A Qualitative Study of Digital Religious Influence: Perspectives from Christian, Hindu, and Muslim Gen Y and Gen Z in Mumbai, India

Abstract

This study addresses how religious affective content in digital media influences epistemic authority, social imaginaries, and religious beliefs. It draws on data from 64 in-depth interviews with Generation Y and Generation Z individuals with a higher-education background who identified as Christian, Muslim, or Hindu, conducted in Mumbai, India. While influencers are increasingly playing a significant role in the daily lives of the respondents, the impact of family on religious behavior appears to be more substantial than the epistemic sources on social media. In this context, accrued social capital can help individuals develop resilience or resistance to online disinformation, hate speech, and radicalization. Furthermore, while individuals exhibited animosity toward politicians and journalists, they also expressed nationalist attitudes, e.g., a shared Indian identity and common cultural capital, which may serve as ‘superglue’ for living peacefully in the current climate shaped by religious fundamentalist movements. In general, this field study contributes to the ongoing scholarly growth of the interdisciplinary focus of digital religion studies, and particularly on the impact of the social media domain on fundamentalist beliefs.

1. Introduction

On 22 January 2024, the world witnessed an extraordinary celebration, namely the inauguration of the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya, India, as the long-held aspiration of the Hindu-nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party1 (BJP) was finally fulfilled. In 1992, a group of approximately 75,000 fanatical Hindus descended upon a mosque in Ayodhya (State of Uttar Pradesh), known as the Babri Masjid, and dismantled it, thus reclaiming the territory conquered by the Muslim Mogul rule in the 16th century (Cesari 2021). Following this incident, interreligious rioting between Hindus and Muslims spread across Indian cities, including Mumbai (Bayly 1993; Clarke 2017; Ram-Prasad 2008).

Furthermore, the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat exhibit the highest per capita death rate and incidence of religious riots in India, as well as the highest overall number of deaths in religious riot-related incidents (Sen and Wagner 2009, p. 306). On 26 November 2008, the capital city of Mumbai in Maharashtra witnessed 10 simultaneous terrorist attacks perpetrated by 10 individuals in their 20s and 30s, belonging to a Muslim extremist faction from Pakistan. It is not unprecedented for young adults to be implicated in terrorist attacks, thus highlighting their susceptibility to recruitment by terrorist organizations (Horgan 2024, pp. 29–33; Missier 2022, pp. 255–56).

Today, the enduring consequences of these incidents persist, exerting an ongoing impact on the security landscape and interreligious relations in Mumbai. The city is characterized by a diverse population, shaped by over a century of immigration and upheld by a historically liberal stance toward religions and cultures. However, this perception is misleading. Mumbai has always been predominantly Hindu “more than anything else” (Klostermaier 1972, p. 83). Hence, in 1993, riots instigated by the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena party compelled 200,000 Muslims to flee the city (Pacione 2006, p. 237). Individuals from the generation that grew up after the riots perceive the city and community differently than the survivors and witnesses of the riots. Generation Y (now 28–43 years old) and Generation Z (now 12–27 years old) individuals have a heightened sense of optimism and a longing to achieve and partake in the prosperity of a flourishing and vibrant metropole (Patel-Banerjee 2017, p. 234). Meanwhile, the bourgeoning digital media revolution has reshaped the multifaceted religious dynamics and life in Mumbai. The widespread dissemination of digital media, coupled with increased religiosity, has resulted in a complex interplay where both media and religion intersect to articulate religious politics and facilitate the mediation of religious identities and practices (Jayachandran 2020, pp. 207–9).

Before engaging with the research questions, it is important to first establish the relevance of this field study. Recent publications such as the volume “Digital Media, Young Adults and Religion”, edited by Moberg et al. (2020), provide a comprehensive understanding of contemporary processes of social and religious change, as well as the increasing impact of digital media, illustrated through case studies from countries such as China, Poland, Peru, and Ghana. However, these inquiries do not address the role of epistemic authority and fundamentalist beliefs within digital media, and fail to consider the issue of polarization and religious conflict in a digitally advanced nation such as India. Also, the “Religions, Mumbai style” (Stausberg 2023) volume gives a profound overview of the “urban realities” of religious communities in the city; however, it does not sufficiently contextualize the growing importance of fundamentalist beliefs among Christians, Hindus, and Muslims within the (digital) religious landscape of Mumbai. Hence, this inquiry aims to contribute to the growing body of literature by conceptualizing the social and religious existence of Gen Y and Gen Z in Mumbai, both in the digital and offline worlds, through the exploration of social imaginaries, epistemic authority, and religious fundamentalism. In doing so, it seeks to enrich the ongoing discourse on the influence of social media on fundamentalist beliefs.

Considering the aforementioned complex religious challenges and growing impact of digital media, the objective of this study is to examine how religious affective content in digital media influences the epistemic authority2, social imaginaries3, and religious beliefs of Gen Y and Gen Z individuals4 belonging to the Christian, Muslim, and Hindu faiths in Mumbai. Religious affective content refers to digital content (text, videos, articles, images, or social media posts) that expresses Gen Y and Gen Z’s sense of belonging and experience toward a worldview, which is often part of their core identity. Religious symbols such as a Hindu AUM sound, a Christian cross, Bible verses, the name of Allah in Arabic, a Palestinian flag, the saffron Hindu flag, etc., are typical examples of objects imbued with affective religious and political emotions that aim to inspire, evoke sentiments, and foster a sense of connection among individuals within religious communities, while also contributing to the formation of religious and national identities (Abdel-Fadil 2019). Hence, through fieldwork, supported by the lenses of religious authority, epistemic authority, social imaginaries, and social field theory, this study seeks answers to the following two research questions (RQs).

• RQ1: How does religious affective content in digital media influence how Gen Y and Gen Z individuals in Mumbai (India), adhering to the Hindu, Muslim, or Christian faiths, perceive epistemic authority and construct their social imaginaries?
• RQ2: How does the influence of religious affective content in digital media contribute to the emergence of radical religious beliefs?

2. Theoretical Perspective

To address the research questions, this study will examine the fieldwork results from three distinct perspectives. The conceptualization of religious authority and epistemic authority has primarily been built on the work of Trinkaus Zagzepski (2012). The Mumbai social fabric is examined through the perspectives of Charles Taylor’s modern social imaginaries (MSI) (Taylor 2004) and Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory as both concepts aim to understand how societal structures and individual actions are interrelated, highlighting the interplay between subjective and objective dimensions of daily social life.

