An Integrated Approach for Failure Analysis of Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- To develop natural gas transmission pipeline failure risk analysis models with limited failure data.
- To establish a methodology for identifying the contextual relationship among the natural gas transmission failure causes with the help of academic and industrial experts’ opinions.
- To integrate rough set theory with existing MCDA methods and Bayesian belief network (BBN) for considering model uncertainties due to limited failure information and the vagueness in the experts’ judgments.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Natural Gas Pipeline Failure
2.2. Present Methodology
3. Methodology
3.1. ISM Method
- Step 1. Establish overall influence matrix H
- Step 2. Develop reachability matrix K and determine the cause-effect relations among the factors
- Step 3. Determine the level of each factor and develop the initial diagram
- Step 4. Develop the hierarchical network model
MICMAC Analysis
- Autonomous variables: This quadrant represents the autonomous variables. In this quadrant, both variables (driving and dependence) have low power.
- Dependent variables: This quadrant contains dependent variables, whereas it holds lower driving and higher dependence power.
- Linkage variables: The linkage variables are expressed in this quadrant. This quadrant has strong driving and strong dependence power. Their action affects others and also possesses a back effect on themselves. The factors affect other factors as well as themselves.
- Independent variables: This quadrant included independent variables considered by higher driving and weak dependency power.
3.2. DEMATEL Method
- Step 1. Initial average matrix
- Step 2. Direct relation (D) matrix
- Step 3. Calculate the total relation matrix (T)
- Step 4. Identify the threshold value
3.3. Rough Set Theory
3.3.1. Rough AHP Method
- Step 1. Classify the criteria, thereafter develop a hierarchical structure with the evaluation objective.
- Step 2. First, conduct a survey from experts’ opinions and develop a group of pair-wise comparison matrix. Here, the pairwise comparison matrix of the expert (eth) is described as follows:
- Step 3. In this step, calculate the maximum Eigenvalue of the (decision matrix). Thereafter, calculate consistency index CI by using the following equation.
- Step 4: Develop the rough comparison matrix.
- Step 5. Compute the rough weight (Wg) of each criterion:
3.3.2. Rough DEMATEL Method
- Step-1 Direct relation matrix
- Step-2 Development of Rough total-relation matrix
- Step-3 Development of the Rough total-relation matrix
- Step-4 Development of the ‘‘Prominence” and ‘‘Relation”
- Step-5: Calculation of final crisp values
3.4. Integrated Rough DEMATEL-ISM Method
3.5. Bayesian Belief Network
4. Failure Analysis Framework
5. Framework Implementation
5.1. Rough-AHP Calculation
5.2. Rough-DEMATEL Calculation
5.3. DEMATEL Calculation
5.4. ISM Calculation
5.5. Bayesian Belief Network
5.6. Model Validation
5.6.1. Extreme Condition Test
5.6.2. Scenario Analysis
5.6.3. Sensitivity Analysis
6. Results and Discussions
7. Conclusions
- Selecting failure causes from the literature review, open data sources from Canada energy regulatory organization, and industrial/academic experts’ opinions.
- The rough-analytic hierarchy process (Rough-AHP) method is applied for rank order (based on priority) analysis to avoid vagueness of the decision-making process of natural gas pipeline failure causes.
- The casual relationship diagram was developed using both rough-decision making trial and evaluation laboratory (Rough-DEMATEL) and DEMATEL methods. Thereafter, the comparison of these two methods is done to analyze the differences of the results.
- Integrated Rough DEMATEL- ISM methods with BBN to implement and analyze the various interactions for gas pipeline failure causes in accordance with developing the gas pipeline safety and security.
- The MICMAC analysis was developed to analyze the driving and the dependence power of the natural gas transmission pipeline failure causes for the development of gas pipeline system integrity toward the industrial implementation.
