Unraveling Prapañca: A Yogācāra Examination of Consciousness, Language, and Liberation in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra

Abstract

In Yogācāra epistemology, the term prapañca refers to various dimensions of the cognitive process in aspects ranging from consciousness, language formation, the conceptualization of subject–object duality, mental defilements, and ignorance. Given that the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra conveys the richness of early tenets for both the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka traditions, an investigation of the meaning and discourse context of prapañca is a necessity. This paper conducts a contextual examination of the word prapañca, primarily addressing (1) a range of meanings, (2) possible characteristics, (3) conditions and consequences, especially the associations with the conceptualization (vikalpa) process, and (4) the significance of the elimination of prapañca that the corresponding dialogue implies. This paper finds that prapañca is associated with dualistic conceptualization and the evolution of consciousness within saṃsāra. It shows some qualities of the beginningless conceptual structure of saṃsāric conditioned negativity and is related to language formation. As the discourse in Laṅka adduces it as the root of suffering, liberation from it is a prerequisite for reaching enlightenment and achieving the state of Buddhahood.

1. Introduction

In Chapter 18 of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) of Nāgārjuna which particularly addresses the concept of non-self, stanza 4 draws our attention to an antidote for suffering in saṃsāra, saying ‘Internally and externally, when [the thought] ‘I’ and ‘my’ have ceased, appropriation (upādāna) ceases. Through the cessation of appropriation, birth ceases’.1 Here, the ceasing of birth refers to liberation from saṃsāra. In other words, it concerns the path that leads to liberation from suffering by means of the cessation of the concept of self. Following this stanza, the word prapañca appears:

Karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ/

Te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate//MMK_18.5//2

Through the cessation of karma and afflictive mental states comes liberation. Karma and afflictive mental states come from conceptualizations (vikalpa), and they come from fabrication (prapañca). That, however, ceases in emptiness.3

The textual picture that Nāgārjuna draws is a causal chain from conceptual structuring (prapañca) and conceptualizations (vikalpa) to afflictive mental status (kleśa) and karma. According to him, karma and afflictive mental status come from conceptuality, and conceptuality comes from fabrication or prapañca. In this regard, one needs initially to get rid of the fundamental cause—prapañca—so as to be free thereafter from conceptuality; one can then eliminate karma and the afflictive mental status and thus achieve liberation. Considering this, prapañca seems to be the fundamental trait that should be uprooted from one’s mind, and it becomes salient when one foregrounds this account of salvation.

The treatment of prapañca in Madhyamaka underscores its significance in Buddhist soteriology. While both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra maintain the ultimate Buddhist objective of universal salvation, an analysis of its representations and characteristics in Yogācāra treatises can enhance our comprehension of the doctrinal transition and nuanced distinctions within this soteriological aim. Although Mādhyamikas emphasize the eradication of prapañca in the achievement of soteriology4, this raises questions regarding the origins of prapañca and the means by which its elimination can be attained. The Yogācārins epistemological approach, which highlights the role of consciousness and the intricacies of mental mechanisms, provides insights into the conditions that engender mental afflictions and, consequently, offers solutions for their eradication.

The term prapañca has an antecedent in Pali (papañca) and has been employed in various contexts by different philosophical schools. Ñāṇananda notes that in the Pali canon, the term conveys the meaning of “sense-perception” and indicates a proliferative tendency in ideation.5 The Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary briefly outlines its ambiguity in both the Pali canon and Mahāyāna treatises, offering translation references in Tibetan and Chinese. The Tibetan translation is regularly given as spros (pa), which means spreading out, enlargement, and activity. Suzuki’s Index to the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra refers to three Chinese translations, xilun 戲論, which means frivolous talk, falsehood, and the error of false statements.6

In Yogācāra epistemology, the notion of prapañca refers to various aspects of conceptual processes, ranging from language formation, subject–object conceptualization, and the ongoing production of mental defilement.7 Akira Saito mentioned that, in early Yogācāra treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu treated prapañca as a notion closely associated with the human application of terms and concepts, which are rooted in “mental, analytical, discursive, and proliferating activities”.8 Speaking in etymological terms, Lugli notes that prapañca “derives from the verbal root √pac and conveys the idea of proliferation, increment or expansion”.9 She cites the five interpretations that Schmithausen derives from the examination of “Yogācārabhūmi (not including the Tattvārthapaṭala), Yogācāra commentarial treatises and, partially, the Nikāyas”—(1) subjective conceptual proliferation, (2) conceptual diversification, (3) phenomenal diversity, (4) forms of conceptualization close to abhiniveśa or tṛṣṇā, (5) existence (bhāva), and (6) the basis of personal existence.

To further specify its connotation and to explore its role in the development of early Mahāyāna philosophy, it would be necessary to explore this key term in Yogācāra treatises and some early Mahāyāna texts, in which the discourse and context of prapañca could supply a range of possible interpretations from an epistemological perspective.

This paper focuses on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (hereafter, Laṅka) as the source discourse for our discussion of the meaning of prapañca. Laṅka reflects the richness of early tenets of both the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka traditions, and this is part of the reason for its frequent citation in later works. The multiplicity of explanations about the operation of consciousness provides accounts for the workings of the mind, and the term prapañca, in particular, occurs with some regularity. Suzuki’s translation of the word prapañca primarily references the Chinese versions of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. In light of this, the discussions on consciousness and mental functionality in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra offer valuable insights into the meaning of prapañca and its relationship with other concepts pertaining to mental mechanisms from a Yogācāra perspective. However, what we need to keep in mind is that the narrative of Laṅka does not provide a systematic, linear framework, and as a result, the regular occurrence of prapañca shows some variation in meaning and connotation, inevitably resulting in ambiguity and multiple interpretations. Nevertheless, a contextual study could still help to glean various meanings of this key, thus deepening our understanding of how it fits into the overall account of consciousness and liberation in Mahāyāna Buddhism. In this regard, the contextual analysis becomes a necessity despite the complexity.

To explore prapañca in Laṅka, this paper addresses the following: (1) the range of meaning of prapañca, (2) its characteristics, (3) the conditions for its arising and possible consequences, and (4) the significance of the elimination of prapañca for the realization of enlightenment.

This study finds that the meaning of prapañca is related to dualistic conceptualization. It shows some of the qualities of a beginningless conceptual structure, which is conditioned by saṃsāric negativity and is related to language formation. As the discourse in Laṅka identifies prapañca as the root of suffering, liberation from it is a prerequisite for reaching enlightenment and achieving the state of Buddhahood. One can claim that the variations of meanings and connotations of prapañca in Laṅka underlies typical Yogācāra ideas about the function of the afflicted mind. Likewise, it is related to the emphasis on the problematic nature of language, especially the notion that the naming and claiming process involves merely conceptualized phenomena without any real referents. As such, prapañca—or, more precisely, it is elimination—is central to the understanding as well as the experience of emptiness (śūnyatā). This comprehension encompasses not only the realization of the absence of independent inherent existence in an ontological sense but also the emptiness of subject–object dualism from the Yogācāra epistemological perspective.

