A Logical Framework for Forensic DNA Interpretation
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Uncertainty in the Criminal Trial
3. Roles of the DNA Scientist and Different Type of Reporting (Factual, Investigative, Evaluative)
- The forensic practitioner has been asked by a mandating authority or party to examine and/or compare material (typically recovered trace material with reference material from known potential sources).
- The forensic practitioner seeks to evaluate the results with respect to particular competing propositions set by the specific case circumstances or as indicated by the mandating authority.
4. Desiderata and Principles of Interpretation for Evaluative Reporting
4.1. First Principle of Evaluative Reporting: Importance of Case Information
4.2. Second Principle of Evaluative Reporting: Two or More Competing Propositions Should Be Considered
4.3. Third Principle of Evaluative Reporting: Scientists Need to Assign Their Probability of the Findings, Not Their Probability of the (Alleged) Facts
4.4. Forth Principle of Evaluative Reporting: The Value of the Findings Is Expressed by the Ratio of the Probability of the Scientific Observations Given the Case Information and Given That Each, in Turn, of the Propositions Are True
5. Avoiding the Transposed Conditional
6. Hierarchy of Propositions
6.1. Issue with Which the Forensic Scientist Can Help: Is Mr Smith’s the Source of the DNA/Biological Material?
6.1.1. Source-Level Propositions
6.1.2. Sub-Source-Level Propositions
6.1.3. Sub-Sub-Source-Level Propositions
6.2. Issue with Which the Forensic Scientist Can Help: Did Mr Smith Perform the Activities Alleged by the Prosecution or Those Alleged by the Defence?
6.3. Issue with Which the Forensic Scientist Can Help: Is Mr Smith the Offender or Does He Have Nothing to Do with the Offence?
7. Formulation of Propositions
8. Formulation of the Alternative in the Absence of Information from the Person(s) of Interest
9. Distinction between Explanations and Propositions
10. A Note on Multiple Propositions
- -
- Mr A is a contributor
- -
- Mr A and Mr B are the source of the DNA mixture.
- -
- Mr A and an unknown are the source of the DNA mixture.
- -
- Mr A is NOT a contributor
- -
- Mr B and an unknown are the source of the DNA mixture.
- -
- Two unknown persons are the source of the DNA mixture.
11. Pre-Assessment
11.1. Revisiting Good Forensic Practices for Evaluative Reporting
11.2. An Example of Post-Hoc Rationalisation That Can Be Avoided Using Pre-Assessment
12. Communication, Reporting, and Testimony
12.1. Reporting: General Desiderata
12.2. Statement Writing
12.3. The Use of Verbal Equivalents
12.4. Testimony
13. A Discussion on Likelihood Ratios
13.1. Likelihood Ratio and Probability
13.2. With High LRs, Does It Really Matter if One Transposes the Conditional?
14. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Investigative Role | Evaluative Role |
---|---|
Tends to be crime-focused. | Tends to be suspect-focused. |
Tends to be at the beginning of the criminal justice process. | Tends to be at the culmination of the criminal justice process. |
Helps the investigator make decisions. | Helps the court take decisions. |
Type of questions: What happened? What is this? Who could be involved? | Type of questions: Is Mr Smith the source of the DNA or is it someone else? Did Mr Smith drive the car or was he a passenger? |
Suggests explanations for the observations and gives guidance. | Evaluates the observations (i.e., results) given at least two mutually exclusive propositions. |
Open-ended process. | More formal and structured. |
Explanations need to encompass all realistic possibilities to avoid bias and avoid potentially misleading the inquiry. | Assigned probabilities should be calibrated; rates of misleading opinions should be low and documented. |
Incorrect or Ambiguous Statement (A) | Correct Statement (B) | Notation | |
---|---|---|---|
1. | Given the DNA results, it is a billion times more likely that the DNA is from Ms Jones than from an unknown unrelated person. | The results are a billion times more probable if the DNA is from Ms Jones rather than if it is from an unknown unrelated person. | A: Pr(Hp|E,I)/Pr(Hd|E,I) B: Pr(E|Hp,I)/Pr(E|Hd,I) Note: In A, the use of the term “that”is always suspicious. |
2. | The likelihood ratio calculated the probability that the DNA evidence observed in the profile originated from the applicant, rather than another person chosen at random from the Australian Caucasian population. (Sometimes, scientists will write “the probability that a randomly selected person would have this DNA profile is 1 in a billion.”. However, the alternative source of the DNA is not “selected at random”, but rather an unknown person, related or not to the persons of interest depending on the case). | The likelihood ratio represents the ratio of two probabilities: the probability of the result given that the DNA is from the applicant and the probability of the result given the DNA is from an unknown person from the Australian Caucasian population. | A: Pr(Hp|E,I)/Pr(Hd|E,I) B: Pr(E|Hp,I)/Pr(E|Hd,I) Note: a word such as « if » or « given » should always be present when using conditional probabilities. |
