KryptosChain—A Blockchain-Inspired, AI-Combined, DNA-Encrypted Secure Information Exchange Scheme
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- A proposed DNA-based Huffman Coding Scheme. It considers the real-time occurrence of every distinct symbol in the plaintext to determine their frequency distribution. In contrast to assigning a 1 to the higher branch and 0 to the lower branch after adding the two least frequent symbols, the proposed scheme alternatively assigns a purine and pyrimidine value to the high and low branch. A different Huffman tree needs to be derived each time to get the corresponding codes, thusly enhancing the security. The variable length of the codes also makes them less guessable and immune to attacks.
- A Blockchain-inspired refinement on the Diffie-Hellman Key exchange protocol is proffered to transfer the cipher information to the intended receiver. Blockchain technology, due to its highly secure and decentralized nature, is predominately used for secure transmission and storage. However, they necessitate possession of cryptocurrencies, writing smart contracts and deploying them to facilitate their many possible functions. Therefore, this paper puts forward a blockchain-inspired scheme that transmits fixed-sized blocks of the original message to the genuine receiver. The trusted third party is only involved to authenticate the sender and receiver, and unknowingly assist them to establish the shared secret key. He only knows the hash of the public key and cannot obtain the actual public key as hashes are one-way The actual message exchange is also safeguarded from the trusted third party as they are encrypted by the intended receiver’s public key, which can only be decrypted with a corresponding private key. Thus, involved parties can exchange information securely via the proposed scheme. An AI-influenced intrusion detection system to further ensure secure communication between the sender and intended receiver. Different classifiers were used to train and test the proposed IDS system such as NB (naive Bayes), logistic, MLP (multi-layer perceptron), SMO (sequential minimal optimization), IBK (instance-based), and J48 on the NSL-KDD dataset.
- The paper first provides a brief introduction to DNA encryption followed by Blockchain technology and artificial intelligence. It also discusses the possibility of coalescing all these three technologies into the proposed KryptosChain scheme. Section 2 focuses on related work of existing research. The proposed methodology is illustrated in Section 3, which first shows the basic block diagram of the overall steps involved and their descriptions. All the results obtained have been categorically demonstrated in Section 4. Section 5 provides the analysis of schemes proffered by this paper. The conclusions drawn and future scope of work are presented in Section 6.
2. Related Work
2.1. Existing DNA-Based Encryption Scheme
2.2. Analysis of Existing DNA-Based Encryption Scheme
2.3. Existing Blockchain-Based Information Exchange Schemes
2.4. Analysis of Existing Blockchain-Based Information Exchange Schemes
2.5. Existing AI-Based Cryptographic Schemes
3. Proposed Methodology
3.1. Proposed Cipher Information Generation Scheme
Algorithm 1: Proposed DNA-based Huffman Coding Scheme |
Generating the Huffman Tree:
|
3.2. Proposed Cipher Information Transmission Scheme
3.2.1. Phase 1: Registration Process
3.2.2. Phase 2: Sender Authentication
3.2.3. Phase 3: Genesis Block Generation Process
3.2.4. Phase 4: Receiver Authentication
3.2.5. Phase 5: Second Block Generation Process
3.2.6. Phase 6: Actual Information Exchange Process
3.3. Proposed Intrusion Detection Scheme
3.4. Corresponding Original Information Retrieval Scheme
4. Results and Calculations
4.1. Demonstration of Cipher Information Generation Scheme
4.2. Demonstration of Cipher Information Transmission Scheme
4.2.1. Phase 1: Registration Process
4.2.2. Phase 2: Sender Authentication
4.2.3. Phase 3: Genesis Block Generation Process
4.2.4. Phase 4: Receiver Authentication
4.2.5. Phase 5: Second Block Generation Process
4.2.6. Phase 6: Actual Information Exchange Process
4.3. Demonstration of Intrusion Detection System Scheme
- True Positive (TP)—Attack data that is correctly classified as an attack.
