On Tang Junyi’s Critique of Anselm’s Argument for the Existence of God

Abstract

Anselm’s argument for the existence of God posits that the concept of God inherently implies its existence. Tang Junyi critiques this argument from two fundamental angles. Firstly, he argues that the contingency of human thought places an unwarranted burden of proof on the existence of God, introducing an inherent contradiction within the argument’s premise. Secondly, he contends that Anselm’s argument fails to deduce the existence of God from empirical things. Tang’s empirical approach to critiquing the argument bears a superficial resemblance to St. Thomas Aquinas’s cosmological argument for God’s existence, yet a profound difference exists between the two, precluding their equivalence. Delving deeper, Tang’s critique is rooted in the Confucian philosophy. Nevertheless, Tang’s critique, while insightful, does not fully dismantle Anselm’s argument, underscoring the intrinsic differences and tensions between Chinese and Western perspectives on religion and philosophy.

1. Introduction

Anselm’s argument for the existence of God stands as a pivotal topic in Western religious and philosophical discourse. It has elicited diverse responses, ranging from criticisms by figures such as Gaunilo, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant, to modifications and advancements by René Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, and others. In the 20th century, Cock (1918) underscores the controversial nature of the argument’s logical underpinnings, noting their difficulty in effectively countering challenges emanating from empiricism and critical philosophy. Paulsen (1984) further elaborates on the challenges faced by Anselm’s derivation of the necessity of God’s existence from his conception of the divine, highlighting the ambiguity surrounding the predicate “existence” and the risk of circular reasoning. More recently, Platzer (2019) introduces a “neo-Cartesian” concept of ultimate divinity, which elevates the concept of God to an unprecedented level of abstraction. This approach transcends the traditional question of God’s existence and instead focuses on the essence of divinity and its intricate relationship with modal truths. Meanwhile, Rushby (2021) adopts a novel approach by formalizing various published versions of Anselm’s modal arguments within propositional modal logic and embedding them in the Prototype Verification System for rigorous verification. His findings reveal that, when modal axioms are taken into consideration, Anselm’s arguments assume a surprising degree of logical simplicity, underscoring the enduring relevance and complexity of this age-old philosophical debate.

Indeed, critiques levied against Anselm’s rationale for the existence of God transcend the confines of Western philosophical and theological circles. Tang Junyi (1909–1978), a renowned modern Neo-Confucian scholar, uniquely contributes to this discourse by offering a Confucian critique, thereby introducing a Chinese philosophical lens to scrutinize Anselm’s celebrated argument. This perspective is encapsulated in his seminal work, Shengming, cunzai yu xinling jingjie 生命存在與心靈境界 (Life, Existence, and Spiritual Realms). Within this treatise, Tang meticulously develops the framework of “Xintong jiujing” (Nine horizons of the mind 心通九境). Notably, the “Guixiang yishen jing” (The horizon of returning to the one God 歸向一神境) serves as a pivotal chapter, where Tang meticulously examines and critiques various arguments underpinning the existence of God, notably Anselm’s. This direct engagement not only challenges Anselm’s thesis but also sheds light on the nuances of religious discourse within the Confucian tradition, offering invaluable insights into the universality and cultural specificity of arguments for God’s existence. Thus, Tang Junyi’s criticism not only enriches the discourse on the existence of God but also underscores the significance of cross-cultural philosophical dialogues in understanding the complexities of religious beliefs and philosophical inquiries.

The academic community has increasingly devoted significant attention to Tang Junyi’s religious perspectives. William Ng (1998) posits that Tang constructed a religious humanism rooted in the Confucian notion of transcendence, emphasizing the elevation of human nature and the primacy of religious experience. From a Confucian philosophical vantage point, Lai (2001) and Chen (2008), contend that Tang’s emphasis on transcendence within religious views embodies a humanitarian religious worldview. Additionally, He (2009) and Peng (2012) highlight that Tang’s exploration of the Confucian custom of offering sacrifices to heaven, earth, ancestors, and sages elucidates the Confucian religious ethos of attaining harmony between humanity and nature through moral cultivation, which stands apart from monotheistic religions centered on an “absolute other”. Fröhlich (2017) observes that Tang situated Confucian philosophical concepts within a framework of civil theology grounded in religious tolerance, aiming to redefine the role of Confucian religiosity in contemporary society and contribute favorably to the democratic landscape of China’s future. Notably, while extant research seldom delves into Tang’s stance on arguments for God’s existence, my analysis, drawing primarily from Shengming, cunzai yu xinling jingjie, focuses intently on Tang’s critique of Anselm’s argument. The objective is to elucidate the rationale behind Tang’s critique, thereby offering fresh perspectives on both Anselm’s thesis and Tang’s religious beliefs, enriching our understanding of both.

2. Anselm’s Argument for the Existence of God

Before embarking on an examination of Tang’s critique, it is imperative to offer a concise exposition of Anselm’s argument for the existence of God, thereby establishing a robust theoretical foundation for the ensuing deliberations. Among Anselm’s seminal contributions, Proslogion stands as a pivotal work that vigorously advocates for the existence of God. Specifically, within Chapter 2 of Proslogion, Anselm meticulously outlines his methodical approach to substantiating the existence of God. His steps can be summarized as follows:

• God is something than which nothing greater can be thought.
• When one hears of something than which nothing greater can be thought, it exists at least in the understanding.
• Something than which nothing greater can be thought cannot exist merely in one’s understanding, for if it did, then something greater could be thought.
• That than which nothing greater can be conceived exists both in the mind and in reality.
• Therefore, something than which nothing greater can be thought, namely God, exists in reality (Saint Anselm 2007, pp. 81–82).

