A Systemist Examination of Civil Wars and Their Actors

Abstract

This article focuses intently on three pieces of civil war research and how they interact with each other to improve our understanding of the dynamic nature of warring actors. Patrick Regan’s book, entitled Sixteen Million One, delves into the conditions under which civil wars emerge by focusing intently on why individual actors take up arms to form a rebel faction. Research by Olson Lounsbery and Cook illuminates the challenge of these actors operating in a cohesive manner when they are faced with decisions to negotiate, while additional research by Olson Lounsbery presents the conditions under which previously splintered factions would once again unite. Each piece is presented through a systemist graphic approach. Doing so helps demonstrate how they interact with one another to improve our knowledge in the field of civil war studies. The article concludes with lessons learned through the application of systemism.

1. Introduction

Research on civil wars has evolved significantly, particularly in the post-Cold War era. While the magnitude of civil wars had been increasing since the mid-1970s, it was not until concerns over nuclear annihilation were temporarily abated with the fall of the Soviet Union that the international community and scholars alike truly took notice. With the prevalence of civil wars, and the seemingly indiscriminate nature of the violence involved in these disputes, came an increased effort to better understand why they were occurring and how the international system could better address them. The result has been a rather large body of research examining various aspects of civil wars ranging from the factors that motivate them to their peace processes.

This article focuses intently on three pieces of civil war research and how they interact with each other to improve our understanding of the dynamic nature of warring actors. Patrick Regan’s book, entitled Sixteen Million One (2009), delves into the conditions under which civil wars emerge by focusing intently on why individual actors take up arms to form a rebel faction. Olson Lounsbery and Cook (2011) illuminate the challenge of these actors operating in a cohesive manner when they are faced with decisions to negotiate, while Olson Lounsbery (2016) presents the conditions under which previously splintered factions would once again unite. Each piece is presented through a systemist graphic approach. Doing so helps demonstrate how they interact with one another to improve our knowledge in the field of civil war studies. The article concludes with lessons learned through the application of systemism.

2. Systemism: An Approach and Method

The research discussed in this article forms a part of the ever-expanding Visual International Relations Project (VIRP) introduced by Patrick James (2019), who sought to provide a mechanism through which international relations scholars could better communicate their work, as well as connect that work to others. In order to do so, the VIRP embraces a systemist graphic approach. Through the project, a given academic publication is presented as a diagram showing causal mechanisms within the system through which they operate. Diagrams are able to portray complex theoretical linkages, the essence of the work’s argument, through the use of shapes (and, where permitted, colors) that represent variable types and how they are connected to one another. All types of theoretical connections are made visible through the figures. According to Gansen and James (2021), “systemism is both an approach and a method that, through its lucidity and completeness, has the potential to benefit the discipline as a whole” (p. 274).

Each figure presents not only the theoretical linkages for the research examined, but also the environment in which it takes place. A systemist figure can have either a material or ideational structure. A material example would include a geographic entity as the system, with an international system as its environment. For example, if Portugal is the system, the macro and micro levels would correspond, respectively, to events in government and society. The international system is the environment. If the structure is ideational—and that is the case for all of the diagrams in this article—the system is an academic discipline. If, for instance, international relations is the system, the macro and micro levels, respectively, are the discipline as a whole and individual scholars within it. The World Beyond academe constitutes the environment, put simply, events in the ‘real world’ as opposed to academic discourse within the discipline.

Civil wars, though they are by definition armed conflicts between a recognized member of the nation-state system and a rebel faction operating within its borders (Gleditsch et al. 2002), take place within the international system itself. Characteristics and shifts within the system affect these disputes, and the disputes themselves reverberate and influence the international system. We can see these connections visually in the VIRP diagrams.

Additionally, each diagram makes clear the interactions between macro- and micro-level variables through the use of upper and lower case characters (Gansen and James 2021, p. 274). The diagrams allow the observer to see how the variables involved relate to one another within its environment, but they also allow for the easy connection to other works within the field. A more detailed introduction to systemism appears in the article that introduces this Special Issue (Barnoschi 2024).