2. Background

The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra is considered an essential work in the Mahāyāna tradition. However, the complexity of language usage, the multiplicity of layers and ideas, and the abundance of crucial concepts blended across schools make an academic analysis of the text considerably complex. Notably, the term prapañca appears in the Pali canon as well as many Yogācāra and Madhyamaka treaties, but despite its ubiquity and tight connection with the cognitive process, various interpretations by traditional commentators and academic scholars have given rise to divergent conclusions and definitions.

The date and author(s) of Laṅka are still unclear. Records for the earliest Chinese translation show that the time of its composition falls in the 5th century.10 The current primary texts comprise Sanskrit editions, two Tibetan translations, and three surviving Chinese translations. The edition provided by Bunyiu Nanjiō is currently considered a reliable Sanskrit edition, which is based on four Sanskrit manuscripts and some other primary materials.11 Nanjiō consulted the three versions of the Chinese translation to edit his copies as well.12 A later edition from Vaidya collated some of the previous work and arguably is overall an improvement. This study relies on the Sanskrit texts from both Nanjiō and Vaidya, facilitated by the digital resources of the Digital Sanskrit Buddhist Canon and GRETIL.13 Regarding modern English translations, this paper mainly makes references to Suzuki’s work. Moreover, I have consulted the contemporary scholarship on the text. In that context, Japanese scholars, in particular, have made great efforts to examine various aspects of Laṅka, covering the concept of tathāgatagarbha (Ogawa 1961), citta (Kamiya 1975), dharma, and bhāva (Kamiya 1977) as well as cittamātra (Kan 1980). Regarding English secondary scholarship, the most relevant studies for this paper include works from Lambert Schmithausen (1969), Florin Giripescu Sutton (1991), Bikkhu Ñāṇananda (1997), Aucke D. Forsten (2006), and Ligeia Lugli (2011).

Turning now to the secondary scholarship in English, Sutton examined the concept of existence and enlightenment in Laṅka. Although touching upon Yogācāra epistemology and sketching the significance of liberation from the dual categories of discrimination (vikalpa) and language, he did not elaborate on prapañca specifically. Forsten focused on the second chapter of Laṅka, in which he approached the concept of svacittadṛśyamātra based on a text-critical analysis and translated the phrase as ‘[the threefold world is] merely something visible consisting of one’s own mind’, further emphasizing that the term alludes to philosophical idealism. However, Lugli criticized Forsten’s approach to the term by questioning his contrast between philology and hermeneutics14 and his unclear philological analysis. Later, Lugli examined the role of language in Indian Mahāyāna, which particularly took Laṅka as the reference. According to her exploration, Laṅka shows the Mahāyāna idea of verbalization as being “inefficacious and potentially misleading”.15 She argues that, in Laṅka, “language cannot express what is undifferentiated”, and “verbalization affects the speaker’s conceptual representation of the world and informs the misperception of reality as diversity;” therefore, “enlightenment emerges in silence”.16 It is undeniable that Laṅka lays weight on language and the cognitive distortions that emerge from language; nevertheless, the particular focus on language and the emphasis on the linguistic approach involve the risk of overlooking other possible interpretations and a range of meanings for particular concepts.

With regards to the specific term prapañca, earlier scholarships include works of Jacques May (Candrakīrti and May 1959), Lambert Schmithausen (1969), and Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda (1997). In his edition of Prasannapadā, Jacques May points out that prapañca is more about “the operation of the function [of discursive thought] (“expansion”, differentiation of the global real into distinct objects and concepts…), and the result of this operation”17 instead of the function of mere expansion or proliferation. Lambert Schmithausen also underlines prapañca as an action, whereas he touches upon the interconnectedness of the action of “spreading” and maintains the objective sense of prapañca when it concerns the manifold appearance of the world. According to him, “prapañcaḥ simply means ‘manifoldness’…”. Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda draws attention to the use of papañca in the Pali canon and the commentarial literature thereof, and he reflects briefly on the term prapañca in Mahāyāna Buddhism. In accordance with his exploration, papañca (the Pali term for prapañca in Sanskrit) is essentially connected with the process of sense-perception, and “papañca-saññā-saṅkhā” could be interpreted as “concepts, reckonings, designations or linguistic conventions characterized by the prolific conceptualizing tendency of the mind”.18 With regards to Mahāyāna tradition, Ñāṇananda particularly cites the Mādhyamikakārikā and Laṅka to underline the significance of prapañca in the philosophical system of Mādhyamika dialect in terms of conceptual constructions and rationality;19 however, a context-based analysis of the meaning of prapañca is largely overlooked.

The scholarship on prapañca could be divided into two major trends. One launches into Madhyamaka treatises. Another tends to address the concept from the Yogācāra perspective. For example, based on an enumerative occurrence of the application of prapañca in Mūlamadhyamakakārika and its corresponding commentary, Akira Saito maintained that, for Nāgārjuna, prapañca means a “mental activity of conceptualization made in various sets of terms”.20 He pointed out that although both Nāgārjūna and Yogācāra thinkers consider prapañca as the fundamental cause of defilement, their understandings differ. However, he did not clarify the different understanding of prapañca in Yogācāra contexts nor its range of meanings. Furthermore, Mark Siderits claims that there is a paradox that prapañca entails in Madhyamaka discourse. According to him, the concept embodies the falsities of the conceptualization, which contrasts with the understanding of emptiness, as “Mādhyamikas claim there are indirect strategies one may use to rule out whole classes of candidates for dharmahood;” “but there can be no strategy that encompasses all uses of all concepts”, and thus there is “no master argument for emptiness” as “a consequence of the emptiness of emptiness”. However, the application of radical contextualist semantics shows a solution for the paradox that prapañca has shown. He contends that “to believe in ultimate truth-makers is to believe in context-transcendent truth-conditions”,21 and the presupposition entailed by the context-transcendent truth-conditions could be rejected by radical contextualist semantics. In terms of a successful reduction along with mistakes shown in hypostatizing concepts, prapañca is false yet useful as being reliably associated with our ultimate aims to see the false of presupposition. He underlines the use of prapañca to reveal the falsification of concepts for Mādhyamikas, and this discussion could be further developed by looking at the role of prapañca from Yogācāra’s view.

With regards to the Yogācāra perspective, Lugli supplies a terminological investigation of prapañca from an etymological and linguistic perspective. According to her, prapañca-vāsanā, despite being a newly introduced term in Laṅka, semantically coincides with the term abhilāpa-vāsanā in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the vyavahāra-vāsanā in the Saṃdhinirmocana. They all collectively highlight the effects of verbalization and language on future perceptions. She took prapañca as “differentiation” and further maintained that it accounted for “why verbalization is the origin of conceptual fabrication (parikalpita) and causes the perpetuation of illusion through vāsanā”.22 It is undeniable that Laṅka proposes prapañca as a beginningless factor that gives rise to “the cyclical arising of misperception through language”.23 In spite of closely correlating to conceptualization (vikalpa) while distinguishing from it, Lugli did not clarify in what sense prapañca is distinguished from vikalpa and parikalpita, and whether there are possible connections. Moreover, an emphasis on its association with language could prompt one to overlook other features of prapañca, such as its relevance to pre-linguistic cognition that can still be characterized as conceptual and the possible consequences of attachment to prapañca, especially in that latter context.

