The Comparison of Cybersecurity Datasets
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Motivation
3. Related Work
4. Role of ML in CPS
- Cybersecurity companies can employ various tools of data science to process and analyze big data that are historic or acting as a threat to intelligence data over the recent years [27].
- Cybersecurity companies make use of ML algorithms to deal with the problems related to classification, clustering, dimensionality reduction and regression [28].
- The use of ML is significant in the implementation and evaluation of various systems, such as the implementation of authentication systems, evaluating the protocol implementation, assessing the security of human interaction proofs, smart meter data profiling, etc. [27].
5. Cyberattacks and IIoT
5.1. IIoT End Point Security Challenges
- Since assaults are deployed into the wild before the antivirus signatures for the attacks are known, antivirus systems are unable to eliminate common malware with any reliability. If the malware manages to infiltrate a vulnerable system between the moment of its launch and the time that the antivirus signatures are applied, the system becomes compromised, even if an antivirus system is installed [31].
- Due to the time that it takes for a vendor to create security updates and end users to install them, the exploitation of the known vulnerabilities is not always prevented by security updates. During this time period, systems are particularly vulnerable. Furthermore, security updates are occasionally incorrect, and when incorrect, they are ineffective in addressing the known vulnerability that is the source of their purpose for being released [1,32].
- IDSs and security monitoring systems are detective in nature, not preventive. In cybersecurity, these systems document and monitor the system continuously to detect, as reliably as possible, any abnormal activity and respond to it. IDSs and monitoring systems are important, but they do not deal with the attacks. There is still a lack of consistent success with intrusion detection and monitoring systems. This is due to the time-consuming nature of intrusion detection and incident response [1,19,32].
- The October 2016 Dyn attack [31]—the world’s most significant attack of its kind—established a new trend in how cyberattacks operate. The assault launched by 100,000 malicious endpoints overwhelmed Dyn’s internet DNS infrastructure DDoS. Aside from this, the machine-to-machine (M2M) connectivity and real-time analytics are sources of innovation in IoT [33]. However, they remain a source of security vulnerability, as M2M communication still has security issues as well as resource efficiency and scalability issues. The following are the common and major problems with IoT, where block chain technology plays its role [34]. The blockchain has garnered significant attention, as more people have become aware of its potential benefits in various domains. It has a substantial impact on an organization’s business model, by reducing expenses, increasing efficiency, and adding additional costs and dangers. The term ‘blockchain’ refers to distributed ledger technology. Users add transactions by establishing a block with an associated cryptographic hash, timestamp, and transaction data [35].
5.2. Types of Cyberattacks on IIoT
- When it comes to security risks, DoS is the most straightforward to implement. Due to the growing number of IoT devices with insufficient security, DoS attacks are becoming increasingly popular among attackers [31]. One of the primary objectives of a DoS attack is to overwhelm the network with invalid requests, causing the bandwidth to be wasted. As a result, the legitimate users are unable to access the services. DDoS is an attack in which multiple sources attack a single target at the same time, making it difficult to identify and avoid. Although DDoS attacks occur in a variety of shapes and sizes, their ultimate purpose is the same [37].
- MiTM attacks are among the earliest types of cyberattacks to be discovered. Spoofing and impersonation are two types of this. It is possible for the MiTM attacker to be interacting with node X while pretending to be destination B. Additionally, a secure sockets layer (SSL) stripping allows an attacker to establish a connection with the server through hypertext transfer protocol secure (HTTPS) while connecting with the victim over hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) [2,31].
- Malware is an abbreviation for malicious software. The number of IoT devices has expanded in recent years, as has the number of IoT software patches, which an attacker can employ to install malware and perform other criminal operations. It comprises viruses, spyware, worms, Trojan horses, rootkits, and other forms of deceptive advertising. Examples include smart home devices, healthcare equipment, and automobile sensors. These attackers are typically state sponsored, well funded, and well trained, which makes them particularly dangerous [38].
- Malicious attacks infiltrate a network and spread malware in the network from infected devices to other devices. A botnet is a hostile attack in which a group of infected devices connects to the internet and engages in illegal, criminal activities together [39].
- Password attacks enable access to a third person’s passwords through malicious entities. These include two methods: one is the dictionary method, and the other is the brute force method. The dictionary method is used to decrypt an encrypted password. In contrast, under brute force, multiple possible usernames and passwords are used [39].
- Distributed attacks are where only a single or specific server is not attacked; the surrounding network’s infrastructure is also affected. Through a vulnerable entry point, an attacker gains access to a website, which is termed as a backdoor attack [40].
- DDoS attacks prevent other users from accessing network resources, such as servers, by flooding a network with overburdened and overloaded requests [39].
- Spam attacks use messaging systems. In this case, spam messages are sent to a large number of people. These messages contain scams and are a sort of phishing scheme to target consumers [39].
5.3. Some Examples of a False Data Injection Attack (FDIA)
- The data from a patient’s equipment, such as blood pressure, pulse, heart rate, and body temperature, are critical to the success of a difficult surgical procedure, according to surgeons. Hackers may tamper with this information in order to cause death. For high-value targets, such as national leaders, influential figures, politicians, activists, and researchers, falsified data can be used to kill them. Given this context, the occurrence of FDIAs cannot be ruled out when discussing internet-based healthcare (e-Healthcare) or remote surgery [37].