What follows is a discussion of Regan (2009), Olson Lounsbery and Cook (2011), and Olson Lounsbery (2016) using the systemist approach. Each work is examined separately, before delving into how they relate to each other to improve our understanding of civil wars. The three diagrams, as per the discussion above, all take an ideational form. In each instance, the system is the discipline of international relations.

Civil wars have posed significant challenges for the international system. These types of wars are defined as armed conflicts occurring between a recognized member of the nation-state system and an armed faction emerging from within the borders of that state (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Their violence tends to involve civilian victimization not typically experienced in interstate wars. Although the roots of such disputes lie in the political structures of the state, the dynamics of such disputes tend to transcend borders. Rebels, refugees, and arms flow in and out of borders, and interventions of various types are likely. Patrick Regan’s book, Sixteen Million One: Understanding Civil War (2009), makes a significant contribution to the literature on civil wars as it delves into the conditions under which the individual might make the decision to mobilize with others to take up arms against their government. Figure 1 is a graphic that captures the essence of his argument as it relates to the world system and the international relations that take place within it.

Most civil wars are fought between a non-state actor and a much stronger government that carries with it the legitimacy of the state and its military apparatus. Making the decision to participate in the mobilization of a rebellion under such conditions indicates that there are enough people who collectively feel their plight so dire that they are willing to take the risk that challenging a stronger government poses. The roots of civil wars, or the conditions that would motivate enough people to take up arms and rebel, occur at the level of the international system. Poverty, which occurs throughout the international system, is a key element in the path to war, but poverty alone is not enough to lead to mobilization. Instead, as per the analysis of Regan, it is poverty manufactured by the state through policy that will create the inequities that guarantee that some people in society will suffer the conditions of poverty while others will not. According to Regan (2009), civil wars are a function of poverty and inequities born of discrimination.

Structural poverty occurring within the system has the potential to result in both an international response, as well as prompting individual moves from those experiencing the deprivation, which leads to two sets of dynamic interactions. Individual targets of structural poverty find themselves living at the margins of society leading to constant struggle and hardship. When this struggle is a function of state policy designed to provide advantage to some in society over others, the impoverished are more likely to mobilize against the inequities of the system. It is one thing to be destitute, but another thing entirely to experience the humiliation assigned to those identified as ‘second’ or ‘third’ class citizens (if citizenship is even permitted for your identity group). For one to take up arms against their much stronger opponent, they must find their situation so untenable that risking one’s life, and that of your family, seems a better option than the status quo.

Regan (2009) makes clear that although poorer countries are more likely to experience civil war, not all do. Structural poverty reaches a tipping point under a set of complex processes involving stressful economic conditions, politicized identity, and repressive government responses to protest. In societies where policies result in some groups experiencing poverty at significantly higher rates than other groups, the key factor in determining the ‘haves’ versus the ‘have nots’ is identity. Group identity can be constructed by race, ethnicity, religion, geography, or ideology. Most, if not all, countries in the world are composed of multiple and competing identities. The roots of conflict lie not in the difference between various identity groups, but in the power hierarchies that are formed based on these differences. Politically dominant and politically subordinate groups are often a function of colonial histories where specific identity groups were provided advantage by the colonizer as a means to deflect animosities resulting from external oppression. Identity-based exclusion is then exacerbated by economic downturns, particularly those involving inflation. Poorer states are less able to absorb economic crises than wealthier states, just as groups at the bottom of the economic ladder suffer disproportionately when prices rise significantly more than incomes.

The result of identity-based, structural poverty and inflation is group mobilization. Small shifts in access to food, water, and shelter affect the impoverished the most. Those that have the least to lose, who experience both political and economic discrimination, will first express their grievances through protest. How the government responds to calls for change is another important step in determining whether mobilization will turn to violence, according to Regan (2009). Politically dominant groups are reluctant to give up their privilege, particularly in poorer countries where resources are less able to support entire populations. Instead, governments facing protests over discrimination tend to respond harshly, attempting to deter further mobilization. Of course, when one has suffered enough humiliation at the hands of a government that does not represent you, repressive responses create both fear, resentment, and the recognition that your group’s security depends on collective action. Under such conditions, rebellion and civil war becomes likely.

