The Discourse on the Marxist Study of Religion in the New Era in the PRC: An Outsider’s Perspective

Abstract

This paper contributes to the intercultural understanding of religious studies in East Asia by examining their discursive framework within the Chinese context. It analyzes the academic discourse on religious studies in the PRC, particularly debates on atheism and the Marxist study of religion. In 2021, President Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of aligning religious studies with Marxist principles, sparking renewed debate on the field’s orientation. This paper examines the responses of religious studies scholars to state directives. It illustrates how the reframing of the discipline and reinterpretations of the Marxist view on religion serve as strategies employed by scholars to answer “the call” of the official discourse. The significant representation of scholars promoting atheism in the political sphere further aligns religious studies with official discourse, narrowing the discursive space for other theoretical approaches toward religion.

1. Introduction

The study of religion is widespread worldwide, including in East Asia (Alles 2010, p. 2). However, Western scholars know less about the scholarly work performed in East Asia. An intercultural approach to the study of religion seeks to provide knowledge on current debates, raise awareness of the discipline’s varied discursive structures across different contexts, and establish a foundation for global exchange and dialog between religious studies scholars from East Asia.

Following Stuckrad’s outline of a discursive study of religion, the category religion is not defined as something sui generis; rather, religion is studied as “statements and utterances that attribute meaning to things and provide orders of knowledge” (von Stuckrad 2014, p. 13). Here, I apply this concept to the discourse on religious studies in different cultural contexts. I will concentrate on religious studies in the PRC.

Religious studies have a historical presence that goes back to the Republican period (Meyer 2015). After Mao Zedong (1893–1976) called for research on religion and the critique of theology (yanjiu zongjiao, pipan shenxue; 研究宗教、批判神学) to explore religion’s function in the history of literature and philosophy, the Institute of World Religions (IWR) was established in 1964 at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). It approached research on religion from an atheist, historical, and dialectical materialist perspective, but it had to stop its work during the Cultural Revolution. Afterward, the term “religious studies” (zongjiaoxue, 宗教学)1 became prevalent again when the discipline was reinstitutionalized in Chinese academia, starting with the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences in 1978 and followed by other institutions. The IWR was reestablished at the newly founded Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The Institute is China’s only national-level academic research institution focusing on religious studies. The Marxist view on religion (Makesi zongjiaoguan yanjiu, 马克思宗教观研究) is emphasized to be the guiding principle in religious studies (Shijie Zongjiao Yanjiusuo Jianjie 2021). Around 40 Academies of Social Sciences, universities, party institutions, and religious associations conduct studies of religion (Tsai 2008, p. 97). It is often categorized as a second-tier discipline, frequently associated with philosophy. However, it consists of three branches: research on the Marxist view on religion;2 the study of the history of religions (including Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Confucianism, popular religion, and new religious movements); and the systematic study of religion (covering areas such as the philosophy of religion, the sociology of religion, the psychology of religion, the anthropology of religion, and religious arts).3

Since 2022, the term “Marxist study of religion” has become popular within this academic field. A broader keyword search on The China Academic Journal Network Publishing Database (CNKI) using related keywords to the Marxist study of religion showed 545 journal publications within the field of religious studies since 1979 (accessed 22 October 2024). Scholars have published a significant number of these articles in Science and Atheism (Kexue yu wushenlun, 《科学与无神论》, 108 articles), followed by China Religion (Zhongguo zongjiao, 《中国宗教》, 70 articles), issued by the State Bureau of Religious Affairs, and Studies in World Religions (Shijie zongjiao yanjiu, 《世界宗教研究》, 50 articles), the leading journal of the IWR. A more precise keyword search focusing only on the term Marxist study of religion (Makesizhuyi zongjiaoxue, 马克思主义宗教学) showed one to three publications per year since 1979. Since 2019 (four articles, 2020 [three articles], 2021 [ten articles]), the number of publications has increased rapidly, with peaks in 2022 (nineteen articles) and 2023 (eighteen articles). Science and Atheism and China Religion has published twelve and fourteen articles, followed by The World Religious Cultures (Shijie zongjiao wenhua, 《世界宗教文化》, another CSSCI journal issued by the IWR) with 10 articles. The increasing number of publications on the Marxist study of religion aligns with political directives that have been issued since Xi Jinping called for the development of the Marxist study of religion in 2021 at the National Work Conference on Religions (2021).

This paper seeks to study the debate on the “Marxist study of religion” as a recent development in the study of religion in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from two perspectives: First, it examines the relationship between the state and the discipline and reflects the political ambitions to establish an independent model for science and knowledge production to serve state stability. Second, it introduces discussions on the Marxist study of religion to analyze scholars’ discursive positions and practices within this context.

I write this paper from an outsider’s perspective. My analysis focuses on observing and studying the debate without actively participating in the discourse-construction process (Jensen 2011). Furthermore, the paper is only a sketch of a vast body of material. It cannot comprehensively depict the discourse on the Marxist study of religion in China since the reform period.