- Modern healthcare facilities can generate a lot of medical imaging data. For example, the dental scan helps dentists locate any atypical wisdom teeth. If the hacker alters the image, the dentist and patient will be taken unawares. False or distorted images may also endanger the patient’s life, especially when it comes to detecting malignant tumors [37].
- Drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are often utilized in military activities. If the FDIA hacks these drones, the drone user party will acquire false intelligence, causing catastrophic damage. Sensors are used extensively in various drone applications to collect data. Bad sensor data can lead to bad intelligence and bad military decisions [37].
- As a result of a recent cyberattack on the Australian parliament interest, there has been a renewed interest in cybersecurity, particularly with regard to the FDIA. On a national and international scale, a successful FDIA could have significant consequences. Things could get even worse in terms of international relations [41].
- User-to-root (U2R) assaults are the second most common type of IoT attack. In a U2R attack, the attacker employs illegal techniques and methods (for example, sniffing passwords and malware injection) to acquire access to devices or obtain access from a normal user account on the victim’s computer [40].
- Remote-to-local (R2L) assaults are the third most common type of IoT attack. These attacks are exploitations in which the attacker discovers a security vulnerability in a network and exploits it in order to gain access to it under the guise of a legitimate local user [40].
5.4. Privacy Threats
- Militarized intrusion techniques (MITs) can be divided into two categories: active MIT attacks (AMAs) and passive MIT attacks (PMAs). The PMA is a passive listener that monitors the data transit between two devices. Despite the fact that the PMA infringes privacy, the data are not altered. An attacker who gains access to a device can silently observe the device for months before launching an assault on the device. With the increasing number of cameras in IoT devices, such as toys, smartphones, and wristwatches, the impact of PMA is becoming increasingly significant [42].
- Passive data privacy attacks (PDPAs), on the other hand, are classified as active data privacy attacks (ADPAs). Data privacy is the root cause of identity theft and reidentification. In this regard, anonymization, location detection, and data aggregation are used in re-identification attacks. They seek to gather information from a variety of sources in order to identify their targets. Malware can be used to impersonate a user. ADPA includes data tampering, while PDPA includes data leakage and re-identification [42].
6. Cybersecurity Datasets
6.1. CIC-IDS2017
6.2. UNSW-NB15
6.3. DS2OS
6.4. BoT-IoT
6.5. KDD Cup 1999
6.6. NSL-KDD
7. Discussion
7.1. Limitations
7.2. Future Research
8. Conclusions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Reference | ML Technique | IoT Attacks | Dataset | Accuracy |
---|---|---|---|---|
[46] | OS-ELM | Dataset Multiple | NSL-KDD | 97.3 |
[47] | NN | DOS, U2R and R2L. | NSL-KDD | 82.3 |
[35] | DT and NB. | Probing, U2R and R2L. | NSL-KDD | 85.8 |
[23] | TAB | DoS Flooding | KDD99 | 99.95 |
[35] | DT | DOS, Reconnaissance U2R, R2L., Backdoor | KDD99 | 98 |
[26] | Ensemble Learning | Malware | AndroZoo, Drebin | 94 |
[48] | DT. | DOS | RPL-NIDDS17 | 98.1 |
[47] | DT | DOS, Reconnaissance U2R, R2L. | UNSW-NB15 | 97.8 |
[21] | NN. | Probing, U2R and R2L | NSL-KDD | 99.2 |
[47] | DT | DoS Reconnaissance, U2R, R2L. | NSL-KDD | 98 |
[49] | NN. | DOS, reconnaissance and DDOS | BoT-IoT | 98.26 |
[19] | LSSVM | Anomaly | KDD99 | 99.7 |
[27] | DFEL | Dataset Multiple | UNSW-NB15, | 98.5 |
[21] | LSTM | DoS Flooding | ISCX2012, | 99.9 |
[24] | Adaboost | Botnet Flooding | UNSW-NB15 | 99.5 |
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Alshaibi, A.; Al-Ani, M.; Al-Azzawi, A.; Konev, A.; Shelupanov, A. The Comparison of Cybersecurity Datasets. Data 2022, 7, 22. https://doi.org/10.3390/data7020022
Alshaibi A, Al-Ani M, Al-Azzawi A, Konev A, Shelupanov A. The Comparison of Cybersecurity Datasets. Data. 2022; 7(2):22. https://doi.org/10.3390/data7020022
Chicago/Turabian StyleAlshaibi, Ahmed, Mustafa Al-Ani, Abeer Al-Azzawi, Anton Konev, and Alexander Shelupanov. 2022. "The Comparison of Cybersecurity Datasets" Data 7, no. 2: 22. https://doi.org/10.3390/data7020022
APA StyleAlshaibi, A., Al-Ani, M., Al-Azzawi, A., Konev, A., & Shelupanov, A. (2022). The Comparison of Cybersecurity Datasets. Data, 7(2), 22. https://doi.org/10.3390/data7020022