Although civil wars tend to emerge from the structures and circumstances occurring within the state, the violence that ensues tends to draw the attention of international actors in the interest of bringing about a resolution to the dispute (even if on specific terms desired by the intervener). In fact, civil wars are resistant to internally driven solutions. As Regan (2009, p. 133) makes clear, the brutality associated with civil wars leads to heightened emotional responses to the opposition and deteriorating levels of trust. Third parties may intervene militarily, economically, or diplomatically. Although third-party military intervention aimed at supporting one side over another tends to make for longer wars, Regan (2009, p. 148) suggests that third parties can support the path to peace, particularly through inducements and diplomatic initiatives. It is the proper sequencing of intervention that is necessary to effectively bring parties to the table.

Returning to the global perspective (see the top layer in the World Beyond of Figure 1), when faced with situations where structural conditions have led to civil war, outside actors may choose to intervene to reinforce the status quo by supporting the government, challenge the status quo by supporting the rebels, or they may choose to not engage. These decisions interact with the conflict actors involved, thus influencing micro-level conditions. According to Regan (2009), intervention that effectively helps the supported party achieve a military victory is more difficult than it seems. Note, for example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 aimed at assisting pro-Russian rebels; even with the assistance of a major power, victory has remained elusive at the time of writing. Instead, interventions can help move parties to a place where they may be more willing to consider negotiation and possible concessions to end the violence.

Regan (2009) notes that diplomacy, or mediation, is a more effective tool for ending civil wars, though it is not used as frequently as economic or military interventions. In order to get parties to a point where negotiations are possible, warring actors must begin to recognize that outright victory may not be possible. Third-party support can help warring actors move towards this recognition through carefully crafted and timed interventions.

Of course, bringing peace to civil war environments is a process that only begins at the bargaining table. It continues with well-crafted agreements that stop the violence, create incentives to avoid a return to arms, and move to rebuild the country. Third-party assistance in this process is imperative to success, particularly in providing a secure environment for agreement implementation and disarmament. Through the process of implementing the agreement, external assistance can help create the stability needed to generate confidence and trust in the peace process.

Ultimately, for peace to thrive and maintain itself in a post-civil war environment, the underlying issues of structural inequities need to be addressed at an aggregate level. The question of how to achieve such a goal is an ongoing one for discipline of IR, as noted in the red octagon that appears at the macro level of the system. Simultaneously, at the level of individual actors, peace processes need to also address trauma created through the conflict itself, in particular human rights abuses experienced through the war. Often the pain of war is addressed through specific provisions in the peace agreement, such as power-sharing arrangements or war crimes tribunals. As per the point of termination that takes the shape of a red octagon in the World Beyond, actors in the system beyond the conflict can help support this process of healing through programs designed to alleviate poverty, including antipoverty and microfinance programs, both of which aim to lift those at the margins of society directly addressing factors that lead to group mobilization. Similarly, system-level support for human rights organizations and advocates who assist post-war societies in moving toward reconciliation are equally important in bringing about and supporting peace.

Olson Lounsbery and Cook suggest that the mediation in the midst of civil wars may influence or be influenced by rebel group dynamics. Rebel groups opposing the state can be rather dynamic. As suggested in this work, the relationship between efforts to resolve a civil war and the rebellious actors involved are potentially intertwined. Competing hypotheses are presented suggesting that mediation efforts may lead rebel factions to splinter or emerge, and/or the shifting of rebel factions might create windows of opportunity for third-party assisted negotiations to commence.

To better understand both the contribution of “Rebellion, Mediation, and Group Change” and how it relates to other important literature on civil wars, a graphic exposition of the work is presented in Figure 2. The diagram begins in the World Beyond the academic study of IR. Although by definition, civil wars are armed conflicts involving actors within the state, these armed conflicts occur within the bounds of that international system. Civil wars tend to transcend borders bringing clear and evident threats to international peace and security, as per the green oval in the World Beyond. In doing so, much attention in the field of international relations has been paid to understanding how to best manage, and ultimately, resolve such disputes.