Building on and departing from the prior work sketched above, I propose to re-examine and re-evaluate the range of meanings of prapañca in Laṅka. Setting aside a strong emphasis on its association with language, this paper will focus more on its nature as a beginningless and negative causal structure that results in mental afflictions. The occurrence of these afflictions can be understood as a conceptualization (vikalpa) process that appropriates phenomenal events in reality.

3. The Interpretation of Prapañca in Laṅka

This paper will examine the meaning of prapañca in Laṅka in four ways: (1) contextual analysis of its meaning in the compounds in which it is embedded; (2) its connection with vikalpa and vāsanā; (3) its significance for comprehending mere representations of mind; and (4) the necessity of its eradication in relation to Mahāyāna soteriology.

3.1. A Contextual Analysis of the Meaning of Prapañca

The precise meaning of prapañca in Laṅka and in Mahāyāna texts more generally is difficult to determine. Regarding the range of meaning that prapañca exhibits in Laṅka, this taxonomy of meanings could be helpful, but there appears to be more to say about prapañca.

The contextual analysis will help situate the term prapañca within its linguistic environment in the discourse of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. This approach aims to specify the grammatical feature of the term concerning its morphological, semantic, and syntactical connections with other closely related terms. In the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, prapañca encompasses meanings such as beginningless conceptual structure, characterized by saṃsāric negativity and mental proliferation related to language formation. These meanings, detailed in the following sections, contrast with the use of this term in texts such as the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī section of the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh) and the Cintāmayībhūmi in the Basic Section of YBh, which explicitly emphasize the linguistic and verbal aspects over the mental aspects.24 Meanwhile, these meanings show some similarities to the usage in texts such as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (SNS), where prapañca serves as a mental proliferation that conceptualizes phenomenal events.25

In terms of the larger themes with which prapañca is connected in Laṅka, more than half of the lexical occurrences fall in Chapter 2, which concerns the operation and function of vijñāna (consciousness). Some other occurrences fall in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 6, whose themes mainly address self-nature, ignorance, self-realization, and enlightenment. Within the broad themes found in these various chapters, the discussion of prapañca relates more specifically to themes concerning the erroneous views held by brahmans and logicians, the function and operation of consciousness, the necessities of the realization of Buddhahood, word discrimination, dualistic notions of existence and perception, and the characteristics of self-nature. To understand more precisely how prapañca is involved in these themes, it is necessary to conduct a detailed exanimation of the several Sanskrit compounds in which it occurs because it is rarely used on its own outside of a compound.

3.2. Prapañca Compounds in Laṅka

According to the number of constituents in each compound, Table 1, the Morphological Structure of Compounds with prapañca (attached in Section 3.4), displays the variations of the morphological structure that involve prapañca. The compounds that appear more than once are marked by a number. Despite the complexity of compounds, there appears to be a rather regular sequence in the morphological structure—from anādikāla (beginningless time), prapañca, dauṣṭhulya (saṃsaric negativity) to vāsanā (imprint). Here, the word anādikāla, meaning beginningless (anādi) time (kāla), indicates the causal and innate nature of prapañca. It signifies that prapañca is intrinsic and arises in dependence on causes and conditions. According to Edgerton’s Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, the term dauṣṭhulya is associated with various forms of wickedness and depravity.26 When associated with prapañca and vāsanā, it conveys the meaning of saṃsāric negativity, highlighting the continuity of suffering in the cycles of life and rebirth. Vāsanā represents subtle tendencies that arise in consciousness as a result of repeated exposure to positive or negative phenomenal events. Vāsanā is also described as subtle forms of afflictions (kleśa) that obstruct the attainment of Buddhahood.27

Specifically, it is noticeable that prapañca is closely associated with vikalpa (conceptualization), dauṣṭhulya, and vāsanā, and Table 1 manifests at least four tendencies: (1) Anādikāla occurs before prapañca, (2) vāsanā tends to be placed at the end of the compound, (3) dauṣṭhulya tends to occur between prapañca and vāsanā and embodies a closer relation with prapañca, and (4) the position of vikalpa tends to be flexible; it appears either before or after prapañca, but in most cases, it is placed before vāsanā and after dauṣṭhulya.

The general trends in these compounds raise questions about the relation between prapañca, vikalpa, vāsanā, and dauṣṭhulya. Accordingly, the next section of the paper will explore these connections and provide possible interpretations. As some passages offer clues for the grammatical relation between prapañca and vikalpa, let us examine this pair first.

3.3. Relation with Vikalpa

Prapañca coexists with vikalpa in many contexts. The following examples convey two major points: (1) Prapañca is semantically distinguished from vikalpa; (2) vikalpa emerges from or is one of the consequences of prapañca. The first example comes from a passage in the second chapter about various forms of cessation (nirodha). Here, the “cessation of the continuum” (prabandhanirodha) is discussed:

prabandhanirodhaḥ punar Mahāmate yasmāt sa pravartate28/yasmād iti Mahāmate yadāśrayena yadālambanena ca/tatra yadāśrayam anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavāsanā yadālambanaṃ svacittadṛśyavijñānaviṣaye vikalpāḥ29

“Moreover, Mahāmati, the cessation of the continuum is [the cessation of that] from which it occurs. Mahāmati, “that from which” means through that which is its basis and that which is its support. Here, the basis (āśraya) is the imprints of the saṃsāric negativity associated with beginningless prapañca; the support is the conceptualizations about the object of consciousness, namely, something perceptible that is [actually] one’s own mind”.

Here, the basis for the continued occurrence of perceptual consciousness (pravṛttivijñāna) consists in the imprints for prapañca, while the support is the conceptualizations (vikalpa). While both contribute to the flow of the six forms of experiential consciousness, it is clear that prapañca and vikalpa connect to distinctive aspects of consciousness, namely, as their basis or foundation and as their “support”—i.e., their focal object.30

The next example comes again from the second chapter in a passage describing various forms of distorted cognition, including the “conceptualization that is an imputation of an unreal characteristic” (asallakṣaṇasamāropavikalpa):

punaraparaṃ mahāmate asallakṣaṇasamāropasya lakṣaṇaṃ katamat? yaduta skandhadhātvāyatanānāmasatsvasāmānyalakṣaṇābhiniveśaḥ idam evam, idaṃ nānyathety etad dhi mahāmate asallakṣaṇasamāropasya lakṣaṇam/eṣa hi mahāmate asallakṣaṇasamāropavikalpo ‘nādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavicitravāsanābhiniveśāt pravartate/31

“Mahāmati, there is another characteristic of the imputation of unreal characteristics. What is it? It is, namely, the fixation (abhiniveśa) on the unreal unique and shared characteristics of the aggregates, the constituents, and the spheres, as in [the thought], “This is just this, and not otherwise”. Mahāmati, this very conceptualization that imputes unreal characteristics [to those things] occurs through fixation from the variegated imprints for saṃsāric negativity through beginningless prapañca”.

