Efficient and Secured Mechanisms for Data Link in IoT WSNs: A Literature Review
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Layered Network Architecture
- Application layer;
- Transport layer;
- Network layer;
- Data link layer;
- Physical layer.
- Power management plane;
- Mobility management plane;
- Task management plane.
- 1.
- Data Link Layer
- 2.
- Clustered Network Architecture
3. WSN in IOT
4. Research Issues of WSN in IOT
- Data aggregation methodologies;
- How to use sensors in a distributed environment;
- Clustering algorithms;
- Localization techniques;
- Rerouting protocols.
5. The Architecture of WSN Nodes
6. IOT Architecture and Its Layers
- Application Layer
- Data Processing Layer
- Network Layer
- Sensing Layer
7. Research Gap in WSN Layers
8. WSN Security Protocols and Their Issues
9. Network Attacks in WSNs
10. Network Security Attacks and Issues of Data Link Layer Protocols
11. Existing Literature in WSN Domain
12. Security Issues concerning the Data Link Layer
13. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Sr No | Issue | Limitation | Required Research Development |
---|---|---|---|
1. | Limitation of resources [42,43,44] | Power Memory Internet Security | There is a need to develop low-powered, low memory, controlled security, and reliable transmission mediums for functional, secure, and fast data communication, which will also prolong the lifetime of the WSN. |
2. | Tampering [29,45,46] | Physical tampering Network tampering | Reliable network monitoring, network management, and network security protocols prevent or control physical and network attacks and ensure security. The WSN is impenetrable, and the network’s performance is unaffected. |
3. | Security [47,48,49] | Network attacks Eavesdropping Access control Privacy | Researchers need to develop a solution to secure the network and ensure unapproved access, and the hub should maintain access control. The network needs to adapt to the various security conventions. |
4. | Operating system [50,51] | Complex systems Management Administration of resources | The OS of the sensor should be a less complex, simple programming environment that is fundamental to memory management. The application engineers should focus on validation activities such as planning, acquiring, and system administration. |
5. | Quality of service [52,53] | Network management Resource management | The QoS application’s precise limits include organizational participation, dynamic sensors, efficiency, an estimate of sensor detail, dormancy, and delay accuracy. Further, the WSN’s QoS can sustain extension, cancelling nodes. It is challenging to track QoS boundaries for sensor networks as the geography of the enterprise tends to evolve and data management is unclear. |
6. | Deployment [54,55,56] | Node organization Data security Deployment strategy | Sensor hubs sent in such situations are incredibly dense; network blockage can occur due to multiple simultaneous transmission efforts. Sensor hubs configured in this case are insufficient or insufficiently numerous, resulting in a low information yield or a lack of data measurement. The property of self-setup is necessary if hubs are distributed randomly. |
7. | Robustness and fault tolerance [57,58] | Defective sensor Sensor failure Attack Network failure | Sensor networks are vulnerable to power outages and faulty sensors as a result of any attack or change in environmental conditions. |
8. | Privacy and data confidentiality [59,60] | Spoofing Unauthorized access Modification of data Sniffing | The IoT device should determine if the user or device has been authorized access to the system. Data access should be limited by granting or denying permission based on a set of rules. |
9. | Acquisition and transmission of data [60] | One-time-pad OTP encryption Wireless transmission security | There is a need to develop a mechanism akin to OTP that monitors end-to-end communication links to identify vulnerabilities in applications and DBMS. |
10. | Authorization [61,62] | DNS attack Biometric authentication Defined role access | Passwords must be updated regularly, and computers should never be left unattended. Similarly, both the sender and the receiver need to perform authentication. |
Protocol | Purpose | Effective against Attacks | Characteristics | Issues |
---|---|---|---|---|
TINYSEC [59] | To solve the inadequacy of existing systems, the TinySec architecture is used. TinySec is lightweight, reliable, and secure, ensuring message integrity, confidentiality, and access control. TinySec decreases energy consumption, bandwidth, and latency by more than 10%. | Gray hole, black hole, worm hole | Authentication Confidentiality | TinySec uses a single network-wide key such that any node in the network can impersonate any other node. It makes no effort to defend against various threats such as replay attacks, hello flood, node cloning, Sybil, path contamination, etc. |
