“Die Luft der Freiheit weht—Videtis illam spirare libertatis auram” (Ulrich von Hutten) was suggested as the motto for Stanford University in the early 20th century, which in some respects has been discussed controversially (cf.
Casper 1995). Ulrich von Hutten (1488–1523) was a German humanist and revolutionary, defending Martin Luther and criticizing the Catholic Church. It is often translated as “The wind of freedom blows”. There are many methods to the present day to interpret Ulrich von Hutten’s actions and publications, and he is by no means without controversy. It would nonetheless be interesting to critically re-examine this individual, not only because there are links with the Bishopric of Trier, where I was bishop before coming to Munich
2, but also because in 2017, especially in Germany, we commemorated the beginning of the Reformation. This was not only a task for the Protestant church in Germany, but also presented a challenge for the Catholic Church. In fact, it is not a commemoration that can be separated along denominational lines, but imposes on us, as Christian churches, a joint responsibility to find the right relationship between faith and society and to give a joint Christian witness to our society.
What can this motto “The wind of freedom blows” mean if it is understood in the context in which Hutten wrote it? Von Hutten wanted to teach the unspiritual clergy a lesson and restrict their excessive power. There were certainly good reasons to wish to do this. As with Martin Luther, he was deeply rooted in the piety and mysticism of his time, which had already demonstrated church-critical potential before his time. Luther’s aim was not to split the church, but to use his reforms to point out unfortunate circumstances that cast a shadow on the message of the Gospel. We can thus also understand Hutten’s statement, after Martin Luther had been found guilty, as an unambiguous warning that the wind of freedom that had blown open doors in the Reformation would not subside as a result of the condemnation of Luther’s Theses; the forecast was for change and upheaval to come. To a certain degree, Hutten was also right: As painful as the separation of the churches is, it is also clear that we can no longer turn back from the Reformation questions and the impetus for change to which they led.
2.1. A Culture of Freedom
What can an appeal for an unstoppable wind of freedom mean? Freedom is certainly one of the basic prerequisites for all academic activity and thought. Without freedom there is neither research nor progress, neither criticism nor preservation of tradition. Freedom is without a doubt a high individual and institutional value. We can certainly speak of a culture of freedom, and we may be grateful that we live in free, democratically legitimated societies.
The call for freedom has increasingly been linked in recent years to the call for responsibility, as well as to the call for ethics. Where does this come from? On the one hand, it is caused by the technological revolution in the broader sense, by the discovery that we are able to do and achieve more and more. The technological imperative would be: Anything we can do, we should do. Nothing that we can produce, do, and achieve technically should be prevented. There is a virtually infinite possibility as a result of technical feasibility. We are finding exponential growth, particularly in the digital economy, the bounds of which we are unable to foretell. The question thus also arises with this technological imperative: How is this progress to be guided in such a way that it does not do harm to humankind?
Added to this is an economic imperative. There have been heated discussions on this matter in recent years, particularly in the wake of the financial and economic crisis, but we have not concluded this process. The economic imperative can be considered as: What is profitable may not be prevented. This suggests, in effect, a pure shareholder value orientation. There is naturally also a call for responsibility here: Does this not have consequences that are damaging? This leads to a discussion of a primitive, overflowing capitalism that, in fact, does not serve humankind but is damaging to us.
We could say that these two imperatives have become linked: What is possible in technical terms is combined with the economic interests in the course of a global competitive aspect of a market that knows no bounds and no framework, and that has also become partly detached from economic realities. In particular, in a high-speed economy, there is a need to say in global terms: The one who first achieves technological progress and first makes the profits sets the pace, the direction, and the conditions. We should adapt ourselves and orient our societies towards this. It appears that this stipulates something fateful, since freedom is basically suspended.
In times past, one would perhaps have called this fate or tragedy. The decisive element of Greek tragedy is not the sad event, but the fact that, in a tragedy, those involved are no longer able to act any differently. It already becomes evident in the first act that people here have been placed in a dilemma from which they are powerless to free themselves. The situation progresses unstoppably towards disaster, and indeed cannot be changed.
