We begin by reporting on the functioning of MNH referral and specialist outreach support systems in the three districts through the eyes of local actors. We then consider key governance factors enabling and constraining these local systems and draw out lessons for the management of interdependencies in local health systems.
3.1. Referral Systems
The perceived functioning of referral systems in the three districts lay on a continuum from mostly functional in D1, to improving
‘but not 100% smooth’ in D2, to
‘a massive challenge’ in D3. These differences arose from a complex interplay of the settings (urban, rural), strengths and weaknesses of individual facilities in the referral pathway (including facilities beyond the district), EMS functioning, the nature of relationships between actors in the pathway, local agreements, and the wider organisation of services and governance processes. This complexity is illustrated in the description of events leading to a maternal death in
Box 1.
A senior provincial clinician recounted how a junior doctor in a district hospital. “… had a patient who was bleeding in theatre, he did everything, but the patient continued to bleed. We said, okay, … tie the uterus and then call the ambulance … He tried to call these people who were nearby who were senior, he couldn’t get hold of them, but for him to sit and see … the patient … move from pink to pale to death … He’s supposed to have a senior person when he’s in trouble, but the only senior person he can get is in [the capital city] on the phone. The second thing is the ambulance must quickly be able to come. When the ambulance comes, you find that they didn’t bring the correct experienced person… Now they have to … wait for the advanced person, the patient is still continuing to bleed…. He is waiting for the blood, in the fridges there is only two bloods. The other blood he can only get is in the blood bank two hours away. When he called … they said the driver is going and an hour later you call the driver, and he says, no, no, I didn’t get the message, was I supposed to go there?” (Pr, D2)
Supplementary Table S1 provides a detailed inventory of referral themes along the dimensions outlined in the methods for each district, and explored further in the narrative below.
3.1.1. Referral Policy/Strategy
All three districts reported provincial referral policies, but these policies remained ‘desk top’ (S,D3) unless they were (re)-negotiated, adapted, and elaborated into standard operating procedures for specific district and sub-district contexts. Local agreements were required, firstly, to manage cross-border flows of patients between sub-districts, districts, provinces, and even countries, as natural catchment areas did not always correspond with sub-district and district demarcations; secondly, on the allocation of roles, such as where uncomplicated maternal deliveries would take place and whether regional hospitals could provide district hospital services to surrounding communities; and thirdly, on bypassing when the requisite expertise was not available at the next level of the pathway. These were raised as issues of concern particularly in D2 and D3. Provincial authorities introduced mechanisms (including service level agreements and regular forums) to address these challenges in D2, while D3 relied mostly on informal arrangements or ad hoc facilitation by partners to resolve problems. As recounted by a clinical manager in D3: “We were struggling when we called X [regional hospital name], X would say no, no you refer to Y [regional hospital name] and you call Y and they would say no, no refer to X… Then that is when Mphatlalatsane came in, lucky enough, and the district also came in… then it was sorted out” (S,D3).
3.1.2. Adequately Resourced Facilities
Referral systems depended not only on agreed roles in the referral pathway, but also on the capacity to fulfil these roles. In all three districts, interviewees described imbalances in the distribution of resources and capabilities. This took different forms. One sub-district of D1 had a “distorted service delivery platform” (D, D1) of regional and tertiary facilities, but no district hospital beds, and a legacy of segregated apartheid hospital planning. As a result, the designated maternal–newborn specialist facility was “at capacity probably 364 days of the year” (S, D1), and unable to accept referrals. In contrast, the district hospital in another sub-district of D1 established its own specialist obstetric and paediatric services, including a neonatal intensive care unit. While compensating for weaknesses at a higher level, this district hospital lacked key support functions, such as a blood bank, normally associated with specialised services. These imbalances necessitated considerable day-to-day problem solving and brokerage by clinicians and programme managers across the platform. As recounted by a senior manager in this hospital: “We’ve even swopped babies, you know, … that’s an ongoing thing and Dr X [DCST paediatrician] really assisted us in this regard being a liaison between us and [referral hospital] …” (S, D1).