Grounded in the assumption that power relations fundamentally shape human actions, French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory offers a comprehensive lens for exploring the intricacies of social media, authority, and religiosity. His theory stems from Weber and Durkheim’s perspectives, illustrating modernity as a process of differentiation in semi-autonomous and progressively specialized areas of activity, including religion, politics, economics, and culture (Benson and Neveu 2005, p. 2). Within these fields, power relations fundamentally influence individuals’ actions. What is real is relational and always contingent within a network. Bourdieu coined his field theory throughout his academic career, broadly, it refers to a social space with its own set of rules, hierarchies, and dynamics, which are concepts that can be applied to various social spheres.

At the core of his comprehension of field, structure, and agency is the concept of habitus5, characterized as “structuring structures” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 166). A habitus internalizes and structures human behavior and societal practices and influences the perception of those practices within a subjective social group or class. Part of this set of beliefs or “immanent law” is characterized by Bourdieu as doxa (set of beliefs), denoting that it is tacitly accepted without explicit acknowledgment. He asserts that the social world also functions as a power structure, delineated into “capital”, which is further divided into “economic”, comprising assets and funds for investment, and “cultural”, encompassing education, technical and verbal abilities, and general knowledge (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

Without being misled by the internet’s normlessness and apparent democratic potential (Tsuria 2020), using Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and field, this paper aims to describe the social and religious contexts of social media use by Gen Y and Gen Z individuals in Mumbai and the practices that embody their specific ways of being and thinking, considering social media not merely as a communication tool, but also as a structured social space and a fundamental component of their identity formation, social interactions, and worldviews (Hamelink 2003; Haythornthwaite 2005; McQuail and Deuze 2020; Vaidhyanathan 2018; Van Dijck et al. 2016).

Examining the intricate relationship between religion and social media necessitates a perspective that comprehensively captures the dynamics at play. Thus, Bourdieu’s theory of practice provides valuable insights into the social dynamics that shape the attribution of epistemic authority to various sources of knowledge within specific social contexts. Individuals’ habitus predisposes them to recognize and trust certain sources over others, while fields serve as a playing ground where actors compete for legitimacy and influence in the production and dissemination of knowledge. In this context, the notion of authority provides a robust foundation for understanding how religion presents a scenario in the context of digital media inquiries and challenges or affirmations of authority, which for Bourdieu fundamentally involve relations or bonds between individuals with (symbolic) power, who have the capacity to impose meanings and legitimate them as authoritative without coercion, e.g., through socialization, education, and cultural practices.

To shed light on the concept of religious authority, consider the question: Who represents Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, and Buddhism? The devout, religious leader, the scriptures, or the religious experience of a deity instructing a devotee on the appropriate course of action? Different scriptures exercise their authority in diverse ways; within the realm of religion, it has predominantly been shaped by Max Weber’s concept of traditional authority and the exercise of power over religious adherents (Weber 2004). Thus, it appears that religious authority is closely entwined with epistemic authority. Kruglanski (1980) employs the concept of epistemic authority, referring to a source that significantly shapes individuals’ knowledge. Individuals exhibit strong confidence in the accuracy of information originating from epistemic authorities, as they perceive this knowledge to be genuine, factual, and trustworthy, incorporating it into their own understanding and relying on it.

Just as Bourdieu and Kruglanski do, Zagzebski addresses how authority is recognized and legitimized in society. Zagzebski (2012) posits that epistemic authority serves as a construct applied to apprehend the process of knowledge formation through which people comprehend the information they have received as valid and consequently rely less on other sources. However, the idea of relying solely on oneself for knowledge, that is, epistemic self-reliance, lacks coherence. Thus, religious authority within a religious community can only be justified if one’s conscientious judgment justifies that participating in the community and embracing its teachings will endure a person’s “conscientious self-reflection” (Zagzebski 2012, p. 203). In gaining (religious) knowledge, it is necessary to place trust in an authority or community and be vigilant to exercise careful discernment when relying on such trust. This involves evaluating the credibility of those in positions of authority and relying on conscientious judgment to make such assessments. Indeed, with a reflective mindset and self-authority, members of religious communities have a way to improve themselves by being susceptible to external scrutiny and, if relevant, expose “religious tyranny” (Zagzebski 2012, p. 203).

Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and Zagzebski’s (2012) concept of epistemic authority can be interpreted within the framework of Taylor’s (2007) understanding of modern social imaginaries (MSIs):

“The way in which they (ordinary people) imagine that their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations which are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and imagines which underlie these expectations”.

Though with a focus on different domains, all frameworks are concerned with the social processes through which individuals and communities attribute credibility and trustworthiness to epistemic sources within a given context. Taylor’s concept of MSIs also provides us with insights and understanding of “ordinary people” and how “ordinary life” plays out in the digital domain (Taylor 2007, p. 171). Thus, Ten Kate (2018, p. 136) emphasizes that secular life and religious experience often become intertwined in MSIs in the digital media space. For example, the virtual space encapsulated by a smartphone app has assumed the role that was once played by priests and religious influencers providing a digital platform where individuals confess and seek forgiveness within a broader religious community.

3. Researcher’s Positionality

I was born in Suriname, South America, in a Hindu household, and grew up in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and am at present employed in higher education as a lecturer and researcher in Amsterdam. Both the Hindu faith and the secular environment in Amsterdam have deeply influenced my personal beliefs and values. Recognizing this, I strived to maintain reflexivity throughout the research process, by engaging in discussions with peers, supervisors, and participants from various faiths who provided valuable feedback and different viewpoints of my notes and observations. I also continually engaged in international, multicultural, and diverse workshops and research groups encompassing various genders and age groups.

In Mumbai, I presented myself as a Dutch researcher belonging to the Surinamese-Hindu community. My feeling was that because of my differences in speech (Hindi and English) and non-verbal cues, participants perceived me as an “outsider”. This facilitated a deeper exploration of sensitive topics such as religion, nationalism, and hate speech in digital media. As a researcher, I was invited to attend Christmas services in church, shared meals with members of different religious groups, engaged in extended conversations on campus, and watched several World Cup football matches with students in local pubs. Furthermore, I delivered lectures on media and ethics at various colleges, receiving feedback regarding the differences in ethical standards and norms between India and Europe. These embodied experiences and interactions significantly helped my understanding and interpretation of the fieldwork results.