In this context, Anselm’s argument for the existence of God fundamentally stems from a rigorous conceptual analysis. The cornerstone of his argument is the notion of “something than which nothing greater can be thought”, which serves as the pivotal premise. This premise reframes the inquiry into God’s existence into an exploration of the existence of such an unparalleled entity—one that inherently embodies the utmost conceivable greatness, surpassing all potential notions of superiority. Given that “something than which nothing greater can be thought” is a concept that can indeed be entertained by the mind, it logically necessitates its existence within the realm of understanding. Nevertheless, the essence of this entity transcends mere intellectual contemplation, for if it were confined solely to the realm of thought, one could conceive of a being that not only exists conceptually but also in reality, thereby surpassing the original conception in grandeur. Such a scenario would inherently contradict the very definition of “something than which nothing greater can be thought”, as it presupposes the possibility of a greater being. To avoid this logical impasse and uphold the principle of identity in reasoning, Anselm posits that “something than which nothing greater can be thought” must necessarily exist beyond mere comprehension, in the realm of reality. This conclusion, therefore, leads inexorably to the affirmation that God—the embodiment of this supreme, unparalleled being—exists. In essence, Anselm’s argument elegantly navigates the terrain of conceptual analysis to arrive at a profound philosophical assertion: the existence of God is a logical necessity.

Furthermore, Anselm delves into the impossibility of thinking about God’s non-existence. In Chapter 3 of Proslogion, his specific steps in proving God’s existence are as follows:

6.

God is something than which nothing greater can be thought of.

7.

Something than which nothing greater can be thought of cannot be thought not to exist.

8.

Otherwise, something than which nothing greater can be thought of would not be God, for God is that than which nothing greater can be thought of.

9.

Therefore, something than which nothing greater can be thought of, namely God, cannot be thought not to exist (Saint Anselm 2007, pp. 82–83).

In his discourse, Anselm meticulously employs the cardinal premise, “God is something than which nothing greater can be thought”, and deduces that if the notion of God’s non-existence were entertained, it would lead to a logical contradiction with this fundamental premise. It becomes clear that Anselm’s argument for the existence of God primarily stems from the realm of logical principles, diverging from the path of causal explanations. Steeped in the philosophy of Augustine and imbued with Plato’s theory of Ideas, Anselm’s argument aligns with the Platonic tradition. Xing (2012) characterizes this line of reasoning, which derives the existence of God solely from its definition, independent of empirical knowledge or evidence, as an a priori argument. Whether labeled the ontological argument or an a priori approach, Anselm’s argument carries a distinct logical aroma emanating from the realm of ideas, which often attracts criticism. For instance, Gaunilo challenges this perspective, arguing that if mere comprehension of something were sufficient to establish its existence within one’s mental construct, then even fictitious and non-existent entities would acquire an existential status within the realm of thought. Furthermore, he posits that the mere presence of something in one’s understanding does not necessitate its actuality. For example, if someone describes an island surpassing even the Isles of the Blessed in ineffable abundance and delights, and I comprehend this description, it signifies the island’s existence in my mind, but not necessarily in the physical world. Otherwise, it could not be deemed the most exceptional island. Gaunilo (2007) thus rejects Anselm’s argument, contending that one must first establish why this purportedly superior island, conceived as a genuine and undeniable entity, ought to exist beyond the realm of mere imagination.

Furthermore, St. Thomas Aquinas underscores the notion that the essence of God, when unknown to an individual, renders God’s existence non-self-evident to human comprehension. Consequently, he vigorously advocates for empirically grounded proofs of God’s existence, drawing upon phenomena such as “the movement and transformation within creation”, “the essence of efficient causation”, and the intricate interplay between “possibility and necessity” (St. Aquinas 2006, pp. 13–19). In contrast, Kant (1998) critiques the ontological argument for God’s existence, asserting that it constitutes an analytical judgment wherein the conclusion of God’s existence logically ensues from the mere definition of the divine concept. However, Kant emphasizes a crucial distinction: logical predicates do not equate with real predicates. Specifically, “existence” does not serve as a genuine predicate that enriches the substantive content of the subject; rather, it is not an inherent attribute or property of God. Thus, the ontological argument, in its pure form, fails to provide a satisfactory empirical foundation for the existence of God.

These criticisms frequently center around the validity of Anselm’s arguments and the Platonic philosophical framework that underpins his contemplations. However, it is crucial to recognize that Anselm transcends the mere realm of philosophy. He was a devout Christian and an archbishop, a fact that significantly colors his work. Consequently, while Anselm presents a logically ontological argument for the existence of God, his rationale does not solely rest on reason and logic. This becomes apparent in Chapter 4 of Proslogion, where Anselm outlines the intricate steps of his argument. The steps of his argument are as follows:

10.

A thing can be thought of in two ways: through the word that signifies it, and by understanding the thing itself.

11.

God can be thought not to exist in the first way, but cannot be thought of as not existing at all in the second way.