This naturally profoundly contradicts our image of humankind and of our entire civilization. It is a matter of course that there are coercive situations, but regarding our own lives and social development as a fate hanging over us would mean taking leave of any kind of cultural mandate, all politics, all civilization—both nationally and globally. This process has always happened and will continue to happen. Thus, it is important to make it clear that this is not just something which has developed in a global world and to which we can only react. It is not a matter of wishing the world to be the way we would like to have it, but of seeing the world the way it is. This is true of the technical possibilities, the economic possibilities, even the political possibilities; we must see the world as something we can shape as we see fit. A complex process of coordination with many other players is needed because we are not alone in the world, neither as individuals in a country, nor as nations or companies, nor as religions.
If we wish to protect and promote the culture of freedom—and not only in a limited fashion for us here and now, but sustainably and globally—we need a critique of freedom. This quite literally means a distinction of freedom. We need to realize that freedom can only be protected if it limits itself and becomes responsible freedom that is obligated to the common good, not simply blindly following the technical and economic imperative.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, these questions became even more significant and important for all nations and societies around the world. In his message for the 56th World Day of Peace,
Pope Francis (
2023), reflecting on the last three years, which were marked by the COVID-19 pandemic, raises an essential question: What did we learn from this? His answer: “Certainly, after directly experiencing the fragility of our own lives and the world around us, we can say that the greatest lesson we learned from COVID-19 was the realization that we all need one another”. This is probably as true for interpersonal relations as it is for relations between states, economies, and social groups. The pandemic has revealed how ramified the global network is, how dependent all economic sectors and nations are on functioning supply chains, and how vulnerable these systems are. Not everything has proven to be effective; some things will have to be agreed upon anew, both globally and in bilateral treaties and agreements. It has also become clear that, far too often, those who do not sit at the nodes of the network are left out of the picture; this applies to states as well as individuals. The tendency towards isolation, including stronger nationalism and borders, also makes it clear that the decisive factor for the survival of humanity and, at the same time, for the active preservation of creation, is to be found in the common good. Especially as Christians, we must also say in retrospect of the COVID-19 pandemic that worldwide solidarity is needed more than ever. Pope Francis concludes, “[T]hat our greatest and yet most fragile treasure is our shared humanity as brothers and sisters, children of God. And that none of us can be saved alone. Consequently, we urgently need to join together in seeking and promoting the universal values that can guide the growth of this human fraternity” (ibid.). This also results in an agenda of all the tasks that we urgently need to actively address and continue: The list ranges from fostering peace and reliable health care to shaping climate change, promoting integration, protecting human rights, combating water shortages, hunger, and poverty worldwide, and to creating just global economic structures. There is much to do—and we can also do something as a church, now more than ever. The greatest source of change available to all people is humanity, which shows itself in responsibility and compassion.
2.2. Democracy as a “Precarious” Structure of the Community
Can freedom be guaranteed, and if so, how? Is for instance democracy a guarantor of freedom? We would presumably intuitively answer “Yes” to this question, but in fact the answer is not quite that simple. Democracy is not a natural value, derivable directly from the fact of being human. The bridge to it is built from freedom and responsibility.
There are at least two “Achilles heels” of the modern world and of free society. Pope Benedict XVI pointed to one in a speech before the German Bundestag in 2011: the
question of majority and truth (
Pope Benedict XVI 2011). We as a church believe that we invoke natural law and hence that we can rapidly solve the question of truth because we, as “knowledgeable people”, only must make it understandable to others. However, natural law is not a sanctified collection of knowledge, but something which should be evident for all. We therefore need the mediation of the future. The relationship between majority and truth is a critical “Achilles heel” of the modern world. We must awaken a sense in our societies that not everything is subject to the democratic majority procedure. However, Benedict XVI, in his contribution, also stated that a majority decision is sufficient as a rule (ibid., p. 32). We should not consider his speech to consist of a fundamental criticism of democracy. He simply pointed out that there are certain points that cannot be subject to a majority decision. We also know this in constitutional law; for instance, in German law, fundamental rights may not be abolished by Parliament. There are elements that can be regulated by law by majority and those that cannot be regulated, which as stated in German constitutional law, have eternal value.