- False Positive (FP)—Normal data that is incorrectly classified as an attack.
- True Negative (TN)—Normal data that is correctly classified as normal.
- False Negative (FN)—Attack data that is incorrectly classified as normal.
4.4. Demonstration of Original Information Retrieval Scheme
5. Analysis of Proposed Model
5.1. Analysis of Proposed Cipher Information Generation Scheme
5.1.1. Number of Bits Required to Encode
5.1.2. Effect of Increase in Number of Symbols in Plaintext
5.1.3. Security Analysis
5.1.4. Complexity Analysis
5.1.5. Comparison of Proposed Model with Existing Similar Models
5.2. Analysis of the Proposed Cipher Transmission Generation Scheme
5.2.1. Attainment of Principles of Security
- Achieving Confidentiality: The proposed KryptosChain achieves confidentiality as any adversary or even the trusted third party Kyrios only get to see either the hash of the public key or encrypted contents locked with the hash of the public key or shared secret key. Hashes are one-way so the original values cannot be obtained from them. If any content is encrypted with the hash of the public key, then only a corresponding hash of the private key can unlock it. Private keys are always kept as a secret and never revealed to the outer world. The shared secret key is calculated at the respective ends of the sender and receiver and never transmitted directly through the KryptosChain.
- Achieving Integrity: The fundamental feature of the blockchain stores the hash of the contents of the previous block into its successive blocks. KryptosChain also employs this basic feature. If any block is tampered with, the hash automatically alters. This will lead to a hash mismatch with the hash stored in the successive block. This helps to easily identify any contaminated blockchain and assure integrity.
- Achieving Availability: All users after successful registration can access KryptosChain whenever needed, thus providing availability.
- Achieving Authenticity: The responsibility to authenticate each user is bestowed upon Kyrios, which validates them by referring to the look-up table.
- Achieving Non-Repudiation: If anything is uploaded once into KryptosChain, it is immutable; thus, there is no repudiation possible at a later stage by any user. The addition of timestamps by Kyrios also eliminates any kind of refusals in the future.
- Achieving Access Control: Even if in the rarest of cases an adversary also successfully registers himself, he too cannot comprehend anything. The reason is that each and every content in the KryptosChain is encrypted and in an unreadable form. Thus, the proposed scheme eliminates any chances of man-in-the-middle attacks.
5.2.2. Immunity to Cryptographic Attacks
5.2.3. Comparison of Proposed Model with Existing Similar Models
5.3. Analysis of Proposed Intrusion Detection Scheme
6. Conclusions and Future Work
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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A = CTG | B = ACC | C = GAC | D = GAT | E = GCG | F = AGT | G = ATG | H = CGT |
I = AAG | J = AGC | K = AGG | L = TGC | M = TCA | "" = GCT | O = GAA | P = GTC |
Q = ACA | R = CAC | S = AGT | T = TTA | U = ATA | V = CTT | W = CCA | X = CTA |
Y = AAA | Z = CTT | 0 = ACT | 1 = AGC | 2 = TAG | 3 = GCA | 4 = GAC | 5 = AGA |
6 = TTC | 7 = ATT | 8 = AGC | 9 = GCT | , = CCC | . = GTC | ! = GCT | ? = CCT |
Category | Involvement of Key | Encryption Time | Limitations |
---|---|---|---|
Substitution-based Schemes | No | Minimum |
|