Early efforts to address civil wars were in large part informed by experience in resolving interstate disputes. Unlike interstate wars, however, civil wars are not as neatly characterized as a single armed faction, such as a state’s military pitted against cohesive armed faction. It is not uncommon for civil war governments to face multiple insurrections simultaneously, leading to two pathways, both of which illustrate the complexity of civil wars as acknowledged via the orange diamond in Figure 2. First, it is recognized that within each conflict, the potential for multiple rebel factions exists as preferences diverge. In the face of competing interests and disagreements over tactics, rebel groups may splinter, die or merge. New groups may also emerge to both challenge the government and perhaps even existing rebel factions. All such rebel dynamics represent “group change” that have significant implications for the conflict and its trajectory. Further complicating civil war interactions is the role that identity often plays in such disputes. Civil wars seem to involve intangible issues related to identity that often mask important underlying political goals, such as group representation and/or security. The dynamic nature of belligerent actors and the relevance of identity in these disputes take the complexity of civil war to a level not typically found in interstate disputes challenging resolution efforts in significant and potentially predictable ways.

Given these complex challenges that civil wars pose, Olson Lounsbery and Cook (2011) suggest that the way out of a civil war often involves third-party assistance. As shown in the point of convergence for the analysis that appears as a blue parallelogram, their focus is on “(i) processes of negotiation that result in group change; and (ii) government attempts to bring about group change through negotiations.” In other words, the relationship between negotiations in civil war and rebel group dynamics is potentially bi-directional. In some situations, as rebels and the government signal a willingness to engage in negotiation, differing preferences among the rebels may lead some to object to dialogue as a way to achieve group goals, or those objections may emerge during the negotiation process when some may become dissatisfied with any concessions provided the government. In both situations, a rebel group faction rejects or removes itself from the negotiation process, and even could act as spoilers to any peace agreement that may emerge (see Stedman 1997 for more on spoilers).

Not all rebel group change can be explained by the occurrence of negotiation. Instead, it is possible that other disputes not related to talks may lead to rebel group change. When a rebel faction splinters, a window of opportunity may emerge for the government to take advantage of group differences and preferences. By negotiating with the more amenable faction, if successful, the government can refocus its military efforts on the remaining, now weakened faction. These different expectations regarding the relationship between rebel group change and negotiations is presented in the figure as two hypotheses: “(1) efforts to resolve armed civil conflict through a negotiated approach are likely to reproduce rebel group change; and (2) group change can create an environment conducive to mediation.”

The testing of hypotheses relating to group change and negotiations requires operationalizing all relevant variables for a combined dataset on intrastate conflicts from Regan (2002) combined with the Armed Conflict Database (UCDP/PRIO). Important steps to the statistical analysis, based on 1179 conflict years, are presented in the nodal component that appears as a purple hexagon in the figure. The dependent variables examined were rebel group change and mediation occurrence, with each measured at time t + 1 and independent variables measured at time t to reflect the predicted direction of both hypotheses, and included relevant control variables. Simultaneous equations were first estimated using bivariate probit but found unnecessary. Instead, multivariate logit models were presenting with standard errors clustered on the conflict. Statistical analysis provided support for Hypothesis 1, but not for Hypothesis 2. Results suggest that mediation increases the likelihood that rebel group change will occur in the subsequent year by 43.18%. Further, as summed up in the nodal components that appear as a purple hexagon, group change seems more likely at the beginnings and endings of conflict, in higher intensity conflicts, following previous rebel group dynamics, and among smaller-sized rebel groups.

Figure 2 concludes with the recognition that, among international relations scholars, future research should focus intently on the role that rebel group splintering and change play on conflict trajectories, but also how the content of mediation may influence these changes as well. These points appear in the terminal component that takes the form of a red octagon at the macro level of IR. The finding that mediation may bring about rebel factions that continue the fight has significant implications for conflict resolution practitioners operating throughout the world. Adjusting approaches and recognizing the complexity of rebel group actors as one engages in the resolution process is probably necessary. These points are made clear in the red octagon that appears in the World Beyond.