3. | Participants of the proficiency test were asked whether their DNA results more probably originated due to the disputed activity or social interactions. (In the exercise, it read as “Participants were required to consider each DNA profile separately and assess whether they originated either due to primary or secondary transfer” however, it is best not to put the word transfer in the propositions as transfer/persistence and recovery are factors that scientists will take into account in their evaluation.) | Participants of the proficiency test were asked whether their DNA results were more probable given the disputed activity than given social interactions. | A: Pr(Hp|E,I)/Pr(Hd|E,I) B: Pr(E|Hp,I)/Pr(E|Hd,I) Note: In A, the absence of the term “if [the proposition]”or “given [the proposition]”is a clue that the statement needs review. |
4. | The probability that the DNA comes from a random unrelated person is one in a million. | The probability of the results if the DNA comes from a random unrelated person is one in a million. | A: Pr(Hd|I) B: Pr(E|Hd,I) Note: statement B is correct (not transposed) but not balanced since Pr(E|Hp,I) is missing. |
5. | Considering the genetic characteristics of the trace, it is a million times more likely that Mr S is the source of the DNA rather than his uncle. | The genetic characteristics of the trace are a million times more likely if Mr S is the source of the DNA rather than his uncle. | A: Pr(Hp|E,I)/ Pr(Hd|E,I) B: Pr(E|Hp,I)/Pr(E|Hd,I) Note: in statement A, the phrase “considering the genetic characteristics of the trace” implies that the DNA characteristics represent the conditioning information (thus are present behind the conditional bar). However, the conditioning information should be the propositions and the information; the term “given” should be associated with the propositions and information, not with the results. |
6. | As explained by this Court in Tuite [No 1] for each DNA sample where the suspect cannot be excluded as a contributor, a ratio was calculated which shows how much more likely it is that the suspect was the source of the DNA (or a contributor to it) than that some other person chosen at random from the population was the source (or a contributor). | As explained by this Court in Tuite [No 1] for each DNA sample where the suspect cannot be excluded as a contributor, a ratio was calculated which shows how much more likely the DNA results would be given the suspect were the source of the DNA (or a contributor to it) than given an unknown person from the population were the source (or a contributor). | A: LR defined incorrectly as Pr(Hp|E,I)/ Pr(Hd|E,I) B: LR is defined as LR = Pr(E|Hp,I)/ Pr(E|Hd,I) |
7. | The most favoured proposition is that S is the source of the DNA rather than an unknown unrelated person. | The DNA results strongly support the proposition that S, rather than an unknown unrelated person, is the source of the DNA. | Note: in A the use the term favour could be read as saying the first proposition is most likely. The term “support” is more appropriate. |
Prior Odds | LR | Posterior Odds | Posterior Probability of the First Proposition | Posterior Probability of the Alternative |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 to 10 million | 1 × 106 | 1 to 10 | 9% | 91% |
1 to 1 million | 1 × 106 | 1 to 1 | 50% | 50% |
1 to 10,000 | 1 × 106 | 100 to 1 | 99% | 1% |
Level | Question/Issue | Results | Example of Pairs of Propositions |
---|---|---|---|
Source | Is the POI the source of the body fluid? | DNA profiling comparison. | Mr A is the source of the blood. An unknown unrelated person is the source of the blood. |
Sub-source | Is the POI the source of the DNA? | Mr A is the source of the DNA. An unknown unrelated person is the source of the DNA. | |
Sub-sub-source | Is the POI the source of the part of the mixture? | Mr A is the major contributor of the DNA mixture. An unknown unrelated person is the major contributor of the DNA mixture. | |
Activity | Did the POI do the activity? | Presence/absence of DNA at different locations. Quantity/quality of the DNA. (DNA profiling comparison) *. Presumptive tests. Multiple traces from same activity. | Mr A and Ms B had penile-vaginal intercourse Mr A and Ms B only had social activities as described in the case information. Mr Smith was the driver and Mr Jones the passenger at the relevant time. Mr Jones was the driver and Mr Smith the passenger at the relevant time. |
Offence | Is the POI the offender? | Multiple traces possibly resulting from different activities compared to Mr A. Presence/absence of DNA. Quantity/quality of the DNA. (DNA profiling comparison) *. Presumptive tests. | Mr A is the burglar (in the sense of “Mr A did the specified activities that the burglar has allegedly done, as specified in the paragraph on case information”). Mr A has nothing to do with the burglary. |
Criteria for Propositions | Basis of the Criteria |
---|---|
They come in pairs, so there are at least two propositions. | To ensure a balanced view representing both parties. |
They are based on the views of the parties and contextual information. | So that the evaluation is relevant to the case. |
They are formal and relate to inductive inference. | To allow scientists logically to assess their findings |
They are mutually exclusive. | If not, a LR cannot be used. |