The second Achilles heel consists of the freedom to make decisions. Freedom achieves its goal if it has opted for what is good, as Pope John Paul II remarked. What, however, happens if people do not opt for what is good? This is a question that we cannot answer. This does not mean that freedom is taken away from us, but it means that we—also as churches—must do everything we can to show people that a decision based on what is good is not only the right way, but the way leading to a larger life and to greater happiness, enabling us to “have life and have it more abundantly” (Jn 10:10). It is therefore a special task to take up a position on current political and social issues, including showing an argumentative Christian justification, and in doing so not to disregard the ability to make compromises in a plural society.
2.3. The Two-Fold Meaning of the Common Good
In addition to “freedom” and “democracy”, “the common good” is the third term used to anchor the topic. The common good is a central term of Catholic social doctrine, although it is difficult to grasp and permits many different interpretations.
In the understanding of Catholic social doctrine, the common good is a “service value”, referring to “the sum of those conditions of social life” that allow for all people without exception “relatively thorough and ready access to their own fulfillment”. This is stated in No. 26 of the Pastoral Constitution “Gaudium et spes”, an important document of the Second Vatican Council. It is therefore a matter of creating frameworks allowing individuals and various groups to pursue their goals in an open society whilst respecting human rights and human dignity.
The aim is specifically not the happiness of as many people as possible as understood in a utilitarian sense. The common good is understood, rather, “with regard to the possibilities which it creates for the individuals and sub-groups in a society to reach their personal goals” (
Kerber 1986, p. 857). This means that the concrete manifestation and shape of the goals are not defined in advance but must be constantly redefined in the dialogue between individual and joint interests. The scholarly formulation of the definition of the common good therefore does not assume a more traditional Aristotelian–Thomistic view according to which “the good of each individual is fully contained in the common good as an ethical value according to the principle that ‘the whole is more than the sum of the parts’” (ibid., p. 858).
As an individuum sociale, people can only reach their goals in community with others. Individual interests and the interests of others must be equitably balanced; moreover, there are values that can only be striven for and achieved jointly.
The definition of the common good therefore reveals the entire tension between individual and social ethics. This is a tension that has fundamentally led to Catholic social doctrine existing at all, as the conviction spread that the judgment of individual acts and the evaluation of complex social action contexts belong to different levels.
When we speak of the common good, we mean first the fundamental conditions in which it is made possible for people to live with one another constructively. The content version of a
bonum commune would then be referred to in the strict sense as common property or as an inherent value, and hence should be placed within a social structure, a society, or even worldwide in the sense of human rights and human dignity. However, a tension also exists when it comes to common property, between what is stipulated by nature, creation, or religion and what depends on acceptance by the members of a social structure. It is important to note first and foremost that guaranteeing the common good as an organizational value is ultimately an administrative task in the broadest sense, whilst common property cannot be directly realized by these means (cf.
Kerber 1986, p. 858).
While these tensions become more potent if we imagine the common good at global level, it is important to consider this scale. In 1987, more than 35 years ago, Pope John Paul II stated in “Sollicitudo rei socialis” that an orientation towards the common good can only function on a global scale (cf. Sollicitudo rei socialis (
Pope John Paul II 1987, para. 39)). He primarily appealed here to the growing awareness of global solidarity and an orientation towards the poor. Pope Francis repeatedly emphasizes this concept in his words and deeds. He does not tire of recalling that all players must take as the criteria of their free, responsible decisions the consequences of their actions on a global scale and across generations. Pope Francis has made this perspective particularly clear in his encyclicals “Laudato si’” (
Pope Francis 2015) and “Fratelli tutti” (
Pope Francis 2020).