Working from the macro level, Olson Lounsbery (2016) recognizes that rebels challenging their government may be more or less cohesive in their organization. While various rebels involved in a civil war may be motivated by the same set of grievances, leadership and tactical differences can and do result in a government at times facing multiple rebel groups instead of one cohesive entity. Differences in tactics led to three different factions in the Filipino conflict on the island of Mindanao, for example. Comparatively, the number of armed factions engaged in the Afghan civil war has fluctuated over time involving 12 different rebel factions as identified by the UCDP Actor Dataset (Davies et al. 2022). The recognition of rebel dynamics is where Figure 3 begins, with an initial component in the World Beyond that is designated with a green oval. Civil wars pose a significant challenge to the system in part because of their group complexity.

According to Christia (2012), rebel factions make decisions about splintering and coalescing as they make efforts to improve their future prospects in light of the changing nature of the conflict and its environment. The number of rebel actors involved and the shifting of these actors has implications for how governments will wage their war or engage in negotiations (see the work of D. E. Cunningham 2006 or Lintner 1994). It is clear also that civil wars draw international attention as external actors seek to bring conflict to an end (Regan 2000), though the direction of that intervention may vary as interveners attempt to bring about a desired outcome. Decisions made at the international level influence the actors directly; when intervention occurs in a civil war, power shifts as a result. Most civil wars begin with a power structure that benefits the state. Decisions to intervene will influence this power structure depending on the direction of that intervention. If a third party provides military support to rebels, their relative power will increase. Comparatively, an intervention on behalf of the government will reinforce the status quo and the asymmetric power structure. Therefore, it is suggested by Olson Lounsbery (2016) that foreign military intervention into a civil war will also influence rebel group cohesion as those groups move to respond to these shifting power dynamics.

Olson Lounsbery (2016) proposes and tests three hypotheses based on the direction of intervention and the impact of that intervention on the relevant power structures involved in the dispute. When warring governments are reinforced by external support, rebel groups find themselves in a more detrimental position than they had been previously. As a result, rebels will need to reconsider their approach, including the possibility that engaging in negotiations, even from an inferior position, may be preferential to an increased chance of defeat. These tough tactical decisions potentially lead to rebel group splintering as some may find negotiating from a weakened position untenable. In the presence of military intervention that supports the government, rebels must choose from two rather undesirable alternatives: pursue weak concessions from an emboldened government or continue the fight from a weaker position. Neither approach is likely to satisfy all rebels, thus they may choose to go separate ways.

Comparatively, foreign military intervention may benefit rebels when external actors move to support such groups. In this situation, rebel factions will be operating from an improved position with additional resources and leverage than they had prior to the intervention. In order to make the most of this external support, rebel groups that had previously been divided will likely coalesce to avoid a post-conflict scenario of which they have no part. It is when times are good that any differences that led to previous fractures of group organization may be overcome.

Some interventions aim to provide stability and support peace processes rather than bolster any particular belligerent group. These neutral interventions do not tip the power scales in ways that influence rebel group dynamics. As a result, Olson Lounsbery (2016) suggests that neutral interventions are unlikely to result in either rebel splintering or coalitions.

All three of these directionally based hypotheses are tested on a global sample of civil conflicts occurring from 1975 to 2009 identified by the UCDP Armed Conflict Database (Gleditsch et al. 2002). This is conveyed by the divergent component that takes the form of an orange diamond in Figure 3. Through the use of these data coupled with other available sources, group dynamics are identified, as are explanatory and control variables. The dependent variables in the study are rebel group splintering and rebel group coalitions. Using rebel groups identified in the UCDP data, each group was researched by Olson Lounsbery (2016) in order to determine if newly emerging groups were breakaway factions from existing groups (i.e., splinters), whereas coalitions were considered to have formed with existing factions merged together into a new entity.