The ablative ending of abhiniveṡa (fixation, attachment, grasping)32 indicates that the origin of vikalpa is dependent on imprints of prapañca.33 In this regard, vikalpa and prapañca are not only syntactically separated but also semantically distinct from each other. The wording here indicates that these terms convey different connotations and specify their causal relation—the imprints in relation to prapañca lead to vikalpa, as mediated by abhiniveśa.

The following passage also comes from the second chapter, introducing four types of Speech (vāk) and the corresponding conditions that give rise to each type of Speech. The example here particularly shows the type of Speech associated with prapañca and its condition.

caturvidhaṃ mahāmate vāgvikalpalakṣaṇaṃ bhavati/yad uta lakṣaṇavāk svapnavāg dauṣṭhulyavikalpābhiniveśavāg anādivikalpavāk//34

…

anādikālavikalpavāk punar mahāmate anādikālaprapañcābhiniveśadauṣṭhulyasvabījavāsanātaḥ pravartate/etad dhi mahāmate caturvidhaṃ vāgvikalpalakṣaṇam iti me yad uktam idaṃ tat pratyuktam//35

“Oh Mahāmati, the conceptualization of Speech (vāk) is of four types: definition-Speech, dream-Speech, Speech from fixation on the conceptualization of saṃsāric negativity, and Speech from beginningless conceptualization.

…

Moreover, Mahāmati, Speech from beginningless conceptualization is arisen from the imprints of its own seed, which is the saṃsāric negativity from the fixation of beginningless prapañca. Oh, Mahāmati, this is the fourfold word-conceptualization, and this is my answer to what was said”.

In this passage, Speech from conceptualization is categorized into four dimensions, and each dimension corresponds with one reason. The first two categories could be considered as Speech with apparently extra-mental reference, and Speech without extra-mental reference. Vikalpa occurs as a term in the third and fourth dimensions, which do not concern the reference of language; rather, it is about the formation of words, which is attributed to discrimination processes. On the one hand, words cannot exist without the application of concepts which is endowed with saṃsāric negativity. On the other hand, the formation of words concerns the beginningless conceptualization process.

The difference between the third and the fourth dimension lies in the causes of words that the prose notes: the cause of the third dimension is the anusamaraṇa (recollection), while the fourth is vāsanā (imprints). In other words, recollection indicates that attachment/grasping of concepts involves intentional efforts, whereas imprints show the conceptualization process does not necessarily require an effort. However, regardless of whether there are efforts or not, words of conceptualization arise due to the imprints in the consciousness seed, which is influenced and ripened by saṃsāric negativity. And that negativity, which fuels the rebirth, comes from the grasping of prapañca. In this regard, prapañca underpins the basis of the conceptualization process.

Table 1. Morphological structure of compounds with prapañca.

Compounds		Morphological Structure
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavicitravipākavikalpavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya	Vicitra	Vipāka	Vikalpa vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcābhiniveśadauṣṭhulyasvabījavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Abhiniveśa-dauṣṭhulya	Svabīja		Vāsanā
Anādikāladauṣṭhulyavikalpaprapañcavāsanā	Anādikāla	Dauṣṭhulya	Vikalpa	Prapañca				Vāsanā
Anādikālāprapañcadauṣṭhulyavikalpavāsana		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya		Vikalpa	Vāsanā	2
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyarūpavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya	Rūpa		Vāsanā
Anādikālavividhaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavāsanā		Anādikāla	Vividha	Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya			Vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavicitravāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya	Vicitra		Vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcavikalpavāsanādauṣṭhulya		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Vikalpa		Vāsanā	Dauṣṭhulya
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya			Vāsanā	3
Anādikālavividhaprapañcavikalpavā		Anādikāla	Vividha	Prapañca			Vikalpa
Anādikālaprapañcaviṣayavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca		Viṣaya		Vāsanā
Anādikālavākprapañcavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca		Vāda		Vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyasvaprativikalpa		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya		Svaprati	Vikalpa
Bāhyacittadṛśyavikalpānādikālaprapañca36	Bāhyacittadṛśya	Vikalpa	Anādikāla	Prapañca
Vikalpaanādikālaprapañcadarśane	Vikalpa	Anādikāla		Prapañca		Darśana
Anādikālaprapañcavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca				Vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulya		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya
Anādikālabhāvābhāvaprapañca		Anādikāla	Bhāvābhāva	Prapañca
Svacittadṛśyavikalpaprapañca	Svacittadṛśya	Vikalpa		Prapañca
Sarvadṛṣṭiprapañcavikalpa			Sarvadṛsti	Prapañca			Vikalpa
Jalpaprapañca			Jalpa	Prapañca
Vikalpaprapañca37			Vikalpa	Prapañcā					4
Sarvaprapañca			Sarva	Prapañca					2
Prapañcavāsanā				Prapañca				Vāsanā
Prapañcā				Prapañca

Table 1. Morphological structure of compounds with prapañca.

Compounds		Morphological Structure
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavicitravipākavikalpavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya	Vicitra	Vipāka	Vikalpa vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcābhiniveśadauṣṭhulyasvabījavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Abhiniveśa-dauṣṭhulya	Svabīja		Vāsanā
Anādikāladauṣṭhulyavikalpaprapañcavāsanā	Anādikāla	Dauṣṭhulya	Vikalpa	Prapañca				Vāsanā
Anādikālāprapañcadauṣṭhulyavikalpavāsana		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya		Vikalpa	Vāsanā	2
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyarūpavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya	Rūpa		Vāsanā
Anādikālavividhaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavāsanā		Anādikāla	Vividha	Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya			Vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavicitravāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya	Vicitra		Vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcavikalpavāsanādauṣṭhulya		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Vikalpa		Vāsanā	Dauṣṭhulya
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya			Vāsanā	3
Anādikālavividhaprapañcavikalpavā		Anādikāla	Vividha	Prapañca			Vikalpa
Anādikālaprapañcaviṣayavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca		Viṣaya		Vāsanā
Anādikālavākprapañcavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca		Vāda		Vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyasvaprativikalpa		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya		Svaprati	Vikalpa
Bāhyacittadṛśyavikalpānādikālaprapañca36	Bāhyacittadṛśya	Vikalpa	Anādikāla	Prapañca
Vikalpaanādikālaprapañcadarśane	Vikalpa	Anādikāla		Prapañca		Darśana
Anādikālaprapañcavāsanā		Anādikāla		Prapañca				Vāsanā
Anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulya		Anādikāla		Prapañca	Dauṣṭhulya
Anādikālabhāvābhāvaprapañca		Anādikāla	Bhāvābhāva	Prapañca
Svacittadṛśyavikalpaprapañca	Svacittadṛśya	Vikalpa		Prapañca
Sarvadṛṣṭiprapañcavikalpa			Sarvadṛsti	Prapañca			Vikalpa
Jalpaprapañca			Jalpa	Prapañca
Vikalpaprapañca37			Vikalpa	Prapañcā					4
Sarvaprapañca			Sarva	Prapañca					2
Prapañcavāsanā				Prapañca				Vāsanā
Prapañcā				Prapañca

3.4. Relation with Vāsanā

Another issue that the compound analysis raises is the relationship between vāsanā and prapañca. As we mentioned earlier, the imprints of prapañca are consequent to vikalpa (conceptualization). However, the direct relation between prapañca and vāsanā has not been clarified. According to the compounds collected in Table 1, prapañca closely associates with three words—anādikāla, dauṣṭhulya, and vāsanā, and the word sequence in compounds shows anādikāla coming first, then prapañca, dauṣṭhulya, and the last one is vāsanā.

