Is the Theory of Karman the Solution to the Problem of Evil? Some Thoughts from Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta

Abstract

Several scholars have discussed various versions of the theory of karman as offering a convincing solution to the problem of evil. Arthur Herman even thinks that the theory of karman is the ultimate theodicy (1976). Such scholars tend to imagine that a unitary theory of karman can be reconstructed as the backbone of most of Sanskrit philosophy of religion and ethics. In this article, I discuss the role of the theory of karman and the problem of evil in one of the schools of Sanskrit philosophy which is still alive and thriving, namely Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. Is karman really the central key to theodicy in this school? Additionally, does the school’s theory of karman correspond to what Herman, Chadha, Trakakis, Sharma and others discuss?

1. Karman and the Problem of Suffering

The problem of the existence of evil has been frequently discussed and debated in Anglo-European1 theology and philosophy of religion. Recently, some Anglo-European and Indian scholars have looked at the theory of karman as offering a possible solution to the problem of evil. For instance, at the beginning of his introduction to his classic book on the topic, Arthur Herman writes:

“Among the many perpetual problems which bother philosophers in both the East and the West, there is one curious puzzle that they do not share: the so-called problem of evil. […] Indians have been strangely silent about what has become a traditional Western puzzle, the problem of evil”

(Herman [1976] 1993).

Herman is convinced that the reason for this silence is that Sanskrit authors in general (“Indians”) already had a solution available to this problem, namely the theory of karman. This article will question this interpretation of the theory of karman. It will therefore first question the idea that there is a single theory of karman and then look at a case in which the problem of theodicy is in fact dealt with, and in which the theory of karman does not represent the single solution for the problem of evil.

1.1. A Survey of Research on Karman as a Solution to the Problem of Evil in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta

Among the contemporary scholars who have discussed the problem of evil within the Sanskrit cosmopolis, the most directly relevant for the present study are Herman ([1976] 1993); Bilimoria (2013); Clooney (1989); Bartley (2018). Herman ([1976] 1993) (first published in 1976) has an ambitious aim, namely to show that “the problems of evil and rebirth, under proper analysis, can be brought together to yield what has heretofore proved to be doctrinally difficult for most European philosophers, viz. an acceptable philosophic solution to the problem of evil” (Introduction, p. 1). Similarly, Bilimoria (2013) discusses the problem of evil in Nyāya and Vedānta in general and sees the doctrine of karman as the main answer to the problem of evil in the Sanskrit philosophical cosmopolis. Clooney (1989) focuses on Vedānta. He immediately notices how the root text of Vedānta, the Uttaramīmāṃsāsūtra (henceforth UMS), dedicates to the law of karman only “three (exceedingly) brief remarks” (Section 1). Clooney then elaborates on the Advaita Vedānta vision of the connection of the law of karman and human freedom on the basis of the doctrine that brahman is the cause of everything. Even more relevant for the present article, Bartley (2018) focuses on the problem of evil in Rāmānuja. After a long introduction on Rāmānuja’s theology, Bartley’s article mentions the texts I too have discussed in other articles (Freschi 2015a, forthcoming a) and which will be briefly summarised below, in Section 3.5, Bartley also notes the reinterpretation of karman as what pleases or displeases God, a crucial move to which this article will come back again:

“Rāmānuja’s tradition cuts the Gordian knot by a reinterpretation of the meaning of karma. For here, karma is a not a self-regulating mechanism independent of the divine will and intellect. It makes no sense to treat it as something that the divinity might take notice of or not when arranging the initial distributions at creation. Rāmānuja thinks that morality is a matter of obeying divine commands. He holds that the notions of the morally good and morally bad have meaning only in relation to what God wills. Virtuous actions are by definition those actions that please God. Indeed, they are forms of worship”

(Bartley 2018, pp. 104–5).2

1.2. The Problems with the Law of Karman as an Alleged Solution to the Problem of Evil

Sanskrit authors do not usually discuss the problem of “evil”, and rather discuss the problem and nature of suffering (duḥkha). In Sanskrit terms, many authors, including authors of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta school, follow the Sāṅkhya classification and distinguish between suffering that is ādhyātmika ‘individual’, such as illness, ādhibhautika ‘physical’, such as earthquakes, and ādhidaivika ‘due to destiny or superhuman agents’ (see Gauḍapādabhāṣya ad SK 1 and ad SK 51, Suvarṇasaptatī ad SK 1, Vācaspati’s Tattvakaumudī ad SK 1, Māṭharavṛtti ad SK 1, and also Suśrutasaṃhitā 1.24.4–7).3 Interestingly, the discussion about suffering is not connected with karman as its cause in the above sources, for instance, the Gauḍapādabhāṣya rather lists other causes for each type of suffering.

Among others, Herman ([1976] 1993); Bilimoria (2013) claim that in Sanskrit philosophy the problem of suffering can be solved through the law of karman. Because of karman, one’s current suffering can be explained as the consequence of one’s past bad actions. This karman-based explanation of suffering has the further advantage of applying to both human and natural evil.4 In this sense, if I suffer either because of an earthquake or because of someone assaulting me, I am just suffering from the consequences of my own karman. In this way, authors like Herman make karman into the single, overarching solution of the problem of suffering. Is this interpretation justified if one bases oneself solely on Sanskrit texts? In other words, can the law of karman be implemented alone and as it is to solve the issue of evil as presented in Anglo-European philosophy?