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Decision-Maker’s Opinion—Rough AHP
Criteria | Engineering Fault | Accidental Failure | Third Party Damage | Human Error | Construction Fault | Natural Force Damage | Corrosion and Cracking | Defect and Deterioration | Incorrect Operation | Equipment Failure |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Engineering Fault | 1 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Accidental Failure | 1.00 | 1 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Third Party damage | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
Human Error | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Construction Fault | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
Natural Force Damage | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
Corrosion and Cracking | 1.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1 | 2.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
Defect and Destrioraction | 1.00 | 2.00 | 0.50 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
Incorrect Operation | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.33 | 0.50 | 1 | 1.00 |
Equipment Failure | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.33 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1 |
Criteria | Engineering Fault | Accidental Failure | Third Party Damage | Human Error | Construction Fault | Natural Force Damage | Corrosion and Cracking | Defect and Deterioration | Incorrect Operation | Equipment Failure |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Engineering Fault | 1 | 0.50 | 2.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Accidental Failure | 2.00 | 1 | 4.00 | 1.0 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Third Party damage | 0.50 | 0.3 | 1 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.25 | 0.25 |
Human Error | 2.00 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 1 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Construction Fault | 1.00 | 0.50 | 2.00 | 0.50 | 1 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Natural Force Damage | 1.00 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Corrosion and Cracking | 1.00 | 0.50 | 2.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 1 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
Defect and Destrioraction | 1.00 | 0.50 | 2.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
Incorrect Operation | 1.00 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1 | 1.00 |
Equipment Failure | 1.00 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 1 |
Criteria | Engineering Fault | Accidental Failure | Third Party Damage | Human Error | Construction Fault | Natural Force Damage | Corrosion and Cracking | Defect and Deterioration | Incorrect Operation | Equipment Failure |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Engineering Fault | 1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
Accidental Failure | 1.00 | 1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
Third Party damage | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
Human Error | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
Construction Fault | 0.50 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
Natural Force Damage | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
Corrosion and Cracking | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
Defect and Destrioraction | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.0 | 1 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
Incorrect Operation | 0.50 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.5 | 0.50 | 1 | 1.0 |
Equipment Failure | 0.50 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.5 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1 |
Criteria | Engineering Fault | Accidental Failure | Third Party Damage | Human Error | Construction Fault | Natural Force Damage | Corrosion and Cracking | Defect and Deterioration | Incorrect Operation | Equipment Failure |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Engineering Fault | 1 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Accidental Failure | 1.00 | 1 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Third Party damage | 1.00 | 2.00 | 1 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 1.0 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
Human Error | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Construction Fault | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Natural Force Damage | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Corrosion and Cracking | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 1 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 |
Defect and Destrioraction | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
Incorrect Operation | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 1 | 1.00 |
Equipment Failure | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.33 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1 |
Appendix B. Rough AHP
Appendix C. Relationship Diagram
Appendix D. Decision-Makers Opinion—Rough DEMATEL