To analyze a Sanskrit compound, the foremost step is to clarify the grammatical relationship between constituents by analyzing the morphological layers in a compound. This step will determine the semantic association between constituents and contribute to a clearer and more accurate understanding of both the term prapañca and the meaning of the compound.

According to John Dunne’s analysis of the two basic forms of imprints (vāsanā) as (1) “those that are ‘placed’ (āhita) in the storehouse by experiences”, and (2) “those that are innate or ‘beginningless’ (anādi)”, it is reasonable to take the second form of imprints which is in relation to “beginningless” into account. In the first layer of a prapañca compound, we can thus consider an attributive relation between anādikāla and vāsanā.38 With this in mind, a Karmadhāraya compound39 indicates a meaning as “beginningless imprints/perfuming”.

Then, the second layer of the compound is constructed by prapañca, dauṣṭhulya (samṣāric negativity), and vāsanā (perfuming/imprints). There could be two ways of division of this compound: (1) prapañca [dauṣṭhulya vāsanā], and (2) [prapañca dauṣṭhulya] vāsanā. The linguistics feature and traces from commentary tell that the second reading should be adopted in this context. There are three reasons that we can consider. First, in terms of the linguistic feature of prapañca and dauṣṭhulya, prapañca is a substantive noun while vāsanā, distinctively, is a verbal noun; thus, the first two constituents tend to be bound (see layer 3 in the diagram). For another thing, the phrase spros pa’i gnas ngan len shown in Jñānaśrībhadra’s commentary on Laṅka survived in Tibetan indicates that spros pa (prapañca) and gnas ngan len (dauṣṭhulya) become associated through a genitive relationship, which means “the samṣāric negativity of prapañca”40 Moreover, with regard to saṃsāric negativity (dausthulya), which mostly appears between prapañca and vāsanā in the compound, it most likely assumes a Yogācāra account, whereby “the cycle perpetuates itself through karmic traces”.41 In this regard, the relation of constituents in the third layer would be read as appositional or attributive, meaning “the saṃsāric negative prapañca,” or “the prapañca which is the saṃsāric negativity”.42

anādikāla	[ prapañca dauṣṭhulya vāsanā ]	layer 1
	[ prapañca dauṣṭhulya ] vāsanā	layer 2
	prapañca dauṣṭhulya	layer 3

After clarifying the grammatical structures of layer 1 and layer 2, a problem arises concerning the relationship between prapañca (which is saṃsāric negativity) and vāsanā. It is important to outline all possible grammatical relationships between these two constituents to identify and determine the most reasonable interpretation within the context of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.

According to Apte, the word vāsanā is a verbal noun meaning perfuming or imprinting, which derives from the verbal root √vās.43 According to Sanskrit grammar, there could be the following possible interpretations:

• Instrumental Tatpuruṣa

Prapañcena vāsanā, meaning perfuming by means of prapañca.

2.

Ablative Tatpuruṣa

Prapañcāt vāsanā, meaning the vāsanā from prapañca.

3.

Accusative Tatpuruṣa

Prapañcaṃ vāsanā, meaning prapañca is what is being perfumed (“perfuming perfurmed on vāsanā as its object”).

4.

Dative Tatpuruṣa

Prapañcāya vāsanā, meaning perfuming for the purpose of producing prapañca.

5.

Locative Tatpuruṣa

Prapañce vāsanā, meaning the vāsanā located in prapañca.

6.

Genitive Tatpuruṣa

Prapañcasya vāsanā, meaning the vāsanā of prapañca, which could indicate that the vāsanā is the cause or source of prapañca (as in, “the imprints for [the arisal of] prapañca”), or that the vāsanā is coming from prapañca (as in the imprints that have been placed by prapañca).

7.

Karmadhāraya, meaning the vāsanā that is prapañca.

8.

Dvandva, prapañca and vāsanā

To identify the relationship between vāsanā and the constituents preceded, we need to have a look at other applications of vāsanā in Laṅka. For example, here is a statement in which the position of prapañca is substituted by nagara (city).

sā ca nagarākṛtir anādikālanagarabījavāsanābhiniveśāt khyāti

tacca nagaraṃ nānagaraṃ na nagaram44

“And the image of the city appears due to fixation on the seed-vāsanā for [cognizing] the city from beginningless time. And that city is not a non-city, nor is it a city”.

According to this message, the nagara-bīja vāsanā is a karmic trace or imprint that prompts the appearance in cognition of an image identified as a city, but that imprint itself is presumably the result of previous experience of what is identified as a city. Thus, the relationship between the imprints and the city is reciprocal. In other words, the formation of imprints entails a cyclical process as a representing and re-enhancing mode, in which nagara-vāsanā indicates cognition by identifying a mental image as a city. In this regard, the imprints that come from previous cognition of a city can result in the present recognition of the city.

In addition, the formation of the notion of city is further represented and re-enhanced in a cyclic manner. The city presented in mind is not a real city nor an unreal city; instead, it is a mental event caused by a cyclically conceptualized operation. The cognition of the city resulted from a notion of the city. And, the notion of a city is re-produced and re-enhanced in the recognition of a city, in which the process leaves imprints of conceptual tendency behind. Therefore, it is possible to say the structure of a vāsanā with a genitive case preceded by a non-case noun conveys a relationship evincing mutual influences and productions between vāsanā and the noun.

evameva mahāmate anādikālatīrthyapraprañcavādavāsanābhiniviṣṭāḥ ekatvānyatvāstitvanāstitvavādān abhiniviśante svacittadṛśyamātrānavadhāritamatayaḥ/45

“In this very way, Oh Mahāmati, those who are fixated on the beginningless imprints for the prapañca discourse of the Tīrthikas are fixated on discourses about identity/difference and existence/non-existence, [and as such] they have opinions that have not determined that [the objects of experience are actually] one’s own mind [presented as] perceptual objects”.

In accordance with the example of nagara, the compound anādikāla-tīrthya-praprañcavāda-vāsanā-abhiniviṣṭa in the example above maintains the same morphological structure as anādikāla-nagarabīja-vāsanā-abhiniveśā. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the relationship between praprañca-vāda and vāsanā as a genitive Tatpuruṣa, meaning the words-imprints are the genitive object of prapañca; specifically, the imprints and prapañca are related in a mutually re-enforced mode. Imprints are left by mental activities that prapañca involved in (imprints result from prapañca), whilst prapañca leads to imprints, being interconnected as the cause and effect in a cyclic continuum of saṃsāra. In this regard, amongst the eight possible interpretations above, the sixth (genitive Tatpuruṣa) that is most relevant means that prapañca could cause vāsanā to occur, and at the same time, the vāsanā is the latent propensity that causes prapañca to arise.