4. Sampling and Fieldwork Methodology

As of 2023, Mumbai city’s projected population is 17,159,000, with an estimated metropolitan population of 25,368,000. However, the most recent demographic enumeration occurred in 2011 (India Policy Foundation 2011), and the scheduled 2021 census for Mumbai city was deferred due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The predominant religion in Mumbai city is Hinduism (65.99%), while Islam (20.65%) is the second-most prevalent religion. Christianity, Jainism, Sikhism, and Buddhism are practiced by 3.27%, 4.10%, 0.49%, and 4.85% of the population, respectively. Approximately 0.40% identified with “other religion”, and 0.26% specified “no particular religion” (Census 2023; Stausberg 2023).

In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted in three higher-education institutions and a charity organization with English Language Education Programs for young adults (aged 18–25 years) situated in Dharavi6 (Fuchs 2023). Participants (see

Table 1. Interviews’ generational cohorts in Mumbai.

Generation	Male	Female	Total
Gen Y Hindu	15 (23.4%)	6 (9.4%)	21 (32.8%)
Gen Y Christian	2 (3.1%)	1 (1.6%)	3 (4.7%)
Gen Y Muslim	3 (4.7%)	3 (4.7%)	6 (9.4%)
Gen Z Hindu	13 (20.3%)	7 (10.8%)	20 (31.3%)
Gen Z Christian	5 (7.8%)	2 (3.1%)	7 (11%)
Gen Z Muslim	4 (6.2%)	3 (4.7%)	7 (11%)
Total	42 (65.6%)	22 (34.4%)	64 (100%)

) were chosen based on residency in the city, considering their religion, affiliation with either Gen Z or Gen Y, and enrollment in local universities or religious communities. Additionally, a segment of the participants was selected through the snowball sampling method. These generations grew up during the digital era (dominated by technology) and have accrued technological proficiency; therefore, they are comfortable with the Internet, gaming, digital tools, apps, and social media platforms. The participants in this study included 10 Christians (Catholics and Protestants), 13 Muslims (Sunni, Shia Ahmadiyya, and Shia Dawoodi Bohras), and 41 Hindus (Sanātana Dharam). In the initial research design, the plan was to interview an equal number of participants—10 Christians, 10 Hindus, and 10 Muslims. I anticipated that recruiting 30 respondents would be challenging, given that the influence of affective social media content on fundamentalist beliefs is a highly sensitive and politicized topic in India. However, during the research, the snowball sampling method proved more effective than expected, and my informants were able to recruit additional respondents, most of whom were Hindus. This outcome is unsurprising, as Hindus constitute the majority religious group in Mumbai. Despite the smaller sample size for the two minority groups, this qualitative study still allows for a meaningful exploration of their experiences alongside those of the Hindu majority. The inquiry offers valuable insights by capturing the complexity of their perspectives and shedding light on the unique challenges respondents face, particularly in relation to social imaginaries, epistemic authority, and fundamentalist beliefs, revealed through the in-depth interviews. As the interviews progressed, I noticed that after approximately 50 respondents, the responses became increasingly repetitive, with no significant new insights. By the 64th interview, it became evident that saturation had been reached. The total of qualitative semi-structured thematic interviews (n = 64) aligns with previous international research on digital media, young adults, and religion by Moberg et al. (2020).

Interviews were conducted after careful ethical consideration and implementation, ensuring all participants gave their informed consent and guaranteeing anonymity throughout the research process. The research protocol received approval from the ethical committee of my university’s faculty. The educational institutions were selected based on their broad representation of the religious focus groups in Mumbai. Given that Hinduism is the predominant religion in Mumbai, it was more feasible to recruit young adults from the Hindu faith for participation, in contrast to those from Christian and Muslim communities. Due to the inclusion of several sensitive questions related to digital religion and fundamentalism, the institutions where the interviews were conducted also have been anonymized. Respondents studied engineering, information technology, business, finance, communication, and journalism. However, due to variations in the ages at which individuals pursue different degrees—whether MA, BA, or PhD—some participants had already graduated or were engaged in postdoctoral research. Additionally, participants without a social media presence were excluded from the study.

Among the participants, 39 (60.9%) relocated to Mumbai for academic purposes, coming from a range of different states, including Bihar (1), Goa (1), Jharkhand (1), Kerala (4), Madhya Pradesh (1), Maharashtra (5), Odisha (3), Rajasthan (5), Tamil Nadu (1), Uttar Pradesh (14), and West Bengal (4), while 25 (39%) were native Mumbaikars.

5. Data Analysis Methodology

The interviews were conducted by one researcher between November 2022 and February 2023. They addressed various thematic domains, including the participants’ life stories, educational backgrounds, employment experiences, social interactions, interactions with the Internet and social media networks, identity formation, engagement in religious activism, experiences related to religious violence, fundamentalist beliefs, nationalism, and conspiracy beliefs.

After obtaining participants’ consent, all interviews were recorded, transcribed, and subsequently imported into the Atlas.ti software. According to Engler et al. (2021), qualitative coding is typically an iterative process for organizing and analyzing qualitative data. Coding began during fieldwork and continued after finalizing the fieldwork in February 2023. The data analysis software, Atlas.ti (version 23), was employed to enhance the searchability of transcripts, ensure the efficient management of created codes, and identify patterns in the data through coding combinations (see the coding groups in Figure 1) (Friese 2019). The analysis approach was similar to grounded theory (Engler et al. 2021), as the study constructed theories from the bottom up through data analysis.

6. Results of Fieldwork Analysis

The findings of this study are categorized into three key areas: the influence of social media, the dynamics of online and offline epistemic authority, and the characteristics of fundamentalist beliefs.