Criteria | Third Party Damage | Corrosion and Cracking | Accidental Failure | Defects and Deterioration | Incorrect Operation | Equipment Failure |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Third Party Damage | 0 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
Corrosion and Cracking | 4 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 3 |
Accidental Failure | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
Defects and Deterioration | 4 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
Incorrect Operation | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
Equipment Failure | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 0 |
Criteria | Third Party Damage | Corrosion and Cracking | Accidental Failure | Defects and Deterioration | Incorrect Operation | Equipment Failure |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Third Party Damage | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Corrosion and Cracking | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | |
Accidental Failure | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Defects and Deterioration | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 3 |
Incorrect Operation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
Equipment Failure | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
Criteria | Third Party Damage | Corrosion and Cracking | Accidental Failure | Defects and Deterioration | Incorrect Operation | Equipment Failure |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Third Party Damage | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
Corrosion and Cracking | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
Accidental Failure | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
Defects and Deterioration | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
Incorrect Operation | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
Equipment Failure | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
Criteria | Third Party Damage | Corrosion and Cracking | Accidental Failure | Defects and Deterioration | Incorrect Operation | Equipment Failure |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Third Party Damage | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
Corrosion and Cracking | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
Accidental Failure | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
Defects and Deterioration | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
Incorrect Operation | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 3 |
Equipment Failure | 0 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 0 |
Appendix E. CPT Figures of Failure
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References | Criteria | Key Points |
---|---|---|
(Chen et al., 2019), (J. Li, Zhang, Han, & Wang, 2016), (Santarelli, 2019) [3,5,12] | The Third-Party Damage | Unauthorized third party constructions and Dig by heavy machinery without informing the natural gas provider authority. |
(Chen et al., 2019), (European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG), 2018) [5,13] | Corrosion and Cracking | Metal loss, reduce the thickness, develop the crack, and external and internal corrosion. |
(Rodrigues et al., 2019), (Shan, Liu, & Sun, 2017), (Canada Energy Regulator, 2019) [2,9,14] | Accidental Failure (Proposed) | Fire explosion, ignition with substantial casualties, and nearby industry fire explosion. |
(Metwally et al., 2009), (Barrett, 2007) [15,16] | Defect and Deterioration | Structural deterioration in the aging pipe and decreases the load-bearing capacity (i.e., pressure flow, internal and external load). |
(Dai et al., 2017) (Hao et al., 2019) [6,10] | Incorrect Operation | Opening a wrong valve, over pressuring on particular equipment, mechanical pressure relief system, and incorrectly assessing a condition during excavation work. |
(European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG), 2018) (Dai et al., 2017) [10,13] | Equipment Failure | Malfunction of natural gas pipeline valves, tanks, meters, pumps, compressors, and other components and devices. |
(European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG), 2018), (Selvik & Bellamy, 2020) [13,17] | Human Error | Inappropriate maintenance practice, bolts are not tightening properly, lack of frequent inspections, inappropriate operation practices, unsafe acts, operators’ mistakes in action planning, improper use of equipment, and error in documentation, etc. |
(Dai et al., 2017), (Hao et al., 2019), (European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG), 2018) [6,10,13] | Natural Force Damage | Earth movement, earthquake, heavy rain/flood, lightning, frost heave. |
(Camagic & Stojcetovic, 2019) (Černý, Mikulová, & Sís, 2017) [18,19] | Engineering Fault (Proposed) | Defects of design, fabrication and manufacturing, inadequate pipeline load pressure calculation. |
(Barrett, 2007), (Chen et al., 2019), (Dai et al., 2017), (European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group (EGIG), 2018) [5,10,13,16] | Construction Fault | Girth weld defects, spiral weld defects, gouges and dents, improper backfill, wrinkle coupling failures, inappropriate construction practices, and incorrect markers. |