Foreign military intervention into civil wars can vary in terms of support provided. Olson Lounsbery (2016) considers troop support, weapons, and financial assistance to be substantial assistance compared to lower levels of intervention, such as providing safe havens for rebels, intelligence, and logistical support. In order to identify military interventions into civil wars, the International Military Intervention (IMI) database (Pickering and Kisangani 2009; Pearson and Baumann 1993) and the UCDP External Assistance data (Högbladh 2011) were used to capture both direction and type of support. To address potential spuriousness, the presence of mediation, conflict intensity, duration and type, rebel capacity, lootable resources, mountainous terrain, region of conflict, number of inactive years, and rival interventions served as control variables in the statistical models presented.

Findings relating to interventions and rebel group dynamics were based on multivariate logit regression due to of the dichotomous nature of the outcome variable, as per the nodal component depicted as a purple hexagon in Figure 3. While Olson Lounsbery (2016) did not find support for Hypothesis 1 (supportive intervention predicting splintering), it does appear that interventions that are hostile to the state (i.e., supporting rebels) motivates rebels to coalesce around that support (Hypothesis 2). This is the case for various levels of support, though Olson Lounsbery (2016, p. 11) reports that weapons to rebels in particular is associated with a 366% chance that rebel group coalitions will form. Among the control variables considered in analyses involving intervention, findings suggest that coalitions are more likely in Africa than in Europe, where they simply do not seem to occur. Further, rebel coalitions are less likely in territorial conflicts and among weaker rebels. Finally, Hypotheses 3 and 4 are confirmed as well: neutral interventions are not associated with the types of rebel group dynamics examined in this work as those interventions tend to reinforce the status quo and do not influence group capacity.

In order to better understand the impact of foreign military intervention on rebel group dynamics, Olson Lounsbery (2016) delves into two case studies, as observed in the nodal component that appears as a purple hexagon. In doing so, the complexity of the relationship is exposed. The first case, Afghanistan, indicates that intervention by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in support of the Taliban (i.e., hostile intervention) did indeed result in a rebel group alliance, but it was not a coalescence around the Taliban itself. Instead, the intervention coupled with the power vacuum created through Soviet withdrawal allowed the Taliban to make such progress in capturing important territory that the threat it posed persuaded anti-Taliban factions to join forces with the failing Rabbani government to overcome any previous animosities to form the Northern Alliance in opposition.

Similarly, the case of Uganda illustrates how intervention can provide the motivation needed for rebel group coalescence. In this case, the intervention was less targeted on the Ugandan civil war than a counterattack to Uganda’s own intervention. The country experiencing the initial attack was Tanzania, which itself laid refuge to various rebel factions that had escaped Idi Amin’s brutality. When Uganda used its military to claim a portion of Tanzania, Tanzania responded with its own forces 30–40,000 strong (Roberts 2014). In doing so, it created a window of opportunity for former President Obote’s Kikoosi Maalum forces to merge with Museveni’s Front for National Salvation to form the Uganda National Liberation Front despite their own ideological and aspirational differences. The Tanzanian intervention not only paved the way for a rebel group coalition, but also led to the toppling of Amin as a result.

The research presented in Olson Lounsbery (2016) made clear that foreign military intervention that supports rebels or challenges warring governments impacts power structures in ways that encourage rebel group cooperation. It is also obvious that the actions and reactions involved in these interventions are not simple and may lead to such rebel group shifts in interesting ways. Thus, the article returns to the international level and recommends subsequent work that explores these important moves in the midst of conflict, as well as how interventions and rebel dynamics relate to negotiation and post-conflict settlement.

3. Engagement of the Three Diagrams

The research examined in this article focuses intently on the actors involved in civil wars. Each makes its own valuable contribution to the literature. If we examine them together, however, we can draw important conclusions that pave the way toward a better understanding of the actor dynamics that take place over the course of a conflict, as well as the context under which these changes occur. The discussion that follows suggests that the three pieces of work examined here overlap and interact with each other around three important but related themes: asymmetric power structures typical of civil wars, varying preferences of rebel actors, and decisions to intervene by external actors. It is suggested here that the asymmetric nature of civil wars is a function of an international system that rests power on the nation-state. That system-level characteristic then influences both varying group preferences and intervention decisions within and surrounding the conflict itself.

