A Critical Analysis of Dreyfus’s Background Knowledge

Abstract

The role of background knowledge in human intelligence, knowledge, and consciousness has been a topic of discussion among several philosophers, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, John Searle, Martin Heidegger, and Hubert Dreyfus. Hubert Dreyfus criticizes what he calls the mediational approach and offers the contact theory to clarify the concept within his theoretical framework. In alignment with Heidegger’s existential phenomenological perspective, he posits that our contact and our embodied coping with the world constitute a background by which we become acquainted with preunderstanding that encompasses both prelinguistic and pre-propositional understandings. In this article, Dreyfus’s analysis of background knowledge is criticized by focusing on his latest writings. It is argued that, although Dreyfus claims to be defending horizontal foundationalism rather than vertical foundationalism, he primarily emphasizes the foundational nonlinguistic role of motor intentionality in absorbed coping. Furthermore, it is asserted that nonlinguistic embodied coping alone cannot provide the basis for linguistic communication and a humanly way of understanding. Rather than serving as a foundation, embodied coping is more appropriately situated within a linguistic context, because we perform deeds with words.

1. Introduction

The concept of “background knowledge” is used as either one of the parts of philosophical theories, or to illuminate concepts like rules, representations, intentionality, consciousness, or embodied skillful coping. To name just a few, in the recent philosophical literature, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, John Searle, and Hubert Dreyfus all refer to the concept and use it in different ways within their frameworks. Although there is no universally accepted definition of the concept, philosophers focus on the factors and conditions that enable us to understand the environment and culture in which we live. The concept has ontological, epistemological, and philosophy of mind aspects not only because it is related to how we acquire knowledge, but also because it is related to how intelligence and consciousness arise in humans, and in what sense human consciousness is different from that of higher mammals and today’s artificial intelligence. As a concept, “background knowledge” is also associated with concepts such as rules, representations, intentionality, consciousness, and embodied coping. As noted above, there are different answers given by philosophers to the question of what background is. For example, Ludwig Wittgenstein discusses the issue in the posthumously published book On Certainty (1969) [1]. Wittgenstein’s starting point in On Certainty is Moore’s two articles “Proof of an External World” (1939) [2] and “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925) [3], in which G.E. Moore asserts that there are some propositions, such as “I have two hands”, “I have ancestors”, and “I am a human being”, that we know with certainty and that they constitute the foundation on which we built our knowledge. Although the hard foundationalist approach of Moore is not welcomed by Wittgenstein, these framework sentences are used in the book to refute the Cartesian skepticism and the correlated hyperbolic or super-doubt. According to Wittgenstein, background assumptions embedded in practices allow us to adapt ourselves to nature and culture.

John Searle, on the other hand, focuses on the matter in The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992) [4] and Intentionality (1983) [5]. Searle uses the concept in two senses: one refers to the mental background that allows us to perform speech acts, to communicate, and to get along with the world. In this sense, mental background is related to our neuronal structure that produces intentionality. From the perspective of biological naturalism, Searle postulates that intentional states can function on non-intentional and pre-intentional backgrounds. The other sense of the word is correlated with a cultural background in his framework. In Searle’s approach, the mental background takes precedence over the cultural background practices, and thus, the first-person point of view or subjectivity is important. However, Searle’s theory of speech acts, and especially the declarative type of speech act, aims to underline the importance of the cultural–institutional background of practices.

The work of Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Samuel Todes, and the neurologist Walter Freeman inspired Hubert Dreyfus to emphasize, in a Heideggerian manner, that a background field of forces influences our basic and skillful coping behaviors. Furthermore, he underlines that engaged coping is primarily non-propositional, non-representational, and nonlinguistic and shaped by the background field of forces. This paper critically analyzes Dreyfus’s assessment of background knowledge, focusing primarily on his latest writings, including Retrieving Realism (2015) [6], co-authored with Charles Taylor. Two arguments will be developed in this paper.

i.

The first is to demonstrate that, although Dreyfus claims to defend a horizontal type rather than a vertical type of foundationalism in the articles written in 2007 [7,8], in Retrieving Realism (2015) a book published eight years after the earlier articles defending “horizontal foundationalism”, he in fact endorses a non-traditional type of foundationalism that is consistent with vertical rather than horizontal foundationalism.

ii.

The second argument is developed against Dreyfus’s claim that preunderstanding or humanly understanding is possible in a purely nonlinguistic medium.

2. The Role of Background in Dreyfus’s Contact Theory

In order to understand how background works within Dreyfus’s theoretical framework, it is necessary to discuss how traditional models of the human mind are criticized and why he deems them inadequate.

In particular, he criticizes what he calls the mediational approach, which assumes a dichotomy between the inner and outer worlds and asserts that the human understanding of external reality is possible through internal representations [6]. In this view, knowledge is constituted by states of mind that represent the external world.

As Dreyfus notes, the mediational approach was defended in one way or another by a number of prominent thinkers and schools of thought, including the Cartesians, John Locke, the materialists, Willard V. O. Quine’s logical behaviorism, and the computational model of mind. The mediational view is characterized by several key elements in his theoretical scheme, including the following:

• Forms, representations, or structured categories play a pivotal role in our epistemic relationship to the world. They function as an interface that allows us to visualize the world as it is. For instance, in the Cartesian system, ideas and, in the Lockean system, true beliefs make possible such a relation to the world.
• Materialists define qualia in terms of brain states. However, this is a reductionist approach that still implies the distinction between inner and outer or mental and physical [6] (p. 11).
• The computational model, on the other hand, is based on the idea of information processing, which assumes that the human brain takes bits of information from the environment and produces outputs by processing them. This view takes for granted the Cartesian dualist distinction between the body and the mind in the form of mechanism and formalism, with formal rules being associated with the mind and mechanism with the body. This approach is inadequate to understand human consciousness, because appealing to formal rules to emulate the human mind excludes what Dreyfus calls the sheer intuitions that allow human agents to cope with the historico-cultural environment [6] (pp. 15–16).

As is well known, the computational approach is thoroughly criticized by Dreyfus in his well-known books What Computers Still Can’t Do: A critique of artificial reason (1992) [9] and Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer (2002) [10] and in some other articles [11,12,13].

As an alternative to the mediational approach, Dreyfus proposes the contact theory, which assumes that our contact or interaction with the world provides us with proto-knowledge. This proto-knowledge enables us to cope in the world and constitutes background understanding.

The concept of background proposed by Dreyfus becomes clearer later in the article. However, it is beneficial to recall that the first level of background understanding refers to the life meanings that allow us to “make sense of our surroundings as figure and ground, zones of confinement and zones of openness, obstacles and facilitations” [6] (p. 110).

Dreyfus, inspired by Heidegger, defines background involvement as a “field of forces” in which embodied coping takes place [14] (p. 7). There should be a direct involvement of an absorbed coper with the field. Dreyfus says, “Such a field of forces can only exist when there is no distance between the absorbed coper and the field. Indeed, as in the Knoblauch’s case, their skill loses its force when attended to from a distance rather than being directly responded to” [14] (p. 7). He further emphasizes that existential phenomenologists, such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, put forward the idea that “the background, qua background, must withdraw to do its job. For them, the background is a whole on the basis of which things can show up, but anything that shows up does so only on the condition that the background not show up. That is, the background qua background must remain hidden and cannot be made explicit” [14] (p. 1).

At this point, it is also necessary to discuss the relationship between background and skillful coping within the framework of Dreyfus.