3.5. About Representation of the Mind

Some negative aspects of prapañca include obstacles to the true awareness of visible objects as representations of the mind. Laṅka see true awareness as having to do with the use of language.

jalpaprapañcābhiratā hi bālās tattve na kurvanti matiṃ viśālām/

jalpo hi traidhātukaduḥkhayonis tattvaṃ hi duḥkhasya vināśahetuḥ//3.93//46

“Indeed, childish people who are of verbiage and prapañca do not think extensively about the ultimate. Indeed, verbiage is the origin of suffering in the three worlds, and the ultimate is the cause for being free from suffering”.

This text makes it clear that one of prapañca’s detrimental consequences is its propensity to acquire discourses, words, and names. And because of the verbiage propensity that childish people have, they fail to comprehend the ultimate. The following dialogue between Mahāmati and Buddha explains the erroneous nominalization by emphasizing that the awareness and the realization of representations of reality as mind should never be confused with a verbiage name of mind-only. The basic idea is that when one first adopts words and names, the mind has already conceptualized objects as external existence and has designated a name upon them. In this regard, one is only concerned with forms or labels of references, thus further making judgments of the reference in terms of whether the reference is existent or non-existent. Despite one’s assertion that the mind is all that exists, it is still the name of the ultimate awareness instead of the awareness itself. True awareness should be a realization that awareness does not perceive an object that is taken as its focus because there are only representations of the mind, and there is even nonperception of the awareness, either.

Mahāmati specifically questioned the Buddha as to how it was possible that nothing could sustain awareness because he believed awareness exists wherever there is a knowing object. If one ignores individuality, generality, plurality, and self-nature, then the awareness that has nothing to focus on cannot possibly be awareness; rather, it is simply non-awareness. In other words, Mahāmati thinks that awareness should refer to a knowing object that evinces individuality, generality, multiplicity, and self-nature. Otherwise, knowledge is another word for non-awareness.

punar api mahāmatir āha/yat punar idam uktaṃ bhagavatā—yadā tv ālambyam arthaṃ nopalabhate jñānaṃ tadā vijñaptimātravyavasthānaṃ bhavati/vijñapter grāhyābhāvād grāhakasyāpy agrahaṇaṃ bhavati/tadagrahaṇān na pravartate jñānaṃ vikalpasaṃśabditam/tat kiṃ punar bhagavan bhāvānāṃ svasāmānyalakṣaṇānanyavaicitryānavabodhān nopalabhate jñānam?atha svasāmānyalakṣaṇavaicitryabhāvasvabhāvābhibhavān nopalabhate jñānam/atha kuḍyakaṭavapraprākārabhūjalapavanāgnivyavahitātidūrasāmīpyān nopalabhate jñānaṃ jñeyam/atha bālāndhavṛddhayogādindriyāṇāṃ jñeyārthaṃ nopalabhate jñānam/tad yadi bhagavan svasāmānyalakṣaṇānanyavaicitryānavabodhān nopalabhate jñānam, na tarhi bhagavan jñānaṃ vaktavyam, ajñānam/etad bhagavan yad vidyamānam arthaṃ nopalabhate/atha svasāmānyalakṣaṇavaicitryabhāvasvabhāvābhibhavān nopalabhate jñānam, tad ajñānam eva bhagavan na jñānam/jñeye47 sati bhagavan jñānaṃ pravartate, nābhāvāt/tadyogāc ca jñeyasya jñānam ity ucyate/48

“And again, Mahāmati said: But there is this that the Blessed one said, namely, that when awareness is not perceiving an object which is taken as its focus, then there is the establishment of mere representation (vijñaptimātra). Because the representation has no object to be grasped, there is the no apprehension of a grasper also. Since there is no apprehension of that, an awareness called ‘conceptual’ does not occur. Also, the Blessed one, does awareness not perceive [objects] because there is no cognition of the non-different variegation of particular and general characteristics, or does awareness not perceive [objects] without realizing of the nature and variations of their particular and general characteristics? Or is it that awareness does not perceive an object to be known because of the proximity or distance of what is obscured by walls, mats, ramparts, fences, the earth, the water, the wind, or fire? Or is it due to having the senses of one who is infantile, blind, old, and so on that awareness does not perceive an object to be known? If, Blessed One, awareness does not perceive [objects] because there is no cognition of the non-different variegation of particular and general characteristics, then, Blessed One, it should not be called awareness, [it should be called] non-awareness. This is not perceiving a presently existing object, Blessed One. Because of not realizing the nature and variations of [objects’] particular and general characteristics, awareness does not perceive [objects], then it is just non-awareness; it is not awareness, Blessed One. When there is an object to be known, awareness occurs, Blessed one; it does not occur due to something non-existent. And because of its connection with the object to be known, it is called ‘awareness’.”

The Buddha answers in the following way.

Bhagavān āha/na hi tan mahāmate evam ajñānaṃ bhavati/jñānam eva tan mahāmate, nājñānam/na caitat saṃdhāyoktaṃ mayā—yadā tvālambyam arthaṃ nopalabhate jñānaṃ tadā vijñaptimātravyavasthānaṃ bhavatīti/kiṃ tu svacittadṛśyamātrāvabodhāt sadasator bāhyabhāvābhāvāj jñānam apy arthaṃ nopalabhate/tadanupalambhāj jñānajñeyayor apravṛttiḥ/vimokṣatrayānugamāj jñānasyāpy anupalabdhiḥ/na ca tārkikā anādikālabhāvābhāvaprapañcavāsitamataya evaṃ prajānanti te cāprajānanto bāhyadravyasaṃsthānalakṣaṇabhāvābhāvaṃ kṛtvā vikalpasyāpravṛttiṃ cittamātratāṃ nirdekṣyanti/ātmātmīyalakṣaṇagrāhābhiniveśābhiniviṣṭāḥ svacittadṛśyamātrānavabodhāj jñānaṃ jñeyaṃ prativikalpayanti/te ca jñānajñeyaprativi- kalpanayā bāhyabhāvābhāvapravicayānupalabdher ucchedadṛṣṭim āśriyante/49

“Said the Blessed One: Oh Mahāmati, it is not non-awareness in this way; it is just awareness, and not non-awareness, Mahāmati. It is not intending this, that I said the following: when awareness does not perceive an object which is taken as its focus, then there is the establishment of mere representation. Rather, awareness indeed is not perceiving objects because, through recognizing that [apparent objects] are merely one’s own mind presented as perceptible, there are no external objects, whether real or unreal. And through the nonperception of those [external objects], there is no occurrence of awareness and what is to be known. And through realizing the three forms of liberation, there is also the nonperception even of awareness. Also, the Sophists (tarkikā), with their minds perfumed with prapañca about existence and non-existence from beginningless time, do not know wisely in this way. And not wisely knowing this, having construed [mere-representation] as the absence of external substance, shape, characteristics, and existence, would teach that mind-only is just the non-occurrence of conceptuality. Attached by the attachment and grasping to the characteristics of ‘I’ and ‘Mine’, they conceptualize awareness and objects of awareness due to not recognizing that [what is appearing] is merely one’s mind presented as perceptible. And due to conceptualizing awareness and objects of awareness, they resort to a nihilistic view because they do not perceive the distinction between the existence and non-existence of external things”.