Due to asymmetric power structures so prevalent in civil war settings (Butler and Gates 2009; Cunningham et al. 2009; Olson Lounsbery and Pearson 2009), when individuals within the state make decisions to challenge their government, they do so knowing that such a move involves great risk because of the strength of their opponent. They know also that the potential to win is quite low as a result. As Regan (2009) makes clear, those that choose this route tend to do so because they have lost previously attempted nonviolent options. He makes clear also that there are varying levels of desperation amongst those that challenge their government, as well as varying preferences. Among those that experience structurally induced grievances, there will still be a range within the oppressed. Those that are wealthier will be less inclined to accept risk than those that are more materially deprived. Regan (2009) indicates that this is what separates those who are willing to make the shift from nonviolent action to armed struggle from those that do not.

Of course, even among those that do take up arms, these varying levels of desperation continue to exist. Think of the desperation felt by the aggrieved as a range that moves from the most desperate to the least desperate. Along that range there will reach a tipping point where, while grievance is felt, the risk associated with armed struggle weighs heavier than what could potentially be gained through compromise. In light of this, varying needs and preferences are produced. These needs of the individual actors involved are formed by their own experience, their own level of desperation. When we understand this reality, it helps to better comprehend why group organization structure is so dynamic.

This discussion then provides insight into the rebel group dynamics examined in Olson Lounsbery and Cook (2011). That rebel actors are motivated to behave in certain ways informed by their varying levels of desperation, and therefore, preferences. When faced with mediation, we can see how divergent interests can challenge group cohesion. When a warring actor makes a decision to negotiate over continued armed tactics, they are in essence recognizing that compromise will be a part of the process. That prospect may be less threatening among those that are relatively less deprived than those in the most dire of situations. Certainly, the reasons a group may splinter from their original rebel group are complex, but we can understand how those most desperate would choose to continue the fight aimed at seeking victory over compromise.

In addition to varying preferences among rebel actors, Olson Lounsbery and Cook (2011) indicate that there may also be varying issues of importance involved. When third parties assist warring actors to resolve their dispute, issues under contention tend to translate into agreement provisions. The issues that are most important to some over others may also be informed by their position and experience within the aggrieved part of society. Political representation may satisfy some, whereas others may need economic development opportunities more than others. Though both of these types of concessions would benefit the group collectively, having representation without economic support may not be enough for the most desperate. Even in the presence of a mediator, power asymmetry is likely to mean that concessions provided by the government may not be comprehensive, and thus lacking in some respect, which will be more problematic to some than others. Those who find the agreement untenable will move to break away and splinter, thus contributing to the findings of Olson Lounsbery and Cook (2011).

Asymmetric power structures within the state which challenge aggrieved non-state actors exist within the international system; thus, as Regan (2009) makes clear, intervention into these disputes is likely. Under these conditions, states are reluctant to compromise and instead view the opposition as a threat to their legitimacy. Instead, states operating within the system, when faced with internal mobilization, work to reassert their authority, resulting in violent government responses. According to Regan (2009), repressive action is an early step toward civil war. Interested external actors then are drawn into the dispute with the goal of ending the conflict, even if on their own terms. In doing so, external actors will make decisions to intervene to either militarily support the government or support the rebels. He makes clear that not intervening at all is an option, but once the decision to intervene is made, who one supports matters. This is where the discussion connects to Olson Lounsbery (2016). Those decisions can influence rebel group behavior. Her findings suggest that hostile intervention reduces the risk associated with taking on the government, thus bringing the more and less desperate back together again. In fact, externally supported rebels do appear more likely to win their conflicts or end their disputes in a negotiated outcome (Gent 2008), and those that are more cohesive gain more in concessions (K. G. Cunningham 2011). Even if there are varying interests and preferences among the rebels, the incentive to coalesce in light of external support will outweigh the benefits of cooperating.