2.1. From Background Coping to Skillful Coping

Dreyfus’s theoretical framework posits that all coping, including skillful coping, occurs within the context of background coping. He says, “Heidegger, indeed, claims that skillful coping is basic, but he is also clear that, all coping takes place on the background coping he calls being-in-the-world that doesn’t involve any form of representation at all” [13] (p. 1145).

In this type of coping, the distinction between inner and outer dissolves. According to Dreyfus, this coping has no as-structure. He states,

That is, when absorbed in coping, I can be described objectively as using a certain door as a door, but I’m not experiencing the door as a door. Normally there is no “I” and no experiencing of the door at all but simply pressing into the possibility of going out. The important thing to realize is that, when we are pressing into possibilities, there is no experience of an entity doing the soliciting; just the immediate response to a solicitation [13] (p. 1144).

In Dreyfus’s work, the concept of “absorbed coper” suggests that human beings are not merely minds extended to the world, but rather, they are “one with the world” [13] (p. 1145). This Heideggerian understanding presupposes that background coping is so fundamental that it precedes thinking and problem solving. The act of confronting solicitations and responding to them serves to dissolve the distinction between the individuals and their equipment and between the inner and the outer [13] (p. 1146). In a Heideggerian way, Dreyfus postulates that background coping cannot be categorized as a traditional type of intentionality and it is unlike the ready-to-hand approach, which is characterized by the presence of conditions of satisfaction, such as the act of hammering in a nail. In this sense, background coping does not exhibit conditions of satisfaction and it is more basic than any other coping including ready-to-hand coping like hammering. All kinds of coping, including skillful coping, occur within the context of a background coping. Background coping, on the other hand, is non-representational, holistic, absorbed, and a kind of intentionality [13] (p. 1149). Dreyfus’s position aligns with the approach developed by Freeman, Merleau-Ponty, and the ecological psychologist James J. Gibson, who proposed a third position between intellectualist and empiricist perspectives.

This approach assumes “that the brain is embodied in an animal moving in the environment to satisfy its needs” [13] (p. 1151).

Dreyfus emphasizes that Heidegger makes a distinction between two modes of coping as the “readiness-to-hand of equipment when we are involved in using it, and the presence-at-hand of objects when we contemplate them” [13] (p. 1142) [15]. As previously indicated, background coping is of such a fundamental nature that even skillful coping, which is associated with Heideggerian ready-to-hand mode, occurs on this holistic, non-representational background coping. However, it is important to note that even skillful coping cannot be fully correlated with a presence-at-hand mode, which requires objectifying the action in question by contemplating on it. Consequently, a brief discussion of skillful coping and its relation to background coping is necessary.

Dreyfus developed his theory of skillful coping in collaboration with his brother, Stuart E. Dreyfus. The Dreyfus brothers’ theory focuses on two significant layers of intelligent behavior: learning and skillful action. The theory postulates that immersed skillful coping is performed without the involvement of mind and brain representations. They define a series of stages by which we become skillful copers. These stages, in the order, are as follows: the stage of novice, the stage of advanced beginners, the stage of competence, the stage of proficiency, and the stage of expertise. According to Dreyfus and Dreyfus, the stages represent a process involving the gradual acquisition of skills from “rule-guided ‘knowing that’ to experience-based know-how” [10] (p. 19). The stages are characterized by two types of processes: nonsituational or non-contextual rule following and situational discriminations. For example, the first stage of novice involves the introduction of task-specific rules in a context-free medium. In the context of teaching automatic car-driving skills, an instructor not only introduces rules such as “put the right foot on the brake pedal,” but also teaches “interpretation-free features as speed (indicated by the speedometer)” [11] (p. 368).

In the first stage, the predominant approach is non-contextual rule following. In contrast, situational discriminations become increasingly prominent in later stages. However, Dreyfus also emphasizes that this non-contextual, detached rule following is a part of the skill acquisition process up to the fourth stage.

He states the following:

Normally, the instruction process begins with the instructor decomposing the task environment into context-free features which the beginner can recognize without previous experience in the task domain. The beginner is then given rules for determining actions on the basis of these features, like a computer following a program

[11] (p. 368).

As illustrated by the aforementioned quotation, an instructor “decomposes the task into context-free features”, while a learner of manual automobile driving is “given rules such as ‘Shift to second when the speedometer needle points to ten miles an hour’” [11] (p. 368). In the second stage, or in the advanced beginner’s stage, the beginner confronts real situations and apprehends new aspects of the situation. In this stage, the individual engages in situational awareness by integrating non-contextual principles with situational elements. Dreyfus’s distinction between “objectively defined nonsituational features” [11] (p. 369) and situational aspects come to the fore in this stage. In the third stage, Dreyfus emphasizes the combination of emotional involvement with detached rule following, which is categorized in the first stage of skillful coping, stating “Progress in the acquisition of skill is possible by novices’ detached rule-following with advance beginner’s involvement” [11] (p. 370). This detached rule following persists even in stage four, as Dreyfus asserts, “Thus the proficient performer, after seeing the goal and the important features of the situation, must still decide what to do. To decide, he falls back on detached rule-following” [11] (p. 371).

It is important to note that detached rule following is one of the components of the constitution until the fourth stage of the process of acquiring skillful coping. It is only in the fifth stage of expertise that rules become integrated into an expert coper’s smooth flow of action, and the expert coper ceases to rely on rules. In other words, two parallel processes occur after the first stage. The former is characterized by detached rule following, while the latter is situational discriminations, which are explained by the concept of the intentional arc borrowed from Merleau-Ponty [16] (p. 137). According to this concept, a skilled performer does not collect representations of what she has perceived in her mind. Rather, she becomes aware of varied situations and refines her responses by eliminating the unsuccessful ones in the performance. Accordingly, Dreyfus’s account of skillful coping involves a dual-faceted, parallel formation: one facet corresponds to nonsituational, representational, detached rule following, and the other facet corresponds to non-representational, phenomenological gestalt formation. As emphasized earlier, the skill acquisition process occurs in background coping, and a unidirectional derivation from background coping determines this process, which also underscores the non-representational nature of engaged, skillful coping.

Dreyfus’s skillful coping has been the subject of critique by several philosophers. For instance, Harry Collins expresses concern over Dreyfus’s exclusion of cultural constructions in the analysis of skilled coping [17] (p. 134). In Collins’ interactional expertise approach, there is a “tacit knowledge laden form of social interaction” [17] (p. 128), and the emphasis is on socialization rather than on bodily coping. In a similar vein, Rodrigo Ribeiro contends that Dreyfus’s emphasis on structural, pre-personal aspects of the human body supersedes his focus on language and culture [18] (p. 201). Evan M. Selinger and Robert P. Crease [19] underline the absence of hermeneutical sensitivity in Dreyfus’s analysis of skillful coping. Justin F. White, on the other hand, underscores the importance of deliberation in refining and extending skills. He says, “Dreyfus’s work shows how we overlook much of human agency if we too quickly identify human agency with deliberative processes, self-conscious intentions, and reflectively self-aware experience of that agency. In his zeal to push in the other direction, however, Dreyfus may end up underappreciating the conscious, intentional, and deliberative aspects of human agency” [20] (p. 231). Mark Coeckelbergh, on the other hand, criticizes Dreyfus’s skillful coping from the perspective of relational phenomenology. He appeals to Wittgenstein and Dewey to remedy Dreyfus’s approach and emphasizes that skillful coping cannot occur in a social vacuum. Coeckelbergh states that this problem is implicit in all phenomenological approaches because there is “a tendency to limit phenomenological analysis to individual subjects and their relation to the world” [21] (p. 275). These approaches ignore the fact that the concept of “embodied” is intertwined with a social and practical context, in which tacit knowledge and language games play an important role [21] (p. 280). Shaun Gallagher’s observations on intersubjectivity and its implications for social interaction are noteworthy. The author highlights the prevalence of intersubjective processes within various practices, emphasizing that deliberations often occur in shared contexts. This observation underscores that these deliberations are inherently shared, thereby suggesting that individuals’ intentions are shaped during interactions and communications with others [22] (p. 345) [23].