SPINS [63] | This is a series of protocols based on the use of two protected building units. The first is SNEP, which assures data security, authenticity, and richness. The second is TESLA, which enables authorized broadcasting in constrained environments. | Eavesdropping, gray hole, black hole, worm hole, replay, hello flood, node replication, Sybil, route poisoning | Authentication Confidentiality Integrity | The protocol states that if the nodes participating in the data are far from the source node and the nodes in between are disinterested in the data, the data will not be forwarded to the destination. As a result, it is not the best option for high-density node spread. |
MINISEC [64] | MiniSec is a stable and energy-aware protocol for WSNs. It uses fewer resources than other protocols such as TinySec and has the same amount of protection as ZigBee. OCB mode is used for authentication. This method saves time by allowing confidentiality and authentication to be granted in one step. | Eavesdropping, black hole, replay, flood, node poisoning | Authentication Confidentiality Integrity | MiniSec cannot be used to encrypt broadcast communications directly. If a node receives packets from many receiving nodes simultaneously, it must keep track of each sender’s counter, which consumes a lot of memory. |
LEAP [65] | LEAP is a security protocol that satisfies essential security needs such as anonymity and authentication. The critical exchange technique enables in-network processing while restricting a node violation’s security impact on the breached node’s immediate network neighborhood. | Eavesdropping, gray hole, black hole, replay, flood, Sybil | Authentication Confidentiality | LEAP’s flaws are that it uses a tweaked protocol implementation that does not adequately secure the end user’s credentials; thus, this information is vulnerable to being hacked. LEAP is only intended for wired networks and is not intended for use with untrusted wireless media. |
ZIGBEE [66] | ZigBee’s trust management model encourages other devices to access the network while still distributing keys. It consists of two categories of network entities: full-function devices that coordinate and reduced-function devices that are end devices. For low-security home applications, the Trust Center employs a residential mode. Commercial Mode is designed for business applications requiring a high security level. | Black hole, replay, route poisoning | Authentication Confidentiality Integrity | Short range is one of ZigBee’s most significant drawbacks. High data speed and low complexity, high maintenance costs, a lack of a complete solution, and poor materialization are all factors to consider. Poor reception and network reliability are also drawbacks, putting ZigBee at a disadvantage compared with others. |
LLSP [67] | LLSP uses the TinySec packet format as its basis. It is an energy-efficient connection-layer security protocol that guarantees message secrecy, authentication, message integrity checks, message security, and access control, among other things. It can refuse a request early and has allowed for performance overhead. | Replay, flood, route poisoning, gray hole, black hole, worm hole | Authentication Confidentiality Integrity | LLSP has the drawbacks of consuming more symbols and being more difficult to customize than others. The LLSP protocol provides periodic updates and a time-to-live value for the details, but it does so quickly, resulting in a weak liveliness indicator. |
LISP [68] | LiSP is built on the concept of crucial renewability. To prevent keystream replay, it creates a new key each time. LiSP enables flexible any-to-any WAN access, encourages virtual machine mobility, increases scalability by aggregating more RLOCs, and supports simplifying multihomed routing. | Gray hole, black hole, worm hole, replay, route poisoning | Authentication Confidentiality Integrity Availability | Extra headers are added to LiSP packets, increasing the packet size while decreasing the payload available. Any modification to the mapping system is disseminated across the network due to the signaling process. This may cause packet loss or add latency to the system. Although LiSP specifies how to send various types of addresses in control messages, it does not specify how to execute look-up operations on any of these addresses. |
LEDs [69] | The static and location-aware aspects of sensor networks suggest an adaptive security architecture to achieve end-to-end security. LEDs are a protocol that is based on position. This protocol’s primary management system incorporates location-aware data, an additional detail that improves the protocol’s resistance to key compromise and node capture attacks. | Eavesdropping, black hole, flood, node replication, replay, and route poisoning are all examples of cyberattacks. | Authentication Confidentiality Integrity | The LEDs protocol can only function if the network setup is predictable; otherwise, it will be unsuccessful due to a lack of complicated routing support. |
References | Attacks | Layer | Routing-Based Attacks |
---|---|---|---|
[70,71] | Interception, radio interference, jamming, tempering, Sybil assault | Physical layer | Sybil assault |