Biological Operations-based Schemes | Biological information is used as key-position of exon-intron, primer values etc. | Maximum |
|
Mathematical–Biological Operations-based Schemes. | Keys are generated by stringent mathematical calculations | Moderate |
|
Paper Title | Merits | Demerits |
---|---|---|
Provably secure covert communication on blockchain—Partala [32] |
|
|
Light blockchain communication protocol for secure data transfer integrity—Guziur et al. [33] |
|
|
Blockchain-based secure communication application proposal—Sarıtekin et al. [34] |
|
|
Secure communications using blockchain technology—Menegay et al. [35] |
|
|
A secure data sharing platform using the blockchain and interplanetary file system—Naz et al. [36] |
|
|
An accelerated method for message propagation in blockchain networks—Bi et al. [37] |
|
|
Secure Messaging Platform Based on Blockchain—Ellewala et al. [38] |
|
|
Blockchain-enabled end-to-end encryption for instant messaging applications—Singh et al. [39] |
|
|
Secure peer-to-peer communication based on Blockchain—Khacef and Pujolle [40] |
|
|
Character | Frequency | Huffman Code |
---|---|---|
, | 1 | TGTGAGA |
. | 1 | TGTGAGT |
l | 1 | TGTGACTG |
w | 1 | TGTGACTC |
C | 1 | TGTGACA |
g | 3 | TCCGGA |
y | 3 | TCCGGT |
u | 3 | TCCCTG |
p | 4 | TCCCTC |
f | 5 | TGTGT |
c | 6 | TCCGC |
m | 6 | TCCCA |
d | 7 | ATGG |
h | 9 | ATGC |
r | 9 | ATCA |
s | 9 | TCTA |
a | 10 | TGTC |
e | 11 | TCGA |
i | 11 | TCGT |
I | 13 | AAA |
t | 15 | AAT |
o | 19 | TGA |
Parameter | Value | Further Specifications |
---|---|---|
Number of Features in the Dataset | 41 | Intrinsic Features 1–9 |
Content Features 10–22 | ||
Time-based Features 23–31 | ||
Host-based Features 32–41 | ||
Feature Type | 4 | Categorical (Features: 2, 3, 4, 42) |
Binary (Features: 7, 12, 14, 20, 21, 22) | ||
Discrete (Features: 8, 9, 15, 23–41, 43) | ||
Continuous (Features: 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19) | ||
Number Of Attack Classes | 22 | DoS Attack Classes 6 |
Probe 4 | ||
R2L 8 | ||
U2R 4 |
Parameter | Value |
---|---|
Number of Rows | 25,291 |
Number of Columns | 42 |
Number of Missing Values | 0 |
Number of Duplicate Records | 0 |
Load Distribution | Normal-13488 |
Attack-11743 |
Parameter | Value |
---|---|
Number of Rows | 11,850 |
Number of Columns | 42 |
Number of Missing Values | 0 |
Number of Duplicate Records | 0 |
Load Distribution | Normal-2152 |
Attack-9698 |
Protocol Type | Service | Flag | Protocol Type_Encoded | Service_Encoded | Flag_Encoded |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
icmp | http | SF | 1 | 10 | 9 |
tcp | http | SF | 2 | 10 | 9 |
tcp | ecr_i | SF | 2 | 5 | 9 |
upd | private | SH | 3 | 15 | 10 |
icmp | ecr_i | SF | 1 | 5 | 9 |
udp | private | SH | 3 | 15 | 10 |
tcp | http | SF | 2 | 10 | 9 |
tcp | http | SF | 2 | 10 | 9 |
tcp | http | SF | 2 | 10 | 9 |
icmp | ecr_i | RSTR | 1 | 5 | 2 |
src Bytes | dst Bytes | src Bytes_Normalized | dst Bytes_Normalized |
---|---|---|---|
1032 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
230 | 1041 | 0 | 0 |
336 | 406 | 0 | 0 |
30 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
378 | 838 | 0 | 0 |
54,550 | 8341 | 1 | 1 |
278 | 6845 | 0 | 0 |
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
1032 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
333 | 710 | 0 | 0 |
Spark-Chi-SVM Model | SVM with Reduced Features | ||
---|---|---|---|
No. of Features | Accuracy (%) | No. of Features | Accuracy (%) |
25 | 99.38 | 41 | 99.01 |
22 | 99.47 | 36 | 99.01 |
17 | 99.55 | 17 | 97.92 |
15 | 99.38 | 9 | 95.48 |