12.

No one who understands what God is can think that God does not exist, although he may say these words in his heart with no signification at all, or with some peculiar signification.

13.

For God is that than which nothing greater can be thought of. Thus, whoever understands that God exists in this way cannot think that he does not exist (Saint Anselm 2007, p. 83).

Here, Anselm acknowledges the hypothetical scenario where God might be conceived as non-existent, yet he contends that such a conception can only emerge when thinking of God through the lens of the word that represents Him, essentially reducing God to a mere linguistic construct, devoid of genuine understanding. In essence, the cornerstone of Anselm’s argument revolves around the fundamental premise that “God cannot be thought as a being greater than He is”. The notion of thinking of God as non-existent, when approached through the word that designates Him, stems from a rejection of this pivotal premise, rooted in an absence of genuine understanding that “God cannot be thought as a being greater than He is”.

At the outset of Proslogion, Anselm explicitly states: “For I do not seek to understand in order to believe; I believe in order to understand. For I also believe that ‘Unless I believe, I shall not understand’” (Saint Anselm 2007, p. 81). This proclamation underscores the essence of Anselm’s argument, which transcends mere philosophical or logical scrutiny; it is an endeavor deeply rooted in the soil of faith. By placing faith before understanding, Anselm establishes the major premise that “God is something than which nothing greater can be thought”, which inherently contains the concept of existence. Thus, within the framework of faith, the existence of God becomes an analytical proposition. Since the dawn of the 20th century, theologians and philosophers alike have come to appreciate the significance of Anselm’s theological foundation, emphasizing that his discourse is a testament to the harnessing of rationality within the sacred realm of faith’s interior quest (Kapriev 1998; Barth [1931] 2009). Moreover, Ortlund (2020, p. 225) elucidates that Proslogion transcends mere persuasion concerning God’s existence; it evokes within readers an intimate, latent longing that is inherent to human nature. Hence, Anselm’s presupposition of God’s “existence” serves as a pivotal point for subsequent generations to scrutinize the ontological argument for God’s existence. Additionally, it stands as a litmus test, differentiating between those who espouse faith as the precursor to understanding and those who hold the opposite view.

3. Tang’s Critique of Anselm’s Argument

Tang Junyi delves deeply into Anselm’s argument for the existence of God, asserting emphatically, “The existence of this perfect being can be proven by the fact that humans are capable of conceiving of such a perfect being. This is why the ontological argument is significant” (Tang 2016a, p. 16). In doing so, he acknowledges the fundamental importance of Anselm’s argument while simultaneously subjecting it to rigorous scrutiny. Tang’s critique of Anselm’s argument primarily focuses on two key dimensions, namely revealing the contradictions within Anselm’s argument and proposing a revised approach.

3.1. The Contradiction Within Anselm’s Argument

Anselm’s argument for the existence of God, according to Tang, harbors a contradiction: human thought, being contingent, is tasked with the necessary responsibility of establishing the existence of God, which is absolute. In other words, Anselm’s argument contains the contradiction of deducing necessity from contingency. Tang’s argument proceeds as follows:

• The existence of God originates from God itself.
• Human thinking about the existence of God, concerning the necessity of God’s existence, is a contingent matter.
• God’s existence does not depend on contingent human thought.
• Nevertheless, the existence of God is derived from the concept of God in human thought.
• Therefore, the contingent human thought bears the necessary responsibility for the existence of God (Tang 2016a, pp. 16–20). (See Appendix A)

It is undeniable that Tang possesses a clear understanding of Anselm’s argument, notably his insight into Anselm’s attribution of existence exclusively to God and the axiom that existence stems solely from the divine. By adhering to Anselm’s logical progression, there emerges no contradiction in deriving the existence of God, who is envisioned as “something than which nothing greater can be thought” or the “perfect being”. However, Tang’s stance diverges from this, asserting that Anselm’s argument harbors an inherent contradiction due to its reliance on human thought as a pivotal factor in validating the existence of God.

It is noteworthy that Gaunilo’s critique of Anselm’s argument is rooted in the hypothetical scenario of a fool’s imagination, offering a unique perspective. Tang’s critique, while sharing some parallels with Gaunilo’s, also exhibits distinctive differences. While Tang acknowledges the comprehensibility of Anselm’s method of deriving existence from God, he contends that it falls short of being a flawless or ultimate approach. Anselm’s argument posits God as a transcendent entity, aloof from humanity and the world, fostering an absolute and insurmountable divide that precludes humans from ever attaining divine status. This implies that humans, in comparison to God, are inherently limited beings, and human thought is inherently subjective and contingent. Tang argues that the crux of Anselm’s argument’s contradiction lies precisely in this dichotomy. In his critique, Tang underscores the significant role of human thought, which introduces a quandary into the ontological argument regarding the manifestation of God’s existence. From this vantage point, human thought, though contingent relative to God’s existence, becomes necessary for the manifestation of that existence. This paradoxical situation presents a contradiction, where contingent human thought assumes the necessary burden of justifying God’s existence, thereby introducing an inconsistency.

