Expressing Faith in a Phenomenological Mother Tongue

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments

General Comments

 

Overall, the submitted paper is acceptable. The strategy and structure of the paper deserves both theological and philosophical notice. The author of the paper has done an important task. Nonetheless, there are a few critical matters to be resolved. In particular, the following three issues are to be considered more carefully. Firstly, some important terms, such as “nature”, “state”, “dark light”, “common ground” need to be defined more perspicuously from a meta-theological or meta-philosophical viewpoint. And secondly, section 4 seems to require some more philosophical justifications. In that regard, increasing the length of the paper would be helpful and should also be allowed. Finally, some typos in the manuscript should be corrected thoroughly.

 

Specific Comments

 

(1) In section 2, important terms, such as “nature” and “state”, need to be defined in a more perspicuous manner, ideally in terms of the author’s own language. The author seems to think that those terms are clear enough to be understood properly. But it is not the case; they can be quite controversial. More often than not, they rather appear to be vague and indefinite, chiefly because some ordinary (normal) and theoretical (stipulative) usages of the terms are intermingled. Concerning this matter, the author may need to make some comparative analyses of Maritain’s original ideas presented in his 1955 book and Stein’s understanding of it appeared in her books.

A similar point can apply to the term “dark light” (section2, lines 136, 138; section 3 line 168). It needs a proper definition or a fuller exposition. (Cf. Stein’s account of dark knowledge appeared in her book Knowledge and Faith, Chapter V, II.4. b) “Faith”.) Lots of readers would not be familiar with Stein’s ideas, terminologies, and works.  

 

(2) In sections 1 and 5, the author repeats the statement that we do not, and shall not, “revise or revive” Janicaud’s ideas. It is hard to understand why the expression “revise or revive” should be repeated. The author’s argumentation in the manuscript does not need to be in the shadows of Janicaud’s assertions. Why don’t you just crystalize (some of) Janicaud’s ideas and present the pertinent points directly?  

 

(3) The author claims that Stein proposes a possible “common ground” where believers and non-believers may meet (the abstract of the paper). Particularly in section 4, the author presents the notion “common ground” quite emphatically. However, exactly on what reasons does the author make that claim? Also, what grounds does Stein herself have regarding that claim? Concerning this matter, taking Christian doctrines as some (philosophical? scientific? or religious?) hypotheses is not enough. Can that idea, really and adequately, secure the so-called “common ground” between believers and non-believers (including other faiths)? It does not seem to be so. In that regard, the author’s (or even Stein’s) reasons for postulating the common ground seems to be weak and insufficient. It seems that some more plausible, concrete, and persuasive reasons for that interpretation are to be supplemented.

 

(In order to legitimately present the idea of common ground, one seems to need to acknowledge non-believers’ views and, even, other faiths; namely, one should become a pluralist about religion. It will be an open question whether Stein could have adopted a form of pluralism. Perhaps she might have taken a certain type of Christian inclusivism. Whatever the final answer may be, the claim that Stein proposed the common ground for believers and non-believers seems to require some further support including textual evidence. Securing such a common ground and making a warm invitation are not the same. Some additional work seems to be needed at the deep level of the issue.)   

 

(4) In section 3, the author uses the phenomenological terms “intention” and “fulfilment”. The meaning of the word “intention” here would be not “purpose” or “purposeful” but rather “directedness”, “aboutness” or “(mind’s) being directed upon something”. (That something would be the objects of intentional mental states, including natural things, propositions, and supernatural beings etc.) In this regard, speaking of the notion of “intentionality”, “directedness”, or “intentional analysis” could be helpful. That is, the author’s exposition may be bolstered by means of using those notions in a more explicit way. However, it would not be necessary.

 

(5) Some typos in the manuscript should be corrected thoroughly. For example, check the following: “Moses describe”(line 215), “That is;”(line 230), “Steins phenomenological”(line 251), “look at Steins contribution”(line 305), “truths as “hypothezis””(line 356), “kept abay?”(line 377), “se for example”(notes x) and so on. 

 

 

Please see the comments above. 

Author Response

Response Referee 1:

Thank you for these comments and for discovering the typos – they are corrected now, I hope. To the other points:

Point (1): ‘nature’ and ‘state’ from a meta-theological or meta-philosophical viewpoint: This would be an interesting exploration and discussion to undertake, but my aim here is more modest: simply to elucidate Steins own contribution. As to the notions of “nature” and “state”, I have filled in some indications of what the work of Maritain may help to elucidate in the note referring to his essay.

Point (1): ‘dark faith’ from a meta-theological or meta-philosophical viewpoint: I have added a few sentences to try to make Stein’s point clearer. I point out that the expression appears in her article on Dionysius Areopagite and that his “mystical theolog” is in fact where one should search to elucidate it’s meaning. The section from Knowledge and Faith, it seems to me, does not add much to understand the notion “dark faith” as compared to EES, but I have included the quotation in a note.

