamental to human existence, establishing an expansive framework for environmental protection [91].

3.3.2. Reimagining International Law Through Climate Change

The recognition of climate change as the new Grundnorm requires a fundamental reimagining of international law’s structure and purpose. This transformation operates on multiple levels and requires substantial reconceptualization of existing legal frameworks. Climate change, as a Grundnorm, would require all other norms of international law to be interpreted through an environmental lens, leading to a revolutionary normative transformation. This revolutionary transformation affects several fundamental aspects of international law.

To conceptualize climate change as a Grundnorm is to establish environmental protection as the central organizing principle of international law. This would require all other norms—such as those governing trade, security, and human rights—to be interpreted through an environmental lens. As Hans Kelsen’s theory of Grundnorm suggests, all legal norms derive their authority and validity from the basic norm [92]. In this case, international legal obligations would need to align with ecological imperatives, ensuring that legal norms collectively contribute to mitigating climate change and protecting planetary boundaries. This approach departs from the fragmented and sectoral treatment of environmental law, integrating environmental priorities into the overarching framework of international governance. For instance, trade agreements would need to incorporate climate considerations, such as carbon border adjustments, and security frameworks would recognize climate change as a non-traditional threat [93].

One of the most profound implications of adopting climate change as the Grundnorm is the redefinition of sovereignty. Traditional notions of sovereignty are rooted in the Westphalian system, emphasizing State autonomy and non-interference in domestic affairs. However, the global and transboundary nature of climate change challenges these conventional boundaries.

Under an environmental Grundnorm, sovereignty would be reconceptualized as responsible sovereignty, obliging States to ensure that their domestic activities do not harm the global environment. This concept aligns with the ‘no-harm’ principle recognized in international environmental law, as seen in the Trail Smelter Arbitration (1938–1941) and reaffirmed in subsequent rulings by the ICJ. States would be required to prioritize ecological integrity and cooperate on shared environmental responsibilities, shifting from a competitive to a cooperative model of sovereignty. Environmental sovereignty would emphasize stewardship over natural resources not only for national benefit but also for the global community [94]. For example, obligations to reduce GHGs would no longer be seen as voluntary contributions under the Paris Agreement but as mandatory duties derived from a universal legal hierarchy, and make territorial sovereignty dependent on adherence to international environmental obligations. Practically, territorial sovereignty now encompasses duties such as protecting forests, which serve as global carbon sinks, and safeguarding biodiversity hotspots critical for planetary health. Failure to fulfill these obligations could lead to international criticism or sanctions, as demonstrated in the increasing pressure on Brazil to curb deforestation in the Amazon [95]. Traditional resource sovereignty grants States the absolute right to exploit natural resources within their borders. However, this concept is recently increasingly being reinterpreted to include intergenerational equity, emphasizing the obligation of current generations to preserve resources for the future. This principle demands that states exercise restraint in resource exploitation and prioritize sustainability [96]. The Stockholm Declaration of 1972 in Principle 1 also recognized the duty to protect and improve the environment for ‘present and future generations’ [97].

The integration of climate change, as the Grundnorm also demands, is a fundamental reassessment of State responsibility. Current international law often treats environmental harm as a secondary concern, subordinate to economic and political interests. A climate-centric framework would elevate environmental protection to a primary obligation, imposing stricter standards of accountability for GHG emissions and environmental degradation. For instance, States could face enhanced obligations to mitigate climate change under the Paris Agreement, which already emphasizes the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). These obligations could evolve into enforceable duties with direct legal consequences for non-compliance, transforming the landscape of international accountability and fostering greater collective action [98]. Additionally, this Grundnorm would strengthen mechanisms for liability and compensation for climate-related damages. Vulnerable nations disproportionately affected by climate change, such as SISs, would gain stronger legal standing to demand reparations or support from major polluters under an enhanced framework of equity and CBDR [99].