3.2. A Revised Approach to Anselm’s Argument

While revealing the contradiction within Anselm’s argument, Tang proposes a revised approach to it. His revised approach is as follows:

• Existence should not be derived from God but should be taken from empirical things.
• Empirical things are flawed and not perfect.
• Humans can mentally supplement the deficiencies of empirical things.
• The result of Humans completing all the deficiencies of empirical things in their thoughts is to deduce the existence of the perfect being, that is, the existence of God.
• Human thought bears no responsibility for the existence of God; it only bears the responsibility of completing all the deficiencies to achieve perfection (Tang 2016a, pp. 16–20). (See Appendix A)

The foundation of Tang’s revision resides in the denial of God as the sole origin of existence, a fundamental premise that underpins Anselm’s argument, thereby marking a significant divergence between the two positions. Tang’s approach revolutionizes the perspective by re-framing the proof of God’s existence from an intrinsic divine perspective to an empirical one, grounding the existence of God in the tangible realm of empirical things. As the existence of empirical things is tangible, verifiable, and universally recognized, it serves as a realistic foundation upon which the necessity of God’s existence can be constructed. In essence, Tang redirects the necessity of God’s existence away from God itself and towards the empirical world. However, the inherent imperfection and incompleteness of empirical things pose a challenge. How, then, can the imperfect nature of empirical existence lead to the concept of a flawless and omnipotent God? Tang’s solution lies in the utilization of human thought. A gradual overcoming of incompleteness is achieved by employing human thought to fill the gaps and rectify the shortcomings of empirical things. When human thought reaches a point of saturation, where no further enhancements are possible, the existence of God as the ultimate perfection is revealed. This approach places the onus of completion on humanity, rather than mere existence, while the responsibility for existence remains with the empirical things. Thus, Tang’s revision elegantly navigates the tension between contingency and necessity inherent in Anselm’s argument, offering a novel perspective harmoniously integrating human thought, empirical things, and God.

It is undeniable that these two aspects mentioned above are intricately intertwined, mutually reinforcing one another. The rationale for this assertion stems from the following considerations: Tang’s critique of Anselm’s argument begins with the notion that existence originates from and can be derived from God, which serves as the common premise for both revealing the contradictions and proposing a revised approach. Within this shared premise, the contradiction in Anselm’s argument, as illuminated by Tang, surfaces prominently when the role of human thought is brought into sharp focus. Moreover, human thought assumes a crucial role in Tang’s revised approach, empowering individuals to bridge the gaps in the empirical realm, thereby facilitating the plausibility of God’s existence. By shifting human responsibility from existence to complementation, Tang adeptly resolves the contradiction he had earlier exposed in Anselm’s argument. In essence, both the reduction and the revision of Tang’s critique of Anselm’s argument hinge crucially on the accentuation of human thought.

Therefore, Tang’s critique of Anselm’s argument for the existence of God encompasses two aspects: revealing the contradiction and proposing a revised approach. With the assistance of human thought, these two aspects are not mutually exclusive but indispensable and complementary.

4. The Similarities and Differences Between Tang’s Critique and St. Thomas Aquinas’s Cosmological Argument

Upon thoroughly considering the preceding discourse, it becomes evident that Tang’s deduction of God’s existence, rooted in the empirical realm, constitutes an a posteriori argumentation. This prompts the following question: Does this approach align with the cosmological argument for God’s existence espoused by St. Thomas Aquinas? If they are indeed congruent, the academic merit of Tang’s critique may face the challenge of being overshadowed. Conversely, if they diverge, what then constitutes the distinctive value of Tang’s critical perspective?

4.1. The Similarities Between Tang’s Criticism and St. Thomas Aquinas’s Cosmological Argument

Tang’s critique and St. Thomas Aquinas’s cosmological argument for the existence of God both embark on a posteriori trajectory, rooted firmly in empirical things. In contrast, Anselm’s argument adopts an a priori stance, initiating its discourse from the very essence of God Himself. The precedence of Anselm’s rationale is evident in two pivotal facets: “Firstly, it is a logical analysis of the definition of the concept of God; secondly, the concept of God serves as the starting point of the argument, unlike posterior arguments where it only emerges in the conclusion” (Zhao 2023, p. 208). Tang, however, forges a different path, grounding the existence of God in the tangible realm of empirical things. This departure from Anselm’s God-centric analytical framework signals a shift towards a posteriori reasoning, which commences from the empirical realm and moves towards a conclusion about the divine. This approach echoes, to some extent, the cosmological argument advanced by St. Thomas Aquinas, who expounds on the existence of God in five ways. One of his arguments runs as follows:

• Some of the things we come across can be but need not be, for we find them springing up and dying away, thus sometimes in being and sometimes not.
• If everything need not be, once upon a time, there was nothing.
• If nothing was in being nothing could be brought into being, and nothing would be in being now, which contradicts observation.
• Not everything is the sort of thing that need not be; there has got to be something that must be and may or may not owe its necessity to something else.
• Just as we must stop somewhere in a series of causes, so also in the series of things, which must be and owe this to other things.
• One is forced therefore to suppose something which must be, and owes this to no other thing than itself; indeed, it is the cause that other things must be (St. Aquinas 2006, p. 15).