In the two rural districts (D2 and D3), there was a perceived mismatch between the distribution of skilled midwives and uncomplicated maternal deliveries, specifically between (under-utilised) 24 h CHCs and (overworked) district hospitals. The chief executive officer (CEO) of a district hospital described the efforts and persuasion required to shift this pattern: “[CHC name] has got two delivery rooms, their challenge was water…I assisted them and said ‘now deliver’. And they said ‘hey, we have not delivered for so long we can’t remember.’ I said ‘come to the hospital and refresh.’ But then they said ‘look, when do I come to the hospital because in the clinic we are short staffed?’ There are all those dynamics…” (S, D3). A more rational distribution of staff and services was made difficult by fragmented human resource pools and reporting lines between PHC and hospital services. High turnover of junior community service doctors at these hospitals also posed a challenge (discussed further under outreach).
Respondents in these districts highlighted how relatively small but critical bottlenecks in supplies had ripple effects on the referral pathway. For example, district hospitals had established neonatal high care units, including staffing, equipment (e.g., incubators and continuous positive airway pressures (CPAP) machines), essential drugs (e.g., surfactant for pre-term infants), and dedicated champions. However, one unit was without medical air and another without replacement piping for the CPAP machine for some months, creating referral overloads of pre-term infants to their respective regional hospitals. This was also a source of demotivation: “I feel like the disappointments in the system, the struggles logistically … has tapped the energy of many people and so essentially they are in a space where they just don’t really care that much anymore” (D, D3).
3.1.3. Functioning Emergency Medical Services
Overall perceptions of the referral system correlated with EMS functioning in each district. In urban D1, although not without challenges (highlighted in
Supplementary Table S1), inter-facility transfers by EMS were considered largely unproblematic by both PHC and hospital clinicians:
“…we can transfer a patient from [CHC name] MOU [midwife obstetric unit] to [district hospital name] and the patient is there within an hour after discussion, and the same goes for transfers to [tertiary hospital name]” (S, D1). This is borne out in the data on response rates and availability of vehicles.
In contrast, in D3, EMS was “massive trouble” (S, D3) at all levels of the system: “[the regional hospital] [will] accept the patient … but the patient might definitely leave after six or eight hours and that is so frustrating, it creates a lot of headaches” (S, D3). In the PHC system, the wait for an ambulance could “go up to three hours after you have called… sometimes it does not come at all…” (S, D3). Acute shortages of ambulances (evident in very low ratios per population) and skilled personnel were compounded by poor triaging and prioritising at the central provincial call centre, unable to distinguish between a genuine emergency and people calling the ambulance “as a taxi … to town” (S, D3). Ambulances were not stationed at or near health facilities where district and sub-district players could develop informal relationships with EMS managers.
Despite a shortage of ambulances and skilled staff, the EMS in D2 was considered reasonably functional against a backdrop of active efforts by provincial authorities to resolve challenges. Ambulances were stationed at facilities (even if the call centre remained central), and EMS managers became assimilated into the informal systems of communication and accountability in the district: “…we’ve got a WhatsApp group here… If I have called the ambulance and there is a delay, she posts the message to the WhatsApp, … and whoever sees the message, it’s connected to the district office… even the district manager, you will see they’re responding ‘I have called the EMS manager to assist’. Yeah, we will communicate in that way, [so] that there is no maternal issue that is not attended. And immediately the EMS manager saw that there is something downwards, his people are not attending to it, he will push because he knows when they go for a meeting, it will be tough” (D, D2).
Interviewees were in favour of ambulances stationed at district and regional hospitals for inter-facility transfers of emergencies. One district hospital manager further indicated that (contrary to national regulations) these ambulances would not require skilled EMS personnel, often a referral stumbling block, since a hospital staff member could accompany the patient and return to the hospital in the same ambulance.
3.1.4. Communication and Collaboration
Communication and collaborative relationships were considered the essential ‘software’ [
27] of smooth referral systems. As indicated by a clinical manager:
“…we communicate frequently and we make sure that we keep in touch … because we know that we are the ones who need the services” (S, D3). Dense networks of communication, straddling a variety of interfaces, were evident in all three districts, which were made possible by common platforms (in particular WhatsApp) and new modes of convening since the COVID-19 pandemic. In one district, the Director of PHC Services was in three WhatsApp groups involving a progressively wider circle of players above and below her in the district. Interactions in these groups were key to everyday problem solving, as described for EMS above, and produced a general shift from the formal to the informal and from face-to-face to virtual modes of communication and decision-making. As recounted by one manager:
“Initially we never had the informal meetings. We only had formal meetings…. I think people are getting more used to those things. So it is easier to manage than when we’re waiting for formal meetings, because formal meetings might be monthly, might be biweekly, it takes longer. But informal is better because you do it as and when it is needed … it addresses the problem immediately” [D, D2].