First of all, there is not a single version of the law of karman, but many different theories regarding karman (see also fn. 5). For instance, some of these theories state that actions create merit and demerit, which then create good or bad results, respectively, while others add the intermediate step of desire and aversion, still others that of saṃskāras ‘traces’ and of karmāśaya ‘karmic deposit’; some see the law of karman as a mechanical law, others include God as a necessary judge within it, and so on. I will not discuss them all here (for more details, see Reichenbach 1989; Framarin 2014).5 My only purpose in this section is to show that there is not a single theory of karman which would be a straightforward and uncontroversial solution to the problem of evil. This is in harmony with what even contemporary defenders of the law of karman claim (see the Conclusion in Chadha and Trakakis 2007). For instance, Chadha and Trakakis (2007) observe:

“[T]he karma theorist wishes to reflect our ignorance in the face of the complexity of reality by offering only a sketchy account as to why humans suffer, one that is based on the unargued assumption that the universe is ultimately just. At a number of important points, for example, the account is deliberately left vague or incomplete”

(Chadha and Trakakis 2007).

Chadha and Trakakis (2007) is a reaction to Kaufman (2005), which criticised karman as a theodicy. Both articles, as well as Kaufman’s response (Kaufman 2007) and Arvind Sharma’s contribution to the debate (Sharma 2008), presuppose that it is possible to extract a “simplified, idealized version of the karma-and-rebirth theory doctrine, one abstracted as far as possible from particular historical or doctrinal questions” (Kaufman 2005, Preliminary Qualifications). Chadha and Trakakis are, in my opinion, right in criticising Kaufman for “a lack of proper attention to the original sources” (Chadha and Trakakis 2007, Conclusion), but they also speak of the “theory of karma” as if there were a unified theory. The same occurs in the case of Sharma, who also speaks of a “doctrine of karma” in the singular.

More in detail, do these various versions of the law of karman envision a moral or a mechanical law? Chadha and Trakakis consider it as a moral law and note the

“strong practical dimension of the theory of karma, a theory that is essentially geared toward providing us with directions for progressing morally and for alleviating or preventing suffering”

(Chadha and Trakakis 2007, Conclusion).

Note the emphasis on karman as linked to suffering, instead of linking it to several consequences, including suffering. In fact, Chadha and Trakakis’ re-reading of the theory of karman interprets it as a rational explanation of the problem of suffering, stressing this aspect more than Sanskrit sources do.

However, if this moral dimension is the case, why should one suffer in this life the consequences of some wrongdoing carried out in a past life, of which one bears no memory? How can one learn from one’s mistakes, if one is punished for them in a later life in which one does not remember at all the mistakes committed in one’s previous life? Additionally, why should one imagine that one would be inclined to act rightly for the sake of one’s future self, given that this future self is so far away in the future and will not know whom to blame? Would not one be more inclined to maximize one’s pleasure now, even at the cost of the future wellbeing of a person to whom one is only loosely connected? In other words, why would one care for a person in the future whose future is determined by one’s present, but that will not be “oneself”? People in the world routinely engage in actions that will severely damage their future selves (like smoking, not brushing their teeth, etc.). If this happens within a single life, how could one expect people to care about the welfare of their respective selves in their next lives? For all these reasons, it is hard to accept that karman functions smoothly as an educational device.6

Alternatively, should one understand the law of karman, in its various versions, as a mechanical law, like the law of gravity?7 A mechanical law presents a different set of problems, such as the question of its possible scientific demonstration and its interaction with other physical laws. It would also be an a-moral solution of the problem of evil, since it would not per se contain any moral value, just like any other mechanical law. A possible solution would be to see it as established by God as a way to have morality work. Such a form of the law of karman, if it could work would guarantee that God is not responsible for any form of evil, because He8 could not interfere with it. However, if God cannot interfere with the law of karman, then He is not omnipotent and Mīmāṃsā authors might be right in insisting that we should only use the doctrine of karman to explain present sufferings and not invoke God at all since He would be redundant and useless. One might say, à la Baruch Spinoza, that the various versions of the law of karman describe a fixed law, like the laws of mathematic and logic, and that God established it forever and cannot interfere with it, just like He could not make 2 + 2 have a different result. However, if that were so, it would be difficult to avoid asking why God made a law whose consequences entail suffering for so many conscious beings. The only way out would be to claim that this world is flawed but is still the best possible world (as Gottfried Leibniz does). Would this be a satisfactory answer? Perhaps not so much, since it would seem to imply that God was not able to do anything better. Nor is the idea that the current one is the best possible world ever mentioned in Sanskrit sources as a response to the problem of evil, at least to my knowledge. Finally, the fact that karman is beginningless seems to make human efforts (including prayer and devotion) devoid of purpose, since they are all only the result of previously accumulated karman and there is no room for free initiative. This would also deprive God of the ability to be extremely benevolent by bestowing His grace on someone in spite of their karman. Another possibility would be to say that God can indeed save people despite their karman, but that He would only interfere with the law of karman in exceptional cases. However, if God could change one’s karman, but usually decides not to do so, then how can He avoid the accusation of being partial and cruel? Why would He save one soul and not the other? Why make an exception for the one and not the other?