[64,72] | Replay attack, jamming assault, spoofing, altering routing assault, Sybil assault, traffic analysis, monitoring, exhaustion, collision | Data link layer | Routing assault, Sybil assault |
[73,74] | Black hole assault, worm hole assault, sink hole assault, gray hole assault, selective forwarding assault, hello flood assault, misdirection assault, internet smurf assault, spoofing assault | Network layer | Black hole assault, worm hole assault, sink hole assault, gray hole assault, selective forwarding attack, hello flood assault |
[75,76] | De-synchronization, transport layer flooding assault | Transport layer | ----------- |
[67,77] | Spoofing, path-based DoS, alter routing assault, false data ejection | Application layer | Alter routing assault |
Attack | Layer | Type | Features of Attack |
---|---|---|---|
Eavesdropping | Physical | Ex | Without the node’s awareness, it overhears and intercepts data in its transmit coverage area. |
Basic jammers | Physical | Ex | Intentional radio emissions obstruct or discourage data transmission. |
Intelligent jamming | Data link | Ex | Since the protocol rules for data delivery are defined, data packets are explicitly targeted. Collisions with adjacent nodes can occur if the filled radio channels are used. |
Collision | Data link | In | Collisions with adjacent nodes can occur if the filled radio channels are used. |
Replay attack | Network | In | Repetition of a successful data transfer. |
Black hole | Network | In | Failing to forward all submitted data packets, including its own. |
Sink hole | Network | In | Fake information is advertised to construct a point of interest for other nodes. |
Sybil assault | Network | In | Using the network to present different identities. |
Node replication | Network | Ex/in | Physically grabbing a node, replicating it, and redeploying it into the network. |
Open worm hole assault | Network | In | The attacker gains access to the source and destination, builds a bogus path without the users’ awareness, monitors the information, and sends it to the destination. |
Data integrity | Transport | In | During delivery, data is compromised by the attacker modifying the content or inserting fake messages. |
Energy drain | Transport | Ex/in | Sends as many link institution requests as possible to a specific node or nodes. |
Exhaustion | Data link | In | Energy resources are wasted, causing the target node to conduct unneeded calculations or to receive or deliver data. |
Tampering | Physical | In | Retrieves cryptographic material such as cipher keys. |
Hello flood attack | network | Ex/in | Sends a “hello” packet to a neighboring node and modifies its network topology. |
Attack on reliability | Application | Ex/in | Places the node in the communication line to produce false data or questions. |
Malicious code assault | Application | Ex/in | Injects a “bug” into the program that causes it to crash or assumes full charge of the application’s resources. |
DoS | Multi-layer | Ex/in | A broad assault that could involve many other attacks occurring at the same time. |
Man-in-the-middle assault | Multi-layer | Ex/in | Sniffs the network to intercept, without the network’s knowledge, contact between two sensor nodes at the key exchange stage. |
References | Data Link Layer Protocols | Attack | Issue Category | Network Consequence | Solution |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
[84] | HDLC (High-Level Data Link Protocol) | Hidden node attack DoS attack | Flow control QoS Jamming attack | A malicious node is added, or a regular node is injected with malicious code or a request. The node can infect the whole network, or network properties can be forged, causing harm to network integrity with denial of service. | For hidden node attacks, applying RTS and CTS mechanisms can help prevent hidden node attacks. These mechanisms validate data sending and receiving for reliable flow control and data connection [85]. |
[86] | Point-to-Point Protocol | Switch spoofing CAM Table Exhaustion attack | QoS Jamming attack | The intruder sets up a device to impersonate a switch and sends DTP negotiation frames. Both VLANs borne on the trunk are sent to or collected by the attacker. The attacking host can then access traffic from several VLANs. CAM overflow allows an attacker to listen in on a conversation and conduct man-in-the-middle attacks. | Applying port-security protocols and dynamic MAC restrictions can help secure switch spoofing and CAM table exhaustion attacks [87]. |
[88] | CDP (Cisco Discovery Protocol) | Fake access points Flooding attack | Flow control QoS Jamming attack | An evil twin attack that provides the attacker with direct access into the network, causing harm or loss of confidential information in a fake access point attack. Flooding attacks are quite similar to DoS attacks. The network is bombarded with a large number of requests or false inputs, resulting in a flood of streamed inputs. | A fake access point is nearly impossible for Wi-Fi devices, so using a VPN can encapsulate the Wi-Fi session in another layer of encryption. Moreover, wireless intrusion prevention systems (WIPS) can detect the presence of fake access points. The onsite firewall should be configured or an intrusion prevention system (IPS) should be installed to detect anomalous traffic patterns [89]. |