While there was a move towards technology-enhanced environments, and cellular communication and Wi-Fi in particular, access to these technologies was not universal. A key challenge, lying beyond the procurement capabilities of the health system, was the unavailability of mobile networks in deep rural areas, posing significant challenges for emergency referrals in the absence of alternatives (such as landlines and radios). Moreover, the technologies in use, while enabling new communication networks, remained at a basic level. In one district, a nationally developed referral and communication application (called ‘Vula’) was being trialled, but beyond this, more advanced forms of telehealth were not evident.
Communication networks were supported by semi-formal local structures established to enable collaboration across referral interfaces. In both D1 and D3, clinical managers were part of regular medical forums, playing a variety of instrumental (e.g., sharing of specialised resources) and mentoring roles. In D1, this forum met monthly, discussing “whatever problems we have in the institutions and there’s a lot of fruitful things that came [of that]… in our various discussions we’ve noted that psychiatric services is a problem. And now we’re trying to establish an outreach from [psychiatric hospital] for their specialist to come to our hospital to assist with the care of our mental health care patients… it’s also a good platform to integrate services” (S, D3). Similar problem solving fora between nursing service managers and between PHC facilities and the local hospital were also reported.
However, these various coordination mechanisms were patchy and relied on champions, tended to follow professional lines, and did not necessarily involve all the relevant players required for authoritative decision-making; they were also not always able to overcome structural silos, in particular, the separation of PHC, district hospital and EMS services at sub-district levels. Collaborative relationships at these interfaces remained uneven, and as indicated earlier, created inefficiencies in services, staffing, and accountabilities in the referral chain. For example, “if my perception … working in the higher level is that the lower level staff… did not actually manage the patient well or they just attempted to move it on to the next level of care, how do you then address that because the person who is in charge of the hospital doesn’t have any jurisdiction over the clinic staff?” (D, D3). Similarly, a vertical EMS reporting line to the province undermined relationships and coordination at district level: “EMS is a little island … EMS comes when they have got challenges and then they expect intervention from the district, but when it also suits them [they say] ‘we don’t report to the district so the district can’t tell us what to do’” (D, D1). Senior managers in two provinces, P1 and P2, recognised these as core governance and system design challenges and introduced, or were in the process of introducing, appropriate system reforms (discussed further under governance).
3.2. Outreach Systems
3.2.1. Models of Outreach
MNH outreach in the three districts consisted of a combination of long-established programme managers (nursing cadres) at district and sub-district levels, outreach from facility clinicians (medical and other) in a cascade model spanning tertiary to PHC services, and the DCSTs based in the district office (
Supplementary Table S2).
Although popular amongst frontline providers, the DCSTs were being phased out in the three provinces. At the time of data gathering, only D3 still had a sizeable DCST, consisting of five members. D1 had a district paediatrician and shared an obstetrician with a neighbouring district, while in one province (P2), the DCSTs were disbanded and replaced with a system of specialist outreach from regional hospitals. This was conducted, according to a senior provincial manager, because “when patients are supposed to be transferred to a hospital which need the resources in terms of specialists, the specialists are not there … we have a gynaecologist in the district office …but at the regional hospital where the ICU bed is … we don’t have a specialist … that’s why they took a decision to say specialists in the regional hospital … will do outreach from the regional hospital to the district hospital, not from the district office” (Pr, D2). Medical specialists were appointed at the five regional hospitals “…to oversee the entire clinical operations … in their catchment area. And what we wanted to see happen here is that the clinical leadership actually takes ownership and accountability for all clinical processes—case management, case referral, down referral, out referral, clinical support for them, clinical support meaning outreach support for clinical care and governance, reviewing data as a unit, responding to data as a unit” (Pr, D2). Two provincial coordination, support and oversight mechanisms, referred to as obstetrics and neonatal response teams, were established by tertiary level clinicians, bringing together regional clinicians, programme managers, and key support functions (blood bank, EMS, pharmacy).
