Extraction of Hidden Authentication Factors from Possessive Information
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- The efficacy of an authentication system based on seven physiological and biological biometrics derived from commonly used personal behavioral biometrics.
- The discovery of self-classifying alphabets using individual data is made.
- The development of a security system based on several biometric measurements of an individual’s profile information that is useful for the duration of the individual’s life.
2. Different Attacks on Biometric Authentication Models
3. System Model
Adversary Model
4. Proposed System and Methodology Used
4.1. Data Collection and Enrollment Phase
4.2. User Authentication Phase
4.2.1. Data Preprocessing and Feature Extraction
- (a)
- Dwell Time: Dwell time represents the time interval between pressing and releasing a key.
- (b)
- Interval Time: Interval time measures the duration between consecutive key presses.
- (c)
- Latency Time: Latency time denotes the delay between pressing a key and the display of the corresponding character on the screen.
- (d)
- Flight Time: Flight time quantifies the duration between releasing one key and pressing the next key.
- (e)
- Up to Up Time: Up to up time captures the duration between releasing one key and releasing the subsequent key.
4.2.2. Statistical Analysis
4.2.3. Classification and Validation
5. Experimental Setup and Performance Metrics
- This experiment’s intended audience consisted of individuals who regularly use smartphones. To prevent bias in the evaluation procedure, the sample was selected at random under strict control conditions.
- To safeguard the participants’ confidential information, pseudonyms were used in lieu of their actual identities.
- The data capture process involved using mobile devices, specifically the iPhone 7, which has a touchscreen and additional sensors such as a light sensor, proximity sensor, accelerometer, barometer, and gyroscope. The choice of this device was based on its widespread use and intermediate screen size.
- A total number of 45 participants (i.e., N = 45) were considered based on Yamane’s equation [42], , which was used to calculate the required sample size . Hence, a sample size of 31 was necessary for an error of 0.1. This condition was satisfied because there were 38 volunteers for the experiment.
- Each participant was instructed to enter their personal information, including their name, surname, email address, and mobile phone number, using the touchscreen keyboard of the mobile device. All participants were instructed to sit while they were entering their data via the smartphone’s touchscreen, ensuring that there was no environmental variation. This data-entry process was performed ten times over the course of ten days to capture consistent typing patterns.
- The entered data, including the timing keystroke values and other features, were stored in a MySQL database. Each keystroke, along with its associated data, was recorded as a separate record in the database. The data was stored on a private cloud system, ensuring its security and accessibility for further analysis.
- Each data was picked and split into 2 datasets: these were the training set, 75%, and testing set, 25%, as depicted in Figure 6. This process is essential to evaluate the model’s generalization performance on unseen data. So, comprising 25% of the data is to provide an unbiased assessment of the model’s performance on unseen instances and evaluate its generalization capabilities. It helps validate the model’s accuracy and effectiveness beyond the specific user or data it was trained on.
- Each user’s separate classification model was trained individually for 290.79 milliseconds on average. This means that a specific model was created and trained for each individual user based on their unique data and characteristics.The target variables used for training and validation depended on the specific classification task and the goal of the model. In the given context, the target variable would be whether the input data corresponds to the genuine user or an imposter. The model was trained to predict this target variable based on the input features such as gender, fingertip, finger pressure, dwell time, flight time, interval time, latency time, and up-to-up time.
- Accuracy: Accuracy measures the overall correctness of the authentication system in correctly identifying the genuine user and detecting potential attacks. It is calculated as the ratio of the correctly classified instances to the total number of instances. It is given as the ratio . In this, are the number of true positives, true negatives, false positives and false negatives, respectively.
- Precision: Precision measures the proportion of correctly identified genuine users among all instances classified as genuine. It provides insight into the system’s ability to minimize false positives and accurately identify the legitimate user. It is given as ratio where is the number of true positives and the number of false positives.
- The recall is, intuitively, the classifier’s capacity to identify all genuine users. The recall is given as ratio where is the number of true positives and the number of false negatives. The optimal value is 100%, while the worst value is 0%.
- Attack Detection Accuracy: This metric specifically measures the accuracy of the system in detecting and classifying attacks or imposters. It indicates how well the system can differentiate between genuine users and unauthorized individuals attempting to gain access.
- The execution time: The execution time refers to the time it takes to train the user data using the proposed authentication system.