[90] | Stop-and-Wait Protocol | DoS attack SYN flooding | QoS Jamming attack | In a DoS assault, the attacker attempts to disturb the services of a host connecting to the Internet by overwhelming the intended computer or resource with unnecessary requests, rendering computer or network resources unavailable to the engaged users. A SYN flood is a DDoS attack that causes the server to be inaccessible to legitimate traffic. | Installing network rate-limiting devices; installing business apps to gain network insight and to observe and analyze traffic from multiple regions [91]; and installing an intrusion prevention system (IPS) to detect odd traffic patterns can prevent attacks. |
[92] | ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) | Session hijacking Fake access points | Flow control QoS Jamming attack | Session hijacking, also known as TCP session hijacking, operates by stealthily obtaining the session ID and posing as the authorized user. A fake access point attack is an evil twin attack in which fake access points appear just like actual ones and deceive users. | Personal VPN solution software can encrypt all data, not just traffic to the webserver. End-to-end encryption between the user’s browser and the web server using encrypted HTTP or SSL prevents unwanted session ID access. Session ID detectors may also be used to examine such issues [93]. |
[94] | Spanning Tree Protocol | STP manipulation attack | Flow control QoS | STP prevents bridging loops in a redundant switched network system. The attacker spoofs the topology’s root bridge, causing STP to be recalculated; the attacker broadcasts an STP configuration/topology change BPDU. | Root guard and BPDU guard assist against STP manipulation attacks by ensuring that no user data is transmitted over a port that is in the root-inconsistent state [95]. |
[85] | LLDP (Link Layer Discovery Protocol) | Spoofing attack Selective forwarding attack | Flow control QoS | Spoofing may be used to gain access to a target’s personal information and disseminate ransomware via infected links or attachments aimed at stealing information or distributing malware. In a selective forwarding assault, the attacker loses certain packets at an arbitrary time, which can be used to protect against an insider packet drop attack. | Spoofing attacks can be avoided by spoofing detection tools, which improve the ability to identify and stop them before they can do any damage. Packet filtering can filter out and block packets, which can avoid IP spoofing [96,97]. To dissuade selective forwarding-based DoS attacks proactively, a defense method for detection and avoidance, such as a preventative routing algorithm, must be implemented [98]. |
[99] | Ethernet protocol | MAC flooding Port stealing | Flow control QoS | MAC flooding is a cyberattack that jeopardizes the security of network switches. The hacker uses this technique to intercept sensitive data being transported over the network. Port stealing is a form of assault in which someone “steals” traffic from one Ethernet transfer port to another. This type of attack causes anyone to accept packets intended for a particular device. | Because the switch’s MAC address table contains incorrect MAC address and port mappings, the port security function can protect it from MAC flooding assaults [100]. In insecure situations, enterprise-grade switches may be used to protect the environment [101]. |
[102] | Sliding window protocol | SYN flooding DoS attack | Flow control QoS Jamming attack | An SYN flood is a DDoS attack that consumes all available server resources by overloading all open ports on a targeted server.A denial-of-service attack seeks to interrupt the services of a host connected to the Internet by flooding the intended computer or resource with unnecessary requests, rendering the computer or network resources unavailable to their engaged users. | Installing network rate-limiting devices is recommended. It is a good idea to install an intrusion prevention system (IPS) to identify abnormal traffic patterns in order to avoid SYN flooding assaults, configure the onsite firewall for SYN assault thresholds, and implement SYN flood defense [91]. Preparing a DoS attack response plan and protecting the infrastructure, investigating black hole routing, upgrading firewalls and routers to reject fake traffic, and applying the latest security updates to routers and firewalls can prevent attacks [103]. |
Sr.# | Authors Name and Year | Problem | Contribution | Research Gaps |
---|---|---|---|---|
1. | Thiago C. et al., 2020 [104] | There is no significant variation in quality measurement in insensitive systems using scalar and visual sensors to perform control functions. | Failures in hardware, networking, and vision coverage are considered when assessing the efficiency of wireless sensor networks. | Lacks reliability involving monitoring modifications to the system due to faults or repairs. Self-diagnosis features should be a part of enhancing QoS. |