For the above reasons, theistic schools like Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta did not reason like Herman, Bilimoria, Chadha and Trakakis, etc., and did not consider their version of the theory of karman as the single solution of the whole problem of evil. Rather, they consider it part of the solution.

1.3. Collective Karman?

What about karman as an explanation of causes of collective suffering? Is collective suffering the result of the sum of individual sufferings determined by one previous karman?

A relevant distinction is the one between ādhyātmika, ādhibhautika and ādhidaivika kind of suffering (discussed in Section 1.2 and in fn 4), since the second category in particular often covers collective suffering (its standard example is earthquakes). The classification originates seemingly independently of the discussion of karman as cause of suffering, since karman is not mentioned in the Sāṅkhya and medical sources in connection with it. When the two explanatory accounts are joined, some authors saw karman as the solution of the problem of ādhyātmika duḥkha, but not of the other two. The Carakasaṃhitā does discuss collective karman as a cause of collective deaths, which could have been labelled ādhibhautika, in Vimānasthāna 3.19–23, but without any link to the threefold classification of suffering.

More in detail, how does this collective karman exactly work? Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā assumes that people with similar karman are meant to be reborn in the same hell and to experience the same suffering. The same reasoning could be extended to people who suffer because of an earthquake, the consequences of a global pandemic or any other circumstance affecting a considerable number of people. By contrast, the above mentioned passage of the Carakasaṃhitā adopts a different point of view and speaks of the consequences of the wrongdoings of rulers making all their subordinates suffer with them.9 The same point is repeated also in the Mānavadharmaśāstra (also known as Manusmṛti), see 7.134.

Similarly, the Pāli canon mentions eight causes of suffering, with karman being just one among them.10 Thus, in the philosophy of the Sanskrit cosmopolis the theory of karman appears to be at most part of the solution to the problem of suffering, but not the single global solution Herman and others want it to be.

Section 2 and following of this article will be dedicated to how Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta integrated the theory of karman in their explanation of suffering.

2. Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta Perspectives on the Problem of Suffering

I will focus on the early Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta school, which developed in South India around the beginning of the second millennium CE and combines a Vedānta background with devotion to Viṣṇu. In some cases, I will try to fill in gaps left by the authors I will discuss—for instance, when I try to reconstruct what they would have said if confronted with possible objections.11

2.1. Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha

Rāmānuja (traditional dates 1017–1137)12 is recognised as the founder of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta school, both by its main exponents and by contemporary scholars. I, for one, am inclined to think that the synthesis of elements that we now call Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, spanning over Vedānta, Pañcarātra and Tamil bhakti, is rather the product of one of his brilliant successors, Veṅkaṭanātha. For the present topic, this means that Rāmānuja elaborated the main idea of God’s allowing people to act, but that he did not take into account the Tamil bhakti sources about God. The enrichment of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic picture of God through these sources is one of Veṅkaṭanātha’s main contributions.

Veṅkaṭanātha (also known as Vedānta Deśika, traditional dates 1269–1370) is one of the most prolific and multifaceted personalities of Sanskrit philosophy. He attempted to create a philosophic system which was meant to broaden Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta and make it a more comprehensive philosophical system. Since Veṅkaṭanātha’s system aspires to be comprehensive, it is legitimate to expect him to deal with questions relating to the nature of God and why He would permit evil. In order to inquire about this topic, one can start by considering Veṅkaṭanātha’s background. On the one hand, there is Veṅkaṭanātha’s relationship with (Pūrva) Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta (and other Sanskrit philosophical systems), and on the other, his relation with the Vaiṣṇava religious literature he considers authoritative (the Pañcarātra Āgamas and the hymns of the Āḻvārs). Given the fact that most research on Sanskrit philosophy focuses on Sanskrit texts, one must be aware of the risk of neglecting the latter component, which is predominant in Veṅkaṭanātha’s non-Sanskrit works.

2.2. The Tamil Vaiṣṇava Background

Even before Rāmānuja, an important tradition of religious hymns in the Tamil language had developed. These are attributed to a group of mystic poets known as the Āḻvārs. A precise date is impossible to settle on at the moment, but “there is a general consensus on the fact that the movement of Tamil bhakti started around the sixth century of our era” (Gillet 2014, pp. 13–14).

