Blockchain for Mass Customization: The Value of Information Sharing Through Data Accuracy by Contract Coordination

This study provides the game-theoretical framework to investigate the relationship between the blockchain service and mass customization in the environment of information sharing and contract coordination. Specifically, we construct the game-theoretical models of the manufacturer and the retailer to discuss the optimal strategy of information sharing by the retailer in the case of mass customization. The result explores the conditions of information sharing for the retailer because she understands the end market information of nearby consumers. This discussion helps us to understand that the motivation of the manufacturer pays for the retailer’s construction of a blockchain system in the case of two types of products, such as a standard product and a customization product. Finally, we use the method of contract coordination to obtain the optimal strategy. Results reveal that information costs significantly impact sharing decisions, and cost-sharing contracts can incentivize retailers to share market data. This study has two main contributions. On the one hand, this study adopts the blockchain service for mass customization by supporting contract coordination, showing the technical value of avoiding false information and tampering-proof. On the other hand, although big data has the same information sharing function, this technology can’t play the role of secure data transmission. In order to increase the accuracy of information sharing, we analyze the fusion results of two technologies in the aspect of increasing the accuracy of data sharing, which better reveals the technical value.