St. Thomas Aquinas acknowledges the existence of empirical things, acknowledging that they are neither eternal nor inescapable but rather contingent, harboring the potentiality of non-existence. This perspective is echoed by Tang, who concurs with the contingency inherent in the existence of such phenomena. To a significant degree, the contingency that Aquinas highlights in the realm of empirical things also underscores their inherent limitations and deficiencies. The logical progression employed by Aquinas, wherein he derives the necessity of God’s existence from the contingency of empirical things, mirrors Tang’s methodology, which infers God’s existence from the very imperfections discernible within these same empirical things. Both scholars’ arguments constitute a posteriori proof, commencing from empirical things and building a rationale grounded in such phenomena. This shared starting point and approach become even more pronounced when juxtaposed against Anselm’s argumentation, which diverges from this empirical foundation.

4.2. The Differences Between Tang’s Criticism and St. Thomas Aquinas’s Cosmological Argument

It is undeniable that Tang’s critique of Anselm, for his failure to substantiate the existence of God from the empirical things, resonates with St. Thomas Aquinas’s proof of God’s existence, which is grounded in the contingency of empirical things. Nevertheless, Tang’s critique transcends mere mimicry of St. Thomas Aquinas’s cosmological argument; it possesses a distinct character. In essence, while Tang’s approach in criticizing Anselm bears a semblance to Aquinas’s cosmological framework, his critique is not a mere replication but a nuanced deviation. Moreover, Tang expresses dissatisfaction with Aquinas’s cosmological argument itself, subjecting it to critical scrutiny. Tang’s critique stems from a fundamental disagreement: he contends that Aquinas’s argument derives the existence of God from the absence of contingency in empirical things, rather than directly inferring it from the very existence of those empirical things. This, according to Tang, constitutes a deviation from a more direct and intuitive approach. In response, Tang highlights the following:

All things could originally have not existed, and then we say that things do exist in reality, thereby forcing out the inevitable existence of a perfect God. This is a thought process that first goes down a wrong path, makes a large detour, and then reverses itself before finally returning to where it should have started, namely, discussing the existence of things in terms of their existence. People do not realize that if they start directly from the imperfection of things’ existence and strive to ascend to the perfectly existing God, they do not need to first consider the possibility of things’ non-existence. Instead, they only need to first complement the imperfection of these things to form a perfectly existing God. 一切事物為原可不存在，然後再說今實有事物存在，以逼出完全之上帝之必然存在，即成一思想方向上先經一大歧途，而來一大迂回、大顛倒，而後再回到其自始即當就事物之存在而說其存在之處。乃不知若人自始直由事物之存在而不完全，以求升進至完全之存在之上帝，即不須先想事物之可不存在，而只須先補足此事物之不完全，以形成一完全之存在之上帝。

(Tang 2016a, p. 25)

From Tang’s perspective, St. Thomas Aquinas’s cosmological argument initiates its discourse by presupposing the non-existence of contingency in empirical things, thereby sidestepping the pivotal aspect of the empirical things’ very existence. While this theoretical maneuver is feasible, it lacks the directness and logical coherence that would ensue from deducing God’s existence directly from the empirical things’ tangible presence. Consequently, Tang posits that the cosmological argument constitutes an indirect and inverted form of posterior proof. This underscores that, despite Tang’s posterior critique of Anselm’s ontological argument, his approach does not merely replicate the cosmological argument. Rather, Tang’s critique extends to St. Thomas Aquinas’s cosmological argument as well, emphasizing that the rationale for God’s existence ought to emanate from the existence of empirical things, not from their lack of contingency. However, Tang’s advocacy for embarking on this journey from the empirical things’ existence, without necessitating the exploration of its non-existence, necessitates a confrontation with the inherent limitations of the empirical things. This prompts Tang to underscore the pivotal role of human thought, advocating its utilization as a means of progressively compensating for the empirical world’s imperfections. Through this process, Tang endeavors to deduce the impeccable existence of God from the flawed existence of empirical things, thereby illustrating the transformative power of human thought in apprehending God.

Essentially, Tang’s groundbreaking insight resides in reframing St. Thomas Aquinas’s cosmological argument, transforming the non-existence of empirical things into an exploration of the inadequacies inherent in their existence. This transformative approach yields two important consequences. Firstly, concerning Aquinas’s cosmological argument, Tang’s methodology dispenses with its indirect and inverted nature. Specifically, the posterior justification for God’s existence no longer necessitates a starting point in the absence of empirical things but rather embarks from their very presence. Secondly, Tang’s approach underscores the paramount significance of human thought. The reason Tang diverges from Aquinas by initiating his discourse from the existence of empirical things is that he recognizes this existence as imperfect, fraught with deficiencies. The driving force behind ascending from the flawed existence of empirical things to the perfect existence of God stems from human thought’s capacity to compensate for these inadequacies through introspection and reasoning. As all imperfections are addressed, the impeccable existence of God is thereby substantiated. In summary, while Tang critiques Anselm’s argument and champions an empirical approach to arguing for God’s existence, his methodology, albeit sharing similarities with Aquinas’s cosmological argument, also distinguishes itself markedly. Aquinas’s argument confines itself to the realm of empirical things and God, leaving little space for human thought. In contrast, Tang, embarking from the imperfections within empirical things, not only establishes an empirical foundation for God’s existence but also creates a platform for human thought to illuminate and soar.