In the context of Dreyfus’s model of skillful coping, three questions deserve consideration.

As previously discussed, detached rule following is one of the components of the constitution until the fourth stage of the skillful coping acquisition process. Dreyfus’s approach entails a generalization of the pattern of the five stages of skill acquisition for humans and the first stage of the pattern applicable to computer programs. The first question to be asked is whether it is possible to cultivate skills by implementing rules in a context-free medium. The second related question is whether it is possible to formulate a general, common, and universal pattern for acquiring and developing skills, as proposed by Dreyfus. The third question is whether it is possible to develop a model of skillful coping that does not consider the role of language and speech acts in the process.

Dreyfus’s approach posits the perspective of detached rule following, whereby the novice stage is similar to an information processing that is characterized by context-free elements, context-free rules, and context-free facts [10] (p. 21). This stage is defined as detached rule following; however, it is challenging to assert that the first phase of skill acquisition is characterized by detached rule following. While it is true that under certain circumstances, the development of skills may be achieved through the implementation of rules within a context-free medium, this approach may not be universally applicable to all skill development processes. Not all skills are the same. The acquisition of skills such as language learning, mathematics problem solving, driving a vehicle or riding a bicycle, piano playing, tennis playing, chess playing, or automotive repair may exhibit distinct patterns of mastery. Consequently, it can be posited that a multitude of patterns exist through which individuals can acquire or develop skills.

The observation of experts engaged in activities such as playing the piano, playing chess, or driving a car could be postulated as a viable method for the acquisition or development of skills. For instance, one might develop the skill of playing chess by observing a master player, or one might develop the skill of playing the piano by listening to or watching an expert piano player. A similar principle applies to sports such as swimming. The observation of an expert swimmer, for instance, has the potential to enhance one’s swimming skills. The advent of simulators has further diversified avenues for skill development in contemporary society. In these scenarios, the emphasis may oscillate between rules, observation of the performances of skilled practitioners, or situational characteristics. In sum, the acquisition and refinement of skills can be attributed to a range of factors, including learning by watching, the alignment of rules with tasks in question, self-improvement, and situational awareness. Nevertheless, in neither of these cases can it be asserted that there is detached rule following or that rules are mastered in a context-free medium. In his aforementioned remarks, Dreyfus draws parallels between the rule following of a novice and that of a computer program. However, this generalization is not easily applied, even to the context of computer programs. The recent computer programs, such as AlphaZero and MuZero, developed by the AI research company DeepMind, exemplify this point. These programs have attained mastery in games through self-play, even without explicit knowledge of the rules thanks to their “ability to plan winning strategies in unknown environments” [24].

The third problem in Dreyfus’s skillful coping is that, although he appears to accept the role of language in the process of mastering a skill by stating that acquisition of new skills is possible “ through written or verbal instruction” [10] (p. 19), he fails to provide an explanation of how language functions in the process of becoming an expert skilled coper.

As previously mentioned, Dreyfus’s theory of skillful coping is linked to Heidegger’s ready-to-hand mode, occurring within the context of holistic, non-representational background coping. Its direction is from rule-based knowing-that or Heideggerian presence-at-hand mode (representational) to experience-based know-how or Heideggerian ready-to-hand mode (non-representational). Upon achieving mastery of a skill, rules become integrated into the expert coper’s smooth flow of action, leading to independence from rules. Engaged skillful coping, in this sense, is also non-representational. Dreyfus underscores that it is only when coping is blocked that a coper engages in deliberation, a phenomenon that aligns with Heidegger’s concept of unready-to-hand mode. Dreyfus states, “I only deliberate when coping is blocked, and I can only deliberate on the background of continued coping. But the involved coping that achieves a goal without a prior representation of it still seems like magic” [11] (p. 381).

Dreyfus’s view that background coping or ground-level intelligence is non-representational is criticized by Massimiliano L. Cappuccio and Michael Wheeler [25] (2012). Their Heideggerian approach avoids many of the problems contained in Dreyfus’s theory. This is due to the fact that their approach elucidates the dynamic interplay between background coping and skillful coping, which facilitates smooth flow of actions within ritualized contexts. Additionally, it discusses the role of action-oriented representations, encompassing signs and preparatory embodied routines in performative, ritualized actions.

They agree with Dreyfus’s assertion that background is a transcendental condition for absorbed coping [25] (p. 16). The background is implicit due to the existence of “endless chains of preconditions (bodily, attitudinal, social, cultural) that provide the context-dependent meaning and normative relevance conditions for any specific intelligent action” [25] (p. 14). Nevertheless, they contend that Dreyfus’s model is inadequate in elucidating the dynamics of background, particularly in the context of ritualized actions. This shortcoming can be attributed to the representation-avoiding character of Dreyfus’s perspective. They make a distinction between background and context-specific coping. Two principles are proposed to elucidate the relationship between these two types of coping. The principle of unity posits that, given the holistic nature of the background, it is not possible to disintegrate it. The principle of mutuality, on the other hand, presupposes that background coping and context-specific coping are mutually shaped by one another [25] (p. 20). Hence, there is a dynamic interaction between them.

In a Heideggerian manner, the emphasis is placed on the function of signs in the process of ritualized actions. The term “sign” is not confined to graphic signs and conventional means of communication, but also includes events, states, processes, and things [25] (p. 25). In context-specific copings, signs can function to display a problematic situation and prompt an unready-to-hand interaction [25] (p. 25). This can cause a shift away from absorbed coping, prompting individuals to deliberate about the predicament to find a way to a solution. The act of deliberation in this context is characterized by its representational nature. Nevertheless, it is also underlined that action-oriented representations (including signs and preparatory embodied routines) have minimal representational status due to their context-sensitivity [25] (p. 28).

Cappuccio and Wheeler claim that preparatory rituals are representational in form. They appeal to the Heideggerian unreadiness-to-hand mode to explain this phenomenon. They claim that, like the Heideggerian unreadiness-to-hand, preparatory embodied routines require problem solving, thereby creating a distance between the agent and the environment [25] (p. 24). This, in turn, gives rise to the emergence of representations. Signs as action-orienting-representations cause a change in a person’s dispositions in an unfamiliar situation [25] (p. 28). Therefore, signs are a part of the scaffold in which the coper better recognizes the available affordances [25] (p. 28). In this sense, Cappuccio and Wheeler allow for “minimally representational processes” that are “at the heart of the ground-level intelligence” [25] (p. 29).