2. Religious Studies in China: Discursive Context and Sinicization of Knowledge Production

2.1. Research Program: Discourse Research

I briefly explain the terminology applied in the paper and its structural framework in this part. The paper applies a discourse analysis approach based on Michel Foucault and Siegfried Jäger to a Chinese context. Discourses do not merely reflect but rather shape social reality and “exercise power because they institutionalize and regulate ways of talking, thinking, and acting” (Jäger and Maier 2016, p. 117). Power and discourse, therefore, have a twofold connection: one is the power of discourse, and the second is the power over discourse. Consequently, “discourses form individual and mass consciousness” and create materialization (Jäger and Maier 2016, p. 117). In this regard, discourses form institutions and other kinds of knowledge production like journals, conferences, university courses, etc. Discourses are not homogenous but consist of different strands which are entangled. Discourse strands operate on different discourse planes, each with their specific social context in which they are expressed, including political and academic planes. These planes also exert influence on one another. In the Chinese context, the political plane is embodied by the official discourse. Although actors may not have complete control over discourses, they actively participate in the evolution of discourses, especially when they belong to the discursive elite.

2.2. Context: Religious Studies and Official Discourse

As Feng Dezheng argues, there is a dialectical relationship between text and context, highlighting the importance of analyzing both. Text analysis serves as an empirical foundation for interpreting the discourse on religion, while context analysis reveals how the discourse is shaped and constrained (Feng 2019, p. 65). Chinese official discourse possesses a strong capacity to form the rules of discourse production. It promotes the excessive application of certain discursive narratives while restricting or entirely preventing the development of others (Alpermann and Fröhlich 2020, p. 115). This also impacts academic research on religion, as its knowledge production has not developed independently of shifts in political discourse since the period of Reform and Opening in 1978. On the contrary, as this section will demonstrate, the political plane delineates the boundaries of discursive space within academic discourse.

2.2.1. The Modification of the “Opium Thesis” in Academic Discourse Following a Pragmatic Shift in Official Discourse

With the release of Document 19, “The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country’s Socialist Period”, in 1982, the party established new frameworks for religious policy, marking a more pragmatic shift in the political approach toward religion. The document recognizes the long-term existence of religion in China and guarantees freedom of religious belief. However, it reaffirms the atheist doctrine, stating that religion will disappear along with the improvement of socioeconomic and cultural conditions. This conventional Marxist interpretation of religion as opium was critically reflected by scholars, culminating in the so-called “opium war between the South and the North”. The debate symbolizes the clash of the orthodox Marxist view on religion by representatives of the IWR (North) and more liberal views by scholars from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and Nanjing University (South) (Duan 2009; Tao 2008). More liberal scholars argued for the contextualization of Marxist views on religion and stated that religion could not be reduced to the metaphor of an “opiate” (yapian, 鸦片). Although constrained by ideological discursive language, the debate marked a significant turning point in challenging previously unquestioned and hegemonic dogma, paving the way for greater tolerance within academic discourse. Similarly, the official discourse has also moved away from the opium thesis (Tao 2008, p. 72).

2.2.2. Cultural Turn and Positive Function of Religion in Society

The cultural turn in the late 1980s led to the recognition that religion is “inseparable from the cultural life of human beings” (Fang Litian quoted in Tao 2008, p. 69). During this time, we can also observe significant knowledge transfers from Western religious studies to China through translation projects and scholarly exchanges, contributing to diverse theories on religion and expanding the scope of research subjects to include Confucianism and popular religion. However, it was only under former President Jiang Zemin’s (江泽民, 1926–2022) leadership in 2001 that the party officially acknowledged religion as a part of a socialist society and endorsed efforts to adapt religion to the socialist framework (Zhuo 2013b, p. 26). Under Hu Jintao’s (胡锦涛, b. 1942) leadership, the concept of a “Harmonious Society” (hexie shehui, 和谐社会) was introduced in 2002. Religious communities were encouraged to accept its realization with contributions to dialog, moral education, and philanthropy (Laliberté et al. 2011; Scott Bell 2016, p. 69ff).4 The portrayal of different religions peacefully coexisting in China aimed to be a global model, particularly in countering “religious fanaticism” and the potential for a “clash of civilizations”. This involved state-backed efforts to promote global religious dialog, using religion as a soft-power tool in international relations to advance the idea of building a harmonious world (Ye 2000; Fällman 2010, p. 968).

The relaxation of religious policy following the Cultural Revolution, alongside the gradual abandonment of the opium thesis—first in academic and later in political contexts—enabled religious studies to define the function of religion within society in the discursive space shaped by the political plane. Furthermore, it facilitated a redefinition of Marxist theory of religion to align with Chinese circumstances. Lastly, it allowed for more objective research on religion, adapting the theory to empirical realities. The events also highlight the intertwined relationship between the political and academic planes, even though the official discourse sets the Marxist interpretative framework.

2.3. Sinicization of Theories of Religion and Its Political Implications

Religious studies scholars have worked on models for religious dialog and comparative religious studies. In 2006, Mou Zhongjian (牟钟鉴, b. 1939), a leading professor in religious studies at Minzu University in Beijing, introduced the theory of religious ecology to explain the rapid expansion of Protestant Christianity in China. His approach emphasized the interaction between elements of Chinese culture, noting the weakened position of traditional Chinese religions due to the anti-religious and anti-traditional movements in the 20th century, alongside the rise of an increasingly intolerant Protestantism. Mou Zhongjian advocated for political intervention to restore religious balance, contrasting with the widely accepted market theory, which emphasizes individual religious choice. While religious ecology theory was further developed and adapted by several scholars—though not always in a normative sense, as Philip Clart demonstrates (Clart 2013, p. 190ff.)—both official and some academic discourses continued to portray Christianity as an instrument of Western infiltration, posing a potential threat to Chinese identity and state security. Consequently, scholars have interpreted religious ecology theory as providing a conceptual basis for the politically driven sinicization of religion (Wesolowski 2023, p. 27).