Not all third-party attempts to influence civil war outcomes occur through military intervention. Both Olson Lounsbery and Cook (2011) and Regan (2009) see a place for mediation to help warring factions out of a violent trajectory. In fact, mediation is a less costly way for interested third parties to assist in bringing the conflict to an end. The varying preferences kept by rebels, however, may complicate peace processes, as Olson Lounsbery and Cook indicate. One of the ways that external actors have sought to support civil war peace processes is through the use of third-party guarantors. In fact, Regan sees a place for neutral intervention in assisting peace processes and serving as a guarantor of the peace. Olson Lounsbery (2016) indicates that these efforts are unlikely to lead to rebel group shifts, which may challenge that peace. This recognition may help inspire mediation efforts as a result.

Through the application of systemism as a method of evaluating and connecting research on civil wars, an improved understanding of civil war actors—who themselves operate in a world of power asymmetries, varying preferences, and external involvement—has become possible. What follows is a discussion of how this approach can improve communication within political science research more generally.

4. Lessons Learned

Civil war researchers have tended to view civil wars as a function of internal characteristics of the state. Though these armed struggles occur primarily within the borders of a state, they do not happen in a vacuum. The existing literature has evolved over time to recognize these transnational dimensions of civil war (Gleditsch 2007), but it is through the application of the VIRP that we can better examine and process these linkages. The international system is a moving and dynamic set of interactions. Action by one actor reverberates through the system forcing subsequent reactions. Civil wars are tied to the international system in important ways forcing scholars to take another look at what we know about civil war behavior.

Research is designed to be cumulative as we work to increase knowledge to better explain and predict international behavior. To do so, scholars must first understand the contributions of previous work on their topic and present an argument for how their piece adds to that existing knowledge. The implication of this work for future research is evident; if we look at trying to understand the factors that cause civil wars, for example, we can view this body of knowledge as a puzzle that is in process. Each new research project builds upon the existing puzzle, adding a new piece or two helping to form our understanding of the factors associated with civil war propensity. In light of the VIRP approach, this traditional view of cumulative research feels rather two dimensional. We are often missing the bigger picture through which we see civil wars.

Kenneth Waltz (1954) first introduced us to the concept of levels of analysis in his examination of interstate war. He suggested that previous work focusing on the individual and characteristics of the state failed to recognize the importance of the system and its structure in which these actors operated. As a result, the body of work surrounding civil war causation includes work within each of these levels, yet this work does not seem to communicate well across the levels. It is through systemism that the interactions among the macro- and micro-level factors can be made evident. While we can still view research as a cumulative exercise in the making of a puzzle, when we incorporate the interactions of various factors within the system with the environment, we might conceive of the puzzle in a more multidimensional way. This article has embraced this approach with three pieces of work examining particular characteristics relating to civil wars. In doing so, the multidimensional interactions were brought to light. The contributions of each piece were made evident, but so too was how they collectively improve our knowledge more so than each individual piece on its own. Any policy implications made through civil war research that embraces systemism will be improved as a result.

5. Conclusions

According to Davies et al. (2023), there has been an increase in the number and intensity of civil wars over the last decade. Further, we are also witnessing more intervention into these disputes, particularly major power counter interventions. The body of literature examining civil wars, as well as their causes and dynamics, is well-developed and provides valuable insight into these trends. Patrick Regan’s (2009) work makes clear that what is motivating these armed conflicts is structural poverty by design, made worse by economic hardship. He also acknowledges the diversity within those that take up arms to form rebel groups in opposition to the state. Through this understanding, the findings of Olson Lounsbery and Cook (2011) make sense. Levels of deprivation among rebels lead some to take the risk of continued armed conflict and potential defeat over compromise in the face of mediation. Similarly, when rebels have the fortune of external support, those differences in tactical preference can be overcome at the prospect of improved chances of victory (Olson Lounsbery 2016). All of these factors occur within an international system that creates the environment through which states are the primary actors and are able to freely structure a system that benefits some over others. The resulting set of actions and reactions when the aggrieved take up arms in an act of desperation to change their assigned lot in life forces others in the international system to respond; thus, we witness the types of interventions that in turn influence rebel group cohesion. The micro and macro factors at play interact. Civil wars may be viewed as internal struggles, but this article has demonstrated that in order to fully understand civil war behavior, both within and without, we need to understand these wars through the lens of systemism.