Although Dreyfus also accepts that the coper is engaged in deliberation when engaged coping is hindered, he finds Wheeler’s view cognitivist and not Heideggerian enough. This is because Wheeler claims that minimal representations take place in the ground level intelligence. Conversely, Dreyfus thinks that skillful coping is not representational because it takes place in background coping or ground-level intelligence. He states, “The important point for Heidegger, but not for Wheeler, is that all coping, including unready-to-hand coping, takes place on the background of this basic non-representational, holistic, absorbed, kind of intentionality, which Heidegger calls being-in-the-world” [13] (p. 1149).

As previously mentioned, Dreyfus argues that our contact with or our interaction within the world, or embodied coping, provides the foundation for conceptual thinking. Despite his denial, this perspective is evident in both his earlier and later writings. In response to John McDowell, he asserts that he is not defending vertical foundationalism but rather horizontal foundationalism [7,8,26]. However, this assertion is not justified within the theoretical framework that he has presented. The following section will first present an analysis of how he defends horizontal foundationalism. Secondly, it will be demonstrated that, although he appears to defend horizontal foundationalism in his earlier writings, in his later writings, he openly defends that nonlinguistic, non-rational, non-propositional motor intentionality is the basis of conceptual thought, thereby advocating for a version of vertical foundationalism.

2.2. The Claim of Horizontal Foundationalism

In order to provide a basis for the discussion of the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell, it is necessary to briefly articulate the concepts of “vertical and horizontal foundationalism.” There are different types of foundationalism, and the concept has an epistemological aspect; therefore, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the concept with all its perspectives. Briefly put, various philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, who defend classical foundationalism in different ways, invoke concepts such as “forms”, “self-evident truths”, “self-justified beliefs”, and “clear and distinct ideas” to avoid the infinite regress problem and to establish a reliable foundation for knowledge in epistemology.

In Descartes’ philosophy, knowledge that is indubitable, incorrigible, and infallible is founded upon clear and distinct ideas from which other beliefs can be deduced. These clear and distinct ideas are mental objects in the mind’s eye to which one has privileged access, and they are internal, mental representations. Not only rationalists like Descartes but also empiricists are in the pursuit of the foundation of knowledge. In the works of Locke and Hume, experience, sense perceptions, and the relations of ideas serve as the primary sources from which probabilistic knowledge is inferred.

A number of characteristics define these classical foundationalist approaches, which can also be characterized as vertical foundationalist approaches. First, there is a relationship between the infrastructural level that forms the basis of knowledge and other levels that are built upon that infrastructural level. This implies a hierarchical relationship between the deep and surface levels of knowledge. Consequently, the formation of knowledge is unidirectional, progressing from the deepest to the surface levels. Secondly, surface-level knowledge or understanding is derivable from the deeper level ways of knowledge. Consequently, the efficacy of causal processes is observed to operate from the deepest to the surface levels. Thirdly, the deeper-level knowing has ontological priority over surface-level knowing, and this deeper-level knowing is proposed as a transcendental condition for knowledge in general, since other kinds of knowledge are derivable from the deeper-level knowledge.

Conversely, in the formation of knowledge, horizontal foundationalism does not presuppose lower and higher levels of knowledge. Rather, it takes into account our embedded, embodied, enactive coping within the complexity of everyday life, without giving any ontological priority to one condition over another. From a phenomenological perspective, it is related to Heidegger’s concept of “being-in-the-world” and Merleau-Ponty’s concepts of “intentional arc” and “maximal grip”. In this sense, knowledge formation is possible through our relational and interactional engagement with the environment. This relation is hermeneutical, situated, holistic, and perspectival, which implies that knowledge formation is possible by coming into contact with all the dynamic and complex relations of everyday life. Accordingly, in this model, since knowledge formation is multi-faceted and nourished from all sources in interaction with the environment, no one factor has ontological priority over other factors in knowledge formation. In this view, the notion of “being-in-the-world” is a precondition for knowledge formation.

In his critique of McDowell’s so-called mentalistic view, which assumes that perception is conceptual, Dreyfus states the following:

The phenomena show that embodied skills, when we are absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of content which is nonconceptual, non-propositional, non-rational (even if rational means situation-specific), and non-linguistic. To focus on the motor intentional content, then, is not to make some implicit conceptual content explicit—that’s the myth—but rather to transform the motor intentional content into conceptual content, thereby making it available for rational analysis but no longer capable of directly motivating action

[8] (p. 360).

Dreyfus posits that background understanding, or what he terms “proto-knowledge”, is acquired through our embodied coping, which is primarily nonlinguistic in nature. He rejects traditional foundationalism based solely on the mediational approach, but in his earlier writings, he acknowledges the role of motor intentionality in providing the foundation for all forms of conceptual intentionality [8] (p. 352). Furthermore, he emphasizes that, in absorbed coping, there is no conceptual intentional content but only motor intentionality [8] (p. 360). He defines the concept of coping with the ground and upper floors. He states that, “The world of background perceptual constants and foreground solicitations can then be legitimately understood as the ground floor on the basis of which a higher-level world of determinate objects and their properties and relations can be apperceived” [8] (p. 362). Obviously, in these discussions, he defends a version of foundationalism by acknowledging the existence of a ground and upper floor relationship in embodied coping. He acknowledges this by saying that “…the phenomenological approach accepts the challenge of relating the preconceptual world to the conceptual world makes that approach, even though it is reminiscent of foundationalism, seem to me the more attractive” [8] (p. 364). Furthermore, he admits that, nonlinguistic, non-propositional, non-conceptual, pre-subjective, and pre-objective motor intentionality serves as the foundation for this phenomenon. He says, “…the existential phenomenologist can agree with McDowell in rejecting traditional foundationalisms, and yet affirm and describe the special supporting role of motor intentionality” [8] (p. 363). However, in response to McDowell’s charge of vertical foundationalism put forward in “What Myth” [27] and “Response to Dreyfus” [28], Dreyfus takes a step back and says the following:

I hope readers in deciding which interpretation is right, will ask themselves whether our egoless, non-conceptual absorbed coping might well be the background on the basis of which conceptual mindedness is possible. To avoid any suggestion of an indubitable ground-floor from which other phenomena are derived, we could, following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, call this a horizonal rather than a ground-floor/upper-story dependency relation

[7] (pp. 376–377).

Accordingly, Dreyfus puts forward that, in the case of absorbed coping, the relationship between the ground and upper floors is not to be conceived of as a vertical one but rather as a horizontal one. Does Dreyfus’s later analyses provide sufficient justification for the so-called “horizontal” account? Dreyfus’s subsequent statements are inadequate to persuade us that he advocates a horizontal as opposed to a vertical type of foundationalism.

In order to advance the idea that Dreyfus defends a version of vertical foundationalism, this paper focuses on his latest writings, namely, the book he co-authored with Taylor (Dreyfus & Taylor, 2015) [6], and written eight years after the aforementioned article. As this book was written later, it is more reflective of Dreyfus’ views than the earlier article.

As previously stated, in Dreyfus’s framework, absorbed coping takes place in the background of the field of forces. He defines his position as that of a robust realist, which entails a rejection of the mediational view of knowledge and the associated idea of the representational view. As noted above, Dreyfus also seems to reject the vertical foundationalism implicit in representationalism. However, the contact theory he presents with Taylor perfectly justifies a version of vertical foundationalism. In order to demonstrate the compatibility of Dreyfus’s views with vertical foundationalism, it is necessary to present analyses by quoting passages from his latest writings.