The verses 3.58, 3.59, and 3.60 following this dialogue briefly summarize the response to Mahāmati’s inquiry, which highlights the aforementioned wrong views because of non-awareness. I did not list verses here because the content of these verses has been explicitly exhibited by the passage above.

Then, the Buddha’s answer continues on as below:

Punar aparaṃ mahāmate bālapṛthagjanā anādikālaprapañcadauṣṭhulyasvaprativikalpanānāṭake nṛtyantaḥ svasiddhāntanayadeśanāyām akuśalāḥ svacittadṛśyabāhyabhāvalakṣaṇābhiniviṣṭā upāyadeśanāpāṭham abhiniviśante, na svasiddhāntanayaṃ cātuṣkoṭikanayaviśuddhaṃ prativibhāvayanti/50

“Furthermore, Mahāmati, those childish ordinary people, who are dancing the dance of their own conceptualizations due to the saṃsāric negativity of beginningless prapañca, are unskilled in the teaching of their own philosophical system and attached to the characteristics of the external things that are [actually] their own minds presented as perceptible. As such they are attached to the teaching of means, and they do not cultivate a form of their own philosophical system that has been purified by the use of the four options”.

The Buddha’s response conveys a crucial message that the awareness that is not perceiving an object, which is taken as its focus, is the actual awareness because the realization—awareness is not perceiving—entails a cognition: visible objects are merely a representation of the mind, and nothing exists externally. It is because there is not the kind of external object that could be perceived, nor is there the awareness whose perceiving should rely on objects. Moreover, because there is no external object to be perceived as awareness, there is neither the awareness of objects nor the perception of awareness.

Buddha uses the Sophists51 as an example to show how true awareness should be understood. On the one hand, Sophists construe the representation of the mind as an absence of external objects and, therefore, claim that the mind-only is just the non-occurrence of conceptuality. This comprehension of the representation of the mind falls into the problematics of external–internal duality and nihilism. The Sophists’ dualistic conceptualization concerns their distinction between the mind as internal and objects to be known as external. The negation of external objects presupposes the existence of an internal mind, creating a dualistic conceptualization of reality. However, the true approach to mind-only should be nondual.

Second, the Sophists conceptualize both awareness and the object of awareness due to the lack of understanding of objects as merely mental representations presented as perceptible in the mind. This is because the Sophists fail to understand the structural relationship between external objects and the internal mind as the essential problem of dualistic mental afflictions. Their attachment to the negation of objects of awareness indicates their attachment to awareness itself. However, according to the Buddha’s answer to Mahāmati’s question, both awareness and the object of awareness belong to the category of representations of mind. There are neither real nor unreal external objects to be perceived; therefore, there is neither the perception of external objects nor the perception of the occurrence of awareness. Through such a realization of the nonperception, there is even a nonperception of awareness. A realization of the structural relationship between awareness and the object of awareness contributes to the understanding of the nonperception of awareness, which is a nondual awareness. This is because, in negating the existence of the object of awareness, the existence of awareness itself, as the dualistic pair of the object, is simultaneously negated.52

The Buddha further implies the causes of the Sophist’s misunderstanding, which is the attachment to the self and its belongings and the perfuming effect from prapañca. As a result, they mistakenly take external objects with various characteristics as mere representations of the mind and attach them to only the means of teaching.

Two key messages are notable, to put it briefly. First, it is important to distinguish between the Sophist’s understanding of mind-only and the real meaning of mind-only. Sophists use the term “only seeing one’s own mind”53 (svacittadṛṣyamātra) to distinguish between the categories of “mind” and “external objects”, as well as between existence and non-existence, rather than pursuing real awareness of mental representations. They fail to understand that the representation of the mind does not concern the absence of external objects; rather, it is about the nonperception of both awareness and objects of awareness. Second, the Sophists’ claim of mind-only, which is a conceptualization process that results in nihilism and the discrimination of mind and external objects, should never be an appropriate approach to the real awareness of the representation of mind; instead, Sophists’ teaching merely keeps one distant from the real and truthful mind-only, and their teaching of the mind-only is not only incorrect but even worse than teaching nothing.

3.6. Relation with Consciousnesses

Another important factor is how the imprints of prapañca affect consciousness (vijñāna). In particular, the message that follows shows how the consequences of imprints of prapañca influence consciousness.

tatra khyātivijñānaṃ mahāmate acintyavāsanāpariṇāmahetukam/vastuprativikalpavijñānaṃ ca mahāmate viṣayavikalpahetukam anādikālaprapañcavāsanāhetukaṃ ca//54

“In this regard, Mahāmati, consciousness of appearances has as its cause the evolution of inconceivable imprints, and the consciousness that constructs real things has as its cause the conceptualization of objects, and it also has as its cause the beginningless prapañca-imprint”.

In the Buddha’s response about the divisions and nature of consciousness,55 khyāti consciousness56 and the vastuprativikalpa consciousness57 mutually function as cause to each other, but the two kinds of consciousness arise based on other different conditions. khyāti-vijñāna refers to the first five activated consciousness, whilst the vastuprati consciousness is designated to the sixth and seventh consciousness.58 For one thing, the prose specifies the distinctions between the khyāti-vijñāna and vastuprativikalpa-vijñāna.59 For another thing, it points out different conditions that give rise to the operation of the two types of consciousnesses. One of the factors that activate the object-discriminating consciousness (vastuprativikalpa-vijñāna) in this context is the imprint of prapañca. As prapañca happens preceded vikalpa (the conceptualization of objects), prapañca could be understood as the circumstance or mental framework that produces the distinction between subject and object.

anādikālavividhaprapañcadauṣṭhulyavāsanāvāsitaḥ ālayavijñānasaṃśabdito ‘vidyāvāsanabhūmijaiḥ saptabhir vijñānaiḥ saha mahodadhitaraṃgavan nityam avyucchinnaśarīraḥ pravartate anityatādoṣarahita ātmavādavinivṛtto ‘tyantaprakṛtipariśuddhaḥ/60

“Influenced by the imprints of saṃsāric negativities of the variegated beginningless prapañca, the so-called Ālaya consciousness—which is the uninterrupted constituent element as itself, along with the other seven consciousness—which produced the imprints of ignorance, like waves arisen on the great ocean. [The constituent element itself] is free from the fault of impermanence and is devoid of the word of self, whose absolute nature is supreme purity”.

In this prose, the relation between prapañca and Ālaya-vijñāna is explicitly uttered, which is implied by the word “avāsita” (influenced by). Ālaya-vijñāna has an absolutely pure nature that is free of self-grasping. Although if Ālaya-vijñāna is interrupted and immutable, the effect of prapañca causes the seven vijñāns, which exhibit the propensity for ignorance, to emerge. It is important to emphasize that while prapañca can activate the seven consciousnesses, which leads to ignorance, prapañca is powerless to change the pure nature of Ālaya-vijñāna.61 Because the writing does not demonstrate a direct connection between prapañca and ignorance, it would be risky to assert that the imprints about prapañca result in ignorance or that the imprints about prapañca are ignorant. The most likely interpretation here is the following: The imprints about prapañca effect on eight consciousnesses, but the pure nature of the Ālaya-vijñāna (the eighth consciousness) cannot be altered; in addition, the arising of the other seven consciousnesses, under the impacts of prapañca, becomes the base of unknowing and leads to ignorance. Moreover, regarding the originally pure nature of Ālaya-vijñāna, as the prose has shown, one of the necessities to avoid the production of defilements and to maintain the pure nature of consciousness is to be free from the influence of the imprints of prapañca. This utterance evinces an insight for the realization of liberation which is about an antidote for ignorance.