6.1. Social Media Influence

How is digital media being used? All 64 participants mentioned the use of smartphones or cell phones, while only six indicated using laptops. Of the 64 participants, 28 and 22 spent approximately 1–2 h and 2–4 h daily on social media apps, respectively. Fourteen individuals surpassed four hours in their daily device usage (Figure 2). The participants spent several hours per day on social media platforms such as Instagram, WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter. The purposes of their social media use included staying connected with family and friends, accessing academic and professional groups, reading educational content, watching videos on YouTube, and obtaining news updates. Generally, social media has become a vital platform for information and communication for Gen Y and Gen Z individuals, constituting a pivotal aspect of their social imaginaries. In this context, previous studies (Stacks et al. 2015) suggest that the amount of time an individual invests in media consumption influences the impact that media will have on their perception of reality. It shapes how they engage with the world and envision their lives, while also influencing their social constructs both online and offline. This is well captured by the following participants’ vivid testimony:

GenZ_Christian_Male_3: “Nowadays, I follow Christianity in India online and on social media because I do not watch TV shows; however, I check on Catholic life abroad, via YouTube. … for young people, being online is now more important”.

Despite the reduced significance of television for Gen Y and Gen Z individuals, it is noteworthy that a majority of Hindu individuals from these cohorts referenced the popular television show Mahabharata (Krishnamacharya 1983) as a significant source of religious guidance and maintenance, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.

From a Taylorian perspective on MSIs, the data show that ordinary people’s questions on deeper ethical notions, religious traditions, and cultures are met and enhanced by numerous faith- and spirituality-related activities conducted through digital platforms (e.g., online worship, virtual religious communities, and digital religious content consumption). This aligns with Ten Kate’s (2018) concept that secular life and religious experiences frequently become interconnected within MSIs, especially in the digital media space.

Social media platforms gather and algorithmically analyze young individuals’ extensive digital footprints with the goal of enhancing the effectiveness of online content through algorithmic persuasion (Swart 2021). Whether this is perceived as a positive or negative phenomenon depends on individual perspectives and ethical considerations. The participants in this study outlined that personalization practices are beneficial and useful for entertainment, education, and religious maintenance. However, these attempts at persuasion can also be perceived as detrimental, as they have the potential to influence individuals into behaviors that may not align with their best interests and alter their decision-making processes in the online environment. Intensive social media users mentioned social media as “dopamine for the brain”, explaining that social networking sites targeted them during periods of psychological vulnerability, and they had problems coping with algorithmic persuasion.

GenY_Male_Hindu_12: “When I was 19, I enthusiastically followed the free cannabis movement on YouTube and because of that I … started smoking profusely … I became addicted … I would say that many of the things I saw on YouTube videos pushed me to the extreme. YouTube somewhat reinforces those beliefs by repeatedly showing these things to young people … Now I feel that YouTube can harm children’s susceptible brains, and they speak about this very freely in the videos and do not realize their impact on young minds”.

Muslim participants argued that digital media portrayed Islam as a religion synonymous with terror on a global scale, emphasizing that their religion was exploited by terrorists and extremists, asserting that such actions aligned neither with the teachings of the Quran nor those of the Hadith. From a Bourdieuan perspective, these observations resonate with the field of forces, where there is a significant power difference between people who dominate and those who are dominated by a majority group (Bourdieu [1996] 1998). Both Muslim and Christian participants conveyed concerns about power imbalances and apprehensions regarding Hindu nationalism. However, it would be overly simplistic to assert that every Muslim and Christian participant in this study perceived dominance from the Hindu majority. Indeed, they also expressed experiencing religious freedom in Mumbai and working and studying harmoniously within the Hindu community in the city.

The participants further recounted their backgrounds as being part of families with influential roles in business, education, and government, and how they used their “cultural capital” to pursue economic power, assert control over their destinies, and prevent communal politics from pushing them into corners. In this context, one can deduce that the Muslims and Christians interviewed were engaged in various fields and shared power across society, indicating the absence of a singular Muslim or Christian field. However, the minority status shared by both Christian and Muslim participants does not necessarily foster a sense of unity between the two communities, and stereotyping was evident in both directions. The Muslims interviewed perceived Christians as compromising on their religious values by “being friends with everybody”. Muslim respondents felt that Christians uncritically accepted the Hindu-normativity in the city. This may stem from “Hindus expecting Christians and Muslims not only to be culturally aligned with their values, but also to either yield cultural space to them or, at a minimum, share that space with them” (Tripathi and Singh 2016, p. 8). Muslims feel that Christians give away too much of their values and do not consider them a bridge-building ally in challenging the Hindus in their religious spaces and practices, as well as on issues such as missiology and the ban on the consumption of beef.

GenY_Muslim_Male_2: “Then irrespective of our previous good relation, we now try to stay away from each other. You know, Christians, they want to be friends with everybody. Though we share the same Abrahamic source, they don’t align with us as the larger minority”.

Conversely, some Christian participants accused Muslims of being unwilling to collaborate with other religions and seeking conflict, portraying them as “criminals” and criticizing them for not adequately educating their children.

GenZ_Christian_Female_2: “We are all good people. Whether Hindu, Muslim, Christian, all are good religions, but Muslim people isolate themselves and should educate their children more”.

In this context, it is noteworthy that all three faiths accused one another of disseminating hate speech and stereotypes on social media platforms. However, according to the participants’ perception of the religious groups and their mobile media use in everyday life, the foremost culprits of spreading hate speech and bad images in the media, particularly on social media, are politicians and journalists. Participants accused both groups of negative campaigning and causing polarization in society.

6.2. Social Media and Epistemic Authority

Does social media influence epistemic authority? Parents functioned as the main epistemic authority for both Gen Y and Gen Z individuals (Figure 3). This finding is unsurprising, given the influence parents have on children’s cognitive, emotional, and social development, as well as their worldview. The main epistemic sources of religious influence mentioned by participants included God/deities, parents, grandparents, family members, religious books (e.g., the Quran, Bible, Gita), and teachers and gurus mediated through digital media content.

The influence of social media influencers on authority is also noteworthy, specifically in the case of prominent online personalities such as Mufti Menk, acknowledged by 6 (46.2%) individuals in the Muslim group, and Sadhguru, referenced by 27 (65.9%) individuals in the Hindu group.