Before the term sinicization was applied within a political context, it had already been incorporated into academic discourse on Buddhism and Christianity to describe the processes of cultural adaptation. In 2013, leading religious studies scholars Zhuo Xinping (卓新平, born 1955), a former director of the Institute of World Religions (IWR), and Zhang Zhigang (张志刚, b. 1956), a professor at Peking University and researcher in the Ethnic and Religious Theory section of the Chinese United Front Theory Research Association in Gansu, established a forum to discuss the sinicization of Christianity. They advocated for both the cultural and political inculturation of Christianity in the Chinese context (Z. Zhang 2011). According to Yang Fenggang, they meant to engage with the new leadership (Yang 2021, p. 29).

From 2015 onwards, party authorities issued the guideline “sinicization of religions” (zongjiao Zhongguohua, 宗教中国化). The incorporation of “Zhongguohua” into the official discourse was followed by a transition from a cultural sinicization (Y. Zheng 2017) to a political “Chinazation” (Wesolowski 2023, p. 19; Yang 2012, p. 16)5 or top-down sinicization (Madsen 2021, p. 1) aiming to systematically adapt the five officially recognized religions to political and ideological requirements, which became part of Xi Jinping’s vision for a “new Era” (Xin shidai, 新时代) (Vermander 2019; Jia 2023, p. 3). According to Ji Zhe and Xuan Fang, the sinicization of religion includes two meanings: “First, religion should obey the leadership of the Party, which means adapting to China’s existing system and maintaining its security; second, religion should play a certain role in shaping morality or interpreting a system of values, with the legitimacy of this morality and system of values then subject to the Party’s evaluation” (Ji and Fang 2024, p. 91). Additionally, the “Four Confidences” (sige zixin, 四个自信) were announced at the 19th National Congress in 2017, including the “confidence in our theory” (lilun zixin, 理论自信), which refers to sinicized Marxism, and “confidence in our culture” (wenhua zixin, 文化自信), which emphasizes that traditional Chinese culture is part of the official doctrine (Lee 2022, p. 60). The terms can be integrated into the sinicization agenda to construct a uniquely Chinese thought system and identity distinct from those of the West.

Alpermann and Fröhlich identify three key features shaping the relationship between official and academic discourses in China: 1. Active guidance and the limitation of (academic) discourses through “soft steering under the shadow of hierarchy”. 2. A top-down structure where academic discourse aligns with official formulations, creating a “follow the leader” dynamic. 3. The constant repetition of phrases from official discourse in academic writing, signaling political loyalty (or the “bandwagon effect”) (2020, p. 112). However, in the case of sinicization, academic discourse may have initially influenced official discourse. Research on the sinicization of Chinese religions, often combined with religious management strategies, has become a popular topic. It has also reframed the orientation of religion itself. This reframing occurs by positioning the field within the following:

• A Marxist framework;
• A context emphasizing Chinese political and cultural uniqueness.

In this environment, knowledge production in the study of religion is expected to serve the state. Scholars actively support and advance the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leadership, governance, and ideological objectives through their research, thus reinforcing state stability (Froissart 2018, p. 6). Scholarship becomes problem-oriented, with its value assessed based on its practical contributions to religious studies (Meinhof 2018, p. 331). As a result, scholars often assume the role of political advisors, and senior state officials frequently contribute to academic journals, resulting in a blurring of academic and political roles, often in the same individual (Meinhof 2018, p. 332).

3. Marxist Studies of Religion: Academic Responses to the Political Call

3.1. The Background of the Marxist Study of Religion

Ren Jiyu 任继愈 (1916–2009), one of the most prominent advocates of scientific atheism, a heavyweight in Chinese religious studies, and a former director of the IWR before and after the Cultural Revolution, was the first scholar to mention the term the Marxist study of religion (Makesizhuyi zongjiaoxue, 马克思主义宗教学) in 1979 and was the founder of the Chinese Association for religious studies. He defines the Marxist study of religion as “a science that examines, under the guidance of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, the regularities of genesis and development of religion and its eventual withering away” (Ren 2010, p. 70). He also emphasizes that the study of religion “must conduct research in scientific atheism” (Ren 2010). The idea of the decline of religion and scientific atheism as a fundamental theory are essential pillars in the Marxist study of religion. Ren Jiyu’s works still serve as important references. In 2009, the Research Office for the Marxist View on Religion (Makesizhuyi zongjiaoguan yanjiushi, 马克思主义宗教观研究室) was established at the Institute of World Religions (IWR), with a particular focus on studying Marxist classics, including the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. However, orthodox Marxist and atheist approaches became less influential in the study of religion, though some scholars continued to aim at strengthening the presence of scientific atheism within religious studies discourse.