11 | 92.35 | 3 | 91.01 |
Character | ASCII Code | Traditional DNA Code | Proposed DNA Huffman Code |
---|---|---|---|
, | 00101100 | CCC | TGTGAGA |
. | 00101110 | GTC | TGTGAGT |
l | 01101100 | TGC | TGTGACTG |
w | 01110111 | CCA | TGTGACTC |
C | 01000011 | GAC | TGTGACA |
g | 01100111 | ATG | TCCGGA |
y | 01111001 | AAA | TCCGGT |
u | 01110101 | ATA | TCCCTG |
p | 01110000 | GTC | TCCCTC |
f | 01100110 | AGT | TGTGT |
c | 01100011 | GAC | TCCGC |
m | 01101101 | TCA | TCCCA |
d | 01100100 | GAT | ATGG |
h | 01101000 | CGT | ATGC |
r | 01110010 | CAC | ATCA |
s | 01110011 | AGT | TCTA |
a | 01100001 | CTG | TGTC |
e | 01100101 | GCG | TCGA |
i | 01101001 | AAG | TCGT |
n | 01101110 | GCT | AAA |
t | 01110100 | TTA | AAT |
o | 01101111 | GAA | TGA |
Total number of bits | 176 Bits | 66 Bits | 113 bits |
Parameter | Smith et al. [53] | Aeilenberg and Rotstein [54] | Meftah et al. [55] | Proposed Scheme |
---|---|---|---|---|
Frequency Distribution Value | Standard frequency of English alphabets | Standard frequency of English alphabets | Probability of appearance of a short Sequence in the initially chosen DNA string | Real-time occurrence of symbols in the considered plaintext |
Type of Plaintext | Only English alphabets | All letters, numbers, characters | Input Image | All letters, numbers, characters |
Resultant Huffman code for | ||||
, | , = No Code | , = TAAT | No | , = TGTGAGA |
. | . = No Code | . = TCTA | methodology | . = TGTGAGT |
l | l = AAA | l = TTAG | described | l = TGTGACTG |
w | w = AAT | w = TATG | for text | w = TGTGACTC |
C | C = AAG | C = TTCG | symbols | C = TGTGACA |
g | g = ACT | g = GAAT | g = TCCGGA | |
y | y = ACC | y = TACG | y = TCCGGT | |
u | u = AAC | u = TACT | u = TCCCTG | |
p | p = CCA | p = GAAC | p = TCCCTC | |
f | f = ACG | f = TAAG | f = TGTGT | |
c | c = AAG | c = TTCG | c = TCCGC | |
m | m = ACA | m = TAAC | m = TCCCA | |
d | d = CT | d = TTAC | d = ATGG | |
h | h = CA | h = TTTC | h = ATGC | |
r | r = CG | r = TTTG | r = ATCA | |
s | s = GT | s = TTCT | s = TCTA | |
a | a = AT | a = GAC | a = TGTC | |
e | e = T | e = GCT | e = TCGA | |
i | i = GG | i = GCG | i = TCGT | |
n | n = GC | n = TTAT | n = AAA | |
t | t = AG | t = GTG | t = AAT | |
o | o = GA | o = GAG | o = TGA | |
As described by authors | ||||
Re-usability of the codes? | Yes, as same Huffman tree is generated every time as frequency of characters remain the same. | Yes, as same Huffman tree is generated every time as frequency of characters remain the same. | No, as they are based on tedious biological processes. | No, as it considers real-time frequency of occurrence of the symbols involved. |
Case sensitive? | No | No | Not applicable | Yes |
Goal. | Status | Justification |
---|---|---|
Confidentiality | ☑ | Kyrios or a registered adversary cannot read the contents of the blocks as they are all encrypted. |
Integrity | ☑ | Hash mismatch denotes any kind of tampering. |
Availability | ☑ | All successfully registered users can access KryptosChain whenever needed. |
Authentication | ☑ | Kyrios authenticates each user by referring to his look-up table and uses timestamps. |
Non-Repudiation | ☑ | Basic immutability of KryptosChain and timestamps refute repudiations in the future. |
Access Control | ☑ | Unwanted parties can be debarred from access by Kyrios and encryption resists man-in-the -middle attack. |
Attack | Immunity | Justification |
---|---|---|
Ciphertext Only Attack | ☑ | The block containing the final Ciphertext, Huffman tree and other information is encrypted by the shared secret key established secretively between Alice and Bob through KryptosChain. Even Kyrios is not aware of this key. |