Zimbabwe-born Islamic scholar Mufti Ismail Menk has a global X following exceeding 10 million as of January 2024, as well as a considerable influence on the global Muslim community (Menk 2024). He has gained prominence for his motivational tweets and khutbahs (sermons), skillfully integrating humor to engage and captivate the interest of a younger Muslim audience (Patel 2023). Menk is considered among the most influential Muslims worldwide (Menk 2024). The participants admired Menk as a religious leader who preaches in English on social media, and they mentioned relying on him as a tutor for explanation. They described him as open-minded and characterized his communication as “clear” and “comprehensible”. One of the informants, who identifies as gay, indicated that while he could read Arabic, he did not comprehend the Quran or its general meaning. Its religious teachings condemn homosexuality and have led to tension and difficulties within his family; therefore, his parents hired a Muslim scholar to teach and elucidate the Quran to him for two hours daily. However, he finds Menk’s online teachings to be more significant.

Indian Hindu mystic and author Sadhguru “Jagadish Vasudev” is the founder of the Isha Foundation and offers his online followers practical advice to strengthen their physical and mental wellbeing (Sadhguru 2024). He is active on X, YouTube, and Instagram, where he has large followings and has expressed admiration for India’s Prime Minister Modi’s leadership, as well as the BJP nationalistic policy (Copeman et al. 2023). Some of the present study’s participants mentioned that they follow Sadhguru and enjoy his teachings, describing his content as “informative” and “practical”. They also stated they appreciate how he articulates his points, speaks with clarity, offers insights, and challenges established taboos on several topics including menstruation, sexual energy, spirituality, marriage, sex, love, food, education, and meditation. Some mentioned watching his videos on YouTube, listening to his podcasts, and reading his books. The participants described his teachings as impactful and life-changing for themselves and others they knew. They shared Sadhguru’s stories on social media and stressed that he had positively impacted their lives.

GenY_Hindu_Female_6: “I absolutely admire Sadhguru, like one of his videos on the taboo when women have their period. … Women are not impure when they have their period, because then the whole creation would be impure. I am glad that a Hindu guru delivers this kind of content for women and the world”.

Two other social media influencers that were mentioned by participants were Andrew Tate and Yogi Adityanath. British American kickboxer Andrew Tate is both an influential and controversial person, with ongoing legal troubles due to rape and human trafficking charges (BBC 2023), on social media platforms. In 2022, he converted to Islam; not long thereafter, he described Islam on YouTube as the “final authentic faith on Earth”, accumulating 3.2 million views (CNN Newsreport 2023). Despite accusations of misogyny and disseminating other hateful ideologies (The Guardian 2023), he has garnered considerable attention among some Muslim respondents.

GenZ_Muslim_Male_1: “I don’t care that people speak bad about him, I admire him (Tate) for converting to Islam. And I love the positive way he is speaking on socials about the Islam as the only true religion and inspiring others to convert too”.

One instance showcasing political and religious leaders shaping beliefs through social media with religious ties is Yogi Adityanath, a Hindu monk and patriotic leader from the BJP, as well as the present chief minister of Uttar Pradesh. The Hindu nationalist leader was acknowledged by Hindu participants for his positive contributions to the state and as a “future Hindu leader”.

GenZ_Hindu_Male_12: “I think everything about Yogi Adityanath is perfect. He recently approved the construction of a roads in UP, and now everybody is taking about this. He is daily on the news and his opinion counts in India. He also gets support from the central government. He is the kind of a leader we need to get things done in this country”.

In the context of religious acquisition, it is evident from the data that authority within the examined religious traditions is bestowed particularly upon parents, sacred texts, and religious influencers. The persistent strong parental influence and that of religious communities on religious acquisition align with the family-pressure dynamics observed in other developing countries (Moberg et al. 2020, p. 255). The parental influence on respondents differed throughout the variations in religious beliefs. While Christians and Muslims emphasized the importance of reading their respective holy scriptures during childhood, Hindus viewed their parents more as mentors in Hindu dharma (duty) in everyday life.

GenY_Hindu_Female_6: “I have just now finished reading the Geeta, but when I was young my parents were teaching me the Hindu dharma themselves and I did not read holy scriptures or go to Hindu classes. We daily prayed to mother Durga for health and prosperity. It is a good thing that I have seen the Mahabharat TV-drama during Corona, and watch Sathguru videos on Insta, so I can relate even better to my religion”.

In the context of religious maintenance, the roles of influencers and religious scholars are gaining prominence. Although priests, imams, and pastors maintain a growing presence on the Internet and social media platforms while continuing to wield their authority, the nature of their influence has become more fluid, and they must compete for epistemic authority with mega-influencers such as Mufti Menk.

GenZ_Muslim_Male_4: “What I dislike about Islam is the power that it has given to men over women. It is like they own them. Also, I question the notion in the Quran that people from other religions and gay people will straight to hell. I believe that God made people this way, so that nobody can claim the truth and people have to cooperate to co-exist. But in my religion this is all haram, but my uncle who married now for the 5th time is not being criticized in the family. So, these practices are no sacred values for me, I rather listen to a YouTube video of Mufti Menk than to my forced Quran teachings. Menk explains about love in Islam and tolerance against gays and other faiths. For me that is the true Islam”.

This finding contrasts with Chaves’ (1994) viewpoint on religious authority, which posits that (central) religious authorities regulate individuals’ access to resources and control the supernatural element to sustain themselves. While traditional authorities and religious digital influencers co-exist, Chaves’ focus on institutional authority overlooks the rise of digital media and the agency it gives individuals in interpreting affective content and engaging with social media influencers. Also, in more decentralized, more fluid religious traditions like in Hinduism, believers have individual access to deities, and the religious experience and maintenance are not as tightly regulated by a central authority. Indeed, the predominant trend among respondents suggests that individual beliefs and practices are often embodied online and offline, as individuals integrate both physical and digital spaces in their religious practices and expressions. In this inquiry participants of all faiths frequently explored and questioned existing teachings online, and traditional religious authorities are being bypassed. In this sense, the search for meaning in the digital media helps the participants develop what Zagzebski (2012, p. 199) calls a “conscientious self-reflection”, making individuals not only embody their religion, but also compare, examine, and cirque their faith. While it is true that engaging in online queries, lectures, new insights, and interactions can help individuals acquire religious knowledge while concurrently fostering conscientious judgment, it is also crucial to acknowledge that influencers like Andrew Tate do not facilitate self-reflection.