As for suffering, the pre-Rāmānuja Vaiṣṇava religious texts in Tamil follow a specific path, since many of them emphasise the worthlessness of the poet (the Āḻvār) or of his poetical persona (often a woman) and his/her desperate need for God’s mercy, which is the only thing which could save him/her (see Clooney 2014). The hymns of the Āḻvārs are religious texts and do not discuss philosophical or theological topics directly. Human suffering is frequently mentioned, but it is not put in relation to God’s action, unless in the case of one’s suffering for God’s absence, nor is God regarded as the origin for natural or moral evil. Rather, suffering appears to be the result of human wrongdoing and of the fact that one’s wrongdoings keep one away from God. The protagonist is desperate because of her/his evil deeds (see, e.g., Tiruvāymoḻi 5.4.1–3, 5.9.1 and 5.9.6, and 10.3.4, translated and discussed in Clooney 2014) and states that s/he cannot achieve anything on his/her own.13 In their songs, the Āḻvārs, at most, ask God to make their suffering cease by revealing Himself to them.14

3. Rāmānuja: Humans Wish, God Allows Them to Act

3.1. God and Karman

As discussed by Herman, Bilimoria and Bartley, Rāmānuja too accepts the idea of karman and discusses it in connection with God in his commentary on UMS 2.1.32—36. There, he first presents the objection of an atheist who seems to have been inspired by Kumārila’s points:

“Although the Lord before the creation being one alone and being connected with the power [to do] all things insofar as He is different from anything else was able to create on His own the whole variegated world, nonetheless it is impossible that [the world] has the Lord as its cause, because the variegated creation has a purpose and the Lord does not have a purpose. In fact, with regard to the production by rational (buddhipūrvaka) people […], the purpose is twofold, for oneself or for the sake of others. For, it is not the case that through the creation of the world any unfulfilled purpose for the supreme Brahman—who, by Himself, alone fulfills all His wishes—could be fulfilled. Nor does He create the present world out of compassion, since the world contains for the most part endless suffering of various sorts, from life in the uterus to birth, old age, death, hell, etc. Rather, He would have created out of compassion a world made only of pleasure. Therefore, since Brahman has no purpose, [the world] cannot be of the nature of Brahman”

(ŚrīBh ad 2.1.32).15

Rāmānuja’s answer is based on the idea (prosecuted by later Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta authors like Piḷḷai Lokācārya) that God creates the world as a realm of playful activity:

“For one who is complete (paripūrṇa), who has obtained (avāpta) all His wishes, only playful activity is a purpose with regard to the creation of the world, which is a manifold and variegated mix of conscious and unconscious beings effected through His decision (saṅkalpa). Just as in the world a great king ruling the seven divisions of earth, although he is endowed with absolute power, heroism and courage, is seen to undertake actions […] for the purpose of his playful activity only. Similarly, it is indisputable that even the Supreme Brahman, although the creation, continuation and destruction of the world can be brought about by His decision only, has as His sole purpose playful activity” (ŚrīBh ad 2.1.33).16

The subsequent passages in Rāmānuja’s commentary deal with karman: An objector observes that God is unfair, insofar as some have better lives than others, and Rāmānuja replies that one’s lot in the present life depends on one’s beginningless karman:

“[Obj.:] Since [He] is the cause of the connection with extremely awful sufferings, it is unavoidable that He is cruel.

[R:] To this, we answer: No, because it depends on something. That is, because the creation is uneven due to the dependence on the karman of the conscious beings (kṣetrajña), such as deities, that are being created. In fact, Vedas and recollected texts show that the connection to the body of a deity, etc. of the conscious beings, such as deities, depend on the respective karman”.17

The whole discussion is short and clearly relies on the readers’ previous acquaintance with the topic. There appears to be no specific and original contribution of Rāmānuja to the debate on karman (for more details, compare (Clooney 1989) on karman in Śaṅkara, and Herman ([1976] 1993), Bilimoria (2013) and Bartley (2018) on karman in Rāmānuja). Rāmānuja clearly espouses the idea that karman is the proximate cause of one’s present situation. However, is karman all that Rāmānuja has to say on the topic? This would lead us back to the problems hinted at above, since if karman were a fixed law, then God would not be omnipotent and could not act in the world according to His wishes (i.e., independently of the law of karman). In the following, I will therefore explore the possibility that the theory of karman should be seen only as a component in a more complex theodical picture. In so doing, I will need to urge Rāmānuja to give answers to questions connected with theodicy that he was not directly asked. This means that I will look for available answers within his discussions of various topics, from free will to God’s playful activities (see fn. 11 for further details of this methodology).

3.2. God and Human Will

In a different context, Rāmānuja elaborates an original idea about how to account for God’s omnipotence while not making Him responsible for moral evil. In his Śrībhāṣya, he discusses the problem of the significance of prescriptions. Due to the Mīmāṃsā principle according to which prescriptions only address those who are able to fulfil them, prescriptions such as “One should sacrifice” presuppose that one is able to undertake actions autonomously. Rāmānuja contrasts this evidence in favour of free will with some passages from the UMS and from the Upaniṣads, which seem to suggest that conscious beings have no free will:18

“This agency of the individual soul, is it independent, or does it rely on the Supreme Self?”

“What is the prima facie view?”