2. | M. Faheem et al., 2018 [105] | A significant issue is noted when sensor nodes forward a sensor node that closes the static sink. Massive amounts of data from more distant sensors are being collected in the deployed network. Thus, the network’s multi-to-one traffic pattern stems from these sensors bearing a large traffic load. The network partition problem is caused by vulnerability to energy depletion when consuming energy. | SIRP (self-optimized intelligent routing protocol) is built on bio-inspired principles for WSN-based SG applications. | The communication architecture that ensures diverse QoS-aware data should have been considered for collection with minimal data replication for multiple WSN-based SG applications. This would have improved flow control and QoS. |
3. | Arslan et al., 2020 [106] | IoT-based WSNs face obstacles due to various environmental changes. The variety of sensor nodes required to monitor vast areas is increasing. | To reliably share sensor data, the NRF protocol can be used. Camera processing and sensors to capture illumination, moisture, humidity, temperature, and other parameters are used to detect weeds. | The framework does not meet modern requirements as it lacks mobile application control of the robot, which could have been a positive asset toward achieving better QoS for users. |
4. | Chi-Tung Chen, Cheng-Chi Lee, Iuon-Chang Lin, 2020 [107] | Time synchronization is another crucial and challenging topic for WSNs. The machine must provide a suitable logical time clock for all devices and objects in IoT environments. Any attacker or malicious node in an IoT system can attempt to disrupt clock synchronization. | Prevention capabilities are quantitatively superior, and authentication efficiency in the IoT can be improved qualitatively. High performance, low computing and connectivity costs, and the lower consumption of resources were positive attributes. | The system can cause hazards to emerge in heterogeneous IoT settings. Different heterogeneous IoT implementations may cause severe network security difficulties. This represents a threat to QoS and to the prevention of jamming attacks. |
5. | Patricia A. et al., 2019 [108] | Spatiotemporal resolution constraints are typical, leading to issues with traditional air quality control systems, such as system non-scalability or reduced personal exposure data storage. | The results show that the method for discriminating and quantifying volatile organic compound concentrations is efficient. | The system lacks the implementation of various sensor nodes to check actual conditions and configure sensors in the region. The system is limited to research only. |
6. | Xiaomin Li et al., 2020 [109] | Agricultural WSNs face many difficulties, such as multitasking with critical problems of data collection and processing to maintain data accuracy and reduce lag for better performance. | A double selection approach determines the right node and sensor network that satisfies data quality and collection time constraints. A data collection algorithm is developed based on a set of data quality values. | The mentioned algorithm has no capacity for data collection from the natural environment, limiting its use to research only. |
7. | Nalluri Prophess Raj Kumar and Josemin Bala Gnanadhas [110] | The network of wireless sensors is incredibly resource-restricted. Because sensor nodes are battery-powered and deployed in hazardous areas, it is difficult to recharge or replace batteries after deployment. Stable routing protocols are needed to improve network life and offset energy consumption. | The algorithm outperforms traditional protocols in terms of efficiency parameters such as network energy consumption, average sensor node energy consumption, packet failure percentage, packet distribution ratio, and network throughput. | The route is not configured in the framework, which defies the route policy that triggers packet loss if the base station is far away; the ZH must waste most of its energy on data transfer, causing flow control and QOS issues. |
8. | Khalid Haseeb et al., 2020 [111] | In terms of generation, energy, transmission, and memory capacities, sensors have limited resources that can adversely affect agricultural production. In addition to their performance, the security and protection of these IoT-based agricultural sensors are critical for malevolent attackers. | The device has dramatically improved communication performance, network throughput, packet drop ratio, network latency, energy consumption, and routing overhead for intelligent agriculture. | The framework lacks the evaluation required to match the consistency and performance of the device in a mobile-based IoT environment that cannot be configured; thus, it does not meet the modern requirements of IoT frameworks. |