6.3. Notions of Fundamentalist Beliefs (Peels and Kindermann 2022)

Next, we turn to the question of whether affective content on social media is driving respondents toward religious fundamentalism. Numerous authors (e.g., Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2005; Berger 2018; De Graaf 2025; Gupta and Rao 2003; Juergensmeyer 2017; Marty and Appleby 1993; Peels 2023b; Perry 1959; Ruthven 2007; Viswanathan 2022) have employed various theoretical frameworks to analyze and understand this phenomenon in society, considering factors such as socio-economic exclusion, pathology, grievances, group processes, the culture of violence, radical redemption, immigration, and post-colonialism. To facilitate the analysis of fundamentalist beliefs, I employ Rik Peels’s definition as the framework for assessing religious fundamentalism:

“A movement is fundamentalist if and only if it is (i) reactionary towards modern developments, (ii) itself modern, and (iii) based on a grand historical narrative. More specifically, a movement is fundamentalist if it exemplifies a large number of the following properties: (i) it is reactionary in its rejection of liberal ethics, science, or technological exploitation; (ii) it is modern in seeking certainty and control, embracing literalism and infallibility about particular scriptures, actively using media and technology, or making universal claims; and (iii) it presents a grand historical narrative in terms of paradise, fall, and redemption, or cosmic dualism”.

(Peels 2023c)

This study illustrated that understanding and describing experiences and behaviors related to religious fundamentalism can be complicated due to the subjective nature of beliefs; cultural variability; broader textual issues, such as the social, economic, and political situation in India; and social desirability bias when answering questions about their beliefs. It was noted by the participants that among the three investigated religions, Christians and Muslims in particular asserted the superiority of their respective religions. This sentiment was mixed among Hindus. Additionally, Muslims expressed the belief that Islam is the last and true religion and mentioned the rules they followed as indicated in the Quran. Hindu individuals perceived proselytizing as problematic and a cause of conflict and fundamentalist behavior by Christians and Muslims, and they participated in noticeably fewer attempts to proselytize. (Three participants in this study discussed being converted from Hinduism to Christianity.)

On religious fundamentalism, Hardacre (1993) notes that for numerous Muslim and Christian fundamentalists, “traditional” family values represented a potent symbol of an idealized moral structure and prioritized this as the foremost objective of the fundamentalist social agenda. Thus, all the participants were also queried on whether their religion played a mediating role in gay/lesbian attitudes. Figure 4 shows how aspects of fundamentalism (e.g., Islam is superior) co-occur with other codes (e.g., gay people are not accepted in Islam). Significantly, Muslim and Christian participants conveyed their belief that God created men and women, and they asserted that homosexuality is not accepted within their religious beliefs. They expressed concern about the public debate and changing views on gender and LGBTIQ+ community’s acceptance in society, emphasizing that equality is not exclusively tied to the Western ideology of secularism.

GenZ_Female_Muslim_2: “God created Adam and Eve and not gay people; being gay is the work of the devil. In the Bible it is Lucifer; in the Quran it is Iblis, who was thrown out of the heaven and said he would do everything to destroy Allah’s work. Currently, this is what is taking place; by rejecting gay people, we fight Iblis”.

Hindu participants maintained that the gay and lesbian community was “accepted in both India and within Hinduism”. However, they also noted being gay is still a taboo and preferably not spoken about. The transgender Hijra (Singh and Pradeep 2020) community was also cited as an example of the acceptance of the LGBTIQ+ community, in the context of individuals living in communal establishments in Mumbai, although it was noted that, in general, they were treated as an “outgroup and faced discrimination”.

Further addressing the issue of marginalization, Hindu respondents also mentioned caste8 discrimination (Figure 5) in society, as well as inequality among upper caste women and lower castes, as chains holding them back.

GenZ_Male_Hindu_2: “There is still the caste system in India. In Mumbai, people are trying not to encourage others to discriminate. I think it comes with education, the more people are educated, discrimination will decrease. But you know, people who discriminate are often from the higher castes. The top ones, they discriminate, the middle ones don’t”.

Several Muslim individuals on the other hand, both men and women, expressed feelings of marginalization by the Hindu normativity, which they noted is being imposed by the “Hindu fundamentalistic” government, and find it “difficult to fight against”. The participants cited examples such as acts of violence targeting Muslims due to beef consumption (Bhatnagar 2022). Furthermore, Muslim participants questioned whether such actions were secular, religious, or simply heinous behavior by religious extremists. However, Hindus expressed the view that religious conflict, communalism, and intolerance in post-independence India have deteriorated rather than improved, attributing this to the imposition of Western secular ideologies in India, which failed to foster respect for pluralism.

Despite regular media reports on communal violence in India, only two participants (a Hindu and a Muslim) explained that they had personally witnessed religious violence in their hometowns (Varanasi and Bengaluru). Both Christian and Hindu respondents mentioned perceiving Islamic fundamentalism as terrorism and thus as a societal threat. This sentiment was triggered by global events such as the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the presence of terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and concerns regarding the neighboring country, Pakistan, which they held responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attack.

While religious fundamentalism and activism can overlap, particularly when adherents are motivated by sacred values, it is noteworthy that not all individuals holding fundamentalist views necessarily participate in activism, as evidenced by most of the interviewees in this study. Respondents also mentioned being actively involved in religious groups, doing voluntary work for the social media platforms of their respective faiths, organizing peaceful protests, and helping with online campaigns—e.g., Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh’s9 (RSS) cultural events. Participants’ motivations for engaging in activism included family expectations (pressure) to join specific religious organizations and a commitment to safeguarding the sacred values of their religion. Undoubtedly, the importance of family is paramount within the context of India. As stated by Kaur (2019), the country has not yet fully encountered the criticism of the “middle-class imaginary”, characterized by prioritizing the family’s needs over those of individual members or relying solely on kinship ties for survival and honor.

6.4. Fundamentalism and Hindu Nationalism

In my examination of religious fundamentalism, I observed that the concept of nationalism was also closely linked to Hindu fundamentalism, and thus considered the following question: Is Indian nationalism synonymous with Hindu Fundamentalism? For Jaffrelot (2021, p. 157) Indian nationalism shifted under the leadership of Modi’s BJP toward Hindu nationalism, what is often called an “ethnic democracy”, by aligning itself nationwide closely with radical local sangh parivar10 and national RSS leveraging their grassroots support for electoral gains. Bhatnagar (2022) and Udupa (2018) argue that the BJP’s perspective on nationalism is synonymous with the revival of a Hindu nation, a trend that is evident in institutional appointments and the increase in violence against outgroups. This hostile behavior is frequently “justified” under the guise of cow vigilantism and coercive religious conversions. To comprehend the societal dynamics between (Hindu) nationalism and religious fundamentalism, all participants were questioned about their level of pride for India and their reasons for it. The participants articulated the nationalism sentiment for a wide range of reasons (depicted in Figure 6). Five participants expressed feeling “neither proud nor unpatriotic”, none of the respondents stated that they were not proud of India, and most respondents from all three religions mentioned feeling “proud” (15 participants) or “very proud” (21 participants).