References | Key Methodology | Application Area |
---|---|---|
(Li et al., 2019) [8] | DEMATEL, ISM, Bayesian network (BN) | Urban buried gas pipeline failure analysis |
(Wang & Duan, 2019) [7] | Improved AHP, Improved TOPSIS | Oil and Gas pipeline failure analysis |
(Hao et al., 2019) [6] | Accident probability, Evaluation tree, Moment multiplication method | Gas pipeline failure fault analysis |
(Santarelli, 2019) [3] | Fault Tree Analysis, Quantitative method | Distribution gas pipeline damage analysis |
(Yu et al., 2018) [42] | Load duration curve, Monte Carlo trials | Transmission pipeline reliability assessment. |
(Shan et al., 2017) [9] | Bow-tie model, Quantitative analysis of Bayesian network, fuzzy logic method | Leakage failure of natural gas pipelines analysis |
(Dai et al., 2017) [10] | Statistical Analysis | Long-distance pipeline failures |
(J. Li, Zhang, Han, & Wang, 2016) [12] | Fuzzy AHP, Fault Tree | Urban gas pipeline damage analysis |
(Witek, 2016) [11] | Monte Carlo method | Natural Gas transmission pipeline failure analysis |
(Dundulis et al., 2016) [43] | Bayesian method, Finite element method, Probabilistic structural integrity analysis. | Structural integrity analysis of natural gas pipeline failure |
n | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
RI | 0 | 0 | 0.52 | 0.89 | 1.11 | 1.25 | 1.35 | 1.40 | 1.45 | 1.49 |
Criteria | W’ (L) | W’ (U) | Differences | Rank Order |
---|---|---|---|---|
Engineering Fault | 0.50 | 0.62 | 0.12 | 10 |
Accidental Failure | 0.55 | 0.83 | 0.28 | 3 |
Third Party Damage | 0.52 | 1.00 | 0.48 | 1 |
Human Error | 0.48 | 0.68 | 0.19 | 7 |
Construction Fault | 0.49 | 0.65 | 0.16 | 9 |
Natural Force Damage | 0.56 | 0.73 | 0.17 | 8 |
Corrosion and Cracking | 0.59 | 0.94 | 0.35 | 2 |
Defect and Deterioration | 0.44 | 0.66 | 0.22 | 4 |
Incorrect Operation | 0.41 | 0.61 | 0.20 | 5 |
Equipment Failure | 0.41 | 0.61 | 0.20 | 5 |
R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | (0.00,0.00) | (0.64,0.73) | (0.31,0.83) | (0.56,0.94) | (0.14,0.23) | (0.32,0.56) |
R2 | (0.14,0.63) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.28,0.59) | (0.41,0.82) | (0.14,0.23) | (0.64,0.73) |
R3 | (0.13,0.31) | (0.13,0.38) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.07,0.31) | (0.41,0.82) |
R4 | (0.41,0.82) | (0.69,0.93) | (0.08,0.44) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.06,0.44) | (0.77,0.86) |
R5 | (0.00,0.00) | (0.15,0.35) | (0.28,0.59) | (0.13,0.38) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.75,0.75) |
R6 | (0.00,0.00) | (0.14,0.23) | (0.42,0.70) | (0.48,0.66) | (0.65,0.85) | (0.00,0.00) |
. | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | (0.00,0.00) | (0.12,0.13) | (0.06,0.15) | (0.10,0.17) | (0.03,0.04) | (0.06,0.10) |
R2 | (0.02,0.11) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.05,0.11) | (0.07,0.15) | (0.03,0.04) | (0.12,0.13) |
R3 | (0.02,0.06) | (0.02,0.07) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.01,0.06) | (0.07,0.15) |
R4 | (0.07,0.15) | (0.13,0.17) | (0.02,0.08) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.01,0.08) | (0.14,0.16) |
R5 | (0.00,0.00) | (0.03,0.06) | (0.05,0.11) | (0.02,0.07) | (0.00,0.00) | (0.14,0.14) |
R6 | (0.00,0.00) | (0.03,0.04) | (0.08,0.13) | (0.09,0.12) | (0.12,0.16) | (0.00,0.00) |
R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | (0.01,0.08) | (0.14,0.22) | (0.08,0.25) | (0.12,0.25) | (0.04,0.13) | (0.10,0.23) |
R2 | (0.03,0.17) | (0.02,0.09) | (0.07,0.21) | (0.09,0.23) | (0.05,0.12) | (0.15,0.25) |
R3 | (0.02,0.08) | (0.03,0.11) | (0.01,0.07) | (0.01,0.06) | (0.02,0.11) | (0.08,0.21) |
R4 | (0.08,0.21) | (0.15,0.25) | (0.04,0.20) | (0.04,0.12) | (0.04,0.16) | (0.17,0.28) |
R5 | (0.01,0.04) | (0.04,0.11) | (0.07,0.17) | (0.04,0.12) | (0.02,0.06) | (0.15,0.21) |
R6 | (0.01,0.05) | (0.05,0.11) | (0.09,0.20) | (0.10,0.17) | (0.13,0.20) | (0.04,0.10) |
Criteria | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | 1.20 | 0.30 | 1.50 | 0.89 |
R2 | 0.97 | 0.89 | 1.87 | 0.08 |
R3 | 0.32 | 0.91 | 1.23 | −0.58 |
R4 | 1.27 | 0.90 | 2.17 | 0.37 |
R5 | 0.60 | 0.61 | 1.22 | −0.01 |
R6 | 0.83 | 1.62 | 2.45 | −0.79 |
R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | 0.05 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.17 |
R2 | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.20 |
R3 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.15 |
R4 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.23 |
R5 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.18 |
R6 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.07 |
Criteria | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | 0 | 2.75 | 2.25 | 3.00 | 0.75 | 1.75 |
R2 | 1.50 | 0 | 1.75 | 2.50 | 0.75 | 2.75 |
R3 | 1.00 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0.75 | 2.5 |
R4 | 2.50 | 3.25 | 1.00 | 0 | 1.00 | 3.25 |
R5 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.75 | 1.00 | 0 | 3.00 |
R6 | 0.00 | 0.75 | 2.25 | 2.50 | 3.00 | 0.00 |