“That it is independent, for if it were dependent on the Supreme Self, there would be the undesired consequence that prescriptions and prohibitions would be meaningless. In fact, only one who is able to initiate an action or stop it of his own volition can be enjoined. Therefore, he must be an independent agent. This is the prima facie view. To this, [UMS 2.3.40 says:] By contrast, this [agency] is due to someone else (the Supreme Self), because of the sacred texts [stating it]”.19

After this objection, it is again the problem of the significance of prescriptions and prohibitions which keeps the ball rolling. In the commentary to the next aphorism (sūtra), the upholder of the final view responds to this problem as follows:

“The meaning of [UMS 2.3.41] is that in all actions, an effort is made by the person. After having seen [her] exertion, the Supreme Self, who is the Inner Ruler, causes [the person] to act by means of giving her His permission. Without the permission of the Supreme Self, the [person] could not act.

Why is this so?

Because what has been prescribed or prohibited is not meaningless and because of other reasons. “Because of other reasons” (ādi) includes [God’s] favouring or restraining [people]”.20

In other words, God allows human beings to carry out the actions towards which they had already undertaken some initial effort,21 because it would be meaningless to prescribe or prohibit something to people who have no free will and because God contributes to the success of one’s will. This last obscure hint is elaborated upon immediately thereafter in the passage quoted at the beginning of Section 3.5.

Rāmānuja does not explicitly say whether this theory applies to all conscious beings (cetana) or only to human ones. In general, he (like most Sanskrit authors) sees nature as not allowing interruptions between various conscious beings. This suggests that the theory applies to all conscious beings.22 Therefore, I will continue to speak of “moral evil,” but this expression should be understood as meaning “evil caused by conscious beings”.

3.3. God’s Permission to Act

The consequences of Rāmānuja’s strategy for dealing with moral evil are more explicitly presented in the Vedārthasaṅgraha. First is an objection mentioning again the key term “cruelty” found in UMS 2.1.34:

“[Obj.:] The fact that the Supreme Self is the ruler of everything has been substantiated insofar as He is the one who causes [others] to act, He is the promoter of everyone in regard to every sort of undertaking. And one also finds in the sacred texts: “He alone causes the person whom He wishes to lead out of these worlds, to perform a good deed. He alone causes the person whom He wishes to fall down to perform an evil deed”.23 Thus, since He is the one who causes [people] to perform good or evil deeds, He is cruel”.24

The answer is based on the idea that God just enables each conscious being to act, without interfering with their specific intentions:

“[R:] To this, we answer: The Supreme Self arranged for all conscious beings in a general way all acts and refraining from acts consisting of the connection (yoga) with the power to think,25 the connection with the power to undertake and [the connection with the power to cease an undertaking]. He then entered [into each conscious being26] being their support in order to realise these [powers] and He rules as one who permits [each conscious being to undertake the action s/he wants to undertake]. In this way, He remains the whole to which all parts belong.

Therefore, [each conscious being], having received the power [to think, undertake or cease an action], undertakes, ceases to act or [thinks] from himself/herself alone. The Supreme Self observes the one who does so without interfering (udāsīna). Therefore, everything is logical.

In contrast [to what the opponent claimed], the fact of causing to do good or evil acts is the content of a specific arrangement (vyavasthā), it is not generally directed to all”.27

This last sentence implies that God does indeed influence the actions performed by human beings, but that this happens in a rule-governed way, on the basis of their intentions and not in all cases indiscriminately. As a matter of fact, there is space for God’s intervention in human actions, although He only aids in realising one’s intention. The following passage explains that God is favourably inclined towards those who are themselves prone to performing good actions:

“A different case (tu) is that of a person who first undertook actions of her own volition, which were beyond measure in agreement [with God’s will]. God, pleased, endows her with a favourable (kalyāṇa) mind and, by so doing, He puts her on the path towards virtue (kalyāṇa). A person who, by contrast, undertakes actions which are beyond measure hostile [to God’s will], receives from God a cruel mind. By so doing, God Himself puts her on the path towards cruel deeds. As it has been said by God: “To those who are devout and are constantly concentrated I, pleased, endow them with an intention through which they can reach me. In order to have compassion on them alone, I, residing as the Self, destroy the obscurity produced by ignorance through the brilliant flame of knowledge”. “For ever and ever I send these evil, vicious and vile people into saṃsāric Asuric births only”

(BhG 10.10–11 and 16.19)”.28

Note that, according to the text above, the scope for free will lies only at the very beginning of the process leading to actions, before one’s precise determination to perform them, since Rāmānuja says that God gives a benevolent mind (buddhi) to the ones who have wished to do good (and vice versa).

3.4. The Nature of God’s Permission

A further important point concerns the nature of God’s intervention, which is identified unanimously by Rāmānuja, Veṅkaṭanātha (see Freschi, forthcoming a, 2015a) and Sudarśana Sūri (see Srinivasa Raghavan 1972) with the root anuman-. In Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, anumati (also called āmantraṇa or abhyanujñāna in comparable discussions) is a technical term indicating the act of inciting by a superior person in regard to her inferior.29 Accordingly, anuman- is used here as an active way of allowing someone to do something, which includes supporting her if she is not able to do it on her own. Maṇḍana, in particular, distinguishes four types of command. The command known as “permission” refers to cases in which a superior person tells something to an inferior, for the benefit of the enjoined person (niyojyārtha) and when the inferior person has already decided to act. Permission is distinguished from ‘teaching’ (upadeśa), which is a command addressed to someone who has not already decided to act.30 For the current topic, the distinction between permissions and the upadeśa type of command is of particular relevance: God does not make us undertake individual actions, particularly evil ones. Rather, He allows us to carry out actions that we had already decided to undertake.