5. The Philosophical Root of Tang’s Critique

In this section, I will examine the philosophical root of Tang’s critique. My argument is that the philosophical root lies in Chinese philosophy, particularly Confucian philosophy. My demonstration encompasses two aspects: “The God of Christianity and the Heaven of Chinese philosophy” and “The spiritual realms and the innate essence of the human mind”. The former aims to highlight the differences between the God of Christianity, as understood by Tang, and the Heaven of Chinese philosophy. The latter elucidates Tang’s critique, which is conducted against the backdrop of the unity of heaven and humans. He aims to achieve the spiritual realms of human mind where the Heaven virtue flows through the innate essence of the human mind, reflecting the Confucian philosophical root of Tang’s critique.

5.1. The God of Christianity and the Heaven of Chinese Philosophy

Indeed, Tang’s critique is founded on his understanding of Anselm’s and Christianity’s conception of God. In Tang’s early works, it is evident that he regards God as an infinite existence. For instance, he states the following: “God is infinity, aligning with the concept of God in Christianity” (“上帝即無限，而符耶教中上帝之概念”) (Tang 2016b, p. 40). This indicates that God, with infinite attributes, exists beyond empirical things. Therefore, Tang points out, “The God of Christianity is also the creator of the world before it exists. Hence, both embody transcendence” (基督教之上帝，亦為在世界之先造世界者。故皆表現一超越性) (Tang 2016c, p. 52). This indicates that Tang views God as an infinite, transcendent, and ultimate, perfect being. Moreover, the God of Christianity aligns with the Western rationalist spirit:

God reveals his teachings to his prophets and saviors, who then transmit them to humanity, hence being called a revealed religion. Consequently, the means to teach people to believe in God’s existence may involve commanding them to hold an absolutely believing attitude towards the words of prophets and saviors, or emphasizing the necessity of proving God’s existence through reasoning. In Western thought, due to the existing trend of rationalism, there is a particular emphasis on proving God’s existence through reasoning. 上帝唯啟示其教義於其先知、救主，由先知、救主傳至人間，故皆自稱為啟示的宗教。因而其所以教一般人信上帝存在之道，則或為命人對先知、救主所言，先持絕對相信態度，或注重以推理證明上帝存在之必然。在西洋思想中，因其素有一理性主義之潮流，故尤重以推理證明上帝之存在。

(Tang 2016c, p. 293)

Tang recognizes that reasoning is a method to lead people to belief in God, which is particularly evident under the influence of Western rationalism. In fact, faith and reasoning were precisely the two pillars of Anselm’s argument, a point that Tang also acknowledged. The conception of God, as understood by Tang, is not different from that of Anselm’s, as they both see God as an infinite, ultimate, and transcendent perfect being. However, the focus of Tang’s critique is not on the concept of God itself, but on the relationship between God and humanity—namely, that God is always at the core, while humans are marginalized as creatures, and there exists an absolute gap between God and humans, making it impossible for humans to attain a status equal to God. This God-centered relationship with an absolute separation between God and humanity is unacceptable to Tang. The reason for his rejection is related to his view of “Heaven”. Although Tang emphasizes that “the meaning of Heaven as understood by ancient Chinese philosophers is not less than that of God in Western philosophy” (中國先哲所謂天之涵義，一方看，可並不少於西方哲學上之上帝的涵義) (Tang 2016c, p. 400), he states that “the Chinese nation does not possess the concept of Heaven with a transcendent meaning” (中國民族無含超絕意義的天的觀念) (Tang 2016d, p. 198) and that “ancient Chinese people do not have a concrete consciousness of Heaven’s power, nor do they truly believe that Heaven has absolute power” (中國古代人對於天的權力，實無具體之意識，並非真相信天有絕對的權力) (Tang 2016d, p. 200). The reason why in Chinese philosophy Heaven is not a transcendent existence and lacks absolute power is that Chinese people advocate that there is no absolute separation between Heaven and humans. This idea of the unity of Heaven and humanity implies that humans can become Heaven-like, or God-like beings, and the elevation of human status weakens God’s transcendence and absolute power. Thus, Tang’s critique does not mean denying the existence of God, but rather denying the “center-periphery” positional relationship between God and humanity in Anselm’s argument. Within the context of the unity of Heaven and humanity, Tang attempts to change humans’ disadvantaged position as creatures before God by highlighting the importance of human thought, thereby enabling humans to attain a sainthood akin to God.

5.2. The Spiritual Realms and the Innate Essence of the Human Mind

Tang categorizes the spiritual realms of the human mind into nine progressively higher horizons, including three objective horizons, three subjective horizons, and three horizons that transcend both subjectivity and objectivity. Anselm’s argument is ranked seventh and is named “Guixiang yishen jing” (The horizon of returning to the one God 歸向一神境), which corresponds to Western monotheism. In this horizon, God is an absolute and transcendent existence. Although humans can recognize God’s existence within the rational perspective of the distinction between subject and object, the relationship between humans and God remains that of a cognitive subject and a cognitive object. Humans can never bridge the absolute gap between God and themselves, and God’s absolute power suppresses humans’ status in the universe. Therefore, the realm of Christianity is not the highest horizon of the human mind. In contrast, Buddhism, which aims to eliminate the attachment to the self and dharma, represents the eighth horizon, known as “Wofa erkong jing” (The horizon of emptiness of self and dharma 我法二空境). It resolves the issue of the absolute separation between humans and God, caused by viewing God as a transcendent and perfect existence. This constitutes an elevation in the spiritual realm of the human mind. However, although the horizon of Buddhism is high, it is a wisdom of emptiness. Confucianism shifts from emptiness to reality and advocates “Tiande liuxing jing” (The horizon of the flowing of heavenly virtue 天德流行境). Tang notes, “The so-called horizon of the flowing of heavenly virtue is the manifestation of heavenly virtue in the accomplishment of human virtue, and thus it is simultaneously a realm that transcends both subjectivity and objectivity” (所謂天德流行境，乃於人德之成就中，同時見天德之流行，故同時為超主觀客觀之境) (Tang 2016a, p. 117). This Confucian horizon represents the unity of heaven and humans. Compared to the seventh horizon, the Confucian horizon as the ninth horizon returns to the relationship between heaven and humans, but there is no absolute gap between them. Moreover, the unity of heaven and humans is centered on humans, as the flowing of heavenly virtue needs to be presented in the process of accomplishing human virtue.