Another critical dimension of this transformation is the integration of human rights with environmental protection. Climate change disproportionately affects vulnerable populations, exacerbating existing inequalities and threatening fundamental rights such as life, health, and access to water. Recognizing climate change, as the Grundnorm would necessitate, would lead to a closer alignment between environmental law and human rights law, reinforcing the concept of climate justice. The right to a healthy environment, increasingly recognized in international legal instruments and jurisprudence, would become a cornerstone of this reimagined framework. The UN Human Rights Council’s Resolution 48/13 (2021), which explicitly acknowledges the right to a healthy environment, provides a foundation for linking climate obligations with human rights protections. This approach ensures that climate action prioritizes equity and justice, addressing the needs of the most affected communities. A climate-focused Grundnorm would compel States to adopt policies that protect these vulnerable groups, ensuring equitable access to resources and resilience-building initiatives. The transformative potential of such integration is evident in judicial decisions like the Urgenda Foundation case, where courts linked state obligations under human rights law to climate action.

3.4. Challenges and Opportunities

While the idea of climate change as a Grundnorm offers transformative potential, it also presents significant challenges. The entrenched nature of State-centric international law, the complexity of harmonizing diverse legal regimes, and resistance from powerful economic and political actors all pose obstacles to this vision. Moreover, operationalizing such a transformation requires unprecedented levels of international cooperation, institutional reform, and political will. The challenges on such a road of climate change law becoming the new Grundnorm can be either theoretical or practical.

3.4.1. Theoretical Challenges

The elevation of climate change to the status of a Grundnorm in international law poses profound theoretical challenges. Addressing these challenges necessitates rethinking foundational principles such as sovereignty, legitimacy, and normative hierarchy within the international legal system. The theoretical challenges of elevating climate change to Grundnorm’s status underscore the need for a transformative rethinking of sovereignty, legitimacy, and normative coherence. While these challenges are substantial, they offer an opportunity to redefine the purpose and structure of international law in the Anthropocene era, paving the way for a more sustainable and equitable global legal order.

Traditional sovereignty must be reinterpreted to align with global environmental imperatives. Among these, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources—a cornerstone of international law—faces critical tensions with global environmental needs. Historically, states have claimed unfettered control over their natural resources, a principle enshrined in UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 [100]. However, such control often conflicts with transboundary environmental concerns. Emerging doctrines, such as sustainable development, emphasize the role of States as trustees of natural resources, responsible for their stewardship on behalf of humanity and future generations. These doctrines require reconciling the right to economic growth with obligations to reduce environmental degradation [101]. On the one hand, the ability of States to apply their environmental laws beyond their borders raises legal and political controversies, while on the other hand, frameworks like the Espoo Convention of 1991 illustrate the need for transnational collaboration in assessing environmental impacts, and hence challenge the traditional notion of jurisdiction [102].

Reconceptualizing sovereignty also requires innovative enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance with environmental obligations. International compliance systems can be a real challenge as environmental laws are generally considered to be ‘weak’ and ‘soft’. Systems such as those under the Paris Agreement, however, emphasize transparency and accountability through enhanced monitoring and verification systems. International courts and tribunals must, nonetheless, adapt to address environmental disputes effectively; sanctions and incentives are critical for ensuring State compliance [103]. Domestic laws must align with international environmental commitments in order to ensure compliance and legal coherence. In this regard, States would need robust institutions to enforce climate laws at the national level [103].

For climate change to achieve Grundnorm status, its legitimacy must be established across democratic and scientific dimensions. Democratic legitimacy is essential to ensure the acceptance and effectiveness of climate change norms. Mechanisms such as those outlined in Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration ensure public involvement (stakeholder consultations) in environmental decision-making. To achieve this, transparency in policymaking fosters trust and accountability [103]. Regular reporting obligations, as established under the UNFCCC, enhance institutional credibility. Independent bodies, such as compliance committees, are essential for monitoring State actions. Scientific evidence must facilitate underpinning the recognition of climate change as a Grundnorm. In this regard, the IPCC’s periodic reports and assessments provide a scientific basis for international climate policies [37,38].