6. Results and Evaluation
6.1. Accuracy, Precision, Recall and Execution Time Evaluation Results
6.2. Attack Detection Accuracy Evaluation Results
- Both approaches exhibited high detection accuracy at 10% malicious users, with the proposed model achieving 97.79% and the benchmark model achieving 96.24%. The proposed model performed marginally better in this scenario.
- When the percentage of malicious users reached 20%, the accuracy of both models remained relatively high. However, the proposed method achieved a detection accuracy of 95.33%, while the benchmark model achieved a detection accuracy of 95.09%.
- At 30% malicious users, the proposed model maintained a high detection accuracy of 94.86% whereas the benchmark model demonstrated a slightly reduced accuracy of 91.76%.
- Similarly, the proposed model outperformed the benchmark model at 40% and 50% malicious users, achieving detection accuracies of 94.45% and 92.48%, respectively, whereas the benchmark model achieved detection accuracies of 91.55% and 90.99%, respectively.
7. Comparative Analysis with Other Similar Related Works
7.1. Biometric Entropy-Based
7.2. Computational Cost-Based
7.3. Security Based
8. Discussions
9. Conclusions
10. Future Work
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Factor Biometrics | Performance | Device | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Accuracy | FRR | FAR | EER | ||
Keystroke dynamics [8] | 97.90% | --- | --- | --- | Smartphone |
Gait detection [9] | 98.79% | --- | --- | --- | Smartphone |
Touch gestures [10] | 74.97% | --- | --- | --- | Smartphone |
Behavior profiling [11] | 98.5% | --- | --- | --- | Smartphone |
Keystroke dynamics [12] | --- | --- | --- | 10.01% | Keypad on Smartphone |
Iris and Fingerprint [13] | 95.00% | 3.89% | 1.11% | --- | Standard database |
Fingerprint, iris, and palm print [14] | --- | 0.15% | 94.54% | --- | Collecting database |
Touch dynamics (touch gestures and keystroking), accelerometer, gyroscope, Wi-Fi, GPS location and app usage [15] | 82.2–97.1% | --- | --- | --- | Smartphone sensor |
ECG, finger vein [16] | --- | --- | --- | 0.12% | Database |
Motion and hold posture, (accelerator and capture the variation model of micro hand motions and hold patterns) [17] | 97% | --- | --- | --- | --- |
Keystroke, Swipe dynamics [18] | 94.26% | --- | --- | --- | Smartphone |
Keystroke, GPS position, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, linear accelerometer, gravity, and rotation sensors [19] | 97.15% | --- | --- | --- | Smartphone |
Factor Biometrics | Single Factor | Multiple Factors | Degradation Protection | Device Dependency | Personal Skill |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Keystroke dynamics [8] | P | P | |||
Gait detection [9] | P | P | |||
Touch gestures [10] | P | P | |||
Behavior profiling [11] | P | P | P | ||
Keystroke dynamics (Unique keypad on smartphone) [12] | P | P | |||
Iris and Fingerprint [13] | P | P | |||
Fingerprint, iris, and palm print [14] | P | P | |||
Touch dynamics [15] | P | P | |||
ECG, finger vein [16] | P | P | |||
Motion and hold posture [17] | P | P | |||
Keystroke, swipe dynamics [18] | P | P | |||
Keystroke, mobile sensors [19] | P | P |
Article Title | Description |
---|---|
Kontun: A Framework for recommendation of authentication schemes and methods [37] | There are three primary guidelines that all multimedia systems must follow to security: (1) ease of use and (2) simplicity, and (3) cost-effectiveness is a priority for the platform. |
Touch-dynamics based Behavioral Biometrics on Mobile Devices— A Review from a Usability and Performance Perspective [38] | Review touch-dynamics-based behavioral biometrics in terms of (1) usability and its impact on (2) authentication performance, including the (3) modalities of user involvement, the (4) quantity of enrollment data needed, (5) algorithmic performance accuracy, and (6) energy consumption. |
Multi-Factor Authentication: A Survey [39] | Thorough analysis of authentication methods that combine two or more authentication processes should increase (1) user verification security. These systems intelligently combine (2) knowledge, (3) biometrics, and (4) ownership. |
Factor Biometrics | Single | Multiple | Non-Degradation | Device Independent | Individual-Skill | Performance |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Keystroke dynamics [8] | P | 97.00% | ||||
Gait detection [9] | P | 98.79% | ||||
Touch gestures [10] | P | 74.97% | ||||
Behavior profiling [11] | P | P | P | 98.50% | ||
Keystroke dynamics (Unique keypad on smartphone) [12] | P | 89.99% | ||||