GenY_Male_Muslim_1: “I am very proud, I would say. I am a very patriotic person. If something happened, like India were in danger, then I would be ready to take a bullet. … This is the best country … We have religious freedom, and our values are protected by the Indian constitution”.

Most interviewees expressed being proud to be Indian and that Indian values and ethics kept them grounded, and they appreciated the respect and compassion shown by Indian people. Individuals in this study held the belief that India is attaining global recognition, and they experienced a sense of duty in representing their nation. Furthermore, the participants mentioned that Mumbai is the place where Gen Y and Gen Z individuals can proudly identify with their religious beliefs. Appreciating the diversity of religions in India and emphasizing the importance of secularism, the participants highlighted the need for a more vocal expression of love and patriotism for their country. This was enhanced by the co-occurrence of the terms ‘nationalism’, ‘secularism’, and ‘belonging’, (Figure 7) alongside the terms ‘religious identity’ and ‘friends from other religions.’ This suggests that despite religious boundaries and Hindu nationalism, a shared sense of Indian identity and shared values may transcend diverse religious affiliations, thus fostering increased tolerance and understanding among respondents.

Some Hindu participants mentioned that in the past, there was a perception that Hindus were not proud of their identity, but at the time of the interviews, there was a vocal pride in being Hindu and supporting Hindutva (Ram-Prasad 2008) across India and the BJP. However, the participants considered themselves more “logical” than strictly supporting a right-wing party. Hindu participants expressed support for Prime Minister Modi and his political stance, taking pride in belonging to one of the world’s oldest civilizations. The Gen Y and Gen Z participants expressed gratitude for the country’s financial support for education and research in accentuating the distinctiveness of Indian culture and music.

GenY_Female_Hindu_2: “Now, people have become vocal about being very proud Hindus or the Hindutva, and negative left-wing secularists do not like this. The Middle East is Muslims, the West Christians. So, what’s wrong with India being a Hindu-dominated country?”

As religious fanaticism frequently depends on nationalism particularly when it becomes more inclusive, it may offer greater rewards to extremist groups (Hardin 2002, p. 14). Findings indicate that Hardin’s notion can also be applied to the respondents in this inquiry as they prefer the broader, more pragmatic benefits of nationalism over the rigid and exclusionary goals of religious fundamentalism. Therefore, there is an indication that Indian nationalism has the potential to work as an “antidote” to religious fanaticism.

6.5. Fundamentalism and Conspiracy Beliefs

Academic perspectives on the meanings and functions of conspiracy beliefs encompass various disciplines. The rationale for integrating conspiracism into this study derives from its categorization as a component of fundamentalist beliefs (Peels 2023b). Thirty-six individuals of diverse religious backgrounds expressed beliefs in various conspiracy theories (see Figure 8). Among these participants, certain individuals provided some details on particular conspiracy topics, such as the mysterious disappearance of Indian nationalist Subhas Chandra Bose, the 9/11 cover-up, the Chinese having intentionally developed COVID-19 in a laboratory, and the most frequently discussed conspiracy theory, namely the alleged existence of a covert group known as the “Illuminati”, a global puppet master. This sentiment is expressed in the following quote:

GenY_Male_Muslim_2: “The Illuminati are controlled by the Jewish; they want to control the world. As far as our religion, Islam, is concerned, Jews are the most intelligent people, [therefore, they] control the world somehow. … And it is like the Quran says, the devil will come and try to take over the world: The devil is the Illuminati organization”.

Van Prooijen and Douglas (2018, p. 902) examine the conspiracy discourse and identify the abovementioned belief as “a social phenomenon that reflects the basic structure of intergroup conflict”. That is, a robust in-group identity and a perception of an out-group threat simultaneously fosters the endorsement of conspiracy theories. Similarly, a sense of self-uncertainty is linked to an elevated belief in conspiracy theories, especially among individuals who experience a sense of inclusion in a group. Individuals in this inquiry revealed their convictions in certain conspiracy theories while recognizing the entertainment aspect of others and shared their fascination with conspiracy-related movies, music, and social media pages. Moreover, they mentioned the impact of politics and government on these theories. Some mentioned the importance of checking platforms for disinformation; however, few individuals critically evaluated information or mentioned that reputable epistemic sources were unavailable online. This finding is consistent with Hardin’s (2002) notion of the “crippled epistemology of extremism” (3–22RR), a concept also cited by Cassam (2019), which suggests that individuals embrace extremist ideologies or conspiracy beliefs not due to irrationality but rather because they possess limited or incomplete information.

7. Discussion and Conclusions

Regarding the first RQ, this study indicates that, despite the danger of algorithmic persuasion and negative online hate speech, the majority of the individuals welcomed the use of mediated technology for activities associated with their religion and the search for meaning, thus transforming traditional sources of religious authority and becoming a significant epistemic resource for sustaining ceremonial rites, echoing previous studies by Atay (2020), Valentini et al. (2020), Ayad (2021), Moberg et al. (2020). Sacred scriptures, the charisma of religious leaders, and personal experiences were associated with epistemic authority, and to some extent, the burgeoning digital epistemic sources (content and influencers) appear to challenge the traditional religious authority. However, the study does not determine which religious community has been more significantly influenced by social media compared to others.