9. | Khashan, O et al., 2021 [112] | Despite developing a novel lightweight cryptographic approach for WSNs, there are various limitations, including flexibility, authentication power resource management, and critical management processes. | A lightweight cryptographic technique, “FlexCrypt”, is developed to address the existing issues. | There exists a need to resist more attacks rather than considering fewer. |
Parameters | Network Performance |
---|---|
Network availability | The availability of a network will influence QoS and network performance. The user or software may receive unexpected or unwanted results if the network is down. The availability of several things used to build a network, such as redundant network devices or interfaces; power supplies in routers and switches; processor cards; resilient networking protocols; various physical links; etc., can render the network unavailable for users, causing a decline in network performance. |
Bandwidth | Network carriers have a limited amount of bandwidth; when oversubscribing to bandwidth, a customer must always have it available. This encourages consumers to bid for the limited amount of B.W. available. They receive B.W. depending on the traffic generated by other network users at any given time. When subscribers use the same network infrastructure, guaranteed B.W. subscribers must have preference over available B.W. subscribers’ traffic to ensure B.W. subscribers’ SLAs are reached even when the network is congested. |
Throughput | Throughput is the number of packets that successfully reach their destinations. Bits per second or data per second may describe the throughput power. The arrival of packets is critical to the high-performance operation of a network. When using services or apps, people expect their requests to be heard and responded to quickly. Low throughput implies packet loss, which contributes to bad or slow network efficiency. Throughput is a metric that calculates network speed, but a low value may impact network efficiency, causing packet loss, latency, and jitter. |
Transit delay | The time it takes an application to travel from the ingress (entry) point to a network’s egress (exit) point is referred to as network latency. Delay can cause severe QoS problems with applications such as video conferencing and fax delivery, which time out and terminate because of an unreasonable delay. Network propagation delay can cause ingress queuing delays for traffic entering a network node, traffic conflict at each network node, and egress queuing delays for traffic leaving a network node. At each network hop, data is distributed over the physical network medium. |
Jitter | The difference in delay reported by different packets in the same traffic flow is known as jitter, as is high-frequency delay variance. The most crucial problem for QoS is jitter caused by variations in queue wait times for consecutive packets in a flow. Jitter is not tolerated by some forms of traffic, especially real-time traffic such as video conferencing. Jitter is present in all transportation networks. Jitter thresholds have little effect on service quality if they are below the specified tolerance level. |
Resilience | Quality of service (QoS) is a critical consideration in the architecture of IP-based multimedia and multiservice networks. Network resilience refers to a network’s ability to survive network assaults and poor results. If the network becomes more vulnerable to attacks, such as sniffing, spoofing, and malicious operations, data confidentiality will be compromised, and data loss will occur. Every well-designed recovery plan must account for the multiple reliability needs of individual traffic flows to prevent unnecessary bandwidth consumption for standby links and decide which flows to defend against network failures as well as the degree to which they must be defended. |
Loss | If a network node gets overburdened, it may lose packets and fail. TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is a networking protocol that defends against packet loss by retransmitting packets lost by the network. As network congestion increases, more packets are lost, resulting in increased TCP transmission. Since most B.W. is used to retransmit lost packets, network capacity can deteriorate if congestion persists. |
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Hasan, M.Z.; Mohd Hanapi, Z. Efficient and Secured Mechanisms for Data Link in IoT WSNs: A Literature Review. Electronics 2023, 12, 458. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12020458
Hasan MZ, Mohd Hanapi Z. Efficient and Secured Mechanisms for Data Link in IoT WSNs: A Literature Review. Electronics. 2023; 12(2):458. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12020458
Chicago/Turabian StyleHasan, Muhammad Zulkifl, and Zurina Mohd Hanapi. 2023. "Efficient and Secured Mechanisms for Data Link in IoT WSNs: A Literature Review" Electronics 12, no. 2: 458. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12020458
APA StyleHasan, M. Z., & Mohd Hanapi, Z. (2023). Efficient and Secured Mechanisms for Data Link in IoT WSNs: A Literature Review. Electronics, 12(2), 458. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12020458