Legal hierarchy would be another pressing challenge. Embedding climate change as a Grundnorm requires integration with existing legal norms and coherence within the legal system. The linkage between climate change and human rights, as highlighted by the OHCHR—not to forget other lex specialis that may include economic law, development, security, etc.—underscores the human dimension of environmental degradation [104]. To let this integration process go smoothly, mechanisms for resolving conflicts with environmental norms are vital, as exemplified by the WTO Appellate Body’s jurisprudence [104].

In order to fill the gap between the security schools of thought, such as realism and constructivism, Arnall suggests a third approach, which he calls ‘human agency’ or ‘capacity to make a difference’ [105]. A human agency-based approach to climate change focuses on the importance of individual and collective human actions, decisions, and responsibilities in tackling climate issues; emphasizes their active involvement in both causing and addressing climate change; and takes into account the social, cultural, and economic factors that shape how people understand, react to, and engage with climate challenges, highlighting the need for empowerment, participation, and accountability [105]. Nonetheless, the duality of body/nature and soul/mind in Western philosophy, as emphasized by Descartes and lived up to date, must be reimagined to address the challenges posed by the Anthropocene and climate change. New philosophical perspectives may be included to better support the law in its approach to climate change. Murray Bookchin’s Social Ecology critiques modern hierarchy and domination, tracing environmental crises to societal inequalities, while Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology dismantles the separation of body and rationality, emphasizing interconnectivity and embodiment [106,107,108,109]. Together, these philosophies advocate for a harmonious, integrated approach to human and natural relationships, replacing domination (security) with cooperation (climate change). This shift requires innovative legal frameworks and policies to transcend the anthropocentric, trade-focused international paradigm and foster sustainable, holistic solutions.

3.4.2. Practical Challenges

Addressing climate change requires States to reform policies across multiple sectors, emphasizing both mitigation and adaptation, as outlined in the Paris Agreement. Giddens advocates policies that consider long-term impacts, protect future generations, and ensure accountability through public engagement, litigation, and enforcement of the polluter-pays principle [110]. Effective implementation demands integrated actions, collaboration, and resource allocation to balance equity and adaptation efforts while addressing vulnerable populations and global cooperation. Ultimately, establishing an environmental Grundnorm is essential to align legal frameworks with sustainability, replacing traditional security paradigms to address planetary challenges.

While the conceptual shift redefines sovereignty, rights, and obligations in legal frameworks, the practical challenges of implementing this shift require meticulous planning and coordinated action. This section explores the multifaceted challenges associated with institutional frameworks, economic transitions, and opportunities to enhance the international legal system [111]. Effective governance of climate change as a Grundnorm necessitates robust institutional mechanisms capable of supporting the complex and interdisciplinary nature of environmental governance.

Building institutional capacity is essential for addressing the technical, financial, and administrative challenges inherent in global climate governance. To address climate change, States and international institutions must invest in the development of scientific and technical expertise. This includes advanced research capabilities, data analysis proficiency, and innovative technology adoption [112]. Scientific advancements are central to designing evidence-based policies and monitoring progress, and strengthening collaborations between research institutions and policymaking bodies is vital [113]. International climate law requires specialized legal professionals who can interpret complex treaties, resolve disputes, and navigate the evolving landscape of customary law and general principles [114].

Building administrative capacity ensures that States can implement international obligations domestically. This includes training bureaucracies, streamlining regulatory processes, and integrating climate considerations into existing governance frameworks [114]. The equitable transfer of clean technologies is critical for enabling developing countries to meet ambitious climate goals. Mechanisms like the UNFCCC’s Technology Mechanism aim to bridge technological gaps.