Dreyfus postulates that prelinguistic coping plays an indispensable role in our lives, thereby providing a foundational support for conceptual focus. This is not merely an infrastructural function, enabling our mental navigation between disparate contexts. Rather, it is a more fundamental aspect, reinforcing our ability to understand and integrate the disparate elements of our thought processes. As Dreyfus and Taylor note, “the background understanding we need to make the sense we do of the pieces of thinking we engage in resides in our ordinary coping” [6] (p. 52). Hence, he emphasizes the primacy and infrastructural nature of prelinguistic or nonlinguistic coping, which serves as the foundation for linguistic coping. The concept of “infrastructural” implies a hierarchical relationship between nonlinguistic motor intentionality and linguistic coping. This represents a further argument in favor of a different form of foundationalism that is incompatible with the realist–representationalist approach, which Dreyfus and Taylor have labeled the mediational approach. However, it is a version of vertical foundationalism. Dreyfus is right in saying that he does not defend a vertical type of foundationalism that is correlated with the realist–representationalist view. Nevertheless, the robust realism that he defends, which is based on enactivism and engaged coping, can be regarded as a form of vertical foundationalism. He defines what he refers to as the mediational view as foundationalist, yet he also espouses a novel form of foundationalism that is associated with “background understanding which underlies and is generated in everyday coping” [6] (p. 54). This is because “background understanding” is not only reproduced in everyday coping, but it also supports the content of conceptual thought in an infrastructural manner.

Another passage that justifies the assertion that Dreyfus implies a hierarchical relationship between our immediate contact with the world and linguistic coping is as follows. In criticizing McDowell’s position, Dreyfus asserts that contact with the world is situated below the conceptual or linguistic level. He says the following:

And yet, for a while our view seemed to be in disagreement with McDowell himself here, because he refuses this idea of a level of our epistemic contact with the world which would lie below the conceptual….By contrast, we are claiming that our propositionally formed beliefs can only arise on the basis of a more original, “primordial” (ursprünglich) epistemically fruitful contact with the world, which is prepropositional and in part even preconceptual

[6] (p. 72).

In the quote above, Dreyfus reiterates the assertion that there exists a hierarchical relationship between our contact with the world and the conceptual or linguistic level. He postulates that the “epistemically fruitful contact with the world” is primordial or fundamental, upon which the linguistic is based. Consequently, the hierarchy between the prelinguistic and linguistic realms is also acknowledged, and a commitment to a version of vertical foundationalism is evident.

The Dreyfus–McDowell debate revolves around the question of whether perception is conceptual. McDowell defends the view that it is conceptual, whereas Dreyfus, in his own terms, maintains that absorbed coping is the foundation of conceptual and propositional processes. This suggests that both McDowell and Dreyfus consider language as fundamentally propositional. McDowell’s assertion that perception is conceptual in its entirety and Dreyfus’s claim that the pre-propositional is the foundation of the propositional indicate that they both believe that language is primarily propositional and, consequently, representational. Dreyfus attempts to eliminate the representational view by presenting the contact theory. He dismisses the associated representational view by emphasizing the primacy of embodied coping, which he believes is the foundation of conceptual.

The question of whether language is propositional or non-propositional can be resolved by acknowledging the non-propositional aspects of language, which are not appreciated by Dreyfus. The use of assertive type of speech acts demonstrates that language does, in fact, possess a propositional aspect. However, this is not the complete picture, as there are other types of speech acts and linguistic uses that do not align with the representational scheme of language. It is thus more appropriate to discuss the distinction between linguistic and nonlinguistic realms than to continue using the terms “non-conceptual” and “conceptual”, which are aligned with the representational and non-representational. Upon examination, it becomes evident that a clear delineation between linguistic and nonlinguistic realms cannot be easily performed. Our bodily actions, such as waving a hand, smiling, nodding, and murmuring, are integral parts of linguistic expression that may or may not have a representational dimension. The definition of language can be extended to include certain bodily actions, gestures, and mimics as linguistic units, even if they are not a part of the representational scheme. Hence, confining the scope of language to its propositional and representational dimensions is to restrict the full potential and to fail to fully encompass the richness and complexity of language. Some of our actions are linguistic in nature, and most of our actions and coping, whether basic or skillful, require the use of speech acts. Even in instances of absorbed coping, there is often an interference with speech acts in the form of a question, warning, or order. For instance, in the event of an unexpected cessation of driving, a question may arise, such as “Why?” Similarly, in the context of playing chess, a question may be posed about a move. Moreover, in sports such as football, basketball, or tennis, a referee may issue a warning. Consequently, there may be frequent interruptions in the flow of absorbed coping due to the involvement of linguistic units.

In Dreyfus, the concepts of “intentional arc” and “maximal grip”, borrowed from Merleau-Ponty, are used to articulate the interaction between an agent and the world in embodied coping. Dreyfus notes that an agent does not save or accumulate representations in the mind during absorbed coping. Instead, the “intentional arc” enables an agent to perform the task at hand by responding to “the solicitations of situations in the world” [11] (p. 367). Maximal grip, on the other hand, is understood as the body’s inclination to reply “to these solicitations in such a way as to bring the current situation closer to the agent’s sense of an optimal gestalt” [11] (pp. 367–368). Dreyfus characterizes this as a normative process [8] (p. 364), whereby normativity is understood as the capacity to cope with the environment in an optimal manner by aligning intentions with solicitations. However, as Dreyfus underlines, the operation of know-how in absorbed coping occurs within a nonlinguistic context. For example, he states that “the lecture room is the condition of the possibility of making judgments about the position of the blackboard” [6] (p. 83). In such a scenario, an incorrectly positioned blackboard may impede optimal coping. This suggests that I may be unable to use the blackboard in the most effective manner. Normativity entails aligning one’s intentions with the solicitations presented by the external world. Nevertheless, within the framework of Dreyfus, the role of language is ignored in the process of aligning one’s intentions with the solicitations offered by the world. In order to comprehend that the blackboard is incorrectly positioned, one must undergo training and become proficient in a language that incorporates esthetic and ergonomic values. It is evident that a judgment regarding the position of the blackboard necessitates the presence of the lecture room with a blackboard in itself. Additionally, a judgment regarding the position of the blackboard can be expressed in a proposition and can have a representational import. However, the capacity to discern the misplacement of a blackboard requires the acquisition of a language that incorporates esthetic values with functional considerations. In the absence of comprehension through language, it is not possible to determine the correct position of the blackboard. For a human being to understand that the blackboard is incorrectly positioned, she must possess the capacity to utilize her language in its entirety and demonstrate an understanding of the subtleties of word, linguistic unit, and speech act usages in contexts. This would entail recognizing the distinction between the terms “position”, “blackboard”, and the difference between “good” and “bad” positioning, as well as the nuances of other related terms and linguistic units. The judgments, presented in the form of propositions, regarding the position of the blackboard can be uttered and are therefore a part of language. However, the problem in Dreyfus’s framework is that language is regarded as entirely propositional, with propositional knowledge being built upon pre-propositional and non-conceptual motor intentionality.

