4.1.1. Descriptive Statistics and Panel Unit Root Test for Part 1 Estimations
For the first part of our study, we used 10 index explanatory variables, which are stationary at a level between the 0.01 and 0.1 significance levels. Our dependent variable was the real GDP growth rate.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the first part of the study. Following
Chong (
2001), our index variables were reparametrized using the empirical mean splitting approach as follows: economic growth (EcoG), property right (ProR: X1, X2), government integrity (GovI: X3, X4), tax burden (TaxB: X5, X6), government spending (GovS: X7, X8), business freedom (BusF: X9, X10), labor freedom (LabF: X11, X12), monetary freedom (MonF: X13, X14), trade freedom (TraF: X15, X16), investment freedom (InvF: X17, X18), and financial freedom (FinF: X19, X20).
Table 2 and
Table 3 below, respectively, present descriptive statistics of all variables used in the second part of the study and their panel unit root tests.
Panels A, B, and C in
Table 3 below display the results of three separate panel unit tests. The results from the Levin, Lin, and Chu test and PP–Fisher chi-square test indicated that all variables are strongly stationary between 0.01 and 0.10 levels, with the exclusion of both intercept and linear trend terms. Also, the Im, Pesaran, and Shin test showed that, with only the intercept term, all variables are strongly stationary between 0.01 and 0.10 significance levels, except population. However, with both the intercept and linear trend terms included, all variables are strongly stationary at 0.05 level, except economic freedom. Therefore, we failed to accept the null hypothesis of the existence of both a common unit root and individual unit root.
Table 3.
Panel Unit Root Tests on the Variables.
Table 3.
Panel Unit Root Tests on the Variables.
Panel A. Levin, Lin, and Chu Test: Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) |
| With Intercept | With Intercept and Trend | No Intercept and Trend |
Variable Name | Statistic | Prob | Statistic | Prob | Statistic | Prob |
Economic growth | −2.7496 | 0.003 | −4.92852 | 0.0000 | −5.4563 | 0.0000 |
Economic Freedom | −7.53633 | 0.0000 | 1.59457 | 0.9446 | −10.7631 | 0.0000 |
Fixed Capital | −4.35385 | 0.0000 | −3.88142 | 0.0001 | −3.64411 | 0.0001 |
Population | −1.3716 | 0.0851 | −1.1025 | 0.0976 | −2.18493 | 0.0144 |
Labor force | −0.99086 | 0.1609 | 27.6564 | 1.0000 | −5.65988 | 0.0000 |
FDI | −1.50306 | 0.0664 | 0.65114 | 0.7425 | −7.60399 | 0.0000 |
Panel B. PP–Fisher Chi-square Test: Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) |
| With Intercept | With Intercept and Trend | No Intercept and Trend |
Variable Name | Statistic | Prob | Statistic | Prob | Statistic | Prob |
Economic growth | 41.1822 | 0.0000 | 53.7973 | 0.0000 | 17.6994 | 0.0603 |
Economic Freedom | 40.5331 | 0.0000 | 31.2738 | 0.0005 | 64.5698 | 0.0000 |
Fixed Capital | 70.2809 | 0.0000 | 82.9391 | 0.0000 | 42.7531 | 0.0000 |
Population | 4.83518 | 0.9019 | 4.82955 | 0.9023 | 20.1525 | 0.0278 |
Labor force | 124.491 | 0.0000 | 60.5693 | 0.0000 | 76.7767 | 0.0000 |
FDI | 91.9613 | 0.0000 | 76.0335 | 0.0000 | 115.188 | 0.0000 |
Panel C. Im, Pesaran, and Shin Test: Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) |
| With Intercept | With Intercept and Trend | No Intercept and Trend |
Variable Name | Statistic | Prob | Statistic | Prob | Statistic | Prob |
Economic growth | −1.97739 | 0.0240 | −4.13443 | 0.0000 | | |
Economic Freedom | −1.76214 | 0.0390 | 0.05410 | 0.5216 | | |
Fixed Capital | −4.19965 | 0.0000 | −3.11733 | 0.0009 | | |
Population | 0.83346 | 0.7977 | −2.16182 | 0.0927 | | |
Labor force | −8.46023 | 0.0000 | −6.72767 | 0.0000 | | |
FDI | −3.93529 | 0.0000 | −2.50187 | 0.0062 | | |
4.1.2. Results and Discussion
As indicated earlier, we proposed to undertake a numerical and graphical comparative analysis of our estimated results from OLS pooled panel kink regression and Bayesian pooled panel kink regression in the first part of our study. Scatterplots of real growth rate and each of the index regressors showed nonlinear relationships, which are a graphical indication of the presence of kinks. The plots are omitted due to limited space. To proceed, we first present in
Figure 1 and
Figure 2, respectively, the trace plots of our MCMC draws for property rights and government integrity to ascertain the convergence of the Markov chains to their stationary distributions.
Figure 3 displays their respective distribution plots. We observed that trace plots for all coefficients showed good mixing, stable behavior, and no presence of any unique trends. All chains indicated convergence to their stationary distribution. The plots for the other variables are omitted due to lack of space.
The estimation results from the OLS and the Bayesian pooled panel kink regressions are presented in
Table 4 and
Table 5, respectively. The results showed that the OLS mean estimates and the Bayesian empirical mean estimates are both very similar in all cases. For the case of the OLS framework, conditioned on the empirical mean of the index regressors, the results showed that, except tax freedom, none of the regressors had a dual statistical significance at all of the conventional levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% for the lower and upper regimes, although each intercept term for all regressors was strongly significant at 1%. One revealing observation from the OLS results was that save tax freedom, none of the OLS estimates for the upper regimes of all other indexes was significant. This was true even for those regressors whose lower regimes were statistically significant.