3.5. God and Evil

The fact that God causes people to act once they have conceived the wish to undertake an activity, leads to a problem recurring in many theodicies—namely, why does God not prevent people from committing evil, if He is omnipotent? Rāmānuja discusses the topic through the simile of two people possessing a common wealth. If one of them desires to give it away and the other merely consents, the merit of the giving accrues to the first one:

“For instance, if two people [let us call them Devadatta and Yajñadatta] have a common wealth, this cannot become the property of another unless also the other person of the two [say, Yajñadatta] agrees. Nonetheless, once the first person [Devadatta] has given their permission, if [the gift of wealth] is performed autonomously, the result [of that action] belongs to that person [Devadatta] alone. It has been taught in the explanation about the Sāṅkhya doctrine31 that the fact that the one who is able to make [people] desist from evil acts permits [them] does not lead to the consequence that He is cruel”.32

The reference is to ŚrīBh ad 2.2.3, where again BhG 16.19 (already quoted above, end of Section 3.3) is quoted and it is said that God observes people freely conceiving intentions without interfering. The next passage shows Rāmānuja’s adherence to the paradigm criticised by Kumārila of an omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent Lord. At the same time, Rāmānuja insists on human free will and adds to the picture God’s being the substrate of all:

“He, the revered Supreme Person, all of whose desires are fulfilled [without any possible obstruction],33 omniscient, Lord of everything, who can realise [alone] through [His] intention (satyasaṅkalpa),34 who undertakes His play in accordance with His own greatness, arranges into two the acts, insofar as some are suitable and some are not. Next, He assigns to all souls in a common way their power to rule, which regards [their] bodies, sense-faculties, etc., which are fit as the material cause of the [power to act]. Then, He shows [them] a sacred text which communicates His own command (śāsana) and, in order to bring it closer to them, He enters [into each person] as [their] Inner Self and He keeps on controlling [them] by means of permissions. These people, who have obtained from Him the powers [to undertake, cease and think], whose [powers to undertake, etc.] have been assigned by Him to sense-faculties, bodies and [mind], and who have Him as substrate, undertake good and evil acts according to their own wishes by themselves alone. And therefore, [God], who knows who has been performing good deeds in accord with His command, gladdens [them] through [the four human aims, namely,] dharma, success, pleasure and liberation. By contrast (ca), He connects those who transgress His command to the opposites of the [four human aims].

Therefore, there is no room for the objections about the fact that [human] autonomy or [God’s compassion] would be diminished. In fact, compassion independent of one’s own purpose consists in the fact that one cannot bear someone else’s suffering. And this [compassion], when it is present also towards those who seek to transgress His command, does not amount to a virtue (guṇa). On the contrary, it only leads to the consequence that one is no longer a real man (apuṃstva35). In this case [of people transgressing God’s command] only holding them back is a virtue, because otherwise there would be the undesired consequence that, e.g., stopping a hostile person would no longer be a virtue”.36

Noteworthy in the above passage is also the binary distinction between puṇya and apuṇya acts (translated above as ‘good’ and ‘evil’). Implicitly, human freedom is therefore linked to this binary choice.

The next objection in ŚrīBh ad 2.3.41 resembles the one discussed in the Vedārthasaṅgraha above, with the same quote from Kauśītaki Upaniṣad 3.8.37 The answer by the upholder of the conclusive view (siddhāntin) is as follows:

“It must be said [in reply]: This (intervention of God) is not common to all [without distinction]. The revered one Himself favours the person who undertakes an action while being determined to be in harmony with the Highest Person, who lies beyond each measure, and He produces interest for the most benevolent acts, which are the tools to reach [Him], in such a person. He [also] holds back the person who undertakes an action while being determined to be against the One beyond measure and produces interest for acts which lead down [to hell] and which are contrary to [His] reach in such a person”.38

In other words, God strengthens people’s intentions and in general intervenes constantly in our favour. Next follow the same quotes from the BhG (10.10–11 and 16.19), but within longer passages (BhG 10.8–11 and BhG 16.8–19), again understood as meaning that God leads people in the direction they have wished for themselves.