3.7. The Elimination of Prapañca

As mentioned earlier, prapañca consists of negativity (as being modified by dauṣṭhulya) and is continuously entangled with the cyclic rebirth. This sort of feature is closely associated with ignorance and suffering. In terms of the Buddhist purpose for liberation, the elimination of suffering, uprooting ignorance and the cause of ignorance are supposed to be the fundamental antidote. The conversations in Laṅka propose some hints for the eradication of prapañca, which concerns the ideal mental status and the antidote Buddhists are supposed to look for.

ye punaranye mahāmate śramaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā niḥsvabhāvaghanālātacakragandharvanagarānutpādamāyāmarīcyudakacandrasvapnasvabhāvabāhyacittadṛśyavikalpānādikālaprapañcadarśanena svacittavikalpapratyayavinivṛttirahitāḥ parikalpitābhidhānalakṣyalakṣaṇābhidheyarahitā dehabhogapratiṣṭhāsamālayavijñānaviṣayagrāhyagrāhakavisaṃyuktaṃ nirābhāsagocaram utpādasthitibhaṅgavarjyaṃ svacittotpādānugataṃ vibhāvayiṣyanti, nacirātte mahāmate bodhisattvā mahāsattvāḥ saṃsāranirvāṇasamatāprāptā bhaviṣyanti/62

“Furthermore, Mahāmati, those monks and brahmans, by perceiving the beginningless prapañca which leads to the conceptualization of visible objects perceptible outside the mind, with [an understanding of] the nature of oneself like a dream, a moon in water, an illusory mirage, the unreal city Gandharva, a wheel of firebrand, and the cloud which have no essence, understand that such occurrences is merely one’s own mind. Without the occurrence of the conceptualization in one’s own mind, in avoidance of names, the defined and definitions, discourse and conceptualization, without the subject-object dualistic appearance in Ālaya consciousness which is the store of form and body, without arising, sustaining and cessation in a sphere of no fallacious appearance (without any appearance), Oh Mahāmati, they will shortly become the great beings—Bodhisattvas, accomplishing the synthesizing of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa”.

This discourse highlights the significant role that the elimination of prapañca plays on the path to enlightenment. For one thing, the perception of prapañca as a recognition of the negativity of prapañca could lead to the avoidance of words, names, and definitions, which concerns the illusory appearance in the mind as incorrect recognition of something outside the mind. The second benefit of the elimination relates to the prevention of dualistic conceptualization, especially the subject–object duality. The subject–object duality comes along with the Ālaya consciousness (not the nature of Ālaya, but after being activated, there are other consciousness evolving from it). Having been free from the dualistic consciousness, there appears a sphere without fallacious appearance regarding arising, sustaining, and cessation. Indeed, we still need further exploration to determine whether there could be an underlying causal chain between the grammatical chunks. Nevertheless, it is possible to contend that the eradication of prapañca is one of the necessities to achieve an enlightened state. Also, based on the mental defilements listed, in aspects ranging from language definition, the thinking of objects as things outside of the mind, the subject–object dualistic conceptualization, and the arising, sustaining, and cessation of appearance, it is possible that the eradication of prapañca contributes to the elimination of defilements and the accomplishment of the ultimate enlightenment.

4. Summary

This paper focuses on a few key issues regarding the concept of prapañca, including its defining characteristics, its relationship to vikalpa, its association with linguistic applications, and its connection with the mechanism. It is worth noting that the current study of prapañca in Laṅka clarifies its role as an innate mental affliction rooted in dualistic conceptualization, whose elimination is a necessary condition for the experience of nondual awareness and the realization of emptiness that transcends linguistic and conceptual constructions.

In specific, this study includes the following essential aspects: (1) Prapañca differs from vikalpa, which relates to the subject–object conceptualization process and is likely a fundamental mechanism for mental operation; (2) it exerts significant influences on seed consciousness, which can activate other consciousness but cannot alter the pure nature of the seed; (3) prapañca is innate, which exhibits the essence of beginningless-ness and is structurally conditioned by negativities; (4) given that language is a key conceptualization tool, it may have something to do with language formation, language use, and the impact of language on consciousness.

The characteristics of prapañca concern beginningless and saṃsāric negativities. Non-saṃsāric beings, including the enlightened Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, are devoid of birth and rebirth; therefore, the imprints of prapañca and prapañca itself could not affect them. The feature implies that only when one is free from prapañca could one obtain enlightenment—a state devoid of ignorance and sufferings of saṃsāra. In addition, an analysis of prapañca’s relation with conceptualization (vikalpa), subject–object duality, and mind-only (citta-matra) helps in approaching an ontological inquiry—“what is prapañca?” On the one hand, prapañca not only distinguishes from conceptualization but also appears to be the cause that leads to conceptualization. It is a mechanism that shapes and reshapes the categorization and conceptualization process. However, it is noticeable that features and functions of prapañca that have been articulated in Laṅka are endowed with fluidity and flexibility because of the mediation of “vāsanā” (imprint/tendency). With this in mind, it is risky to pin down a single determinative definition of prapañca without further clarification of the relationship between prapañca and vāsanā. Thus far, amongst the potential grammatical implications, it is reasonable to maintain that prapañca and vāsanā evince a mutually reinforcing relation, simultaneously operating as the cause and result for each other, and this relationship connects prapañca with the foundational operation of mind and consciousness. This reading unfolds the significance of the role that prapañca plays in framing the structure of the conceptualization mechanism.

Another important aspect of understanding prapañca is its association with the representation of the mind. According to Laṅka, Sophists attach to words, names and the concept of self and self-belongs, thus giving rise to the wrong view of mind-only. The Buddha’s answer indicates that, because of the perfuming of prapañca, Sophists not only conceptualize both the awareness and the object of awareness but also simply consider the representation of the mind just as an absence of external objects. Their means of teaching via linguistics application become a hindrance to true awareness, as the language used in Sophists’ teaching of the mind-only refers to nothing but concepts without real reference. Also, according to the Buddha, real awareness of the representation of the mind is a nonperception of awareness due to the absence of both awareness and the object of awareness. This emphasis on the nonperception of awareness induces a tendency to transcend “mind-only”, potentially bringing the voice of Madhyamaka with a focus on the empty nature of concepts and conceptualization and giving rise to the understanding of the lack of inherent existence for both awareness and the object or awareness.

Given the complexity of the language application of Laṅka, which shows an extent of the fluidity of the meaning of prapañca in the textual conversations, it might be necessary to further address the meaning of prapañca by referring to other influential Buddhist treaties around the 4th century. So far, it is undeniable that the meaning of prapañca still shows variations. Regardless of the wide range of thesis that prapañca might associate with, it is crucial to be aware that its coexistence with other important notions in the Yogācāra system reveals the value of further clarification and illustrations.