Provincial managers in another one of the provinces (P1) also viewed this as the most rational approach: “if we want a system that works well, our regional and tertiary facilities should have clinicians that have structured outreach programmes. Now the DCST is … a compromise because we didn’t have enough people to do that” (Pr, D1). In this province, the remaining DCSTs were increasingly being drawn into provincial strategic and system (re)design roles.
An additional challenge was that DCSTs were not planned with the programme managers in mind and there was duplication of roles, particularly in the nurse-based PHC system. As one programme manager recounted: “to me it is almost same, DCSTs they mentor and train, and make sure if policies are implemented, but most of the time it’s done by a programme manager” (D, D1). An implicit hierarchy between the DCSTs and MNH programme managers furthermore undermined the “ownership and agency” (Pa, D2), of the latter.
Although P2’s cascade model and central response teams were considered the most efficient and sustainable design for outreach, the approach was still in the early stages of implementation and faced a number of challenges. This model required, firstly, significant mindset shifts amongst specialists: “…when the DCSTs were disbanded, obviously we went to the specialist guys, this is the new model, and they looked at us as though we were crazy that we were saying that they must go and do what? What about the patients in their hospital? So, they just didn’t get the concept that problems at the PHC become your district hospital problems. Problems at the district hospital become your regional hospital problems. Regional hospitals automatically become your tertiary hospital problems” (Pa, D2); secondly, availability of resources for travelling in the district, which were yet to be provided; and thirdly, a system of oversight with clear expectations and answerability: “If nobody’s going to ask you, did you do outreach, if nobody’s even worried about [it] … how are you going to be reimbursed, you’re just going to sit back and not do it” (Pa, D2).
In the light of this, frontline clinicians, especially in district hospitals expressed a preference for the dedicated and “hands on” (S, D2) clinical governance and support provided by the DCSTs, and their disbandment in D2 was experienced as a loss. Paradoxically, the MNH outreach system in D3, which operated without a provincially formulated or supported outreach strategy, but which had a combination of a strong DCST, programme manager, and regional hospital, was perceived the most favourably of the three districts.
3.2.2. Outreach Roles
Table S2 summarises the outreach roles of clinical care, training/mentorship, and audit/M&E in the three districts. Regional hospital specialists and DCSTs generally provided clinical outreach in district hospitals, but bar a few exceptions, there was no clinical outreach from district hospitals to PHC for maternal–newborn services. Complex cases were referred up to ‘high risk’ clinics. This was considered a key gap—for example, in support for the identification and management of hypertension antenatally—and was in contrast to the more developed outreach to PHC clinics for other disease programmes (notably HIV and TB).
All three districts had active MNH in-service education programmes based on nationally recognised courses. Programme managers (with support from DCSTs) steered the planning and organisation of training through a variety of structures and processes: regional training centres (D1), partner initiatives (D2, D3), and the obstetric and neonatal response teams (D2). In-service training appeared more anchored in the planning and management routines of D1 and D2 than in D3, where continuing education was “not departmentalised” (D, D3), and relied on ad hoc arrangements, described by one manager as “normalised anomaly” (S, D3). Provincial clinical specialist coordinators in this province who were supposed to oversee the outreach system were no longer in place. There were gaps, for example, in the induction of new community service doctors in surgical and anaesthetic skills to conduct caesarean sections, referred to by one interviewee as “a public health disaster waiting to happen” (D, D3). Clinical skills development in this district was de facto delegated to clinical managers in district hospitals “placing a lot of reliance on one individual to be multi-skilled” (D, D3).