3.6. The Root of Good Intentions

A possible further question would be: what makes people inclined towards God or against Him? Is it karman? Is it God Himself? The ŚrīBh does not raise the problem in the chapter (adhikaraṇa) quoted above. However, one might suggest that Rāmānuja, since he shares the general belief in the system of karman, would have—if asked—answered that one has good intentions because of previous virtuous births. However, the objector in the Vedārthasaṅgraha just keeps quiet and karman is only hinted at:

“This Highest Person who is the supreme Brahman can only be reached through devotion (bhakti) which has no other purpose,39 is uninterrupted, is fond of the Excellent one, and has the form of meditation (anudhyāna) which has reached the level of making [Him] clearly perceptible.40 This devotion is by one whose multitude of evil deeds (pāpa) gathered through endless births have been destroyed by the unsurpassed accumulation of good deeds (puṇya), who is turned towards Him because he has taken refuge at the lotus-feet of the Highest Person, and who is endowed with the virtues of equanimity, self-control, ascetic power (tapas), purity, patience, sincerity, discernment between situations in which fear is needed and situations in which no fear is appropriate, generosity, non-violence and other [similar virtues] which he has been gathering day by day through the awareness of the real essence of the truth which he has learnt through the sacred texts and which has been nourished by the teaching of a good teacher. [The devotee, furthermore,] is firm in bringing to completion (upasaṃhṛ-)41 the fixed and occasional rituals which have the appearance (veṣa) of pleasing the Highest Person and are adequate for [his] caste and stage of life, and in shunning prohibited [acts]. He has laid down (nyas-) his self at the lotus-feet of the Highest Person, and he has had his own inner darkness dispelled (vidhvasta) through the gratuitous deeds (prasāda) of the supremely compassionate Highest Person, who is pleased by incessant praise, recollection [of Him], endeavours (yatana), repetition [of His name] (kīrtana), hearing of [His] virtues, speaking [about them], meditation (dhyāna), bowing, obeisance (praṇāma), and similar [acts of devotion], brought about by devotion to Him”.42

The passage stresses the importance of one’s commitment to God. However, how does this commitment arise? Rāmānuja suggests the need to get rid—presumably, to first get rid—of one’s accumulated evil deeds (see above, the first emphasised passage), through the accumulation of an “unsurpassed” amount of good deeds. This presumably means that these need to be accumulated through a large number of previous births—which would ipso facto deprive the actions in the present life of their presumed autonomy. In fact, if one had to first accumulate endless good deeds, then in the present life one could only struggle to accumulate good deeds in order to erase the evil ones, with no hope of achieving the possibility to venerate God, and thus leading to the problems pointed out in Section 1.2. However, the problems can here be circumvented since the mention of the accumulation of good deeds is closely followed by that of śaraṇāgati (‘taking refuge’), a juxtaposition which is also present elsewhere in Rāmānuja. Consider, for instance, this passage (the first part of which has been quoted above, Section 3.5):

“By means of no longer assenting to the endless intolerable offences accumulated in beginningless and endless eras, [which amounts to] just desisting from the determination to transgress His own command, [a person] undertakes action by herself alone, for the sake of augmenting beyond measure [her] happiness”.43

More explicit is the following passage from Rāmānuja’s commentary on the BhG, where the problem of who is able to start engaging in the practice of bhaktiyoga is dealt with:

“Arjuna was dejected, seeing that bhaktiyoga can be practised successfully [only] by a person who is free from all evil deeds and to whom the Blessed One is inexpressibly dear, seeing further that the evil deeds which are inimical to starting bhaktiyoga are infinite and the dharmas which are in the form of expiation [for them], to be done in a limited time,44 do not help in overcoming them [and] that he was therefore unworthy of starting bhaktiyoga. Then, the Blessed One said, “Abandoning all dharmas, take refuge in me alone,” thus driving away his sorrow. “There are evil deeds, hoarded up from beginningless time, of various types, endless, [which are] obstacles to [your] undertaking bhaktiyoga. There are expiatory rites for each of these [actions] such as kṛcchra, cāndrāyaṇa, [and others, including] agniṣṭoma etc. various, eternal,45 which are difficult to do for one such as you who has little time. [Therefore], renouncing all [these] dharmas, in order to succeed in beginning bhaktiyoga, take refuge in Me alone. I, who am supremely compassionate, the Refuge of the entire world, impervious to distinctions,46 the Ocean of Compassion for those who seek Me, I will free you from all those evil deeds which have been spoken of, which are obstacles to beginning that bhakti towards the essential nature. Do not grieve”.47

This seems48 to mean that taking refuge in God or performing the appropriate expiation rites constitutes a shortcut for neutralizing all one’s evil deeds and being thus able to start venerating God. Together with the passages mentioned above, this would mean that one should take refuge in God before being able to conceive (other) good intentions, since the accumulated evil deeds would otherwise hinder one. As a consequence, there would seem to be no possibility of autonomous efforts for one who has not taken refuge nor performed expiations, since she would be prey to her previous evil deeds and not be able to start on the path of veneration toward God. This also means that atheists could only regain the ability to make autonomous decisions through the hard path of Vedic expiation rites. However, for Rāmānuja, it seems self-evident that one’s previous actions cannot interfere with one’s intentions.49 One’s previous actions can determine one’s present condition, but one can still autonomously decide to undertake expiation rites, to turn to God as one’s refuge, or to refrain from both. Although accumulated evil deeds may hinder one’s actions, they do not seem to be able to hinder one’s intentions.

