Goal Conflicts, Classical Management and Constructivism: How Operators Get Things Done
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Can examples of goal conflict and of local ingenuity be identified within an operational environment?
- Is the sum of possible goal realisation improved in the examples of local ingenuity compared to the base case?
- Are these examples of local ingenuity known to management?
- Are the examples of local ingenuity aligned with the literal wording or the intent of rules and regulations?
- Are the examples of local ingenuity tested for the introduction of new risks?
- Are the examples of local ingenuity absorbed into the existing knowledge base of the organisation?
- Have the examples of local ingenuity been disseminated as best practice?
- What rule paradigms have been applied in the base case with goal conflicts and in the creation of local ingenuity?
- How have these paradigms influenced the creation of local ingenuity?
2. Literature Review
2.1. Goal Conflicts, Violations & Local Ingenuity
2.2. Two Conflicting Views of Rules and the Covert Nature of Local Ingenuity
2.3. Local Ingenuity
2.4. Implications for This Research
3. Method
3.1. Target Organisation
3.2. Interviews
- Could you tell us about something that makes executing your job difficult?
- How do you deal with this?
3.3. Scenario Descriptions
3.4. Coding
4. Results
4.1. Interviews
4.2. Scenarios
4.3. Local Ingenuity
4.4. Goal Conflicts
4.5. The Characteristics of Model 1 and Model 2 for the Base Cases
4.6. The Characteristics of Model 1 and Model 2 for local ingenuity
5. Discussion
5.1. Scenarios
5.2. Local Ingenuity
5.3. Goal Conflicts and Goal Opportunities
5.4. Model 1 and Model 2
5.5. Effectiveness of a Workplace
5.6. Limitation of the Study
5.7. Theoretical Contribution
5.8. Practical Contribution
5.9. Recommendations
5.10. Next Steps
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Model 1 Strengths | ||
---|---|---|
1 | Emphasis on written nature of rules to facilitate checking by regulators for non-compliances | “Emphasis on the scrutiny of writte documentation” |
2 | Consequences of violations are clear and explicit | “Emphasis on the detection of non-compliance.” |
3 | Management and SME’s are most competent in making the rules, which are imposed on the operators | “Rules are devised by experts that are not part of the workforce, to prevent errors and mistakes of the workforce, who are seen as more limited than the experts in their competence and experience.” |
4 | Based on Scientific Management, a rationalist and prescriptive approach to rules | “Rules are seen as a best practice, the one best way to perform a job.” |
5 | Action rules are used to describe the best way to do the work, which are easy to follow for novices | “Because novices do not yet have their own action rules and/or are not able yet to derive them from process rules, they need, at least temporarily rules from experts imposed on them.” |
6 | Rules are the ’gold standard’ for correct behaviour (Behavioural Based Safety) | “BBS, visible in observable rules, schedules of observation and feedback provided, is used to ensure compliance.” |
7 | Organisational complicity as a result of violations in case rule compliance conflicts with productivity demands | “This characteristic is only visible when a non-compliance has been detected.” |
Model 1 Weaknesses | ||
8 | Sees operators as dumb robots that have to follow the rules that are imposed on them | “Operators need not to bother themselves with thinking about rules and exceptions, just following them or asking management what to do in case a rule cannot be complied with.” |
9 | Violations and errors are voluntary, negative actions, committed by employees that think they know better | “Violation is always wrong and blame worthy” |
10 | Sees rule-making as a one-off, static process; rules only need modification when the work changes significantly or an accident happens | “Rules are carved in stone, the threshold for rule modification is rather high.” |
11 | Encountered exceptions can only be dealt with by rule book growth | “If operators cannot comply with a rule, management will come up with new rules as a solution” |
12 | The focus on written rules results in a gap with reality; if rules do not match reality a modification of reality is needed | “Model 1 starts from the written rules and deduces from them that actions are compliances or violations. Modify reality to match the rules.” |
Model 2 Strengths | ||
1 | Operators as seen as the real experts central to rule making | “Operators know the complexity of the work and are hence the experts needed for rule making.” |
2 | Key to rule use are experience, expertise, construction of meaning and sense-making | “Using of rules is based on both individual perceptions and judgements as well as group processes in which the applicability of rules is determined.” |
3 | Rule-making is a continuous, dynamic process that is never complete | “Rules need to be adapted and translated to be used.” |
4 | Relates abstract, generic, written rules to the flexible, local interpretation visible in routines | “Tacit rules or emerging expert rules are based on experience and socially constructed. They constitute organisational memory on how to deal with situations and change as a result of new experiences and learning.” |
5 | Recognises the importance of exceptions of written rules and sees adaptations not as violations | Reality is much more diverse than rules give credit for which makes violations inevitable, a positive necessity. |
6 | Placing centrally experience, competence and ability to adapt | “Experience, competence and ability to adapt guide if, when and how to deviate from procedures.” |
Model 2 Weaknesses | ||
7 | The making and changing of rules happens locally which lacks transparency for regulators and creates learning difficulties for novices | “Rules are not always written, making it difficult to check for risks or for novices to get familiar with them. There is no rule modification process.” |
8 | Undervalues the need for the organisation to explicitly manage the use and development of rules | “Changing the rules and their definition fundamentally to match reality. If rules are not described and/or the way to do something is not transferable, this characteristic is not applicable.” |
9 | Differences in interpretation and competence/experience are not visible | “It is unclear whether “the knowledge to vary and adapt the procedures is […] present”, or whether “mistrust of rules leads to needless violations of them”. If the difference between erroneous deviation and professional deviation is clear and visible, this characteristic is not applicable.” |
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Scenario 1: Requesting terrain for military training is accompanied by a quite a bit of administrative work and takes at least two weeks to complete. Following the prescribed procedures hampers the productivity of the unit and significantly reduces flexibility. To cope, all the necessary information to request terrain is summarised in one A4 page which is submitted to the authorities. This local ingenuity is within the existing rules. A copy is taken by the employees on the exercise. The productivity goal is hereby greatly improved. For the base case, the model 1 characteristics were predominantly applicable and the model 2 characteristics were not. The characteristics of model 2 are applicable to local ingenuity. Some of the model 1 characteristics are applicable to local ingenuity, some are not, and some can neither be confirmed nor disproved. |