A mix of national, provincial, and district MNH audit tools and processes were in use in the districts, and were understood to be a core, clinical governance function of programme managers and specialist teams. Notwithstanding the interruptions of COVID-19 lockdowns, many facilities had perinatal mortality review meetings, feeding data into an information system referred to as the Perinatal Problem Identification Programme (PPIP). However, PPIP meetings were attended by clinicians who did not have decision-making authority or control over resources: “…they [DCST] will go and do some audits in facilities and they will come up with recommendations and they will send to CEOs and to the executive in our office. But you might not see those things implemented. Because maybe there is a question to say ‘who are they?’. And how far their role? Can they instruct the CEOs, the medical managers to make sure that things are implemented?” (Pr, D3)
In one province (P2), where reducing maternal mortality was a stated political priority, senior provincial managers mandated the establishment of monthly performance monitoring and response forums (PMRFs) in each sub-district, bringing together providers (medical, nursing, and allied), as well as line and support staff in the immediate catchment area to address bottlenecks. The sub-district PMRFs would then meet together quarterly at the district level. Similar processes were underway in a second province (P1). In one sub-district of D1, the Mphatlalatsane Project introduced a structure referred to as the Monitoring and Response Unit (MRU), where clinicians and managers from the district hospital and feeder facilities met on a regular basis to review maternal–neonatal outcomes. As expressed by a hospital clinical manager, achieving health outcomes: “does require the whole team, the whole district level platform if I can put it that way to function as a team and I think that the promotion of such a teamwork and effort will definitely be to improve a lot of things. Be that the referral system, quality of care, be that clinical skills… there’s a lot that we can learn from primary health care, there’s a lot that primary health can learn from us” (S, D1). The plan was to extend this approach to other sub-districts.
Districts also conducted audits of, and reported, maternal deaths to a National Committee on Confidential Enquiries into Maternal Deaths; and MNH was included in general monthly and quarterly reviews at sub-district and district levels, respectively. In addition, there were provincially designed tools and processes, such as the maternal health care standards and neonatal quality ‘Facility Assessment Tools’ in P2. While referral processes were often identified as a key factor in maternal and perinatal deaths, there was little formal monitoring of these systems. EMS turnaround times were included in the National Indicator Data Set, but were inconsistently reported.
3.3. The Governance and Leadership Context
In P2, the PMRFs were introduced in the context of a wider governance redesign referred to as the geographical service delivery (GSD) model. In this model, “if you are a CEO of a hospital … that whole catchment area should be the responsibility of the CEO, … similarly the clinical manager is responsible for clinical services in that area and all the outcomes… So even the issue of … HR responsibilities, you would want them to be accountable and responsible … for who will be based at the hospital, even the rotation of staff could be around that similar geographical area. Because now what happens is when you are recruiting, you would recruit for the clinic, but the hospital is also saying they have a shortage … if you know that, okay, actually I’m going to work in this geographical service area, so even if I am at a clinic, I could be called to the maternity ward in the hospital…” (Pr, D2). The cascade approach to outreach and the provincial obstetric and neonatal response teams were also aligned with the GSD vision and service reorganisation. At the time of the research, the GSD model was still being introduced, but was already perceived to be making a difference: “since we came in with the geographical arrangement, our relationships have improved a lot” (S, D2).
Similarly, in P1, the establishment of MRUs was part of a growing recognition of the need to strengthen the sub-district as the core service delivery and governance unit: “at the end of the day your sub districts should actually be the heart of everything… That is actually where you should have your resources to make it happen” (D, D1). The province was also embarking on “service delivery optimisation”, which in D1 included repurposing a specialised tuberculosis care hospital into a general district hospital with maternal–child services.
Such new thinking and service delivery re-arrangements were not evident in the third province, P3. While the “noises that were made” (S, D3), including by the Public Protector (a national oversight body), on neonatal services at the regional hospital in D3 reportedly resulted in a facility upgrade, the provincial sphere was experienced as uninvolved and/or unable to resolve major structural challenges. There was a high turnover in senior provincial leadership, with key positions (including the Head of Department) vacant at the time of the research, and a perceived loss of strategic and technical skills (described as “the centre not holding” (S, D3)), alongside an intense politicisation of the public service, where managers were easily “sacrificed”, and were “more afraid of unions than their superiors” (Pa, D3).
All three districts had a high turnover of leadership teams in health facilities, especially hospitals, which was reflective of fractious social and labour relations in these institutions. Positions became filled by “…young, young, young clinical managers and young, young, young CEO’s that don’t know what to do” (Pa, D2) who received little induction and mentorship.