Known Plaintext Attack | ☑ | The final DNA key is chosen from a pool of best DNA keys and changed for each encryption process. |
Chosen Plaintext Attack | ☑ | The intruder needs to undergo the registration phase only; then, he gets access to KryptosChain and encryption machinery. |
Chosen Ciphertext Attack | ☑ | The intruder needs to undergo the registration phase only; then, he gets access to KryptosChain and decryption machinery. |
Replay Attack | ☑ | The intruder needs to undergo the registration phase only; then, he gets access to KryptosChain. |
Side Channel Attack | ☑ | All the information is encrypted in the form of a chain of blocks. |
Brute Force Attack | ☑ | All efforts are futile as everything is encrypted with suitable asymmetric keys, which are difficult to guess. |
Parameter | Menegay et al. [34] | Naz et al. [35] | Ellewala et al. [37] | Singh et al. [38] | Khacef & Pujjole [39] | Proposed Scheme |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Real Blockchain usage | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
Type of Blockchain | Public | Public with IPFS and smart contracts | Private with encryption | Public with digital certificates | Public with PKI | Not applicable |
Crypto Currency | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
Comments | Email server added in an existing Blockchain | Digital assests are shared and delivered | Restricted to a single enterprise | Each user uploads his public key certificate into the Blockchain | Instead of CA Blockchain enables distribution of keys | A Blockchain-inspired Diffie Hellman protocol is used |
Limitations | Scalability issues as number of users increases | Economically cumbersome | Private blockchains are expensive | Highly dependent on MNO to provide certificates | Scalability issues as number of users increase | 6 phases need to be passed |
Classifier | Accuracy (%) | Precision | Recall | F-Score | Time to Train (msec) | Sensitivity (%) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
NB | 78.35 | 0.812 | 0.785 | 0.798 | 2457 | 75.45 |
Logistics | 82.47 | 0.856 | 0.815 | 0.836 | 2490 | 83.14 |
MLP | 80.35 | 0.808 | 0.785 | 796 | 2503 | 79.89 |
SMO | 85.56 | 0.832 | 0.798 | 0.814 | 2734 | 84.67 |
IBK | 91.35 | 0.837 | 0.807 | 0.821 | 2556 | 91.28 |
J48 | 95.84 | 0.868 | 0.838 | 0.852 | 2769 | 96.78 |
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Mukherjee, P.; Pradhan, C.; Tripathy, H.K.; Gaber, T. KryptosChain—A Blockchain-Inspired, AI-Combined, DNA-Encrypted Secure Information Exchange Scheme. Electronics 2023, 12, 493. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030493
Mukherjee P, Pradhan C, Tripathy HK, Gaber T. KryptosChain—A Blockchain-Inspired, AI-Combined, DNA-Encrypted Secure Information Exchange Scheme. Electronics. 2023; 12(3):493. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030493
Chicago/Turabian StyleMukherjee, Pratyusa, Chittaranjan Pradhan, Hrudaya Kumar Tripathy, and Tarek Gaber. 2023. "KryptosChain—A Blockchain-Inspired, AI-Combined, DNA-Encrypted Secure Information Exchange Scheme" Electronics 12, no. 3: 493. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030493
APA StyleMukherjee, P., Pradhan, C., Tripathy, H. K., & Gaber, T. (2023). KryptosChain—A Blockchain-Inspired, AI-Combined, DNA-Encrypted Secure Information Exchange Scheme. Electronics, 12(3), 493. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics12030493