Dreyfus’s emphasis on the significance of embodied coping in the formation of knowledge and consciousness is well founded and merits further investigation. Goethe’s famous motto, “Im Anfang war die Tat”, is a particularly illuminating statement that underscores the necessity of an embodied engagement with the environment for the development of human knowledge and consciousness. However, the concept of “deed” makes sense when considered in the context of language. It is evident that human embodied coping plays a significant role in the development of human skills. Nevertheless, rather than forming the basis of linguistic skills, prelinguistic and pre-propositional abilities are on the same level with linguistic abilities to make humanly understanding possible. Dreyfus draws a distinction between linguistic and nonlinguistic realms and defines them with two distinct levels. The first level is concerned with animality, which he calls “life-meanings,” while the second level encompasses culture and language and is called as “human meanings”. He puts forward the following:

Our first level is the universally human, and is closely linked with our similarity as organic beings—in certain cases, even with what we share with the animals. But the intractable differences which seem to defy understanding are at the level of culture, or of the specifically human meanings, which are disclosed in language….Here we are dealing not with what we might call life meanings, which we share as biological creatures, but with meanings on a moral, or an ethical, or a spiritual level, having to do with what are seen as the highest goals, or the best way of life, or moral obligation, or a noble style of being, or virtues of one kind or another. Let’s call these “human meanings,” because they’re the kind of thing we find among humans, as linguistic and cultural beings, and not among the other animals

[6] (pp. 107–108).

The first level can be correlated with the ontological, which indicates an ontic contact with reality. The second level encompasses epistemological as well as the moral, ethical, and esthetic levels including the values associated with each of them. These levels are distinguished from one another based on their nonlinguistic and linguistic characteristics, thereby allowing us to attribute a variant of vertical foundationalism to Dreyfus.

Dreyfus’s argument hinges on the notion that the two levels are, in fact, notionally separated. He asserts, “Of course, these two levels are only notionally separated. In actual human life they are profoundly interwoven” [6] (pp. 107–108). Nevertheless, the discussion of the first and the second levels implies that the former is fundamental and serves to support the latter. Furthermore, his subsequent remarks do not substantiate his assertion that the distinction between the first and the second levels is merely a notional separation.

Drawing on the work of Gadamer, Dreyfus emphasizes that the comprehension of others can be achieved through a process of “fusion of horizons” [6] (p. 125). Nonetheless, there is an inherent incommensurability between cultures, which can be overcome by delving deeper than merely comparing a foreign culture’s descriptive vocabulary with the world. The necessity of the comparison of a foreign culture’s descriptive vocabulary with the world is the demand and assumption of the mediational theory. A deeper understanding, on the other hand, can be attained by grasping how, across the entire variety of ways, these cultures construct meanings that are initially unfamiliar to us [6] (p. 121).

As a proponent of robust pluralistic realism, Dreyfus thinks that, in order to overcome the incommensurability between different cultures, it is necessary to transcend the boundaries of the phenomenal world and gain access to the “things-in-themselves”. However, it is not clear how, in Dreyfus’s framework, mere contact with the world provides us with knowledge of the things-in-themselves. Nevertheless, this assertion illustrates that the first level, as defined by Dreyfus as “life meanings”, provides a foundation for a deeper understanding of other cultures. In this regard, Dreyfus engages in a practice that he criticizes in the mediational or representational view by implying that language functions as an interface that impedes our deeper understanding of the ontological level of communication. Thus, despite his assertion to the contrary, the ontological level constituted by life meanings is fundamental to Dreyfus’s framework. As previously stated, the first and the second levels are delineated as nonlinguistic and linguistic levels, respectively, within Dreyfus’s contact theory. Dreyfus puts forward that access to the things-in-themselves is possible through embodied or absorbed coping. The first nonlinguistic level of coping provides immediate, unmediated, and pure contact with the world, thereby enabling access to the things-in-themselves. In this sense, it has a fundamental character. Therefore, nonlinguistic, embodied coping is more fundamental not only because it enables access to the things-in-themselves, but also because it allows us to comprehend seemingly distant cultural forms of life. Dreyfus emphasizes the necessity of challenging the limitations of the mediational perspective that pervades modern culture in order to overcome the complexities of intercultural understanding. To gain a more nuanced and fruitful perspective on cultural differences, it is essential to move beyond the confines of the mediational view [6] (p. 130). The mediational, “disembodied”, and “detached” approach presents an obstacle to direct access to the things themselves. In contrast, Dreyfus’s robust realism asserts that active engagement with the world provides a pathway to a genuine penetration. He states, “But we now can see that it is not by having a disembodied, detached, contemplative capacity that we are thus in touch, but rather, thanks to an involved, active, material body that can orient itself appropriately to cope with things” [6] (p. 137).

As noted above, Dreyfus advocates robust realism. However, he also emphasizes that there are “many languages, each correctly describing a different aspect of reality” [6] (p. 154). He offers a critique of the scientism that is pervasive in modern Western thought. The idea that there are multiple approaches to interrogating reality is the reason for the use of the term “plural” in “plural robust realism”. Dreyfus maintains that, when the focus is on essences, a pluralistic perspective is essential. In this sense, for example, the statement “Gold has atomic number 79” and the statement “Gold is sacred” are of equal weight in representing different aspects of gold regarding its essence. Therefore, “all attempts fail to bring the different ways of interrogating reality into a single mode of questioning that yields a unified picture or theory”, and thus ”different ways of interrogating reality” re-main plural [6] (pp. 153–154).

In essence, Dreyfus implies that language serves as a barrier to accessing the “things-in-themselves”, as it establishes boundaries between human beings due to cultural differences. In contrast, direct, unmediated, or non-mediational contact with the world is regarded as a primary and fundamental means of accessing the things-in-themselves. Accordingly, Dreyfus’s concept of “pluralistic robust realism” may be understood as a form of realism associated with direct, unmediated contact with the world. In this form of realism, the second level, which he refers to as “human meanings”, is supported by and derivable from the first level, which he calls “life meanings”.

As previously stated, one of Dreyfus’ key assumptions is that things as they are in themselves can be fully grasped and understood by engaging with them directly through the process of embodiment. He believes that the methodology of phenomenology enables one to penetrate “beneath the determinate and conceptually permeated perceptual world where analysis normally starts” [6] (p. 137). The problem is that, although he attempts to eliminate the inner–outer dichotomy associated with the mediational approach he criticized, he also makes a distinction between pre-propositional and propositional or nonconceptual and conceptual levels, thereby implying that the unmediated, nonlinguistic level is fundamental. This view implies that language, which is entirely representational, functions as an interface that hinders immediate awareness. Therefore, the first “life meanings” level is more fundamental within Dreyfus’s framework. Moreover, Dreyfus’s framework lacks sufficient clarity to demonstrate how human beings gain access to the things-in-themselves through an arational, nonlinguistic mode of coping. In addition, the framework does not open a space for human beings to improve, interfere with, and enhance what is already there.

When evaluated from the vantage point of previously established definitions, Dreyfus’s perspective appears to be consistent with the principles of horizontal foundationalism. In a Heideggerian manner, he underscores the importance of being-in-the-world and a holistic, hermeneutical, situated, interactional engagement with the environment. However, a difference in interpretation emerges when his early and later writings on the concept of “being-in-the-world” are compared. In his earlier writings, he places a considerable emphasis on practical activity and the role of cultural practices in self-interpretation when analyzing the concepts of “background” and “being-in-the-world”.