Scenario 12: From civil airports, it is not allowed to take off after sunset. Civil airports are used as an alternate in case of an emergency. It this is the case, there is a chance that once landed, it will not be possible to leave on the same day, creating the challenge of securing the aircraft, disrupting productivity, and impacting the main task of the unit. No local ingenuity accompanies this base case. No non-compliance was found. Model 1 characteristics are applicable to the base case and model 2 characteristics are not. |
Scenario 13: Military personnel may have to use violence to attain a military goal. Rules of engagement (ROEs) describe the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner of violence that is allowed. Interpreting the ROEs can be difficult in some situations, resulting in the risk of unwantedly breaking these rules. The resulting conservative attitude negatively impacts the safety and expertise goals. Within the existing rules, a briefing is constructed by an employee, which provides more background and clarity of the ROEs. This briefing results in less safety risk and improved building of expertise. Model 1 characteristics are applicable to the base case and model 2 characteristics are not. The reverse is found for local ingenuity. |
Scenario 28: Employees are obligated to have certain rules and procedures physically with them when training, of which most are digitally stored on iPads. Finding the right procedure during training takes time and effort, negatively impacting the safety and productivity goals. Within the existing rules, a master pdf file is constructed, which encompasses short cuts to all the necessary rules. This turns the digital documents into one master file. Both the safety and productivity goal are improved, diminishing the goal conflict with the compliance goal. No procedures pertain to either the base case or local ingenuity, resulting in model 1 and 2 characteristics neither confirmed nor disproved for this scenario. |
Model 1 | Model 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Strengths | Weaknesses | Strengths | Weaknesses | ||||||||||||||||||
Scenario | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 |
1 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
2 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
3 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
4 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | + | 0 | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
5 | 0 | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | 0 | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | + | 0 | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
7 | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
8 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
9 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
10 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
11 | + | − | + | + | + | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
12 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
13 | 0 | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
14 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
15 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
16 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
17 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
18 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
19 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
20 | + | − | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | − | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
23 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
24 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
25 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
26 | + | 0 | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
29 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
30 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
31 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
32 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
33 | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | 0 | + | + | + | + | + | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − | − |
Model 1 | Model 2 | ||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Strengths | Weaknesses | Strengths | Weaknesses | ||||||||||||||||||
Scenario | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 |
1 | + | 0 | − | + | + | 0 | 0 | − | 0 | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | 0 | + | − | + | − |
2 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | + | + | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
3 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | + | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
4 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | 0 | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
7 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | 0 | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
9 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | 0 | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
11 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | + | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
13 | − | 0 | − | − | 0 | 0 | 0 | − | 0 | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | 0 | − | − |
14 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | + | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
16 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | 0 | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
18 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | + | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
19 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | + | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
20 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | − | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | − | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | 0 |
22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | − | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | 0 |
24 | + | 0 | − | − | + | 0 | 0 | − | 0 | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | 0 | + | − | − | − |
25 | 0 | 0 | − | − | + | 0 | 0 | − | 0 | − | 0 | − | + | + | + | + | 0 | + | − | − | − |
26 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | + | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
27 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
29 | − | − | − | − | 0 | 0 | − | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
30 | − | − | − | − | − | 0 | + | − | − | − | − | − | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
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Boskeljon-Horst, L.; De Boer, R.J.; Sillem, S.; Dekker, S.W.A. Goal Conflicts, Classical Management and Constructivism: How Operators Get Things Done. Safety 2022, 8, 37. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety8020037
Boskeljon-Horst L, De Boer RJ, Sillem S, Dekker SWA. Goal Conflicts, Classical Management and Constructivism: How Operators Get Things Done. Safety. 2022; 8(2):37. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety8020037
Chicago/Turabian StyleBoskeljon-Horst, Leonie, Robert J. De Boer, Simone Sillem, and Sidney W. A. Dekker. 2022. "Goal Conflicts, Classical Management and Constructivism: How Operators Get Things Done" Safety 8, no. 2: 37. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety8020037
APA StyleBoskeljon-Horst, L., De Boer, R. J., Sillem, S., & Dekker, S. W. A. (2022). Goal Conflicts, Classical Management and Constructivism: How Operators Get Things Done. Safety, 8(2), 37. https://doi.org/10.3390/safety8020037