So, how does the flowing of heavenly virtue manifest in the process of accomplishing human virtue? In other words, how does a person become a sage, who is one with Heaven? When criticizing Anselm’s argument, Tang emphasizes human thought, which is a cognitive ability of the human mind. However, it is not human thought in the epistemological sense that makes a person a sage who is one with Heaven, but the innate essence of the human mind, which is the foundation of human thought. Tang argues: “True Confucianism in China regards the subtle and lucid consciousness as the realm where benevolence and virtue flow and regards attaining such subtle and lucid consciousness as a means to facilitate the flow of benevolence and virtue, rather than equating subtle and lucid consciousness with the innate essence of the human mind. The innate essence of the human mind is the ever-flowing benevolence or rational principle. What humans must cultivate, maintain, and recognize is the entirety of this ‘subtle and lucid consciousness that inherently possesses ever-flowing benevolence’” (中國真正之儒家，只以虛靈明覺為仁德流行之地，只以致虛靈明覺，為使仁德流行之一工夫，而不以虛靈明覺即心之本體。心之本體，乃生生不已之仁德或性理) (Tang 2016c, pp. 398–99). Here, Tang views the innate essence of the human mind as the key to breaking the barrier between the human mind and the universe, because desires, will, emotions, and other aspects of the human mind hinder the unity of humans and Heaven. The innate essence of the human mind inherits the rationality of Heaven and can encompass all things, thereby removing the obstacle between humans and Heaven and making the unity of humans and Heaven possible. Major (2021) argues that Tang’s concept of “Lixing” (Reason 理性) serves as a dual-faceted construct: it translates the Western concept of reason while also expressing the Neo-Confucian capacity to intuitively grasp moral truths, empowering individuals to comprehend the universal. This reason paves the way for human beings to attain sagehood, a state that harmoniously blends transcendence, moral perfection akin to Godliness, and empirical existence. Tang’s view, aimed at breaking the absolute divide between humans and God, cannot be traced back to the Christian tradition but is rooted in the Confucian philosophy.

6. My Views on Tang’s Critique

Tang’s critique of Anselm’s argument and its Confucian philosophical roots have been clarified. In reality, Tang’s critique represents a cross-cultural ideological collision between medieval European theology and modern Chinese philosophy. Elucidating and analyzing this ideological collision is not my sole purpose. Beyond that, I also wish to use it as an entry point for reflecting on how Sino–Western religious cultures can communicate and interconnect. Therefore, in this section, I will explore three questions: What value does Tang’s critique hold for theology? What insights can medieval European theology provide for Chinese philosophy? And what can we learn from them?

6.1. The Value of Tang’s Critique for Theology

I believe that the greatest value of Tang’s critique for theology lies in elevating humans’ position in their relationship with God. Christian theology holds that there is an absolute separation between God and humans, while Tang’s critique is precisely aimed at breaking this separation and achieving a unity between humans and God, with humans as the center. It is evident that Tang’s critique has crossed the fundamental boundaries of Christian theology, which holds that God is the transcendent Creator, and humans are always the created beings. In other words, humans cannot become God, nor can they be placed at the center of the relationship with God. However, the value of Tang’s critique lies in its ability, under the premise of the absolute separation between God and humans in Christian theology, to achieve a limited elevation of humans’ status in the universe. Specifically, the philosophical root of Tang’s critique is the Confucian idea of the unity of heaven and humans, which begins with humans conforming to natural life in daily existence and expanding it to its fullest, thereby becoming a spiritual life that connects with the flowing of Heavenly Virtue. This idea helps to expand the issue of personal identity within the theological perspective. The issue of personal identity concerns why a person remains the same individual despite undergoing changes. From the perspective of Confucian philosophy, personal identity should not be limited to the identity of an individual’s life course; an individual can extend their personal identity to all things in the universe, making humanity and all things in the universe one. However, this unity of humanity and all things in the universe is only a unity with all created beings, not with God as the Creator. In this way, humanity is not a member of God’s creations, but the entirety of all created beings. The unity of humanity and the universe is an expansion of personal identity, and although the unified humanity with the universe is still a created being subject to God, in the process of extending personal identity to all things in the universe, humanity also achieves an elevation in knowledge and realm. Compared to a person facing God alone, a person who can be one with all created beings in the universe elevates humanity’s status in the universe, which is a form of progress.