In conclusion, it seems that Rāmānuja upheld, at least phenomenologically, a form of compatibilism, i.e., considered free will to be compatible with God’s omnipotence. Initial efforts need the support of God to be turned into actions, but one can autonomously intend to take refuge in God, and this intention is the root of one’s future attitudes and deeds. Why did he hold this position? It is not enough to say that he did so “because it is supported in the sacred texts (śruti),” given that the same authoritative texts have been interpreted in different ways by other Vedāntic authors (e.g., by Śaṅkara, who denied the existence of individual ātmans). Rather, Rāmānuja must have been convinced that the existence of free will was a positive element which needed to find a place in his theology. He therefore elaborated on the concept of permission to find a way to express the compatibility between God’s omnipotence with regard to actions and one’s free intentions.

4. Veṅkaṭanātha: God Is Neither Partial nor Cruel

In his Sanskrit works, Veṅkaṭanātha reiterates the doctrine already examined above, namely that God causes people to act by giving them His permission.50

In his Maṇipravāḷam works (see, e.g., his Rahasyatrayasāra Chapter 23) the Tamil bhakti background comes to the foreground and Veṅkaṭanātha dedicates many pages to the objectors who claim that affirming God’s omnipotence naturally entails one’s being unable to do anything but cry for help. In the perspective of such objectors, God’s omnipotence is absolute and human beings have no ability whatsoever to determine their destiny. The only thing they can do is pray for God’s help as loudly as possible, just as a baby, unable to do anything on her own, cries to get her mother to help her. This condition of absolute dependency should make God alone responsible for every human action, including therefore all moral evil. However, the topic of God’s responsibility for moral evil is not explicitly addressed in such contexts. Why do the objectors embedded in Veṅkaṭanātha’s texts not address this issue? Perhaps because theodicy-like discourses cannot arise in a situation in which God is not considered to be accessible to human questioning and understanding. Theodicy is linked to rational theology, whereas personal devotion presupposes a different attitude towards God. Rational theologians may decide to discuss the legitimacy of God, but devotees will rather focus on surrendering to Him, without previously examining Him.

But why did God not create a world without moral evil by just preventing us from forming evil intentions in the first place? Why did He not create a world full of agents who would only be His perfect servants, incapable of conceiving intentions contrary to His will? Possibly because the world is his līlā (‘playful activity’), which entails not just unconscious matter but also conscious agents:

“For the one who has taste for enjoyments (rasika), who does not require anything, there is, it is well known (iṟē), no difference (vāci) between the rejoicing [which occurs] having seen the pleasure (ukappu) of a [bird], after having put (vai) a conscious parrot (kiḷi) in a cage (pañjara) and having fed (pāl-koṭu-) him and let him fly (paṟakka-viṭu-) as it pleases him (the parrot) (vēṇṭiṉapaṭi) and the rejoicing (uka-kkiṟa-tu) [which occurs] after having put (pūṭṭu-) decorations and having seen the beauty [of a doll] after having melted (aḻi-) and decorated (paṇṇu-) an insentient (acetana) wooden doll (kuḻamaṇaṉ)”.51

I could not find any explicit statement to this effect, but one could imagine that the logical conclusion of this line of reasoning would be that God prefers to have free agents in the world, even if this entails the risk of moral evil.

Finally, starting with Rāmānuja himself, it is clear that the relevant point of view is that of God and of His līlā and that there will therefore be free will if He chooses for there to be. However, one’s own personal inclinations again play a role through one’s personal relation to God and through the fact that one is inhabited by God and, therefore, part of His playful activity.52

5. Conclusions

This article discussed the role of the theory of karman as an explanation of suffering (the Sanskrit version of the problem of evil) and concluded that there is not a single theory of karman and that different schools embedded a theory of karman as an ingredient of their explanation of suffering. The schools of what was later to be called “Hinduism” seemed to have acknowledged the complexity of the problem of suffering and to have therefore avoided a single easy solution for it.

In particular, the answer to the problem of suffering by Viśiṣṭādvaita authors like Rāmānuja and Veṅkaṭanātha embeds the theory of karman, but focuses more on the theologeme that God deliberately decides to accord autonomy to human beings. In other words, He could order the world as He likes, without needing our cooperation, but decides to grant us the possibility to make autonomous decisions. Why so? Because (as explained by Veṅkaṭanātha in his RTS Chapter 12, (Viraraghavacharya 1980, p. 404), quoted above) God enjoys the company of autonomous agents, not just that of puppets. Whenever we make a decision, He allows (anuman-) it, and makes it therefore possible for the corresponding action to take place. Allowing for us to be autonomous also entails giving us the possibility to misbehave and cause suffering to ourselves and to others, compatibly with the results of each person’s past karman. Karman is therefore a component of a theological landscape, rather than a rational solution of the problem of suffering and/or evil. In this sense, the view of authors like Herman represents an interesting development of Sanskrit ideas, but it is less reliable when it presents the theory of karman as a single theory and as being incompatible with any attempt of theodicy because due to it the problem of evil just does not arise. By contrast, there were different views of karman and at least some of them were parts of the discussion of the problem of evil or of suffering (see also the discussion of medical texts in Section 1.2).