The findings also indicate that in today’s digital culture, participants tend to utilize the online community to look for new perspectives or challenge their views and not just to curate information that reinforces offline social religious networks. They are both focused on personal stories and on the religious–political communities they belong to (Udupa 2016). In this context, most individuals described politicians as “hate mongers” (Figure 9) and held them responsible for disseminating animosity on social media. Similarly, the outcome highlights concern about journalists being perceived as being untrustworthy; individuals labelled them as contributors to polarization on social media and criticized them for biased political communication. This aligns with research conducted by Luoma-Aho et al. (2020) which indicates that Gen-Z individuals are recognized for expressing their opinions on social media and actively demanding accountability in various social and political arenas. Consequently, this behavior may lead to a sustained increase in distrust towards institutions and organizations. This trend may pose a threat to democracy, challenging the role of the journalism field (Bourdieu 2005, pp. 29–44) as the custodian of secular Indian society (Rao 2018). However, a recent study shows that in the Indian BJP-ruled “ethnic democracy” mainstream media are more diverse than often believed and that online and offline publications allow space for cultural, religious, and political pluriformity and debate, rather than being entirely controlled or biased toward one viewpoint (Ravikumar et al. 2024).

Regarding RQ2, from a Bourdieuan perspective, the digital media space of social media networks is not a neutral ground but a field where existing habitus (Bourdieu 1984, p. 166), including radical beliefs, interact and change. Understanding this relationship helps identify the complexities of religious expression and individuals in the digital age. In the quadrant graph of tolerance and religious fundamentalism depicted in Figure 10, most of the participants were categorized into Quadrant C, expressing conservativism and tolerance toward other faiths, while those in Quadrants B and D express more animosity against other communities. This hostility can stem from what Hardin (2002, p. 21) describes as “the group’s fanaticism intensified intergenerationally through blinkered education”, as participants noted being taught by their families and religious scholars as well as pressured to meet family expectations. Thus, the data indicate that fundamentalist beliefs can be an integral component of individuals’ social imaginaries, resonating that these sets of beliefs are not confined solely to Abrahamic religions but also manifest within Hinduism (Peels 2023a). In Mumbai, although “Hindu” culture appears to be the most dominant, it is intricate and expressed by respondents in diverse ways. Hence, it is insufficient to conclude that organizations like the RSS, Sangh Parivar, or BJP serve as the primary epistemic authorities for contemporary “Hindu” culture. The influence extends across multiple societal layers, including family structures, political and cultural organizations, opinion leaders, influencers, and other epistemic sources.

Data also indicated that in daily life well-educated Muslims and Christians feel cross-pressured (Taylor 2007, p. 548) between the Hindu normativity of Mumbai, and the religious upbringing of their families. Indeed, results reveal that the impact of family on religious behavior appears to be more substantial than the epistemic sources of the Hindutva nationalism on social media (Udupa 2018, pp. 465–66). In this context, social capital, along with the support and influence of family and community, may contribute to individuals’ development of resilience or resistance to online disinformation, hate speech, and radicalization.

It is imperative to emphasize that participants exhibiting fundamentalist beliefs were not isolated individuals motivated by unfounded animosity; instead, they were young adults characterized by foresighted rationality. In this context, findings suggest that possessing a higher level of education is not associated with a lower endorsement of conspiracy and that it is merely one element among several that can influence conspiracy beliefs, while individual social, cultural, and religious differences may play a significant role.

Moreover, data show that individuals can become vulnerable to the detrimental effects of algorithmic persuasion enhanced through digital media. This was depicted by participants in the instance of the free cannabis propaganda on YouTube and the reference to social media algorithmic persuasion as “dopamine for the brain”. Given the increased epistemic authority, legitimacy, online hate, the search for meaning, and the credibility of online influencers, social media evidently, with the aid of algorithmic persuasion, may play a role in religious radicalization and harming individuals. In this context, the scholarly discourse on Indian Hindutva nationalism propaganda on social media (Geraci 2019; Sengupta 2019) often emphasizes the perception that the Hindu majority resent and repress minority communities. However, this study’s findings suggest that though Hindus are enhancing their Hindu self (e.g., social and cultural identity), they are not inclined to hold negative attitudes about Christian or Islamic theological aspects. However, within the context of religious polarization in India, individuals may be predisposed to provide politically or socially desirable responses.

Notably, the data also reveal that the participants (whether Christian, Muslim, or Hindu) held common nationalistic beliefs. The participants frequently articulated intense sentiments of nationalism and partisanship, as exemplified by a Muslim participant’s readiness to “take [a] bullet” for India. It is possible that this explicit patriotism stems from the fact that “Indian Muslims are always called upon to prove their loyalty to the Indian nation, unlike Hindus” (Tripathi and Singh 2016, p. 8). Notwithstanding, respondents embraced India’s religious freedom and multiculturality, discussing the compassion exhibited by various religious groups during the COVID-19 pandemic and expressing a shared cultural Indianness. Individuals also indicated Hindi (Bollywood) music, educational opportunities, and the celebration of diversity in food, languages, and cultures as forms of shared cultural and social capital, as outlined by Bourdieu (2005). Thus, individuals in this study possess multiple identities rather than a singular religious identity; they are also participants in multiple communities and undertake actions informed by their diverse identities, as previously noted by Riddle (2024) and Sen (2007). This trend conveys the shared sentiments of imagination, belonging, shared nationalist identity, and common cultural capital, which may serve as a ‘superglue’ for living peacefully in society, endorse plurality, and function as an ‘antidote’ against various religious fundamentalist movements in troubled times.

This study’s overall results offer insights into digital epistemic sources of religious authority as a tool for religious maintenance, notions of fundamentalist beliefs, power struggles, family expectations, and animosity toward politicians and journalists. Thus, this empirical study contributes to the scholarly growth of the interdisciplinary focus of digital religion studies and the ongoing discourse on the influence of social media on religiosity by illustrating that fundamentalist beliefs can constitute essential components within rational well-educated individuals’ social imaginaries.

7.1. Limitations of the Study

First, it was conducted based on 64 face-to-face interviews in the city of Mumbai, which has a population exceeding 20 million, and the data cannot be generalized to India’s other cities or its hinterland. Additionally, the scope of this inquiry was confined to individuals aged 18–35 years with a background in higher education. Therefore, it is impossible to generalize and adequately represent the entire Gen Y and Gen Z population in Mumbai.

7.2. Suggestions for Future Research

Further interdisciplinary research is recommended on religious fundamentalism, regarding political leaders strategically employing online hate speech and manipulation to alter the course of public discourse or enhance societal polarization. Future research should also examine how young adults experience cognitive harm on social media and encounter religious challenges in coping with algorithmic persuasion. Finally, further understanding is also necessary to determine the influence of private religious instructions and user-generated content on fundamentalist beliefs.