3.2. Scholars and Officials

Although scholars represent the speaker’s position of their institution, they also represent a certain individual discourse position determined by ideological worldviews (Jäger and Maier 2016, p. 124f). Therefore, scholars employ subtle and overt discursive demarcations and coupling maneuvers to reinforce their positions or weaken discursive opponents. They also form loose groups with other actors of similar interests to increase influence and distance themselves from different groups (Schwab-Trapp 2002, p. 53). The scholars I refer to work as officials in key political institutions, like the United Front Department or the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the National Political Consultation Conference, maintaining close ties with the party. Elite discursive scholars employed by the CASS serve as scholars and, at the same time, as officials and advisors.6 They spread the agenda of the official discourse in universities by providing lectures, discussions, and training (Schwab-Trapp 2002, p. 76). Some actors systematically get involved in public discourse by spreading their interpretations on social media platforms like Weibo and WeChat (G. Zhang 2023, p. 11). Xi Wuyi (习五一, b. 1951) was especially famous for her posts on Weibo (Han 2022, p. 77; Yang 2012, p. 824). The posts mainly imply a critical view of religion or one that usually belongs to the discursive elite in religious studies.

3.3. Atheism and the Marxist Study of Religion

3.3.1. The Reintroduction of Atheism

Marxist or scientific atheism often appears to be a catchphrase. Nonetheless, the question arises: what is atheism in this context?

Li Lan distinguishes between three fundamental definitions of atheism.

• It entails a lack of belief in supernatural or divine forces.
• It involves actively rejecting such beliefs.
• It encompasses a perspective that deems the topic unworthy of consideration altogether. Additionally, he observes that within the Chinese tradition, atheism is characterized more by an absence of belief rather than forced disbelief (L. Li 2021, p. 786). He further asserts that ancient Chinese philosophers never explicitly advocated atheistic viewpoints. Instead, the Chinese philosophical framework lacks any ontological concept delineating a divine realm (L. Li 2021, p. 787). Li defines the atheism propagated by the CCP as an ideology (L. Li 2021, p. 806), which aims to replace religion with science, aesthetics, and philosophy (Yang 2012, p. 809). The official ideology of the CCP adheres to the principles of Marxist atheism, which political leaders consistently emphasize (Jia 2018, p. 7). Notably, the Chinese constitution does not mention “atheism”, stating instead that China is “under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism” (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 2019).

In 1978, Ren Jiyu became the Chairman of the Chinese Association for the Study of Atheism (Zhongguo wushenlun xuehui, 中国无神论学会, CAA).7 In 1979, he also took the position of the Chairman of the Chinese Association for Religious Studies (Zhongguo zongjiaoxue hui, 中国宗教学会, CARS). This dual presidency showed a close relationship between religious studies and atheism in the early Reform and Opening period.

In 1982, the passage of propagating atheism was removed from the constitution, and the influence of atheists decreased, which was considered a setback among atheists. The period from 1986 until 1997 is also called the “Nobody Talks on Atheism” period (wushenlun wu ren jiang, 无神论无人讲) (Han 2022, p. 69); given that atheist propaganda became marginalized, conferences (S. Li 2014, p. 35) and CAA meetings did not take place. This changed with the state’s fight against the increasingly strong Falun Gong movement. In 1997, the CAA was refunded and represented scholars from the natural and social sciences who rejected Falun Gong/Qigong (S. Li 2014, p. 35) and reasserted a form of scientific atheism. In 1999, the party under Jiang Zemin released the campaign “Education of Marxist materialism and atheism” to counter Falun Gong and highly supported atheist propaganda and education (Han 2022, p. 69).8 In the same year, the mouthpiece of atheists, Science and Atheism (Kexue yu wushenlun, 科学与无神论),9 was founded as a semi-annual journal supported by the party and government. It is issued by the School of Marxism at the CASS. The journal is classified as a religious studies journal and mainly publishes articles on the separation between religion and education (also providing studies on religious beliefs among university students and addressing these as a problem), sects/evil cults (xiejiao, 邪教), and atheists’ critiques on religion.10 The current principal editor is Gong Yun 龚云,11 who is also the vice chairman of the CAA and the director of the Research Center on Atheism (CASS).

In 2004, the Propaganda Department and five other departments jointly issued a document titled “Notice on Further Strengthening the Study and Propaganda Education of Marxist Atheism” to strengthen atheist education in party schools and administrative colleges, in media, and as a key topic in the development plan for the social sciences (Han 2022, p. 69). The document “Significance of Preventing the Infiltration of Colleges and Universities by Religion from Abroad and Preventing Campus Missionary Work” (Guanyu zuohao diyu jingwai liyong zongjiao dui gaoxiao jinxing shentou he fangfan xiaoyuan chuanjiao gongzuo de yiyi,《关于做好抵御境外利用宗教对高校进行渗透和防范校园传教工作的意义》) (Xi 2013, p. 26) was adopted in 2011, followed by several surveys on the religious beliefs of Chinese university students.12 Even though China is a self-identified atheist country, religions are pragmatically included to construct the national narrative, and atheism is never overrepresented in official discourse (Lu 2019), except for party members who were reminded again in 2016 to be atheists (Yan 2017, p. 21ff; Yang 2012, p. 824ff). In 2018, a document called for strengthening atheist propaganda education in rural eras, an era that also became a focus of the atheist research agenda and propaganda (G. Zhang 2023, p. 110). On the occasion of the CCP’s 100th anniversary in 2021, the party called for strengthening education on Marxist materialism and atheism. At the National Religious Work Conference 2021, atheist education was also targeted. Han Qi describes the period from 2017 to 2022 as a success story for atheism (Han 2022, p. 70). Relating the contents of party-state-released documents and articles in Science and Atheism, it becomes evident that publications in Science and Atheism reveal an overlapping of the CCP and atheist discourse concerning atheist ideology. Actors absorb interpretive patterns from the hegemonic discourse that align with their views to gain greater influence. They also proactively advance topics. The official WeChat account of Science and Atheism has become much more active within the past year. Since April 2024, it has been called the Chinese Atheist Association (CAA, Zhongguo wushenlun xuehui, 中国无神论学会), and it now publishes almost daily announcements about conferences and calls for papers as well as articles published in Science and Atheism (as of May 2024). It also seems to be the main aim of atheist scholars or academic politicians to spread the idea that the propagation of atheism and freedom of religion is not a contradiction (G. Zhang 2023, p. 108) and to reintegrate the term atheism into the constitution.