Iris and Fingerprint [13] | P | 95.00% | ||||
Fingerprint, iris, and palm print [14] | P | 94.54% | ||||
Touch dynamics [15] | P | 97.1% | ||||
ECG, finger vein [16] | P | EER 0.12% | ||||
Motion and hold posture [17] | P | 97.00% | ||||
Keystroke, swipe dynamics [18] | P | 94.26% | ||||
Keystroke, mobile sensors [19] | P | 97.15% | ||||
Proposed method | P | P | P | P | 97.59% |
Ref. | Authentication Factor | Number of Digits | Characters | Dataset | Entropy (Bits) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Wang D [44] | PIN | 4-digit | Numerical characters | Dodonew, CSDN, Rockyou, Yahoo (total 3.4 M) | 8.41 |
PIN | 6-digit | Numerical characters | Dodonew, CSDN, Rockyou, Yahoo (total 6.4 M) | 13.21 | |
Wang D [45] | Password | 6-digit and 10-digit | lowercase alphabet characters and numbers | 14 datasets (total 113.3 M) | 20–22 |
Sutcu Y [46] | Iris | ICE (High quality set—374 iris, 10 samples each) | 8.9–10, 8.9–10 bits | ||
Krivokuca V [47] | Finger Vein | VERA (220 fingers, two samples each) | 4.2—13.2 | ||
UTFVP (360 fingers, four images each) | 18.9–19.5 | ||||
Inthavisas et al. [48] | Combine password and voice | 18–30 | |||
The proposed method | Keystroke | 10-digit PIN | 38 samples | 51.7 |
Category | Criterion | Behavior Profiling [11] | Keystroke, Mobile Sensors [19] | Proposed Method |
---|---|---|---|---|
Usability | Ease of use | High (does not require explicit user interaction) | Low (requires explicit user interaction) | Low (requires explicit user interaction to type profile data) |
Ease of learning | Medium (user may need time to adjust to the monitoring) | Low (user may need to learn to type correctly) | Low (user may need to learn to type profile data correctly) | |
Need of using a device | High (requires a smartphone) | High (requires a smartphone) | High (requires a smartphone) | |
Method’s reliability | High (98.3% accuracy) | High (96.47% accuracy) | High (97.59% accuracy) | |
Security | Importance of security | High (continuously monitors user behavior) | High (passively monitors user behavior) | High (relies on personal behavioral biometrics) |
Resistance to well-known attacks | High (relies on smartphone data) | Low (keystroke dynamics can be easily replicated) | Low (keystroke dynamics can be easily replicated) | |
Costs | Implementation costs | Medium (may require development resources) | Medium (may require development resources) | Medium (may require development resources) |
Costs per user | Low (minimal additional costs for users) | Low (minimal additional costs for users) | Low (minimal additional costs for users) | |
Server compatibility | N/A (occurs on the smartphone) | N/A (occurs on the smartphone) | N/A (occurs on the smartphone) | |
Need of acquiring licenses | Low (minimal licensing requirements) | Low (minimal licensing requirements) | Low (minimal licensing requirements) | |
Available technologies | High (utilizes smartphone data) | High (utilizes smartphone sensors) | Low (limited to individual’s typing-skills) | |
Others | Client’s requirements | Medium (user may need to adjust behavior) | Low (user may need to type correctly) | Low (user may need to type profile data correctly) |
Application context | Medium (may be limited to certain types of applications) | Medium (may be limited to certain types of applications) | Low (may be limited to certain types of applications requiring profile data input) | |
Norms and legislation | Low (minimal legal restrictions) | Low (minimal legal restrictions) | Low (minimal legal restrictions) |
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Nanglae, N.; Yakubu, B.M.; Bhattarakosol, P. Extraction of Hidden Authentication Factors from Possessive Information. J. Sens. Actuator Netw. 2023, 12, 62. https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan12040062
Nanglae N, Yakubu BM, Bhattarakosol P. Extraction of Hidden Authentication Factors from Possessive Information. Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks. 2023; 12(4):62. https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan12040062
Chicago/Turabian StyleNanglae, Nilobon, Bello Musa Yakubu, and Pattarasinee Bhattarakosol. 2023. "Extraction of Hidden Authentication Factors from Possessive Information" Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks 12, no. 4: 62. https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan12040062
APA StyleNanglae, N., Yakubu, B. M., & Bhattarakosol, P. (2023). Extraction of Hidden Authentication Factors from Possessive Information. Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks, 12(4), 62. https://doi.org/10.3390/jsan12040062