For instance, in the article “Holism and Hermeneutics”(1980) [29], he makes a distinction between theoretical and practical holism, asserting that theoretical holism’s analysis of background is inadequate due to its tendency to objectify belief systems and evaluate them in a detached manner, divorced from the cultural context that is commonly accepted as a given. However, he also identifies background, skillful coping, practices, and the familiarity with the world as prerequisites for both theoretical and practical holism. In contrast with theoretical holist’s analysis, practical holists’ analysis is characterized not by beliefs but by “habits and customs, embodied in the sort of subtle skills which we exhibit in our everyday interaction with things and people” [29] (p. 8). Consequently, background practices do not encompass a belief system, a set of rules, or formalized procedures. Indeed, they do not even involve representations [29] (p. 9). In other words, we are situated in the “hermeneutic circle of understanding,” and any effort to know the background is formed by this ontology. This “hermeneutic circle” constitutes a tacit ontology, which cannot be conceptualized as background assumptions in our minds, but enables us to behave towards things and people in practices [29] (pp. 10–11). Dreyfus also emphasizes that self-interpretation in cultural practices is primordial, elaborating on this point by saying, “This is why Heidegger in Being and Time calls this cultural self-interpretation embodied in our practices ‘primordial truth’” [29] (p. 7).

As previously stated, Dreyfus’s early writings underline the primacy of cultural self-interpretation. The emphasis is on practices, habits, and customs in which embodied skills are shaped by the interaction with things and people. This is what he calls “primordial truth” in his early writings when he defines “being-in-the-world”. Conversely, in his latest writings, as discussed above, he identifies the nonlinguistic or life-meaning level as “primordial”.

In fact, Dreyfus’s position deviates from the vertical foundationalism defended by traditional philosophers. He does not contend that contingent, propositional knowledge is derived from self-justifying, self-evident truths or from clear and distinct ideas. As noted above, it is this perspective that he seeks to undermine. Nor does he subscribe to the strict empiricist assumptions that empirical experience, which is obtained through sense perceptions and represented in our minds, provides us with knowledge and understanding. As previously mentioned, his phenomenological approach implies that background and skillful coping are non-representational. However, some characteristics of his latest approach overlap with a version of vertical foundationalism. First, as previously discussed, he presupposes an infrastructural and hierarchical relation between nonlinguistic and linguistic or life-meaning and human-meaning level. Additionally, the background coping is classified as primordial, and deeper than other levels. This also presupposes a relationship between deep and surface levels of knowing, with surface levels of knowing being derived from deeper-level knowing. Dreyfus says,

Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of embedded embodied coping, then, is not that the mind is sometimes extended into the world but rather that all such problem solving is derivative (emphasis added), that in our most basic way of being, that is, as absorbed skillful copers, we are not minds at all but one with the world” [13] (p. 1146).

Furthermore, there is a unidirectional or unilateral relation between the deeper levels of knowledge and the surface levels of knowledge. That is to say, the deep level causally determines the surface levels of knowledge, which also results in a unidirectional relationship between the deep and surface levels of knowing. In this sense, the deeper level of knowing has ontological priority over surface levels. This point is clearly emphasized by Dreyfus, who states, “But the issue concerning the background is not an empirical question. It is an ontological question” [13] (p. 1149).

In this section, analyses of Dreyfus’s early and later writings lead to the following conclusions.

i.

Although Dreyfus claims that he defends horizontal foundationalism in his earlier writings [7,8], his later writings [6] indicate that he actually defends a version of vertical foundationalism. It has been argued that Dreyfus engages in a practice that he himself criticizes in the mediational or representational approach by implying that language functions as an interface that impedes our deeper understanding of the ontological level of communication. In Dreyfus’s theoretical framework, language plays the role of a mediator between the mind and the external world, as other intermediaries perform the same job in the representational theory. In order to avoid this mediation, he underlines the primacy of the nonlinguistic “life-meaning” level. Therefore, the basic ontological level constituted by life meanings is fundamental to Dreyfus’s framework, despite his assertion to the contrary. Given its fundamental status, there is a form of unidirectional relationship between what he calls the first and the second levels, namely, life meanings and human meanings.

ii.

It is also argued in the section that the McDowell–Dreyfus debate revolves around the idea that language is entirely propositional in nature. McDowell’s adoption of the view that “perception is conceptual” and Dreyfus’s maintenance of the position that absorbed coping is the foundation of conceptual and propositional processes serve to reinforce that language is fundamentally propositional and thus representational. Dreyfus attempts to discredit the representational view (or the mediational approach, as he calls it) by proposing that background coping enables us to engage in immediate or unmediated interaction with the external world. In doing so, it allows us to gain access to the “things-in-themselves”. It is thus a foundational factor upon which conceptual processes are built. This consequently aligns his position with that of the tenets of vertical foundationalism.

iii.

It has also been suggested that rather than distinguishing between conceptual and non-conceptual (or propositional and non-propositional), it would be more fruitful to distinguish between linguistic and nonlinguistic realms. Once the distinction between linguistic and nonlinguistic realms is performed, it becomes clear that this categorization is not a simple one. Although language has a representational aspect, it is not entirely propositional and representational in nature. Furthermore, the term “language” can be expanded to encompass some of our actions, mimics, and gestures, which may or may not have representational significance. While there are speech acts that have representational import, such as the assertive type of speech acts, there are also others that do not have representational import. It is therefore proposed that, rather than viewing language as entirely propositional, it is better to deem that language has both representational and non-representational aspects.

The following section of the paper addresses the second question posed at the beginning of the paper, namely, whether humanly understanding is possible in a purely nonlinguistic medium.

3. The Myth of Preunderstanding

As previously stated, Dreyfus’s contact theory assumes that the first level, which is defined as life meanings, provides us with preunderstanding and proto-knowledge [6] (p. 52). This gives rise to the question of whether this is actually possible. The question emerges due to the presence of a derivative relationship between deep and surface levels of knowing, which can be characterized as unidirectional, in Dreyfus’s framework. As discussed earlier, Cappuccio and Michael Wheeler‘s approach [25] (p. 20) avoids this problem because, inspired by Merleau-Ponty, they put forward the principle of mutuality, which presupposes that background coping and context-specific coping mutually shape each other. This dynamic interplay constitutes one of the tenets of their theoretical framework. In contrast, Dreyfus’s framework depicts a unilateral relationship from the deep level to the surface level (or from background coping–life meanings to skillful coping–human meanings), thereby preventing background coping from being shaped by skillful coping. The central question that emerges from this discussion is whether background coping provides the necessary equipment to derive and provide a sufficient basis for surface-level skillful coping in Dreyfus’s framework. This also gives rise to the question of whether background coping in itself provides us with preunderstanding and proto-knowledge.

It is suitable to inquire whether, in the context of a nonlinguistic medium, mere contact with the world can provide us with a form of humanly preunderstanding. To illustrate this point, it is helpful to consider an imaginary scenario: let us suppose that a child is left in a jungle alone and/or raised by animals without being trained in a culture. The question thus arises as to whether this child has the preunderstanding of its surroundings in the same way as a child raised by human beings. For example, can it be reasonably assumed that the child understands that it is surrounded by a distinct species of trees, that these trees have branches, trunks, leaves, fruits, or flowers? That there are distinct kinds of animals in the jungle and that some animals can be dangerous, and that it can be prey to them?

Empirical studies on the acquisition of children’s language have demonstrated that there is a critical period during which children must acquire language. This period is proposed to extend from the early first year of childhood to puberty, as proposed by Eric H. Lenneberg [30,31]. In the absence of exposure to language during this critical period, the child later exhibits significant language defects that result in impairments in understanding. There are several notable cases that illustrate this phenomenon. Three cases will be discussed to demonstrate the ways in which a lack of exposure to language impairs humanly preunderstanding. One such case is discussed by Harlan L. Lane in his 1976 book, The Wild Boy of Aveyron [32]. Another example is that of the feral child Genie, and a third is that of the Ukrainian girl Oksana.