3.3.2. Discussion on the Correct Understanding of Religious Studies

The academic orientation of the discipline of religious studies has been continuously negotiated. Some scholars demand that scientific atheism be considered the guiding principle in religious studies. Other scholars reject interest-driven research in religion that serves to realize an ideological goal. Marxism is related to scientific atheism, which is different from Western atheism since it is based on historical materialism and dialectical materialism, standpoints, manners, and methods (Zhuo 2022, p. 239). Scholars advocating atheism define Chinese tradition as secular, indicating that China was never a religious country (Yan 2017, p. 17). Atheism is also discussed as contrary to Western theist religious “superstition”. Therefore, some actors seek to ban the influence of Western religious studies from Chinese religious studies since it does “theology in religious studies”, as they associate it with Westernization and separation (Yang 2012, p. 824). Criticisms against religious studies intensified following the death of Ren Jiyu in 2009, leading to the establishment of atheist research institutes given that scientific atheism continued to lose influence (Yang 2012, p. 823ff.).

In 2013, Xi Wuyi claimed that theology was being practiced within religious studies, contradicting the principle of maintaining a separation between the state education system and religion. Consequently, she suggested a careful observation of how religion is approached within universities. Furthermore, she recommended a particular increase in government action to uphold the principle of separation between education and religion and to guard against foreign influence (Xi 2013).

Zhao Dunhua (赵敦华, b. 1949), a former head of the School of Religious Studies at Beijing University, responded directly to the criticism on the IWR website in the same year. He dismissed her critiques by referring to the official guidelines of religious studies, highlighting the discipline’s role as a mediator between atheists and believers while being guided by a Marxist view on religion. Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of objective representation, sympathetic understanding, and rationality as fundamental approaches within the study of religion (Zhao 2013). He rejected Xi Wuyi’s accusations, characterizing them as conspiracy theories. Furthermore, he pointed to a deficiency in well-trained personnel in atheist studies and emphasized that religious studies is a discipline that is officially recognized by the state (Zhao 2013).

In response to Zhuo Xinping’s 2013 speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the IWR, Du Jiwen (杜继文, b. 1930), Buddhist studies and former short-term director of the IWR in 1987, criticized the “hegemonic (baqi 霸气) interpretive authority of religious studies in public discourse” (Du 2014, p. 130). He highlighted the marginalization and criticism of those with different opinions (Du 2014, p. 130), which creates pressure for uniformity within the discipline (Du 2013, p. 15). Referring to Max Müller, recognized as the founder of the study of religion, Du Jiwen also critiqued the Christian or missionary influence on religious studies (Du 2014, p. 134). In response, Zhuo Xinping did not deny the theological origins of the scientific study of religion. However, he emphasized the scientific framework of religious studies, its interdisciplinary approach, and its independence from institutional churches (Zhuo 2014, p. 127).

In an influential article published in 2014, Zhao Dunhua analyzed Marxist writings to argue against militant atheism (Zhao 2014).13 He quoted Engels, who said that forcing people to be atheists would only strengthen religions (Zhao 2014). He also highlighted that, according to Marx, there is no need for atheism in a socialist society.14

Debates among scholars have been conducted in a harsh tone. The discursive elite scholars have critiqued each other without explicitly mentioning or directly quoting each other. The proponents of atheism have complained about the marginalization of atheist studies. They have aimed to limit the discursive space for religious studies by challenging its scientific objectivity and presuming an entanglement with theology. In contrast, scholars of religious studies have stabilized their interpretative scheme by providing “correct interpretation of Marx and Engels” and rarely quoting Lenin. Zhao Dunhua and Xi Wuyi employed vertical coupling maneuvers to align their narratives with official discourse. This strategy legitimized their discourse by reaffirming the state’s commitment to supporting their discipline. Both atheist studies and religious studies benefit from state funding. Nevertheless, for political practice and religious administration, atheism as a part of the academic landscape seems to be more influential because of the appearance of different regulations to prevent the spread of religions (especially Christianity in universities), to limit the space for Western liberal philosophy, and to restrict people under the age of 18 from entering religious sites. In practice, atheist discourse is less remote than Du Jiwen’s characterization of it suggests. Certainly, a scientific atheist perspective on religion would narrow the scope of religious studies and lead to a discrepancy between social reality and ideological research assumptions.