Point (2): The reference to Janicaud is linked to the invitation to this special issue of the journal, explicitly referring to his work. I have changed the “we” to an “I” since the “we” should not be read as a generalized “we” (an archaic form perhaps): it concerns what I as an author want to do (precisely not, once more, crystalize Janicaud’s ideas and present the pertinent points directly).

Point (3) A ‘common ground’ from a meta-theological or meta-philosophical viewpoint:  To make Stein’s point clearer, I have added a couple of sentences to try to elucidate it further. The issue is not that of a common faith, but of a joint philosophical scrutiny. The possibility of becoming “a pluralist about religion” is thus a different question. And it is not “the author” (= me) who postulates or make a claim to the possibility of a “common ground”: The research question / investigation in this article is concerned with Edith Stein’s positions and arguments. The textual evidence is thus given from Stein’s own text and I see no need to go beyond it. Also, the grounds Stein herself gives regarding this claim is quite convincing from the point of view of philosophical epistemology. Again, the principal questions could be an interesting discussion to undertake, but they go beyond what I intend to do in this article.

All additions and changes are marked in blue writing.

Reviewer 2 Report

Overall a very fine paper.  

 

I think the context is fine, just a few additions to really make the paper more firmly embedded in the literature.  The author might include Jean-Louis Chrétien, Emmanuel Falque, and Greg Sadler’s work Reason Fulfilled by Revelation: The 1930s Christian Philosophy Debates in France.  The reason being demonstrates it is not a concern to only Stein, yet she offers a unique solution.  Also, a note in the introduction about bringing in such thinkers, Levinas, and Marion would round it out.  

 

The only other comment concerns the last paragraph of section 3:  Doesn’t St. Augustine use religious writings in his philosophy?  Many of the medievals do, seemingly bouncing back and forth between reason and revelation.  Perhaps Stein’s uniqueness lies in her doing so in modern times?  

 

Below is a line-by-line summary of mostly grammatical errors.  

 

Lines 7 & 41:  “In this research” sounds clunky.  Replace with something like “here”.  

 

Line 22:  Comma after “initially”.  

 

Line 26:  “seems” 

 

Line 30:  “Stein’s” 

 

Lines 34-35:  Eliminate the period and semicolon around “that is” and the two sentences one. 

 

Line 36:  Eliminate semicolon, insert colon.

 

Line 49:  Is there a section 4?  Sections 1-3 are labeled.  

 

Line 52:  Eliminate “with her solid phenomenological anchoring” 

 

Line 54:  Eliminate comma and semicolon 

 

Line 55:  Eliminate “to this rich and extensive book” 

 

Line 55:  “Focuses on” 

 

Line 69:  “worldview”  

 

Line 71:  “Aquinas’s” 

 

Line 74:  Commas around “for example” 

 

Line 80:  “Stein’s” 

 

Line 110:  “confronts” 

 

Line 140:  “searches” 

 

Line 154:  “needs” 

 

Line 168:  Eliminate semicolon, substitute comma

 

Line 170:  “exists” 

 

Line 177:  Citation for the quotation 

 

Lines 181-184:  I’m not sure the comments on chapter 7 are relevant.  If eliminated, another sentence could transition into the next paragraph.  

 

Line 204:  Eliminate semicolon, insert comma.  Use full title here.  

 

Line 215:  “describes” 

 

Line 217:  The “i.e.” has an extra space 

 

Line 227:  “words” or “Word” depending on the meaning 

 

Line 228:  “the Scriptures being inspired” is redundant as per mentioning the Bible in the same sentence 

 

Line 251:  “Stein’s” 

 

Line 253:  “personal-experiential” 

 

Line 255:  Period after “effects” 

 

Line 256:  Eliminate “that is” for redundancy with “as in” 

 

Line 260:  Eliminate semicolon, insert period 

 

Line 268:  Eliminate semicolon, insert comma

 

Line 272:  Comma after “especially” and “perhaps”

 

Line 273:  Eliminate comma after “out” 

 

Line 281:  Eliminate semicolon, insert colon.  Rephrase question.  Something like “what remains when…?” 

 

Line 283:  Eliminate “Edith” 

 

Lines 283-284:  Rephrase “to close any area in on a dogmatism” to something like “to cordon any area off in dogmatism”.  

 

Line 286:  “person’s” 

 

Line 298:  Citation for the quotation 

 

Line 305:  “Stein’s” 

 

Line 311:  Citation for the quotation 

 

Line 315:  Capitalize “Catholic” 

 

Line 342:  “expresses” 

 

Line 345:  Citation for the quotation 

 

Line 347:  “thematizes” 

 

Line 356:  “hypothesis” 

 

Line 363:  “remarks” 

 

Line 364:  Eliminate comma

 

Line 366:  “raises” 

 

Line 379:  Eliminate the period, lowercase “she” 

 

Simmons and Benson are missing from the references.  