Criteria | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.27 | 0.07 | 0.16 |
R2 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.23 | 0.07 | 0.25 |
R3 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.23 |
R4 | 0.23 | 0.30 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.30 |
R5 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.27 |
R6 | 0.00 | 0.07 | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.27 | 0.00 |
Criteria | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | 0.36 | 0.76 | 0.75 | 0.81 | 0.53 | 0.96 |
R2 | 0.42 | 0.48 | 0.66 | 0.71 | 0.49 | 0.93 |
R3 | 0.23 | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.59 |
R4 | 0.55 | 0.81 | 0.71 | 0.64 | 0.59 | 1.09 |
R5 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.50 | 0.42 | 0.31 | 0.72 |
R6 | 0.25 | 0.46 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.59 | 0.63 |
Criteria | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | 4.17 | 2.01 | 6.18 | 2.16 |
R2 | 3.69 | 3.24 | 6.93 | 0.46 |
R3 | 2.08 | 3.52 | 5.60 | −1.44 |
R4 | 4.39 | 3.48 | 7.87 | 0.91 |
R5 | 2.53 | 2.83 | 5.36 | −0.29 |
R6 | 3.14 | 4.93 | 8.07 | −1.79 |
Criteria | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | 0.36 | 0.76 | 0.75 | 0.81 | 0.53 | 0.96 |
R2 | 0.42 | 0.48 | 0.66 | 0.71 | 0.49 | 0.93 |
R3 | 0.23 | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.59 |
R4 | 0.55 | 0.81 | 0.71 | 0.64 | 0.59 | 1.09 |
R5 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.50 | 0.42 | 0.31 | 0.72 |
R6 | 0.25 | 0.46 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.59 | 0.63 |
Criteria | R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R6 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
R1 | 1.05 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.17 |
R2 | 0.10 | 1.06 | 0.14 | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.20 |
R3 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 1.04 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.15 |
R4 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.12 | 1.08 | 0.10 | 0.23 |
R5 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 1.04 | 0.18 |
R6 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 1.07 |
Iterations of Level Partitions in ISM | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Iteration 1 | ||||
Variables | Reachability Set | Antecedent Set | Intersection Set | Level |
R1 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,4,6 | 1,2,4,6 | |
R2 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,4,6 | 1,2,4,6 | |
R3 | 3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 3,4,5,6 | |
R4 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | |
R5 | 3,5,6 | 5,6 | 5,6 | I |
R6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | |
Iteration 2 | ||||
Variables | Reachability Set | Antecedent Set | Intersection Set | Level |
R1 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,4,6 | 1,2,4,6 | |
R2 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,4,6 | 1,2,4,6 | |
R3 | 3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 3,4,5,6 | II |
R4 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | |
R6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | |
Iteration 3 | ||||
Variables | Reachability Set | Antecedent Set | Intersection Set | Level |
R1 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,4,6 | 1,2,4,6 | III |
R2 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,4,6 | 1,2,4,6 | III |
R4 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | |
R6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | |
Iteration 4 | ||||
Variables | Reachability Set | Antecedent Set | Intersection Set | Level |
R4 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | IV |
R6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | 1,2,3,4,5,6 | IV |
Incorrect_Operation_R5 | Accidental_Failure_R3 | Failure_Probablity | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Low | Moderate | High | ||
Low | Low | 95 | 3 | 2 |
Low | Moderate | 80 | 20 | 0 |
Low | High | 65 | 30 | 5 |
Moderate | Low | 80 | 20 | 0 |
Moderate | Moderate | 20 | 65 | 15 |
Moderate | High | 0 | 10 | 90 |
High | Low | 60 | 30 | 10 |
High | Moderate | 0 | 10 | 90 |
High | High | 0 | 2 | 98 |
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Ahmed, S.K.; Kabir, G. An Integrated Approach for Failure Analysis of Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline. CivilEng 2021, 2, 87-119. https://doi.org/10.3390/civileng2010006
Ahmed SK, Kabir G. An Integrated Approach for Failure Analysis of Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline. CivilEng. 2021; 2(1):87-119. https://doi.org/10.3390/civileng2010006
Chicago/Turabian StyleAhmed, Sk Kafi, and Golam Kabir. 2021. "An Integrated Approach for Failure Analysis of Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline" CivilEng 2, no. 1: 87-119. https://doi.org/10.3390/civileng2010006
APA StyleAhmed, S. K., & Kabir, G. (2021). An Integrated Approach for Failure Analysis of Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline. CivilEng, 2(1), 87-119. https://doi.org/10.3390/civileng2010006