However, since 2019, the term the Marxist study of religion has become very prominent in the political part of religious studies journals and conferences, and NSSF research projects on atheism within religious studies have increased.15 This raises another question about the conception of a Marxist study of religion.

3.4. Xi Jinping’s Call for a Marxist Study of Religion

The year 2021 can be seen as a pivotal moment in which scholars contributed to shaping a disciplinary framework for the Marxist study of religion. This implies that Marxism is not merely an element of religious studies but that religious studies should be aligned with a Marxist framework. At the National Conference on Religious Work in December 2021, Xi Jinping, as a representative of the political plane, called for establishing three teams, the party, religious representatives, and scholars of religion (san zhi duiwu, 三支队伍), with all three working together to improve religious work in China (Xi Jinping Zai Quanguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Huiyi 2021). For religious studies, it became “necessary to cultivate a team of researchers who are firm in ideology and politics, adhere to the Marxist view on religion, have an excellent academic style, and are good at innovation” (Xi Jinping Zai Quanguo Zongjiao Gongzuo Huiyi 2021). Xi Jinping also proposed the so-called “three big systems” (San Da Tixi 三大体系 2021): the system of the discipline (xueke tixi, 学科体系), the academic system (xueshu tixi, 学术体系), and the academic discourse system (xueshu huayu tixi, 学术话语体系). According to these three categories, scholars would be expected to develop the discipline of the Marxist study of religion, to support and advise the party-state in religious governance, and to develop influential international theories based on the Chinese context (Zhuo 2019).

Furthermore, Xi Jinping announced the strengthening of a discipline of the Marxist study of religion. This suggests that the official discourse aims to reshape and homogenize scholarly agendas and discourse positions in alignment with the official aim of making China Marxist again (Cheek and Ownby 2018).

This situation has led to increased support and funding for advancing the Marxist study of religion, potentially limiting opportunities for alternative theoretical frameworks. In March 2022, for instance, the Research Institute of Marxist Religious Studies in the New Age was established at Zhejiang University City College (Xinshidai makesizhuyi zongjiaoxue yanjiuyuan, 新时代马克思主义宗教学研究院) (You Yi Jian Da Shi 2022).16 The institute also signed cooperation agreements with the Marxist Study of Religion Research Center at Northwest University of Political Science and Law (Xifa Daxue makesizhuyi zongjiaoxue yanjiu zhongxin, 西法大学马克思主义宗教学研究中心) in Xi’an and the Religious Research Center at Xinjiang Normal University (Xinjiang Shifan Daxue xinjiang zongjiao yanjiu zhongxin, 新疆师范大学新疆宗教研究中心) in Urumqi (Yanjiuyuan 2023).17

3.5. Analysis of Academic Response

I read approximately 15 articles and several books to understand the current debate on the Marxist study of religion. Most articles begin with Xi Jinping’s formulations and then proceed with a draft of the discipline’s framework and characterization or describe its consistent evolution (e.g., Zeng 2023). The Marxist study of religion draws on both Marxist classics and contributions from Chinese scholars like Ren Jiyu. This approach emphasizes a uniquely Chinese perspective that seeks to develop its own theories and methods. While the existence of religion in Chinese society is acknowledged, the new discipline and its teaching materials are intended to support society better and align with religious policies to further socialism with Chinese characteristics (He and Wang 2022, p. 4, 13). As Zheng Xiaoyun (郑筱筠, b. 1969), the current Director of the IWR, puts it, “We must integrate theory with practice and continuously advance theoretical and practical innovation” (X. Zheng 2022, p. 8). The primary goal is to create a discipline with a unified disciplinary, academic, and discourse system to realize political demands (Wang 2023, p. 180).

For closer reading and analysis, I selected five essays by researchers who have contributed drafts on the (Marxist) study of religion in the “new era” and whose works have been published in leading journals. The scholars belong to the discursive scholarly/official elite engaging actively with the official discourse and supporting the decision-making process of the party and the government. Furthermore, I chose these representatives because they reference each other.

Li Jianxin 李建欣, a Senior Editor and Researcher at the IWR, published a draft in 2020, which he presented in lectures available on the video platform Bilibili (B 站). Jia Runguo (加润国, b. 1964), the deputy director at the Religious Studies Center within the United Front Department, has published numerous critical articles on Western religious studies. In 2020, he adopted the term “Marxist study of religion”. He has expanded on it in various articles, arguing that Western ideas have influenced Chinese religious studies and should be corrected to align with “correct ideology” (Jia 2020, p. 9). Fu Youde (傅有德), director of the Institute for Judaism and Interreligious Research at Shandong University, critically evaluated both approaches (2022).18 In addition to publishing numerous articles, Zhuo Xinping provided a comprehensive outline of the Marxist study of religion in a new book published in 2023. He and his team were assigned a research project on that topic in 2019 by the School of Marxism (CASS). They were also responsible for the release of “Research on Basic Theoretical Issues in Religious Studies with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era”, funded by the National Social Science Fund (NSSF) Special Major Research Program (Guojia sheke jijin zhuanxiang zhongda xiangmu, 国家社科基金专项重大项目) (Zhuo 2022, p. 2).19 Lü Jianfu 吕建福, a Professor at Sichuan University and the Institute of Daoism and Religious Culture, working on Buddhism and minorities, provided a detailed exploration of the Chinese Marxist study of religion, grounded in his reflections on Lü Daji’s (吕大吉, 1931–2012, an influential scholar within Chinese religious studies) work. Except Ji Runguo, all the scholars have a background in religious studies and are affiliated with either a university or the Institute of World Religions. Fu Youde, Zhuo Xinping, and Lü Jianfu also participated in the 2022 conference on “Establishing a Marxist Study of Religion”, held at Sichuan University (Ran 2022).