Minor grammatical errors.  

Author Response

Respons referee 2:

Thank you for these very helpful comments – and not the least for the detailed summary of typos, grammatical errors, a.o. ... I hope I have succeeded in correcting them all.

– I have added a note VI with the reference to Greg Sadler’s work Reason Fulfilled by Revelation – the book is a real goldmine, presenting precisely the context for Stein’s interest in the question as I point out in the note, so thank you!

– As to the authors from the “new phenomenology”, I have noted in the abstract and the introduction that I bring in Levinas and Marion as examples. I still have omitted Falque though, because he is a later generation that Janicaud did not target, and Chrétien because he is hardly mentioned (and I also would need to do a more serious study of his work to include him ...).

– And then of course, you are perfectly right about both Augustin and the medievals “bouncing back and forth between reason and revelation”.  I have added a note in the section «Meaning and possibility of a Christian philosophy», pointing out that the separation of theology and philosophy into two distinct disciplines came about rather late in their history, and that Stein’s use of religious writings would be a novelty to “the moderns” only.

– I have moved the comments on EES chapter VII to a note X, and added a sentence of transition in the text.

– In my version, Simmons and Benson were already in the references, but I have marked it now to be sure.

All additions and changes are marked in blue writing (... although not all the commas, semicolons, spaces, etc. I’m afraid ...).

Round 2

Reviewer 1 Report

Additional Comments

 

 

The submitted paper provides us with some vital insights and messages in theology, philosophy, and religious studies. Meanwhile, like many religious thinkers, Stein’s ideas appear to be, essentially, apologetic. Some may call it a form of confessional theology. When it comes to having a faith and understanding the believers of the faith, apologetics is necessary and important. In the meantime, some philosophers’ worry about the theological turn in phenomenology would have to do with the implicit apologetic character of the matter. What is surprising is that the author of the paper (and Stein interpreted by the author) seems to be quite successful in addressing many apologetic ideas in a philosophical way, particularly by means of utilizing some phenomenology. Thus seen, the author’s exposition penetrates three distinct disciplines mentioned above. This achievement certainly deserves notice.

 

Meanwhile, there still seems to be an unpersuasive point in the article. It is the issue of a common ground between believers and non-believers. In a word, the author (and also Stein) seems to think that taking a set of Christian doctrines as philosophical hypotheses is sufficient for securing a common ground between believers (Christians) and non-believers. She seems to think that that is a “common epistemological effort”. To the religious others, however, that could still be a one-sided handling of the matter. The common ground in question seems to need some more fine-grained approaches and treatments. What would Stein say if religious others or antagonists claim that those (Christian) hypotheses are false or wrong or senseless? Due to the limitations of time and background, each of us (e.g., Stein, the author of the paper, and the reviewer) may have a different understanding of the ideology of a common ground between believers and non-believers. Then, exactly what are those different understandings of the notion in question? What if those understandings, after all, turn out not to be different? The reviewer has an opinion that if the term “non-believers” in the article is really intended to include religious others or antagonists, then it seems that Stein and the author of the paper are using the word “common ground” too easily or romantically.   

 

Some typos should be corrected. (For example, line 5 book title, italicization needed? ; line 57 focus ; line 187 tools. as ; line 319-320 goes.)    

 

See the additional comments. 

Author Response

Thank you again for your comments and, not the least, for detecting all my typos!

It would be nice to carry on this discussion somewhere sometime ... but for this particular article, pursuing it would carry too far astray.

Just a few comments:

– I think the “worry about the theological turn in phenomenology” is not so much a concern about apologetics as it is a concern about a possible transgression of the immanentism of phenomenology, i.e. the concern is more about phenomenological methodological rigour than about any content claim.

– the “common ground”: The reviewer still seems to think that a “common ground” imperatively implies agreement which is not the point here, nor is it the case. The notion actually refers to an everyday and commonplace activity in philosophical work, namely the task to scrutinize and elucidate the presuppositions of positions, propositions and “beliefs” of all sorts, be they philosophical, religious, political or scientific. It is a matter of making apparent their meaning. If the philosopher is “unbiased” as Stein points out, this may be done from no matter what standpoint.

So neither Stein nor the author of the article think that “taking a set of Christian doctrines as philosophical hypotheses is sufficient for securing a common ground between believers (Christians) and non-believers”, and that this would be a “common epistemological effort”. On the contrary, it is precisely the scrupulous philosophical work that is the epistemological effort necessary to establish a possible common ground of dialogue. The issue at stake is how to best approach a perfectum opus rationis. I have added a sentence on this.

And what could then be the answer to the question “What would Stein say if religious others or antagonists claim that those (Christian) hypotheses are false or wrong or senseless?” Well, it would probably be her asking for reasons and arguments and descriptions of lived experiences to support it.

I think, relying on other referees, that I have made the point of the “common ground” sufficiently clear and I will not discuss it further in this article.  But thank you for stimulating questions.