The first case is that of a boy discovered in a French forest in 1797. Apparently, the wild boy of Aveyron had spent his childhood in the forest without human contact. He was then taken into the care of Dr. Jean-Marc-Gaspard Itard at the doctor’s residence. Despite Dr. Itard’s best efforts to accelerate the child’s integration into society, Victor did not succeed in acquiring the ability to speak, except for two words, “milk” and “O God,” during his lifetime. Furthermore, his markedly impaired understanding abilities remained untreated [32].

The second example is that of the feral child, who has been given the nickname “Genie”. Genie was subjected to neglect, abuse, and molestation by her parents. From the age of 20 months until she was discovered by researchers at the age of 13, she was iso and held in a small room with closed windows in her parent’s house. The child had been rarely spoken to by her caregivers and had been physically punished for making noises. As a result of this prolonged isolation, she had not acquired language. Following her discovery, she demonstrated some progress in language acquisition with the assistance of educators and researchers. However, she exhibited difficulties in using language effectively throughout her lifetime and displayed a certain degree of cognitive impairment [33] (p. 284) [34].

The third example is that of a Ukrainian girl, Oksana Oleksandrivna Malaya, who was left alone by a drinking father and ended up living with dogs for about four and a half years until she was found by authorities at the age of seven and a half years old. When she was found, she was practically behaving like a dog and was not speaking any language. Following her rescue, she underwent extensive therapeutic and educational interventions, enabling her to acquire language and basic communication skills. However, despite these efforts, she remained unable to develop the full range of human linguistic abilities, including proper syntax and grammar, and her condition continued to affect her linguistic and intellectual capabilities [35].

The above examples are given to demonstrate that, in the absence of linguistic interference, it is not possible for a child to attain preunderstanding or proto-knowledge, as postulated by Dreyfus. The acquisition of language should occur simultaneously with a child’s initial contact with the external world, thereby enabling the development of a humanly understanding from the very beginning. In the absence of linguistic interference, a child’s understanding would be hindered and impaired, as evidenced by the presented examples.

Dreyfus’s perspective is shaped by Heidegger’s ideas on this matter. He states this in the following manner:

For Heidegger what is required are nonconceptual coping skills that disclose a space in which things can then be encountered as what and how they are. In disclosing a holistic background by orienting ourselves in it we are not subjects striving to get it right about an independent objective reality, but rather we are absorbed into a field of forces drawing us to keep up our ongoing coping like a pilot staying on the beam. Since there is no mind world distance in such activity, there is no need for conceptual content to mediate a mind-world relation

[6] (p. 84).

The preceding paragraph is intended to challenge McDowell’s assertion that perception is conceptual. As previously discussed, Dreyfus emphasizes that absorbed coping is nonlinguistic. In this nonlinguistic mode of coping, the individual is wholly immersed in a field of forces, with no distance between the mind and the external world. Dreyfus postulates that, for there to be no distance between the self and the external world, absorbed coping must be nonlinguistic. As previously stated, Dreyfus implies that any linguistic interference functions as an interface that impedes immediate or unmediated access to the things-in-themselves. This is because, in his theoretical scheme, language is regarded as entirely propositional and therefore representational. This is avoided, in case, a direct and unmediated nonlinguistic contact with the external world is established within his theoretical scheme. In this sense, nonlinguistic coping is fundamental and primordial within his framework [6] (p. 72). However, as the empirical examples above illustrate, immersed and nonlinguistic coping, in and of themselves, are insufficient for providing us with a humanly preunderstanding. While such awareness may equip us with animal and instinctive awareness, this is by itself an insufficient foundation for the full development of human cognitive abilities, as evidenced by the cases above. Furthermore, Dreyfus does not explicitly articulate how absorbed coping enables us to have an immediate or unmediated access to the things-in-themselves. He draws upon Heideggerian concepts such as “thrownness”, “absorbed (falling)”, and “projection” [6] (p. 161), yet these concepts offer minimal clarification. The explanations remain rather vague and unsatisfactory in this regard. The basic assumption behind this idea is that, similar to Heidegger’s view, Dreyfus defines the background as a field of forces that is hidden, and that cannot be made explicit [14] (p. 9). From an epistemological standpoint, this is also a problematic issue. While the background is typically non-propositional and free from questioning most of the time, it is not, in fact, hidden. This is because, at least in principle, if not in practice, in extraordinary circumstances, background assumptions may be subjected to scrutiny, and some elements of the background may be subjected to testing. In this process of testing, what was previously not a proposition may become a proposition and may be tested for its role in the background in the future. Therefore, the assumption that the background is entirely hidden is an overstatement. There are different interpretations of the later Wittgenstein as presented in the book On Certainty. However, this is the interpretation that I derived and adopted regarding the “background” from my readings of (On Certainty [1] (sec§94–§99).

4. Conclusions

The objective of this paper is to present a critical analysis of Dreyfus’s concept of “background knowledge”, with a particular focus on his later writings. It has been argued that Dreyfus’s claim that he is defending horizontal foundationalism and not vertical foundationalism is unjustified within his framework, especially when his later writings are taken into consideration. It has been asserted that Dreyfus defends a form of vertical foundationalism, whereby nonlinguistic contact with the world, triggered by motor intentionality, paves the way for access to the things-in-themselves. This immediate and unmediated contact is attained by harmonizing one’s intentions with the solicitations in the field of forces presented by the external world. Additionally, the first level, which Dreyfus characterizes as “life meanings”, serves as the foundation on which the conceptual level is built. The argument has been made that language is regarded as an interface that impedes our pure, immediate, and unmediated contact with the world and with each other and thus hinders our access to the things-in-themselves within Dreyfus’s theoretical framework. Moreover, this view is based on the assumption that language is entirely propositional and thus representational within Dreyfus’s theoretical scheme. Accordingly, the first level defined as “life meanings” by Dreyfus is fundamental in his theoretical framework on which the conceptual level is built. Because Dreyfus’ theoretical framework does not address the dynamic interplay between the deep and surface levels, it opens a space for a unidirectional relationship between the deep and surface levels, paving the way for the attribution of a version of vertical foundationalism. It has also been put forward that Dreyfus’s implication that language is completely representational is problematic, because although language has a representational aspect, it is not entirely representational.

Additionally, Dreyfus’s second assumption, namely, that nonlinguistic coping provides us with preunderstanding and proto-knowledge, is also problematic in several respects. The empirical cases of the wild boy of Aveyron, the feral child Genie, and the Ukrainian girl Oksana demonstrate that, when a child is left alone in nature or isolated from culture and not exposed to linguistic training until a certain age, later training is insufficient for the child to develop human cognitive abilities.

This disproves Dreyfus’s view that humans can attain preunderstanding and proto-knowledge even in the absence of linguistic interference. Furthermore, it is proposed that language acquisition should occur concurrently with a child’s initial contact with the external world, to pave the way for humanly understanding from the very beginning. This approach enables the formation of human understanding from the earliest stages of cognitive development, which is of the utmost significance. In the absence of linguistic interference, a child’s understanding would be impeded and impaired, as illustrated by the aforementioned examples. It is also argued that embodied coping plays a pivotal role in the evolution of human abilities and cognition. However, rather than providing the basis for linguistic skills, prelinguistic and pre-propositional abilities must operate on the same level with linguistic abilities to make humanly understanding possible.