The positions of these five scholars will now be briefly introduced. The texts address the place of religious studies within the academic system and its subdisciplines, the role of atheism in religious studies, and the evaluation of Western religious studies.

3.5.1. The Marxist Study of Religion Within the Academic System

Although Marxism is often seen as a foundational framework in religious studies, it is frequently treated as a subdiscipline, prominently positioned, for instance, as the first category in scholarly journals (e.g., in Zhuo 2023). Jia Runruo, however, conceptualizes religious studies itself as a subfield within Marxism, assigning its other branches, such as sociology, to their corresponding main academic disciplines. In this view, the Marxist study of religion encompasses topics like the theory and history of religions, atheism, religion and politics, and the sociology and anthropology of religion (Jia 2020). Jia Runruo’s approach closely aligns religious studies with official discourse, using it to support atheist propaganda and state religious policy. By contrast, Li Jianxin, drawing inspiration from Ninian Smart’s theory of religion, outlines a model of religious studies that is rooted in the humanities and social sciences. His framework aims to depart from the traditional emphasis on Religious Philosophy and the History of Religion (J. Li 2020, p. 20). It is divided into humanities-focused foundational research, which includes subdivisions like religious history and religious philosophy, as well as sociology-focused applied research, covering areas such as the psychology of religion and religious economics (J. Li 2020, p. 20). Although he incorporates official discourse, Li Jianxin avoids establishing a clear divide between Chinese and Western approaches to religious studies, and he does not foreground Marxism as the primary perspective. Fu Youde presents a third approach, categorizing religious studies as a first-tier discipline within the broader humanities and social sciences fields. While he acknowledges Marxism and materialism as guiding frameworks, he proposes referring to this field simply as “religious studies”, allowing it more independence (Fu 2022, p. 4). Fu Youde applies the rules of official discourse to religious studies by still leaving space for defining it as an independent first-tier discipline, which was an earlier goal of religious studies scholars.20 He seeks to mitigate tensions between atheists and religious scholars by recommending a separation of religious studies from theology. Zhuo Xinping regards religious studies as an open and interdisciplinary field. While Marxism serves as a guiding framework, the discipline also critically engages with traditional Chinese culture and contemporary society (Zhuo 2013b, p. 3). Furthermore, he argues that religious studies are one type of religious research in which scholars dedicate themselves to objective, scientific, and neutral research while also suspending their own beliefs. He further distinguishes between religious “policies” (zhengzhi, 政治) carried out by government departments to serve their religious work practices and religious research conducted to protect religion (hujiao, 护教) (Zhuo 2013b, p. 4f.). Here, he draws a clear line between politically driven studies conducted by state agencies and scholarly religious studies that aim for objective analyses of social reality. Lastly, Lü Jianfu, like Jia Runguo, advocates for more narrowly defined religious studies aligned with Marxist theory, scientific atheism, and state religious policies. He critiques overly broad approaches as lacking scientific rigor and argues that they mimic Western models that allow religion to pervade many aspects of life and science, thereby leading to confusion between religious studies as an academic field and religious practice itself (Lü 2023).

3.5.2. Atheism in Religious Studies

Jia Runguo views atheist studies as a fundamental component of the Marxist study of religion, considering it both a starting point and conclusion for the discipline (Jia 2020, p. 11). His framework emphasizes analyzing the historical trajectory and theoretical underpinnings of religion’s eventual “extinction” (xiaowang, 消亡), a perspective that distinguishes his work from that of other scholars who do not explore this aspect (Jia 2020, p. 10).

Fu Youde, however, disagrees with Jia’s approach, arguing that religious studies should not inherently dismiss the existence of deities or similar concepts. For him, atheist studies should remain a subdiscipline within the Marxist framework of religious studies rather than defining the entire field (Fu 2022, p. 3). Li Jianxin notably omits atheist theory from his conceptual framework. Meanwhile, Zhuo aligns closely with official discourse, deliberately steering clear of promoting militant atheism. Instead, he focuses on integrating religion into a socialist context and prioritizes the creation of a harmonious society as a core principle of religious studies, explicitly excluding any militant atheist perspective (Zhuo 2023, p. 355).