However, the Bayesian framework offered a more suitable alternative by allowing for the use of posterior distributions. Let us take property rights for example. The median of the intercept was 6.24532. This indicated that, on average, we expect the response variable to have a value of approximately 6.24532 when all predictor variables are zero. The 95% credible interval for the intercept is approximately [5.008, 7.5275]. For X1 and X2, the median of X1 is −0.08471, and the median of X2 is 0.06519. These values indicated the central tendencies of the estimated coefficients for X1 and X2. The 95% credible intervals for X1 and X2 were approximately [−0.352, 0.1860] and [−0.260, 0.3839], respectively. The median of the variance, sigma2, was 9.84391, representing the central tendency of the estimated variance. The 95% credible interval for sigma2 was approximately [7.420, 13.5062]. This interval provided a range of plausible values for the variance term, capturing the uncertainty associated with the estimation. These intervals represented the plausible range of values for the coefficients. The results for the other variables can be similarly interpreted. This framework allowed for a probabilistic understanding of the relationships between the index regressors and economic growth, considering the uncertainty captured by the posterior distribution. For all practical intents and purposes, the Bayesian approach provided a better characterization of our data by allowing us to capture randomness in the estimates. We presented a discussion on the causal relationship between each regressor and economic growth using graphs later.
We now turn to the graphs of our model fits.
Figure 4 (panels (a) to (f)) and
Figure 5 (panels (a) to (d)) present a pair of graphical representations of the model fits from OLS and Bayesian estimations. The colors red, blue, and green represent, respectively, the mean, lower, and upper credible bounds. The plots indicated that, although both frameworks provided fairly similar plots for the estimated means, the Bayesian credible intervals provided by the posterior distribution of all regressors offered a more appropriate capturing of the data than in the case of the OLS plots. This lent a graphical support to our earlier observations based on the numerical estimates. We now present a brief discussion of the causal relationships.
The graphical results showed that property rights, government integrity, government spending, monetary freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom indexes have a bivariate convex-like shape with economic growth. This shows that, below the threshold of their respective empirical means, each of these variables had a negative relationship with economic growth and a positive relationship beyond that point. This implies that for these indexes to positively impact economic growth, they are required to go beyond the kink points. For concreteness, a mix of policy initiatives and implantations that define each of these indexes are required to be enhanced to promote economic growth.
The above findings offer some wealth of policy considerations in the fight against geo-economic fragmentation of the Sub-Saharan African economies, which is due to the lack of strong intra-sub-regional cooperation. Worse-performing economies in the sub-region can emulate the selected economies in our study by adopting and adapting the cluster of policies that enhanced their performances on the aforementioned indexes and their rankings. In terms of the property rights index, policies that can explicitly and implicitly reduce and eliminate the risk of undue government expropriation, promote legally guaranteed intellectual property rights, and ensure the quality of contract enforcement would be required to be rolled out. In the case of the government integrity index, key policies that deal explicitly with corruption perceptions, bribery risks, and state capture by elite groups must be implemented as a matter of policy.
As part of the policy options to score highly on the government spending index scale, streamlining all government expenditures to strictly exclude all forms of profligate expenditures, including transfer payments of all kinds that fail the litmus test of cost–benefit considerations, would be required. One index that requires immediate policy attention due to the current inflationary pressures in the sub-region is the monetary index. Government interventions and involvements that grossly distort price stability in factor and commodity markets require policy realignments that promote macro-stability along with zero, or extremely limited, government microeconomic policy interventions. The same goes for both investment and financial indexes. Policy initiatives would be required to ease unwarranted investment restrictions on both local and foreign capital inflows. Cumbersome and inefficient bureaucracies that characterize investment procedures in most economies within the sub-region would require urgent policies to remove them. Government policy initiatives to ensure sound macro-prudential environments must be rigidly guided and guarded to avoid overly restrictive financial sector regulations so as not to stifle financial sector development, with a possible adverse impact on economic growth.
The graphical model fits for tax burden, business freedom, labor freedom, and trade freedom indexes show
concave-like results, indicating that lower regimes of these indicators promote economic growth and that they reduce it in the upper regime (see
Figure 5 (panels (a) to (d))). This finding is diametrically opposite to the earlier set of indexes discussed above. This latter finding indicates that these freedom indicators should not be allowed to go beyond certain thresholds.
Our study indicated that policy choices that push the above indexes above their empirical mean levels should be discouraged. For instance, in the case of the tax burden index, a mix of policies that keep the score from going beyond the mean should be rigorously pursued. Summarily, the total tax burden as a proportion of GDP should not be allowed to drop via the easing of individual and corporate income tax rates. This is an indication that the current tax regimes in the selected economies are appropriate for economic growth. In the case of labor freedom, unbounded labor freedom has some consequences for productivity and participation rates. Given this, labor-related policies must be directed at achieving outcomes that ensure productivity and labor rewards. These can be achieved through the implementation of realistic minimum wage rates, flexible self-development policies, and conductive non-monetary benefits. In the case of trade freedom, policy choices would be required to be designed in a fashion not to overly regulate and unguardedly liberalize trade. Some minimal amounts of quantitative, regulatory, and customs restrictions would be required to sanitize the trade environment, as overly liberalized trade could have negative repercussions for economic growth, just as excessive trade controls deny economies the opportunity of reaping trade benefits, noting that single economy can claim complete autarky.