They represent the positions that prosecution and defence respectively would be expected to take at court. | So that there is one value of the findings and not several values (one LR, not several). |
Propositions are about “causes”, not results. | To enable the scientists to add value and expertise that is needed for the understanding the case. |
Examples to Avoid | More Meaningful Examples | Comments | |
---|---|---|---|
1. | Mr Smith was not the passenger. | Mr Smith was the driver. | If propositions are vague, it is difficult to assign a probability, unless this is specified in the paragraph summarising task-pertinent information. |
2. | The DNA is from someone other than Mr Smith. | The DNA is from an unknown person. | |
3. | Mr Smith was in recent contact with the victim. | Mr Smith visited the victim’s house as described in the case information. | |
4. | The matching profile comes from Mr Smith. | The DNA is from Mr Smith. | “Matching profile” is a result: it should not be included in the proposition. |
5. | The male DNA is from Mr Smith or someone of his paternal lineage. | The male DNA is from Mr Smith. | Here, it is Mr Smith who would be on trial, not his paternal lineage. If one needs to consider a person from the paternal lineage, this should be done in the alternative. It is the methods that depend on the issue and not the reverse (i.e., propositions do not depend on methods). |
6. | Mr A’s DNA was transferred on the drug package via Officer B. | Officer B arrested Mr A before seizing the drug package. | As written, the statement says that “DNA was transferred”. This is essentially an explanation for the observations. The probability of the findings given this explanation is approaching 1. The probability of DNA being transferred needs to be taken into account by the scientist when evaluating results given activity-level propositions and the case information. That transfer has occurred cannot be included in the proposition for evaluation. |
Observations | Explanations |
---|---|
DNA profile of Mr Smith is compatible with the DNA profile of the trace. | The DNA was planted by the police. |
The real offender has the same DNA profile | |
His DNA was transported from his beer can to the door by the wind. | |
The government synthesised a DNA profile with the same allelic designations as him. | |
The DNA is from his lost twin. | |
There was contamination. | |
The DNA was secondarily transferred. | |
The person was recently in contact with the object. | |
No semen. | There was no ejaculation. |
A condom was used. | |
There was no intercourse. | |
There was intercourse but all trace of semen was lost following a vaginal douche. | |
The swab taken did not recover the material that was present because of bad procedures. |
Reason for the Caveat | Example |
---|---|
Underline the importance of case information and propositions. | The evaluation presented in this report is crucially dependent on the information provided to the examiner and on the propositions addressed. Any change in the framework of circumstances or in either of the propositions should be seen as sufficient reason for a new evaluation. If some information were found to be incorrect, or if new information were made available, I would need to re-evaluate the value of the findings. Re-evaluation will be more effective if performed in advance of a trial. |
Explain what a LR is and is not. | A likelihood ratio indicates if and to what extent the DNA analysis results support one proposition over another. It is not possible, on this basis alone, to determine which is the most probable proposition. To assign the probability of a proposition, the DNA analysis results should be combined with other information in the case. This is generally not considered to be the remit of the DNA scientist. |
Alert on the difference between source and activity issues. | This report does not provide any information on the mechanisms or actions that led to the deposition of the recovered biological material. It only provides information regarding its origin (e.g., who is the source of the DNA). Should there be any issue regarding the transfer mechanisms that led to the detection of this material, the results should be evaluated given the alleged activities. |
Delineate the meaning of a verbal scale. | The likelihood ratio is a numerical value. Words can be assigned to brackets of numerical values and used as a descriptor of the results’ support for a proposition. Several verbal equivalence tables have been published, and it is above all a convention. |
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Hicks, T.; Buckleton, J.; Castella, V.; Evett, I.; Jackson, G. A Logical Framework for Forensic DNA Interpretation. Genes 2022, 13, 957. https://doi.org/10.3390/genes13060957
Hicks T, Buckleton J, Castella V, Evett I, Jackson G. A Logical Framework for Forensic DNA Interpretation. Genes. 2022; 13(6):957. https://doi.org/10.3390/genes13060957
Chicago/Turabian StyleHicks, Tacha, John Buckleton, Vincent Castella, Ian Evett, and Graham Jackson. 2022. "A Logical Framework for Forensic DNA Interpretation" Genes 13, no. 6: 957. https://doi.org/10.3390/genes13060957
APA StyleHicks, T., Buckleton, J., Castella, V., Evett, I., & Jackson, G. (2022). A Logical Framework for Forensic DNA Interpretation. Genes, 13(6), 957. https://doi.org/10.3390/genes13060957