3.5.3. The Evaluation of “Western Religious Studies”

Religious studies theories evolve in different contextual backgrounds, and not all theories can be verified in a transcultural context (Matthes 2005; Fan 2011). Therefore, scholars aim to develop a framework within religious studies corresponding to the Chinese context. However, we can find different evaluations of Western religious studies. In Jia Runguo’s text, a binary between China and the West appears, in which the negative Western influence on the discipline in China must be removed, and religious studies should be absorbed by Marxism on both ideological and institutional levels. He criticizes Chinese religious studies for mindlessly following the “superstition” of Western religious studies and for its dependence on Chinese humanistic traditions (Jia 2023, p. 4). He points out that Western religious studies have missionary purposes and seek to explain, understand, and defend religion (Jia 2023, p. 5). In contrast, Zhuo Xinping emphasizes that Western religious studies derive from their own discursive context and discourse order. He suggests analyzing the development of religious studies from dialectical theology and remarks further that Chinese religious studies should not wholly deny Western religious studies. He reminds us not to stop research on theology, since its relevance is for a broad conception of religious studies and interactions with international research (Zhuo 2019, p. 6). In another article, Zhuo underscores the distinctions between Marxist and Western religious studies, noting that the former is often undervalued due to political factors rather than academic merit (Zhuo 2022, p. 155). In contrast, Fu Youde raises some points where Chinese religious studies can learn from Western institutions (Fu 2022, p. 6).

Notably, scholars do not mention the sinicization of religion in the analyzed texts. In his article on the Marxist study of religion, Zhuo Xinping defines the research on religion in contemporary Chinese society as the sinicization element in the Marxist study of religion. For Zhuo Xinping, “Chinese characteristics” represent a form of religious studies labeled as Marxist. It incorporates the study of Chinese traditions within the context of globalization and systematically explores religions of the world using comparative methods to understand religious phenomena in society and offer solutions for religious issues (Zhuo 2019, p. 1). It does not aim to eliminate religions but rather to produce academic knowledge on religions to contribute to the revitalization of China. Furthermore, he expands sinicization to the religious context and states that it should adapt positively to Chinese society and not alienate itself (yihua, 异化) from society (Zhuo 2022, p. 160), which aligns with official discourse. In an article some years ago, Zhuo Xinping criticizes what he sees as religion’s being degenerated into an “other” (linglei, 另类), thus being distorted or excluded from social life. Therefore, he suggests treating religion less as a sensitive political issue (mingan de zhengzhi huati, 敏感的政治话题) and instead approaching it from a cultural and mental health perspective (Zhuo 2013a). He certainly still insists on a tolerant attitude towards religion, but he does not use this terminology in his publications.

4. Discussion and Conclusions

The “Marxist study of religion” emerged only in recent years in political discourse and is now integrated into the academic field by officials and scholars. It belongs to the top-down process of sinicization and can also be understood as a redefinition of the relationship between Chinese academia and Western knowledge production within religious studies.21

The scholarly works introduced here mainly operate within the party’s ideological framework and align their research with the Chinese official discourse. Engaging with and interpreting these directives creates opportunities to assert their perspectives, even within restricted discursive boundaries. If these scholars choose not to engage, the space may be occupied by critics of the current framework in religious studies. Figures such as Zhuo Xinping employ strategies that emphasize tolerance over religious suppression, aligning with the United Front policy to promote social harmony and stability. The integration of official formulations also can offer an opportunity to interpret it in a wider discursive context (Becker 2021, p. 278). While covering the official code, Zhuo Xinping combines the Marxist study of religion with tradition and opens space for more work on Chinese culture and Chinese thought, using the term Sino-religious Studies (Hanyu zongjiaoxue, 汉语宗教学) (Zhuo 2024, p. 13). These strategies blur the lines between scientific suggestions and integrate official formulations in academic discourse and research. The party-state obtains a position in which it guides religious belief, religious institutions, and religious studies. Religious studies align with the official policy and have the function of developing what they regard as the correct understanding of religion and religious practice within the academy and society to guarantee healthy development.

However, discursive diversity is shrinking, and the study of religion is encountering challenges in research, fieldwork, and publication (yanjiu nan, diaoyan nan, fabiao nan; 研究难, 调研难, 发表难) (Yan 2023, p. 79). According to Yan Kejia 晏可佳, the director of the Religious Studies Institute at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the primary issue revolves around understanding the discipline (Yan 2023, p. 79). Scholars engage with religious communities and their religious ideas, acting as intermediaries between these communities and the government (Madsen 2021, p. 4). As a consequence, some interpret scholarly work as a promotion of religion (xuanjiao, 宣教) (Yan 2023, p. 79). Additionally, limitations in publishing, the lack of high-ranking journals,22 and ideology and censorship have compelled scholars to branch out of the discipline or discouraged young academics from studying religion. The Annual National Social Science Religious Studies Project Analysis Report shows that while religious studies successfully gained 126 research projects in 2013, the number of research projects declined to 92 in 2023. Since 2020, there has been a relatively substantial decline in research projects (See

Table 1. Number of research projects in religious studies, 2013–2023 (Annual National Social Science Religious Studies Project Analysis Report).23

Year	2023	2022	2021	2020	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013
Number of projects	92	100	108	115	129	127	126	128	115	126	126

).

The political plane, represented by the official discourse, wields significant influence within religious studies, but internal power struggles persist, particularly between atheists and religious scholars in China. Critical perspectives on religion within the political sphere further align religious studies with official discourse, narrowing discursive space. Conversely, pursuing theories with distinctly Chinese characteristics provides an opportunity to explore the Chinese context without being overly influenced by Western knowledge production. The future development of this field will be fascinating to observe.