The development of reliable funding mechanisms is another cornerstone of institutional effectiveness. These include funding mechanism establishments, such as institutions like the Green Climate Fund, which serve as models for channeling resources to vulnerable countries; resource allocation systems, where transparent criteria for fund allocations ensure equitable distribution based on needs and impact; and financial transparency requirements, regular audits, and public reporting to build trust and accountability in the funding process [115]. Eventually, coordination across multiple levels of governance is crucial for overcoming jurisdictional and administrative silos.

Inter-agency cooperation, such as achieving synergies among international organizations, national agencies, and non-State actors, requires information-sharing systems, such as platforms for exchanging data and best practices among stakeholders; joint decision-making processes, as in collaborative frameworks for creating unified policies; resource pooling arrangements, efficient utilization of resources through collective funding, and shared expertise; and multi-level governance [115]. In a nutshell, climate governance must operate across global, regional, national, and local levels, including regional cooperation framework institutions like the EU’s Emissions Trading System to demonstrate the benefits of regional collaboration. Additionally, local implementation supports matter, as in empowering municipalities and communities to implement climate policies effectively [115].

Economically, the global transition to a low-carbon economy poses both challenges and opportunities, requiring careful planning to ensure equity and efficiency. The transition to sustainable economies must prioritize social equity and justice to minimize the negative impacts on vulnerable populations. Programs like Germany’s Coal Commission aim to reskill workers for renewable energy sectors, and employment transition assistance, such as providing financial support during periods of unemployment caused by structural changes [116]. Market-based solutions, such as carbon pricing systems, are integral to achieving climate goals while maintaining economic efficiency. The EU ETS is a leading example of a cap-and-trade system [117]. Carbon tax frameworks are another tool. Countries like Sweden have successfully implemented high carbon taxes to incentivize emissions reductions [117].

3.4.3. Opportunities

However, the opportunities are equally compelling. Embedding climate change into the core of international law can drive innovation, foster global solidarity, and create a legal framework capable of addressing the existential threat of climate change. It represents a paradigm shift towards sustainable development, intergenerational equity, and the long-term survival of humanity.

Reimagining international law through the lens of climate change as a Grundnorm is both a visionary and necessary step in addressing the global climate crisis. By redefining sovereignty, enhancing State responsibility, and integrating human rights with environmental protection, this transformation offers a holistic approach to global governance. Despite the challenges, elevating climate change to a Grundnorm offers profound opportunities to enhance the international legal system. The Grundnorm framework inspires legal innovation, that is, the development of novel principles, procedural mechanisms, and enforcement tools tailored to global environmental governance [118].

While challenges remain, the imperative to align international law with the realities of climate change underscores the urgency of this evolution. As the international community continues to grapple with the escalating impacts of climate change, adopting a climate-centric Grundnorm could provide the legal and moral foundation for a sustainable future. Embedding climate change into the legal system fosters systematic integration and coherence between environmental, economic, and human rights frameworks [119,120].

Thus, climate change is pushing the international community to reconsider the creation of an environmental Grundnorm based on the priority of life and nature before thinking about material terms such as finance and city infrastructures. Climate change fulfills the two principal requirements of the Kantian Grundnorm: general acceptance or universality and reasonableness [121]. International environmental law (IEL) is often criticized for being ineffective, mostly voluntarist and hortatory [122]. Therefore, a reform, a new paradigm in this era of environmental degradation, is decisive. IEL is linked to a soft, sustainable development-related agenda, which is centered around economic developmental goals, pushing environmental sustainability to the edge, periphery, or to a nexus-status. This sort of development, prevalent in the hegemonic neo-liberal form of perspective, is troublesome. It has been declared dead but keeps moving as zombies do [123]. Neo-liberal globalization is focused on trade, economic growth, and development, while IEL—climate change—needs a Grundnorm to preserve environmental sustainability [121]. This Grundnorm is, Adelman argues, significant in taming economic activity, as it may work as the ‘yardstick by which economic activity is measured’ [121]. Therefore, in order to preserve life on Earth, such a Grundnorm will serve as a new technic, legal in nature, and it will help reform policies and reimagine new dynamics of the relationships between humans and nature. This coincides with a period in which the practical application of many environmental principles has faltered, notably, the failure to hold polluters financially accountable for the damage they cause, where the no-harm principle is constantly violated, GHG emissions seem to be excluded from precautionary principles, and sustainable development is not and was not friendly to the environment [124]. The Paris Agreement, thus, suffers from a number of contradictions, as Adelman states:

‘It is binding but voluntary; human rights are included but confined to the preamble; article 5 addresses deforestation without stopping it; and article 8 recognizes loss and damage but provides no right to compensation or to relocation and resettlement—a necessity for small island developing states threatened by rising sea levels [124]’.

Many historical reasons affect the current and possibly future implementation of climatic agreements; the Paris Agreement basically includes colonialism and exploitation of the East/South by the West/North. This is probably a reason for the different views between the two blocks regarding the States’ responsibilities in preserving nature and the environment for current and future generations. Additionally, this is the reason behind the different levels of application seen in the environmental laws and techniques of the two blocks. Generally, such applications seem to be higher in number in the West—the US, the UK, and the European Union, for instance—as compared to the East; most of the world’s climate litigations occur in the former [125,126]. The Paris Agreement suffers from other things, too. Among these, ambiguity concerning the loss and damage principle, the role of human rights in climatic lawsuits, the liability of States in cases of failure to deliver the promised emission reductions, and lack of clarity regarding the responsibility of non-State actors or corporations all could affect the opportunities outlined earlier [127].

Climate change seems to be more than a ‘problem’ or more than an ‘environmental problem’, as it affects all aspects of the life and activity of humans and other creatures. There have been calls to delink climate change from IEL and deal with it through innovative governance approaches [128]. Therefore, a new paradigm, in which it is taken seriously as a global issue, dealt with through in-kind international norms, not less than a Grundnorm, may work.

4. Conclusions

To balance litigation with adaptation policies, governments must allocate all available resources; prioritize equity, equality, and non-discrimination in their climate actions; provide fair access to education, technology, and innovation; and ensure that the public is well-informed and involved in sustainable development and climate policy decisions [129,130,131,132]. The key aspects of such an approach include the following: individual and collective action and community-led initiatives; people’s empowerment and participation in climate decision-making; integrating cultural values and social norms into sustainable solutions; and emphasizing the role of governments, corporations, and individuals in reducing GHG emissions and fostering shared responsibility [133,134,135].

This paper has maintained that climate change law has the characteristics required to be recognized as an international Grundnorm, setting it apart from other environmental issues on the one hand and from conventional concepts of security on the other. By tackling the global and interlinked aspects of climate change, this area of law not only seeks to alleviate its effects but also transforms our perspective on security. Comparing security-related expenditures with climate change finance can help illustrate the picture. Russia, for instance, has spent around USD 130 billion in 2022 due to its war with Ukraine [136]. The US has spent trillions in its wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria since 2001, not to mention its financial support to Israel since its war with Hamas in Gaza (Palestine), which is estimated to reach USD 22.76 billion [137]. That being said, the US, Russia, Israel, and other countries focus not merely on their ongoing war(s), but there are other security expenditures to consider, such as the US military bases and activities around the world that cost billions of dollars annually [137]. These wars affect not only the States and their proxies but all their neighboring countries as well as the world in general in terms of food security, energy prices, inflation, migration, and much more, while the benefits and gains are not too many to mention [138]. On the other hand, when it comes to climate change, it was only at the UNFCCC COP29 that the Member States agreed to allocate USD 300 billion by 2035 from the developed to the developing countries as part of climate action and climate finance [139]. These figures make it clearer that, due to its severe impacts on nature and societies, as well as the global formal acceptance and membership of climate-related legal instruments, the international community needs to make way for climate change and accept it as a new basic norm instead of swinging toward national stories, conducting ethnic wars, or likewise that lead to nothing but destruction.