6.2. Insights from Medieval European Theology for Chinese Philosophy

While this paper focuses on Tang’s critique of Anselm’s argument, the impact of this ideological collision should not be unilateral. Of course, medieval European theology should not merely be the target of criticism; in fact, it possesses many qualities that Chinese philosophy lacks but needs, offering valuable insights into Chinese philosophy.

Medieval European theology asserts the existence of an ultimate, transcendent being beyond humanity, namely God, who possesses absolute power. While emphasizing faith in the omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good God, theological teachings also provide inspiration for people to pursue truth and advocate rational activities, promoting the development of science, logic, and philosophy. This religious spirit of a clear distinction between God and humanity reflects the philosophical dichotomy between the metaphysical world and the empirical world and reinforces the rational methods and spirit of philosophy. The essence of Chinese philosophy lies in expanding the individual’s life spirit to the universe, thereby forming a harmonious whole. This philosophical pursuit of the ultimate, transcendent reality and the tradition of emphasizing logical analysis and deductive reasoning in philosophy are particularly important for the modern construction of Chinese philosophy. Since the 20th century, modern Neo-Confucianism, represented by figures such as Tang Junyi, has built on the traditional foundations of Chinese philosophy and actively introduced logical analysis methods as an important method for constructing Chinese traditional wisdom within the Western philosophical framework. Influenced by this, Tang Junyi and others begin to classify and explore Chinese traditional texts from the perspectives of ontology, epistemology, and methodology, shaping Chinese philosophy into a philosophical system parallel to Western philosophy. This modern construction of Chinese philosophy often touches on discussions about transcendent existence, which cannot be said to be unrelated to the inspiration drawn from medieval European theology. Moreover, modern Chinese philosophy has actively embraced the Western rational methods and spirit but lacks the firmness of faith, compared to medieval European theology. Most modern Chinese philosophy researchers use rational methods to understand and study Chinese philosophy, with some dilution of faith in the unique qualities of Chinese philosophy. In this regard, Chinese philosophy can learn from medieval European theology in terms of faith preceding understanding.

6.3. What Can We Learn from This Cross-Cultural Ideological Collision?

The reason why I discuss Tang’s Critique is to explore how effective communication can be achieved between Chinese and Western religions and philosophies through this cross-cultural ideological collision. It cannot be denied that there are significant differences between China and the West in terms of religion, philosophy, and even ways of thinking. Furthermore, both sides tend to understand each other from their own perspectives during their encounters, which inevitably leads to some misunderstandings.

For example, Anselm’s argument actually does not contain the contradiction pointed out by Tang. This contradiction arises from Tang’s examination of Anselm’s argument through the lens of Confucian philosophy. Influenced by Confucian philosophy, Tang Junyi could not agree with Anselm’s approach of regarding God as the highest being. This is because viewing God as the highest being inevitably diminishes the status of humanity and creates an absolute separation between them, which contradicts the Confucian ideal of the unity of heaven and humans. Tang points out that the contingent nature of human thought in Anselm’s argument cannot support the necessary existence of God, a contradiction that can only be identified from a Confucian philosophical perspective. In other words, Tang does not discover an inherent contradiction in Anselm’s argument but rather creates one from a Confucian philosophical standpoint. Additionally, Tang overlooks the theological faith background of Anselm’s argument. From the perspective of the effectiveness of criticism, Tang’s critique, based on the Confucian philosophical stance, cannot refute Anselm’s argument within the theological context.

From the case of Tang’s critique, I have discovered that understanding and criticizing the other side from one’s own stance is a common pitfall in cross-cultural dialogues between China and the West. Therefore, I propose a principle for cross-cultural dialogue: based on accurately grasping the other side’s viewpoint, one should start with the other side’s argumentation to identify any issues within it, rather than imposing one’s own stance on the other side and viewing their failure to follow one’s viewpoint as an error. This is a problem that often arises when modern Neo-Confucianism absorbs Western religion and philosophy to construct Chinese philosophy. Thus, the research in this paper contributes to providing insights for promoting effective cross-cultural dialogues between China and the West.

7. Conclusions

Focusing on Tang’s critique of Anselm’s argument for the existence of God, this paper initially expounds upon Anselm’s argument, subsequently elucidating the rationale behind Tang’s disapproval. Subsequently, a comparative analysis is undertaken to highlight the similarities and differences between Tang’s critique and St. Thomas Aquinas’s cosmological argument. Following this, a deep dive into the Confucian philosophy of Tang’s stance is conducted, culminating in my perspective on his critique. In essence, my conclusions are as follows:

• Tang does not refute the existence of God; his critique is specifically targeted at Anselm’s argument, which he believes harbors a contradiction in deriving necessity from contingency.
• Tang advocates an alternative approach, starting from the existence of empirical things and deducing the existence of God through human reasoning, presenting a unique posterior argumentation that stands apart from the cosmological argument.
• Tang’s critique is deeply rooted in the Confucian philosophy.
• Tang’s critique, while not sufficient to dismantle Anselm’s argument, underscores the profound ideological collision between Chinese and Western perspectives on religion and philosophy.

Finally, the academic value of this paper resides in its exploration of the ideological collision between medieval European theology and modern Chinese philosophy, with Tang’s critique serving as the point of departure. This endeavor not only enhances our understanding of the theories surrounding the proof of God’s existence but also offers fresh perspectives on integrating Confucian philosophy and Christian doctrines.